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ABSTRACT
The various communities now comprised in the State of Ghana were, 
before their absorption into the Gold Coast under British colonial 
rule, separate independent polities. Boundaries between such tradi­
tional states were neither abolished, defined nor demarcated. For 
over three centuries, the basis of the relation between Britain and 
the Gold Coast was the import-export trade which did not require 
direct involvement of British subjects in land exploitation. Thus 
until the last two decades of the nineteenth century, land problems 
did not concern the colonial government.
However, the long contact with Europeans led to the reception of 
English conceptions of tenure. The introduction of commercial agricul­
ture based on permanent cultivation of cocoa and coffee plantations 
and the development of the mining and the timber industries during the 
1880s had significant impacts on the traditional tenure systems. The 
concession boom which accompanied these developments caused problems.
Land values appreciated and rights to them became keenly con­
tested. Since boundaries remained undefined, there were conflicting 
and overlapping concession grants. English conveyancing forms and 
terminology which the grantors could not understand were employed in 
drafting concession agreements. It was difficult for strangers to 
identify the persons with legal capacity to deal with the lands which 
were group-held property. These problems caused insecurity of titles 
and costly litigation.
The measures contained in the abortive Public Lands Bills, 1894 
and 1897 were designed to solve these problems. When they were with­
drawn on account of European and native opposition, the establishment 
of a deeds registration system and special courts established to ad­
minister concession grants were relied upon for their solution. The 
Study investigates the effectiveness of these measures and Land admin­
istration in the North where the principles of the abortive Land 
Bills were applied. The period between 1880 and 1977 is covered by 
the Study.
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PREFACE
The exposition, critique and analysis of Ghana Land law have received 
considerable attention and the literature on the subject is reasonably 
large. But not enough attention was hitherto paid to the investigation 
of the evolutionary history of land tenure and administration, how the 
systems worked in the past and the effects which social and economic pressures 
have had on their working at present.
Colonial land policy in the Gold Coast is itself a fruitful area of 
investigation which has been entirely neglected. The abortive Crown Lands 
Bills of 1894 and 1897 for example, require far more discussion than they 
have hitherto received. Despite the fact that a large volume of Official 
Correspondence and Records on the subject exist in the archives, no attempts 
have so far been made to carry out any comprehensive investigation of the 
political and the socio-economic policy objectives which made the introduction 
of the Bills necessary. Instead, their withdrawal is often cited merely 
as an exemplary victory of a colonised poeple over an alien authority.
This does not go far enough.
An objective and a perspicacious assessment of the merits., and demerits 
of the legislative measures can only be undertaken on the basis of the 
kind of enquiry which can illuminate the pith and marrow of the problems 
which they were designed to solve. A historical study of the political 
and socio-economic forces which have hitherto influenced the evolution 
of customary land tenure can provide some useful research data from which 
those concerned with land law reform and policy decisions about land exploi­
tation and administration can draw on the experiences of the past. The 
formulation of sound and adequate present and future national land policies 
for Ghana would depend on this kind of inquiry.
It is one of the principal objects of this thesis to fulfil a need 
for the study of the evolution of customary systems of tenure from a historical 
perspective. It is a basic assumption of this study that the general principle 
of the customary land law and the case law built up on them have received 
sufficient treatment and are generally known. The emphasis is thus not 
on the exposition and critique of the customary land law but the political 
and economic forces that have shaped the ways in which the law has evolved 
and developed.
Over four centuries of trade and commercial contact with Europeans 
led to the reception of Anglo-American conceptions of tenure. In the 
last two decades of the nineteenth century, certain economic events that
11
occurred had significant impacts on the land tenure systems and land 
values generally. Permanent agriculture based on the cultivation of 
tree crops such as cocoa, coffee and rubber plantations was introduced 
in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The development of 
the mining and timber industries also occurred about the same time.
The thesis centres around the investigation and analysis of the problems 
which accompanied these developments and the way in which the colonial 
government tried to solve them.
This study is substantially based on archival materials obtained 
from the Public Records Office At Kew, London. The records consist of 
colonial records (C096) series containing manuscripts of official correspond­
ence and minutes of all manner of proceedings, meetings etc. Reliance 
was also placed on data obtained from the List of Colonial Office Confidential 
Prints (C0879) series. Other subsidiary sources include official documents 
and manuscripts (ADM) series obtained from the Ghana National archives; 
field research data obtained from a survey of 80 sample villages in Ghana 
by the Land Administration Research Centre, University of Science and 
Technology, Kumasi, Ghana in 1976 and personal interviews of lawyers, 
solicitors, Regional Lands officers, Regional Surveyors of Ashanti, Northern 
and Volta. Regional town planning officers and some district chief execu­
tives in the Regions mentioned above were also interviewed. Files and 
documents of the Lands Departments of the Regions mentioned were also 
examined. All these interviews and the examination of the files and 
records took place between June 3976 and August 1977.
The thesis is divided into four parts. The first part deals with 
the preliminaries setting out the principal objectives of the study.
The understanding of the thesis can be enhanced by some knowledge of 
certain common but central issues that stand out clearly in the traditional 
schemes of tenure; issues such as the administration of group-held property 
and the problems associated with it, the nature of individual rights 
or interests in land and some terminological issues under the customary 
law. Thus although the thesis is not primarily concerned with the exegesis 
of the customary:' land law in depth, such issues have been discussed 
in this part in order to lay a sound foundation for the understanding 
of subsequent discussion of research data within the context of such 
issues.
Part II of the Study is the meat of the thesis. It deals with colonial 
land policy. For purposes of clarity, this part is divided into nine 
chapters. The first chapter treats the period of the Company of Merchants’
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rule as an introductory chapter to the discussion and analysis of colonial 
land policy. The understanding of this part is essential to the appreciation 
of the issues raised in subsequent chapters. The nature of the quasi-colonial 
government established in the Forts along the coast and which was taken 
over by a non-merchant administration during the early 1830s is examined 
here.
Chapter II is in fact, a continuation of Chapter I in the sense that 
it highlights the way in which earlier claims by the Imperial Government 
that it had no soveriegn rights over the native polities were to be used 
in the future to challenge the rights of the colonial government to enact 
laws affecting lands. The impact of the industrial revolution,.the 
abolition of the slave trade in Europe, the introduction of permanent agricul­
ture and the development of the mining and timber industries on land values 
and traditional attitudes to land rights are outlined in this chapter.
The Crown Lands Bill of 1894 is discussed under Chapter III. The 
events and the debates preceding the introduction of the measure are considered. 
This is followed by the examination of its provisions against the background 
of the problems they were designed to solve.
The nature of the opposition to the Bill and the vigorous defence 
of it by Sir William Maxwell are exhaustively discussed in chapter IV.
This is followed by the consideration of the expanded form of the Crown 
Lands Bill, 1894, under the Public Lands Bill, 1897. The principal objectives 
of the Bill are critically examined in the light of the criticisms levelled 
against the measure as being; in volation of native rights. The ways in 
which its principal provisions reflected the communal principles underlying 
the indigenous conceptions of tenure are highlighted.
In chapter VI, the change in direction of policy after the withdrawal 
of the Bill on account of active opposition to it is critically examined.
In this regard, the examination of the Concessions Ordinance, 1900, and 
the operations of the Concessions TCourts feature prominently. The withdrawal 
of 'Sir William Maxwell’s Bill and the change in direction of land policy 
that followed it led to the consolidation and the enhancement of the power 
and authority of chiefs and traditional authorities in land matters. The 
way in which the traditional authorities used such powers for land administra­
tion purposes are discussed under cahpter VII. The statutory control of 
stool land administration as a response to the problems arising out of 
the land control functions of such authorities are also examined in this 
chapter.
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The basic underlying principle of the abortive Public Lands Bill,
1897 was applied to Land administration in the Northern Territories.
This aspect of colonial land policy is examined in chapter VIII. Land 
administration in these parts of the country can be seen as an experiment 
with Sir William Maxwell's policy, and the relative degree of title security 
and absence of litigation over land titles there is highlighted as a 
vindication of the latters foresight and wisdom.
Forest law and policy are examined in the last chapter of Part II.
The problems relating to the timber industry and the measures adopted 
by the colonial administration to solve them are discussed in this chapter. 
The problems and the measures are discussed in the light of the recommenda­
tions and guide lines on forest administration in Southern Nigeria, which
H. M. Thompson had supplied to the Gold Coast government to be used as 
a guide for legislation on forests. The forest Ordinance, 1911, and opposi­
tion to it are also examined in this last chapter of part II.
Part III of the Study is concerned with land titles registration 
in Ghana. It also forms part of colonial land policy; but it is deemed 
necessary to treat it under a different part because of the specialized 
nature of the subject. This part is also divided into two chapters.
Chapter I deals with the historical aspect of the subject. In the first 
chapter, the discussion centres around the Land Registration Ordinance,
1883 and the Land Registry Ordinance, 1895 and the problems relating 
to the administration of the schemes established under them. The
failures of the schemes as instruments for securing titles are 
highlighted.
The concluding part examines the trends towards individualisation 
under the customary law. The role played by the judiciary and the bar, 
the increasing use of Anglo-American terminology and conveyancing forms 
in the disposition of interests in land in the individualisation process 
is discussed in this part. The issues raised by the individualisation 
process are discussed in the light of the socio-economic policy objectives 
which we consider should guide those concerned with policy formulation 
on land matters in deciding how the land tenure system must evolve and 
develop.
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P A R T  I 
PRELIMINARIES
A. Introductory
The basic characteristic feature of land tenure .and administration
in black Africa generally might be said to be the way in which the land
tenure systems are intertwined with the political and social organisation
of society. Not only is this so in general terms but Gluckman for one
could go so fair as to say that the hierarchical system of customary land
administration which he describes for the Lozi of Zambia in terms of
primary, secondary and tertiary estates of administration is the general
pattern in African land tenure.'*' This is to go far too far - not every
African society was central nor was its administration hierarchical,
but the picture is valid for many of the central states of West, East
and Central Africa.
Similar distinguishing features of land administration based on
a hierarchy of "chiefly jurisdiction" carrying with it the responsibility
for land allocation, distribution and administration is identified by
2
Ian Hamnett in his work on the Sotho. If we now turn to Ghana, we
can note the comments of Allott on the pyramidal structure of political
organisation and land tenure in Ashanti. He writes:
"The Ashanti system for the control and enjoyment of interests in 
land was fundamental to the whole structure of government, so much 
so that, if one removed the land rights of the chiefs, the basis 
on which they held their office and exercised jurisdiction over 
their subjects would be destroyed. This network of land rights 
supporting the political structure extended both upwards and down­
wards . "^
See M. Gluckman^ Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law, London, 
1969, pp. 253 and 257.
Chieftainship and Legitimacy, London, 1975, p. 63 In Lisotho, the 
fundamental principle of both the administration and the tenure of 
land is that the land belongs to the nation, a principle which has 
both, legal and political implications.
3
A. N. Allott^ The Ashanti Law of Property, Stuttgart, 1966, pp. 140-141
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Although one may not agree entirely with Gluckman that in African 
traditional systems of tenure, the control^management and administration 
of lands are universally based on hierarchically organised political 
structures, such characteristic features are common and identifiable 
at a general level of investigation in many property systems in black 
Africa. However, in societies which lack unifying structures or central 
authorities, land rights are normally enjoyed through voluntary occupation 
and exploitation of land without the necessity of a formal grant or alloca-
4
tion based on a hierarchy of political administration or chiefly authority.
In some other societies, although there may be chiefs exercising jurisdic­
tional rights over land within their areas of authority, such chiefs
   • 5
may not have rigKts^ of administrative control over lands at all.
Such minor differences do not make it impossible, even at a general 
level of investigation, to identify a universal norm which appears jjo 
underlie, and determine the beneficial enjoyment of rights in land and 
the nature of such rights or interests under black African traditional 
land tenure systems. What appears to be such a universal principle of 
traditional African land tenure is exemplified by the right of the individual 
member of a social group5such as the polity, the clan, the tribe or the 
family to beneficially enjoy property as a member of the group or community.
A general principle can thus be deduced from the various land tenure 
systems to the effect that the beneficial enjoyment of rights in land 
is community-based.
This is so whether the land administration system and land rights 
are based on hierarchical structures or simply based on the group member­
ship. For claims to benefit from the land are ultimately dependent on 
membership of one of the social groups mentioned. One can hardly discover 
any traditional land tenure system in black Africa where the beneficial 
enjoyment.of rights in land is dependent on status in the sense that 
one is a member of a particular social class or on anything else other 
than membership of the land-holding community.
4 ' in
See the discussion of this point by C. M. N. White,/Readings in African
Law, Vol. I, p. 225, ed.,E. Cotran. White discusses the land tenure 
systems of the Tonga and some societies in Northern Rhodesia. See 
also the discussion of the land tenure system of the Arusha based 
on the family system by P. H. Gulliver in The Family Estate in Africa, 
London, 1964, pp. 197-229, ed. R. F. Gray and P. H. Gulliver.
5
The Northern E&e.. of Ghana and the Ibo Societies of Nigeria discussed 
by A. P. K. Kludze and S. N. Obi respectively, afford good examples.
See respectively, Ewe Law of Property, London, 1973, pp. 141-143; and 
The Ibo Law of Property, London, 1963, pp. 3-35.
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The appreciation of this factor - the community-based nature of 
the enjoyment of rights in land in the traditional scheme is fundamental 
to the understanding of the nature of individual rights in land under 
African customary law. Once this element in the customary law is under­
stood, it can’ be employed as a tool of analysis of property relations 
in African traditional societies. A proper understanding of the community- 
based nature of rights in land under the indigenous law, will eliminate 
much of the confusion which usually characterises the discussion, exposition 
and critique of African systems of tenure. It can also be of help in 
avoiding the common error of suggesting similarities with other property 
systems where none exist and dissimilarities where there are practically 
none.
The recognition and appreciation of community basis of rights in 
land can restrain the Lawyer and the Land administrator from too 
readily applying Anglo-American and Roman-Dutch terminology to African 
traditional schemes of interests in land. This view is closely connected 
with the main theme and objectives of this work which we shall endeavour 
to set out below.
B. Objectives
i*
Prior to Colonial rule, the territories now comprised^the State 
of Ghana were occupied by various independent polities. Although their 
boundaries were not well defined most of the traditional states had well- 
organised governments. The people of each community resided in well 
established towns and villages constituting the fixed bases from where 
they were engaged in the exploitation of the land and its resources.
Members of each community or tribe were united by certain patriarchal 
and matrilineal traditions owing allegiance to its own individual tribal 
government.
Each polity, whether it was an Akan, Dagomba, Ewe or Krobo, had its 
own internal arrangements and rules for the control, management and admini­
stration of lands included in the areas it regarded as the territorial
0
confines of its territory. Like the Lozi system described by Gluckman,
political and social organisation of society, which Allott describes
for the Ashanti of Ghana revolved around a hierarchical arrangement of
political authority with the political head of government at the upper
7
limits, of the hierarchy.
6
Op. cit.,pp. 253-257.
7
Op. cit.
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Responsibility for the control and administration of lands devolved on 
the same persons exercising political and other powers associated with 
government, . This description would also be valid for most other Akan 
communities including some Ga-Mashie areas where the concept of Stool
Q
lands was highly developed, although there might be slight variations
in the customary law in certain cases.
But in most non-Akan patrilineal communities such as the Northern
Ewe described by Kludze in his pioneering work on Ewe Property law*the
political heads or chiefs of the Ewe Chiefdoms did not usually perform
9
land control funtions in their capacity as Chiefs. Land administration 
was carried on by family heads and their principal members. If we now 
turn to the generally acephalous patrilineal communities of. the Upper 
Region of Ghana which Pogucki studied and discussed in his work, it 
will be noted that in such societies, the functions of land administration 
were performed by Religious leaders known as Tindanas who might not neces­
sarily be political functionaries.^
In spite of such disparities as might have existed in the internal 
arrangements for land administration and control in each individual polity 
in the country, three factors were common to all the systems. They were:
(a) an inherent right in the individual member of a land-holding 
group to benefit from the land regarded as a common asset and 
resource;
(b) the recognition of certain members of the community as having
0
In its physical sense the Stool is the Wooden Stool which the political 
ruler of a community or a chiefdom notional}, y occupies, ^n those tradi­
tional states where it exists, it is believed that it embodies the spirits 
of the ancestors and the souls of the body politic subject to the juris­
dictional authority of the person occupying it. The Stool is not only 
a symbol of- unity of the subjects owing allegiance to it, but also a 
legal personification of the office which the traditional ruler occupies.
The Stool may thus be likened to the modern State concept or what the 
Crown represents in English jurisprudence or political theory. The paramount 
title in lands within the territorial borders of those native States 
in which this concept was developed is held to be vested in the Stool 
and not in an individual.
9
A. P. K. Kludze, Ewe Law of Property, London, 1973, pp. 108-112.
See, R. J. H. Pogucki, Gold Coast Land Tenure, Vol. 1, pp. 6- 8 •
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the power of control over how rights to benefit may be exercised 
and;
(c) the lack of individual ownership of the soil itself, the paramount 
title of which was accepted by the communities as vested in 
the groups, such as the Stool, the clan or the family, all 
of which are corporate juristic entities.
The land tenure systems operated upon the basis of these common factors 
- factors which could be employed to harmonise the systems within the 
context of a national land policy.
Since the right to benefit depended on membership of individual 
polities, tribes or families, in terms of beneficial enjoyment of rights 
in land, each land-holding group regarded people from other communities 
as strangers and thus not entitled to benefit from the land unless the
permission of those with the power of control over the community's land
\
was first obtained on terms prescribed by the laws of the tribe concerned.
During Colonial rule, all these petty independent polities were
absorbed into the Gold Coast Colony under British colonial administration.
By an Imperial Charter, a legislative Council was established in 1874.^
This was followed by the enactment of the Supreme Court Ordinance which
made the common law, the doctrines of equity and the Statutes of general
application which were in force in England at the date on which the local
Legislature was established,operative and applicable within the jurisdiction 
12
of the Courts. Subsequently, a Public Lands Ordinance was passed under
13
which lands could be compulsorily acquired in the service of the Colony.
None of the Statutes affected land rights of the natives or the 
land administration systems significantly. In terms of beneficial enjoyment 
of rights and land controls, the petty States were treated by the colonial 
administration as if they still retained their independence and sovereign 
rights. No attempt was made to use the common features of the land tenure 
systems to harmonise them. Boundaries remained undefined and undemarcated 
with the result that boundary disputes between adjoining polities began 
to cause problems.
^  Charter of 24 July^ 1874.
12
Ordinance no. 4 of 1876, S.14, Section 10 of the Ordinance permitted 
the application of the customary law to "Causes and matters relating 
to the tenube and transfer of real and personal property" provided 
such law was not repugnant to the principles of justice, equity and 
good conscience.
13 No. 8 of 1876 .
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In order to deal with such problems, Sir William Brandford Griffith 
and Sir William Maxwell introduced the Crown Lands Bill of 1894 and the 
Public Lands Bill of 1897 respectively. Both Bills, particularly the 
latter embodied the inherent communal principles of benefit and control 
under the traditional schemes of tenure. Had any one of these Bills 
come into force, its inherent principles could have been employed to 
harmonise the various land tenure systems of the Colony and Protectorates 
under British jurisdiction.
It is one of th main objectives of this work to attempt a justification
of the introduction of these Bills and the policy considerations actuating
their introduction. The main theme of the thesis is that the principles
of the Bill by which the administration of all lands in the Colony was
to have been taken over by the colonial government was the natural conseq- 
the
uence of/absorption and amalgamation of all the native states into the 
Colony under British administration. This was a principle understood 
in many of the polities where the rights of land administration and control 
devolved on those exercising political power. Even in those communities 
where such rights wWere not necessarily exercised by those wielding 
political power, the right in certain Elders of the Community to exercise 
control over communal property was recognised.
It is intended to show by this study that upon the establishment 
of the Colony under the colonial government, the Imperial government 
should have proceeded to abolish boundaries between the various traditional 
states and to have assumed the land control functions of the traditional 
authorities as was done in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast 
and Northern Nigeria. Under such a policy, in place of the narrow individual 
community membership basis of enjoyment of rights in land, membership 
or citizenship of the Colony would become the broad basis for the enjoy­
ment of such rights. The main objective is to prove through the historical 
analysis of the evolution of land tenure and administration that a policy 
of the kind could have solved the major land tenure and administration 
problems of the past and the present. During the course of the discussion 
attention will be drawn to the need to go back to the policies and principles 
of the abortive Land Bills of Sir William Brandford Griffith and Sir 
William Maxwell, at least in a modified form. It will be shown that 
policies of the kind hold the key to a lasting solution of the present 
and future land tenure and administration problems, such as insecurity 
of title sind costly litigation, inequitable distribution of resources, 
problems relating to the introduction of improved and modern techniques
21
of land use and development and diminishing returns on agricultural produc­
tivity.
Such policies were successfully opposed in the past, as will be 
shown, on account of the threat they posed to vested economic interests 
of the native middle class consisting of the lawyers, merchants and the 
elite, and European firms and financial institutions. The traditional 
authorities, mainly the chiefs, as a result of their ignorance, illiteracy 
and selfish economic interests supported the opposition to such measures. 
The economic and political power associated with land controls and rights 
therein constituted the key obstacle to the implimentation of such policies 
in the past and will continue to be the major stumbling block to the 
resurrection of such policies at present.
But such possible objections should be regarded as the inevitable 
consequences of land reform which normally implies redistribution of 
political and economic power. It may involve the mass of the presently 
excluded farmers in the rural communities gaining a voice in the shaping 
of public programmes and policies. Decisions concerning land reform 
inescapably imply not only economic and social policy considerations, 
but political action. The view to be urged in this work is that land 
reform requires bold political decisions within the context of sound 
national land policies, formulated in accordance with the socio-economic 
policy objectives of the country. Unlike the colonial government which 
dragged its feet when such bold and decided action was required, present 
independent governments ought to master pressure groups, particularly 
those of peasant organisations within the rural community, through public 
education to counter the expected opposition of the minority of strong 
powerful interest groups and push 'such measures through.
The thesis seeks to draw attention to the fact that if a reasonable 
level of agricultural productivity is to be maintained, then the formula­
tion of sound national land policies will be inevitable. Firstly, lands 
or interests in land will have to be made cheaply and easily accessible 
to as large number of people as will require them for cultivation and 
development. Secondly, modern techniques of agricultural production 
ought to be given the proper attention that they deserve. Thirdly, perhaps 
the most important of all, the peasant farmer who needs direction ought 
to be supplied with and taught the efficient application of fertilizers, 
manure and other iniputs necessary for improving the productive capacity 
of the soil.
Since peasant farmers do not have the capital for the necessary 
modernisation required for improving productivity, the responsibility
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for giving advice and supplying inputs devolves on the government. But
this can be done more effectively if farmers are assisted in groups or
co-operatives. It will be a sensible policy for large tracts of land
to be made available to a large number of farmers where resources can
be concentrated at places where a large number of people can make use
of them. This will be better and easier than the situation where assistance
will be given to individuals cultivating lands of uneconomic sizes scattered
all over the country.
Vesting of the administration of all unoccupied lands in the country
in the government in the manner proposed in the abortive Land Bills of
1894 and 1897 can provide a sound basis for organising productivity in
the manner suggested. For this reason, it is intended to highlight the
present trends towards individualisation of interests under the customary
la.w - trends which will not only undermine the traditional tenure systems
but the success of the sort of policies we seek to urge in the thesis.
Since the withdrawal of Sir William Maxwell's Bill, the tendency
had been to encourage the evolution of customary interests in land into
individual freehold titles of the English type. As early as 1891, William
Brandford Griffith, son of Sir William Brandford Griffith advised his
father that the primary objectives of the Crown Lands Bill of 1894 should
14
be the creation of Freehold titles and sought to promote this view relent-
15
lessly at the courts of the Gold Coast where he became the Chief Justice.
Bentsi-Enchill regards the process of individualisation of interests 
16
asrprogressive and Asante holds the view that the evolution of the custo­
mary interest into the "freehold is not necessarily incompatible with
the trusteeship idea, which is essentially an ethical justification of 
17
property." Today, the Law Reform Commission of Ghana has recommended
legislation for the transformation of the land user-rights of individuals
18
under the customary law into what it calls , "Customary freehold".
One of the ways in which individual titles is sought to be established 
is the introduction of a system of Land titles registration in the country.
It is intended to draw attention to the fact that although individualisation
14
Secret Dispatch from Sir W. B. Griffith to Ripon, 29 August, 1894,
C0879/46.
15
See his decision in Lokko v Koklonfi (1907) Ren. 450.
16
K. Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law, London, 1964, 8 8 .
17
S. K. B. Asante, Property Law and Social Goals in Ghana 1844-1966,
Accra, 1975, 31.
18
See The Report of the Law Reform Commission on Proposals for the Reform
of Land Law, Accra, Nov. 1973.
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of interest has never been stated as one of the objectives of introducing 
such schemes, their . implementation usually tends to promote it
and ha.s. that effect. The objective is to show that apart from the expense 
involved, the consequences for the land tenure system, the economic, 
social and political implications for the country have never been seriously 
considered. Moreover, there are formidable obstacles to the implementation 
of such programmes, since foriheni to be successful, rights in land would 
have to be defined and settled, qualified personnel for the survey of 
lands and other equipment necessary for the programme would have to be 
provided.
It is the aim of this work to focus attention on the failure of the 
system through a historical account and exafftination of the .way the system 
had worked in the past and the analysis of the data collected on the 
way the system is working at present. In the process, efforts would 
be made to shed light on the short-comings of the system which would 
be found to be due mainly to lack of surveys and qualified personnel, 
equipment and public education on the programme. The intention is not 
only to demonstrate the failures of the system with regard to the attain­
ments of its primary objectives of securing titles and thus prevent 
costly litigation, but to bring into relief, the desirability of vesting 
land administration in the government as a better alternative to the 
expensive and the already unsuccessful programmes of land registration.
This is where the policies of Sir William Maxwell exemplified in 
his abortive Land Bill of 1897 will come into focus. It is intended 
to draw attention to the success of that kind of policy in the Northern 
Territories as affording a good example of the feasibility of similar 
policies in the whole of the country.
The thesis is thus not concerned with the exegesis of all aspects
of the customary land law in depths. It is concerned with the discussion
of the evolution of customary land tenure and administration in terms 
of the already familiar rules and procedures. Questions relating to 
legal capacity to dispose of interest in group-held property, the nature 
of individual interest in land under the traditional land tenure systems 
and issues concerning the appropriate choice and use of terminology will 
be discussed only to the extent that such discussion can serve as a prelimi­
nary information to the reader who is not already familiar with such 
questions.
Such treatment of the subject is also intended to enhance the under­
standing and appreciation of the nature of the land tenure and administra­
tion problems which emerged during colonial rule and the measures adopted
24
to solve them. The aim is to highlight such factors as the reception 
of Anglo-American ideas of tenure, the development of the mining industry 
and the concession boom which accompanied that development in the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century, the introduction of permanent 
agriculture through cocoa and coffee plantations and the considerable 
appreciation of land values consequent upon these developments. These 
developments had a great impact on customary schemes of tenure and caused 
land administration problems which had to be solved.
In discussing the rules relating to customary land administration 
and individual interest in land, the main objective will be to show that 
once the nature of individual rights under the indigenous law is appreciated 
in terms of rights of benefit and control, the measures adopted under 
the abortive Land Bills of the last decade of the nineteenth century 
to solve land tenure problems would be understood from the right perspec­
tive. It should become obvious that such measures would not necessarily 
have infringed individual property rights as the opponents of the measures 
would make it appear. Instead, such measures would most probably have 
protected individual rights against the improvident, ignorant and generally 
greedy traditional authorities in whom land control functions were vested 
and against the powerful European speculative capitalists and their native 
middle class intermediaries.
C. Group Titles
One of the most central but common themes of traditional property
systems in Ghana, as in many traditional African property systems, is
the recognition of non-natural including super-natural entities as in
19
some ways participating in the legal order. Related to this peculiar 
feature of the customary land laws is the great importance attached to 
social and political organisation of society in property relations.
The customary land laws were^^articularly in the past, ■ based on 
groups and communities in the same manner as the beneficial enjoyment 
of rights in land was dependent on membership of a social group or community.
19
See A. N. Allott, "Legal Personality in African Law", in Ideas and 
Procedures in African customary Law, London, 1969,/p. 180; see also 
S. N. G. Obi, op. cit., p. 25 ed.f M. Gluckman,
i|
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Thus under the indigenous schemes of tenure in Ghana, the Stool or
the Oman, the village community, the clan, the family or dzotinuwo are
corporate juristic entities of the customary law. They are accorded
legal personality and are capable of suing and being sued. Bentsi-Enchill
writing about this distinctive feature of the customary law in relation
to land titles says:
"The title to property owned by a group such as the family or clan, 
the village community or State or Oman or Stool is vested not in 
any member of the collectivity, but in the group regarded as a unit; 
i.e., such title is vested in the corporation and not in the corpora­
tors ."20
This is one fact on which all students of the customary law are 
agreed. Allott commenting on the attribution of rights and duties to 
such legal entities under Akan law says that the Stool has both plural 
(Corporation aggregate) and. singular (C. F. Corporation sole) charac­
teristics . ^  in Akan communities where the concept of stool lands is 
highly developed families often have stools occupied by family heads.
Such stools symbolise the unity and identity of particular kinship groups 
in which title in property held by them is vested.
In most non-Akan patrilineal communities of Ghana such as the Ga- 
Adangbe, the Ewe or the generally acephalous communities of the Northern 
Territories, the concept of Stool lands is not highly developed. In 
communities like those of the Northern Ewe for example, there are Stools 
symbolising the unity of the chiefdom or kinship groups. But title
20
Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill, op. cit>, p. 41. See also J. M. Sarbah,
Fanti Customary Laws, London, 1968, 3rd ed., 62, where he writes:
"The village community is a corporate body, of which the members are 
families, or family groups, residing in the several household, and 
including the joint as well as patriarchal families." For further 
discussion of the issue see the following: A. N. Allott, "Legal
Personality in African Law", in Ideas and Procedures in African Cust­
omary Law, op. cit., p. 179; Gordon Woodman, "The Family as a Corporation 
in Ghana and Nigerian Law", li African Law Studies, pp. 1-36; J. B.
Dan.quah, Akan Laws and Custom, London, 1928, p. 200; ' A. P. K. Kludze,
Ewe Law of Property, London, 1973, chapter five, and N. A. Ollennu, 
Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana, London, 1962, chapter 2.
21 _ . , , .. 
Loc cit.»p. 191.
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in landed property is not vested in such stools. Instead, paramount title . in
land is vested in families or kinship groups. Like the Stool in Akan
law, such families or dzotinuwo are corporate juristic entities of the 
22
customary law. The conclusion to be drawn from various expositions 
of the customary law is that the paramount title in Lands is generally 
vested in corporate groups and not in individuals. Rights and duties 
are attributed to the groups as artifical legal persons of the customary 
law and are separate and independent of their natural constituents.
D. Group Administration
We have seen that the paramount title is vested in artificial legal
persons of the indigenous law. Therefore natural persons are often selected
or elected to represent and act on behalf of the Stool, the family or
any of the artificial legal persons concerned. Under Akan and other
systems of law where the concept of stool land is developed, the paramount
chief and his councillors act on behalf of the Stool. For the family,.
such land control functions devolve on the head of the family and his
principal members. The rules which govern the control and administration
of such property are practically the same whether it is a Stool, family,
23
clan or a village community land.
In exercising control over Stool or family lands the customary law 
does not permit either the Stool occupant or the head of the family, 
to manage affairs on his own. The former is obliged to consult his council 
of subordinate chiefs and elders. In a similar way the latter is required 
to act in consultation with his principal members. When the head of
22
Like the Ewe,most of the patrilineal communities of the Northern and 
Upper Regions have kinship groups in which the paramount title in 
land is vested. These groups referred to by Pogucki as maximal lineages 
or clans acquired their titles by settlements. See J. H. R. Pogucki,
Gold Coast Land Tenure, Vol. 1, pp. 6-9. In this discussion of the 
customary land law and administration, the traditional tenure systems 
of the North are not important for our purposes, since the administra­
tion of all lands there is vested in the government. The nature of 
land administration in that part of the country is treated fully below.
See pp. 254-293.
23 In the discussion of the land control functions of traditional authori­
ties, the emphasis will be on the head of the family and its principal 
members; but it should be borne in mind that the rules are practically 
the same in each case. The nature of .Akan-type family interest in 
land may differ from those of a partrilineal family interest in land in the 
sense that while the latter may be paramount, the former may be subordinate 
to the Stool. Nevertheless they are both persons of the customary law.
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tha family and his principal members of the stool occupant and his council
of Surbordinate Chiefs and elders are acting together on behalf of
the family or stool, they constitute what is called a "management committee".
The head of the family or stool occupant may thus be referred to as
the chairman of the management committee when acting in a representative
capacity of the family, or the stool.
The general rule governing the administration of any such group- 
held property is that for any act done on behalf of the customary legal 
entity which the management committee represents to be valid, the 
chairman of the management committee must act in concert and with the 
consent and concurrence of other members of the committee.
E . Consents necessary for valid alienation of property.
It has already been pointed out that beneficial enjoyment of rights 
in land under the traditional law is community-based in the sense that 
membership of the community or a land-holding group confers an inherent 
right on the member to benefit and enjoy rights in land through the 
development and occupation of vacant land. A non-member of one land- 
holding community is thus a stranger in another. In order to enjoy 
property rights in a community where he is a stranger, he would have 
to approach the management committee of the land-holding group concerned
and acquire it in accordance with the rules prescribed by the customary
law.
One of the most important but common problems for prospective 
acquirers of interest in land who are strangers is how to identify 
the persons with the legal capacity to deal with the property. Even 
where the chairman of the management committee - the head of the family 
or the stool occupant and other members sire known , the rules relating 
to their land control functions are unclear. When the customary law 
says that the chairman of the management committee must act in concert 
and with the consent and concurrence of the other members, does this 
mean that the chairman must be joined in every transaction by:
(a) all the other principal members,
(b) a majority of them, or
(c) a minority of them?
If the chairman of the committee does not participate in the act, can
all the other members or a majority of them take a legally binding decision?
Bentsi-Enchill coined the phrase, see his Ghana Land Law, op . cit., 
p . 49.
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On those occasions where the Chairman is acting in concert with all
the other members, is it a unanimous or a majority decision that will
bind the group?
These are some of the pertinent questions relating to the consents 
necessary for the disposition of family or stool lands for which the 
customary law does not provide a clear and ready answer. As will be 
seen from this discussion, the difficulties of identifying members 
of the management committee, the uncertainties in the law and certain 
exceptions to the general rule which will be discussed, constitute 
some of the major sources of insecurity of title and costly litigation 
in the land tenure systems of the country. These problems are exemplified 
in the management of family property which will be discussed in order
to draw attention to the difficulties.
(i ) The head of the family acting alone.
It is clear from Sarbah's work that the head of the family has 
no legal capacity to deal with family land in his own rights. He writes:
"Neither the head of the family acting alone, nor the senior members
of a family acting alone, can make any valid alienation nor give
title to any family property whatsoever." 25
The logical basis for this proposition seems to be that as the 
management committee represents the family - the artificial legal entity 
in which title is vested, it will be necessary for the management committee 
to be properly constituted in order to be in a position to act in that 
representative capacity. Thus where the head is acting alone, he cannot 
be said to be doing so in the name of the management committee or as a 
representative of the group. Similarly, neither all the principal members 
without the head nor the head with some, but exclusing some principal 
members can constitute the group or the management committee which alone 
has thie legal capacity to act on behalf of the family.
It follows that acting in concert by members of the committee is 
a condition precedent to the validity of any action performed in the name 
of the family. Here, a distinction must be drawn between a concerted 
and a majority action. It should be expected that not all members of 
the committee will approve of a particular kind of action in the name 
of the family. But it is important that all members of the committee 
should be present or given the opportunity to be present and to make 
their views known. Where after deliberation on the issue a majority
H. M. Sarbah, op. cit., p. 79. Emphasis supplied.
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decision is taken,it will be a concerted action albeit a majority and 
not a unanimous decision. It will not be a concerted action where some 
of the principal members are ignored and decisions taken without their 
knowledge or participation. In such a case the committee would not only
be failing to act together but would not be properly constituted as
26a representative of the family.
This would seem to be the logical and legal basis for certain decisions
of the courts in which it was held that the disposition of interest in
family property by the head of the family without the consent and concurrence
27
of the principal members was invalid or void. Thus in Awortchie v Eshon, 
where a family land was sold by the head of the family without the concur­
rence of the principal members, the sale was set aside and the head of
28
the family was ordered to pay the purchase price. In Gais iwa v Akraba
the head of a family at his discretion sold family property in order
to defray family expenses incurred in litigation. Members of the family
were not informed before the sale. It was held to be invalid. A similar
29
conclusion was reached in the 1899 case of Insilhea v Simons where 
the family had sold the property without the consent of the principal 
members. In its judgment the court said:
"It is a settled rule of native law that the family property cannot 
be sold except by the head of the family with the concurrence of 
the elder members . . . "  J
It is thus clear, on the strength of these authorities that the head
of the family has no legal capacity to dispose of family property in
his own right.
(ii) Disposition of family property by principal members alone.
From what has been discussed about the constitution of the management
In Awortchie ; v Eshon (1872) Sar.^F.C.L., 170,. it was held that a family 
meeting must be called to discuss the alienation. It should be pointed 
out, however, that it will not always be possible for all principal
members to attend. A principal member may fall sick, travel or delibera­
tely refuse to attend. In such cases, the authorities suggest that 
notice to such a person would be enough. The following cases:
Tamakloev Attippoe* ittireported, Civil Appeal, No_.’ 38/52,_W.A.C_1A. ;
Welbeck v Captan (1956) 2 W.L.R. 47 and Okoe v Ankrah / 1961_/ G.L.R. 
109; all suggest that if a principal member is informed and he refuses 
to attend the family meeting he cannot challenge a decision reached 
later. See also. N. A. Ollennu, op cit.,. p. 147 and pp. 245-256.
In Assraidu v Dadzie (1890) Sar., F . C . L 174j a principal member 
of the family who travelled to Salaga and remained there for 8 years 
was held bound by an alienation in which he did not concur. See also 
Akakpo v Afafa (1952) D. C. (Land), '52-'55, 116.
(1872) Sar.yZ^GL-L. 170 •
(1876) SartF.L.R. 94 •
(1899) SaiMF .L.R. 104 at p. 105
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committee, it is obvious that the principal members alone as a group can
have no legal capacity to alienate family property. In the 1947 case of 
30
Agbloe v Sappor where the issue came up for determination, the West African
Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion, although upon a different
reason which as will be seen,was wrong.
In that case, family land was pledged by the head of the family.
He was unable to redeem it and the family land was in danger of being lost. 
Sappoip, an enterprising member of the family redeemed the land from his 
own resources. In appreciation of his action, four out of the six principal 
members of the family made a gift of part of the redeemed land to Sappor.
One of the two principal members ignored in the transaction was the head 
of the family.
At the West African Court of Appeal where the validity of the transaction
was challenged, Harragin C. J.^observed that there were two points for
31
serious consideration in the case. Firstly, did the so-called conveyance
by four of the principal members of the family land in fact, according
to native law and custom, convey the land to the respondent's predecessor
in title? Secondly, because the head of the family was at variance with
the majority of its members, would this automatically give the majority
the right to dispose of the family land?
The main issue for the consideration of the court thus turned on the
question as to whether it was possible for the principal members alone
or the majority of them alone (without the head of the family) to perform
the functions of the management committee and bind the family. In order
to answer the question, the court made reference to the case of Insjlhea
32
v Simon referred to above and concluded that the family land could not be
alienated except by the head of the family with the concurrence of the
elder members. The court regarded it as important the fact that throughout
Sarbah's work on Fanti customary laws, it was assumed that in every case
the land ought to be alienated by the head of the family and to be concurred
33
in by the principal members.
But the court did not base its decision on the authority of Sarbcfh's
work or the cases referred to. Instead,the Court quoted with approval,
that portion of Lord Haldane's judgment in Amodu Tijani v Secretary of 
34
Southern Nigeria in which his Lordship said that the head of the family
2 (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 187.
Ibid., at p . 188.
32
See Note 29
33
34 Agblo'e v Sappor (1947)12 W.A.C.A. 187 at 189 
/1921/ A.C. 399 at 404
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was to some extent in a position of a "trustee" and as such held the land
in trust for the use of the community or family. Accepting this proposition
as the correct statement of the law,Harragin C. J., concluded that the
head of the family was in the position of a trustee. Upon the basis of
this conclusion he declared:
"The head of the family may be considered to be in an analogous posi­
tion to a trustee from which it follows that it is quite impossible 
for land to be legally transferred and legal title given without his 
consent. The alleged deed exhibit *B 1 was therefore void ab initio,
and the respondent derived no right of absolute ownership by virtue
thereof."35
One would agree with the conclusion of the Chief Justice that the
transaction was void in this case, but not with the basis upon which such
conclusions were founded. Under the customary law, the head of the family
is not in an analogous position to a trustee in the sense in which the
30
term is employed under English law. As pointed out already, without 
the participation of the head of the family in the transaction, the manage­
ment committee would not be properly constituted so as to be in a position 
to act as a legal representative of the family.
This would seem to be the reasoning behind many of the cases in which 
transactions concluded by the head of the family alone, all the principal 
members alone or a minority of them alone without the participation of 
the head were held to be void or invalid. If the proposition that the head 
of the family is a r trustee were correct, then he would be in a position 
to transfer legal estate in the family lands. But this would be impossible
under the customary law.
37
In Bassil v Honger , the Court of Appeal declared the transaction 
invalid because the principal members of one branch of the family whose
consent was necessary for the validity of the transaction was ignored.
38
Similarly in Nelson v Nelson f it was the head who made the conveyance
of the family property without the concurrence of the principal members
39
of r the family. It was declared invalid. Again in Owiredu v Moshie ,• . 
it was the head of the family together with some of the principal members 
of the family who leased the property without bringing other principal 
members whose consents were necessary into the decision making process.
Loc. cit.
36
See a fuller discussion of this at pp. 55-50.
37 (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 569
qq
ZZ (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 248 - 
(1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 11 ..
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In this case also, the transaction was declared void. If the head of the 
family were a trustee, the transactions in all the cases referred to would 
have been valid, subject to the equities of the family members. It can 
thus be concluded on the basis of the authorities discussed that neither 
the head of the family alone nor the majority of the principal members 
alone can make valid disposition of family property.
(iii) Voidable grants
If this view of the indigeous law has been consistently followed, 
the problems relating to the valid disposition of interest in group held 
property under the traditional law would have been minimised. But this 
is not the case. Against the judicial views discussed above is a school 
of thought which holds the view that such violations of the rules do not 
necessarily render the transactions void but only voidable under certain 
conditions.
This view was established in an early decision of the Full Court in
40
Quaisie Bayaidee v Quamina Mensah. In this case, the plaintiff sought
to recover from the defendant a piece of land the possession of which he 
claimed the defendant had unlawfully deprived him. It appeared from the 
facts that the plaintiff purchased the land in dispute from one Kofi Aigin 
who was occupant of the family Stool 14 years earlier. The latter sold 
the property on the understanding that it was his individually "owned" 
property. The plaintiff remained in possession, developed it and remained 
in occupation until the action was begun.
The lower court gave judgement in favour of the plaintiff. The defend­
ant appealed on the grounds that the land was family property and that 
the vendor, Kofi Aigin although the occupant of the Stool at the time of 
the sale had no power to make a valid sale of the land without the concurrence 
of the family members. It was alleged that one of the members of the family, 
Eccua Assibill, protested against the sale at the time but the head of 
the family ignored her protest and went ahead with the sale.
On the basis of these facts, the full court held that whatever right 
of challenging the sale the family had was barred by their acquiescence 
and the plaintiff's continuous undisturbed possession for so long. The 
main grounds of the decision were contained in the following statements:
40
(1878) Sar.^F.L.R. 171 ■.
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that
"Now although it may be, and we believe it is the law,/the concurr­
ence of the members of the family ought to be given in order to con­
stitute an unimpeachable sale of family land, the sale is not in itself 
void, but is capable of being opened up at the instance of the family, 
provided they avail themselves of their rights timeously and under 
circumstances in which, upon rescinding the bargain, the purchaser 
can be fully restored to the position in which he stood before the 
sale."
It should be pointed out that the court erred in its view that the trans­
action was not void but voidable. The law says that the transaction must 
be concluded by the head of the family in concert and with the consent 
and concurrence of the principal members of the family. The facts of the 
case showed that it was only the head of the family who disposed of the 
property - a clear violation of the rule on alienation of group-held property 
under the customary law. As argued earlier,, title vests in the family and 
not in the head of the family. He alone cannot constitute the management 
committee which alone has the legal capacity to act on:, behalf of the family. 
By the operative effect of the rule that nemo dat quod non habet therefore, 
he ha:d no title to pass under the transaction and was thus void. Surely,
to say of a transaction that it is voidable presupposes the existence of
case
a valid contract which on the basis of the facts of this/did not exist.
Notwithstanding the apparent flaws in the arguments of the court in
this case, its principles have been followed in some cases. In Manko v 
42
Bonso, a case in which the validity of the sale of a family house by
the head of the family without the requisite consents was challenged, the
West African Court of Appeal said that if the decision in Bayaidee v Mensah
was sound, and the contrary was not suggested by the appellants' counsel,
"then it appears clearly that the sale of 1885 was not void, but merely
voidable and the plaintiffs having taken no steps to set it aside have
43
no title to the land in dispute."
44
This view of the law was restated in Yaoga v Yoaga where a grant 
made of family property by the head of a patrilineal family without the 
requisite consents was in issue. Although the case of Bayaidee v Mensah 
was not referred to, its principles influenced the Court in its decisions.
41 Ibid., p. 172 %
42
(1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 62 ,
43
Per Petrides, C. -1J., at p. 63. See the criticism of this decision by 
K. Bentsi-Enchil in his Ghana Land Law, op. cit.,pp. 54-56.
44
(1958) 3 W.L.R. 309.
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The court said:
"A sale of family property by the head purporting to be with the concurr­
ence of the principal members of the family is voidable, not void, 
if not in fact made with such concurrence, and it can be set aside ^  
at the instance of the family if members of the family act timeously."
It must be said that not only are these views inconsistent with that
line of authority which maintains that the non-compliance with customary
rules for valid alienation of group-held property is void, but do not state
the customary law correctly. Koker suggests that the result of the cases
shows that an irregular alienation of family property would be void or
voidable according to the description of the property sold. If the property
is described as family property and is being sold for and on behalf of
the family or by and with the consent of the family, the sale may be merely
voidable. If on the other hand, it is described as individually held property,
46
then it is of course void, as the maxim nemo dat quod non habet applies.
Koker cited among Nigerian bases for these propostions, the Ghana
case of Manko v Bonso discussed above. It should be pointed out, however,
that even if such a distinction is made in Nigerian cases, it is doubtful
if the courts in Ghana draw any such dichotomy, and it should be added
that even if a distinction in respect of the way the property is described
has been made, it will be one as to form and not of substance.
It would have been possible for the courts to achieve the same results
in danger of losing
in those cases in which the unconsulted family members weiw their'rights
in the family lands without necessarily declaring the transactions voidable
and not void. As Bentsi-Enchill points out, the fundamental issue of justice
presented in such cases "is the one of deciding as to which of two innocent
parties - the purchaser or the unconsulted members of the family - is to
b e a r  the loss in the case of a purported sale of family property not made
47
by the proper persons."
45 — —
Ibid., at p. 311. But see the decision of Dao v Klu / 1961/ 2 G.L.R.
555 by the same judge. He implied that a grant made by the family head 
to the execution-debtor without the knowledge of the family was invalid.
He regarded the lack of knowledge by the family as fatal to the claimant’s 
case "because its effect would be that the grant to the execution-debtor 
is null and void and he acquired no interest whatsoever in the property 
which can be attached." at p. 557. Emphasis supplied. See also his 
Customary Land Law in Ghana, op. cit., pp. 127-128 where he writes:
"Any conveyance made by the occupant of the Stool alone, or by the head 
of the family alone, is null and void ab? initio, and any alienation 
made by the principal elders alone without the occupant of the Stool 
or the head of the family is likewise null and void ah ■- initio,"
46
G. B. A. Koker, Family Property Among theYQr.ubas, 2nd ed., London, 1966, 
p. 97.
47
K. Bentsi-Enchill, op. cit., p. 56*
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This means that in most of the cases in which it was decided that 
an irregular grant was not void but voidable, both legal and policy considera­
tions come into play. The policy considerations here, as Woodman points
out, involve the conflict between the interests of families and those of
48
purchasers of family property. If a head of fanily is to be able to make 
unauthorised grants of family property which after a time will become bind­
ing on the family, a family may lose property without the management committee
ever consenting to its alienation. If such sales were held void, the family
49
would lose the property if it were itself guilty of acquiescence. If 
on the other hand the family did not sleep on its rights and acted timeously,
it should be able to recover its land and the purchaser would be free to
pursue his remedies against the irregular seller of the property.
Such policy considerations involve equitable principles of acquiescence, 
estoppel and larches. Such principles would seem to be the controlling
50
factor in the decisions. Thus in Bayaidee v Mensah itself, Abbey v Ollenu ,
51
Bokitsi Concession and cases of similar nature were decided on the equitable 
principles of laches, acquiescence and estoppel. The courts could have 
employed such equitable principles in the decision making process to 
achieve just results without the necessity of introducing the concept of
voidable transactions. This unnecessarily complicates and confuses further,
the problems relating to the disposition of group — held property under
the customary law and the uncertainty of title which is consequent upon
.. 52 
it.
(iv) Insecurity of title
It may be observed from the discussion of the cases, some of the prob­
lems associated with the administration and management of group-held property, 
such as family, Stool or community lands. The most obvious of these prob­
lems concerns the difficulty faced by strangers in identifying members 
of the management committee. The uncertainties in the law can make easy 
the perpetration of fraud on strangers. The problems which frequently
Memorandum on the Reform of Land Law in Ghana, Accra, 1975, p.76.
Ibid.
50
(1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 567-
51 ,
Concession Inquiry No. 38, (1903) Sar.F.L.R. 159.
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For some discussions of the problem of void and voidable grants see
the following: E. D. Korn, "Unlawful Disposition of Family Land - Void
or Voidable?" (1967) 4 U.G.L.J. Ill; G. Woodman, "A Note on Voidable
Grants in Customary Law", 3 Law in Society (Ahmadu Bello University, 
Nigeria) (1967) 59; E. D. Korn, "Limitation of Action to Recover Land", 
(1968) 5 U.G.L.J. 13 at pp. 61-63.
36
arise from lack of clarity in the rules and the diffiiculties faced by
prospective purchasers of group-held property were adequately described
53by Coussey J., in Clerk v Okai when he said:
"The time of the courts is frequently occupied with cases where one 
or more members of a family, perfectly aware of a contract and its 
terms, keep in the background their identity more or less clouded, 
to declare, if it suits them, at a later occasion, that they had no 
knowledge of the transaction and to claim to set aside the transaction."
Apart from the difficulties outlined above, there is also the uncertainty
about whether it is the majority or unanimous decision of the committee
which shall be binding on the ■group or the family. Sarbah provides a clear
authority on the point. He writes:
"The head of the family cannot, without the consent of all the prin­
cipal members or the greater part thereof, that^s the ebusuafu, alien­
ate the immovable ancestral or family property.
It is clear from this statement that in Sarbah's view, either the
unanimous or the majority decision of the management committee will be
enough. In the analogous case of the election of a family head, Sarbah
says that "all", or "the majority" of the principal members of the family
55
must be present and consent in his election.
But against this view are some authorities suggesting unanimity as
56
to consent on the alienation. In Bassil v Honger, the court said obiter,
that . . ."the concurrence of all those persons who claim to be the princi-
57
pal members" would be necessary. It was also implied in Solomon v Codjoe
58
that a unanimous decision was required. In Kwan v Nyieni , the Court of
Appeal made the emphatic declaration saying:
"In our opinion the principle of law is that a deed of conveyance, 
mortgage or lease of family land which is on the face of it executed 
by the head and another member, upon proof timeously made that its 
execution was without the knowledge and consent of the principal 
members of the family, i€ null and void."
It is clear from these cases and what Sarbah says on the point that 
there is no certainty as to what proportion of the management committee 
can take a decision on behalf of the family and which will be binding.
All these constitute a recipe for uncertainty of .title and costly litgation 
as is evident from the volume df litigation arising from these doubts.
63
(1950) D. C. (Land) '48 - '51, 270.
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J. M. Sarbah, op. cit..,pp. 78 and 90. Emphasis supplied.
55 Ibid., p. 38
56
(1954) 14 WACA 569. But see comments of Woodman, Memorandum on the 
Reform of Land Law, op.cit. 71.
57 (1954) D.C. (Land) '52-'55, 265.
58 /~19597 G.L.R.67- Emphasis supplied.
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(v) Some Exceptions to the General Rule.
The problem of identifying members of the management committee and
the prevention of fraud on stranger-purchasers of group-held property have
been made even greater by certain exceptions to the general ruliec on land
59
alienation. In Vanderpuye v Botchway, it was held that children of 
a sixth-cloth marriage under Ga-Mashie law were entitled to a share of the 
self-acquired property of their father if he died intestate. This means 
that under Ga-Mashie law, although children may not be members of the family 
or principal members of the family*. they can challenge the validity of 
any disposition of the family property by a properly constituted management 
committee on the grounds that they have not been consulted. It follows 
that a stranger-purchaser of such property is required, not only to look 
for and identify the members of the management committee, but should also
make a further inquiry as to whether some persons such as the children
60
of a sixth cloth marriage have interest in the property.
Allott suggests another possible exception to the general rule similar
to the one just discussed. He suggests that a family may have a personal
6 X
right in family property- distinct from the communal right of the family.
For example, a family member may have a right of residence in a family
house. In such a case a sale of the house without his knowledge and conseht
62
may be sufficient to invalidate the transaction.
As Woodman argues, on the basis of this view, a right would be vested
in junior members and in persons like the children of a male member of
63
a Matrilineal family to prevent a proposed sale of family property.
But even in these exceptional cases it is not clear whether such persons 
need only to be consulted or whether their consent must also be had-.The
59
(1951) 13 W.A.C.A.164
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Sarbah reports Edmund Bannerman's opinion supporting this view. See 
his F.C.L., op. cit.^pp. 109-110. See also Ankrah v Odamten (1952) .
D. C. (Land) '52-'55, 72 where it was held that the consent of all 
such children would be necessary for the valid alienation of any such 
land. Woodman is of the view that this follows that each child will 
have a right of veto, unless the decision of all of them (perhaps by 
a majority vote) was needed. Memorandum on the Reform of Land Law, 
op. cit., p. 58.
A. N. Allott, Essays in African Law, London, 1960, pp. 305-6.
Ibid. See Woodman's comment in "The Alienation of Family Land in 
Ghana", (1964) I.U.G.L.J. 26,
Woodman, Memorandum. Op. c i t.* p . 58.
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question is whether despite their dissent a unanimous or a majority decision 
of the management committee will be sufficient to enable the latter to 
dispose of the property against the wishes of such persons. These are 
questions for which the customary law on the administration of groupheld 
property does not provide ready answers. The result is insecurity of ‘.title 
and costly litigation which has been a characteristic feature of land trans­
actions under the customary law. These problems are made worse by an unneces­
sary dichotomy which the courts draw between what is termed the wider and 
immediate family. A problem faced by the prospective purchaser of family 
land is whether he should deal with the wider or the immediate family.
Is the latter ■ a legal person of the customary law,separate and independent
of the former of which it is a mere segment?
If so, can the management committee of either of them dispose of the 
property managed by it in such a manner as to divest the other of any expectant 
or reversionary interest that it might have without the consent of the other?
The courts have not as yet provided clear cut answers to the questions
Cl A
raised by the distinction drawn between the wider and immediate family.
Bentsi-Enchill would seem to suggest, as a solution to the problems
of identifying the members of the management committee, the recording of
their names and thus create an official record which can assist outsiders 
seeking to transact business with the family. The onus of keeping the
65list of names up-to-date could then be placed on the family concerned.
The weaknesses of such a proffered scheme become" obvious when it 
is realised that for it to be effective as a means of providing information 
to the general public, it would require more than a mere production of 
records listing the names of the members of the management commitee of 
families, Stools, clans and communities of all sorts. Is the registration 
of names to be accompanied by photographs or identity cards of members?
How is the purchaser to know that the names :^given correspond to the persons 
he is dealing with?
For such a scheme to be effective, not only the names should be recorded
For authorities favouring the immediate family view, see Arthur v 
Ayensu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 357; Re Eburahim deceased Ansa v Ankrah,
(1958) 3_W.A .L .R . 317; Larkai v Amorkor (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 323; Enin 
v Prah / 1959/ G.L.R. 44,. For the wider family view, see Amarfio v 
Ayorkor (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 554; Pobee v Arhin / 1964/ 1.G.L.R. 42.
For.the discussions of the problem see G. 'Woodman, "Two problems in 
majtrilineal Succession", (1969) I.R.G.L. 6 ; Benvtsi-Enchill, op.cit. ^ 
pp. 132-142. Kludze, op.cit.^Ewe Law of Property, op.cit., p. 272. 
Allott, "Family Property in West Africa! Its Juristic Basis, Control 
and Enjoyment", in Family Law in Asia and Africa, ed.. J. N. D. Anderson, 
London, 1968, p. 132.
K. Bentsi-Enchill, op. cit p. 51.
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but the lands over which the management committee has control would have 
to be clearly defined, surveyed, demarcated and recorded. This would amount 
to a form of land titles registration. But if the past and present machin­
eries of land titles registration have failed to solve these problems primarily
due to the lack of facilities for accurate surveys, then the suggested
00
method of solution is less likely to succeed. Assuming that the mere 
recording of the names will have a measure of success, the exceptions to 
the general rule on alienation of group.ir held property could still operate 
to make the purchaser's title insecure, since he would not from the recordings 
of the names alone become aware of any junior member who might have acquired 
a right in the proprty the valid disposition of which would be subject 
to his consent.
It should be borne in mind that the inherent problems of the rules
relating to land administration under the traditional law did not come
67
into the open until colonial rule. Until European mining firms began the
acquisition of mining concessions on a large scale in the last two decades
of the nineteenth century and the introduction of permanent agriculture
at about the same period, economic activity involving land use and development
68was limited to the production of goods at a subsistence level.
Land rights were thus not keenly contested as there was no need to
do so. For such reasons, the inherent problems of the land tenure systems
remained dormant and were only stirred up by economic activity in the last
two decades of the nineteenth centurey. The introduction of the Crown
as
Lands Bill in 189^ and the Public Lands Bill of 1897,/we shall see,
were measures designed to deal, among other problems to be discussed, with
the insecurity of title to which the difficulties involved in identifying
members of the management committees and the uncertainties relating to
the rules governing the disposition of interest in land under the indigeous 
69
gave rise.
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See the discussion of the past and present machineries for land titles 
registration in the country and their failures at pp. 343-432
See the discussion of this point at p p. 79-97.
Ibid. .
See Part II.
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F Individual Rights in Land
It can be seen from the discussion of group-held property and its 
administration under the customary law, the prominence given to the control 
function of the management committees of families, Stools, village communi­
ties and clans. The attention which is often focused on the functional 
role of such committees with regard to the disposition of interest in land 
and the problems associated with it often tend to overshadow the role 
which the individual plays in land exploitation and the nature of his rights 
and interest in the property.
The value of discussing individual rights in respect of group-held 
property under the traditional law is that,it will assist in dispelling 
some misunderstandings regarding the nature of such rights and to expose 
the confusing use of terms suggesting similarities with terms in Anglo- 
American systems of tenure where none exist and dissimilarities where there 
are practically none. One of the main objections raised against the Crown 
and the Public Lands Bills of 1894 and 1897 respectively was that such 
Bills would have the effect of infringing individual rights in land or 
at least that,they would be employed deliberately to achieve that result. 
However, as will be seen from the discussion of colonial land policy, the 
Colonial Office in London accepted such arguments against the measures 
contained in the Bills partly because of certain misconceptions about the 
nature of individual interest in land under the indigenous law'.
Shedding light on the nature of such rights as a sequel to the dis­
cussion of colonial land policy is thus essential for the appraisal and 
analysis of the Land Bills from the right perspective. Such a discussion 
will also have the additional advantage that in Ghana where the introduction 
of a system of lands titles registration is under serious consideration,
attention will be focused on the definition and classification of registrable 
will be
interests which / some of the essential preliminary undertakings under 
the scheme.
As already indicated, individual rights in land under the customary 
law is community-based. In polities where the paramount title in lands 
is not vested in the Stool or the village community, such a title is vested 
in families, clans or lineages. The Northern Ewe and those societies of 
Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana described by Kludze and Pogucki respect­
ively provide good examples. The former quoting with approval the oft- 
quoted and criticised Report of Rayner , C. J.?. in which the latter stated 
that the notion of individual ownership was foreign to native ideas, says 
that this statement expresses the tradional view of Ewe Land law.
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He writes:
’’The acquisition or holding of the paramount or absolute interest 
in land by am individual was unknown to the Northern Ewe. The para­
mount or absolute interest in land could be vested only in the families 
or .dzotinuwo as legal entities ” 70
Undoubtedly, the paramount title-holding families or lineages within 
such traditional states are large agnatically organised lineages consist­
ing of extended families. Though there is a process of segmentation whereby 
nuclear families are formed, they remain part of the maximal lineage.
These minor segments regard themselves as part of the major segment and 
members of a large community united by common descent with an inherent 
right to benefit and enjoy property held by or vested in the group as an 
entity. Similarly, in his study of some extended families known to have 
common rights in land in the North, Pogucki found that the Baiun clan of
Wa in the Upper Region numbered 140 persons and the Ambrebissi clan numbered 
71
2,000 people.
Like the subject of the Stool, therefore, an individual member of 
the paramount title-holding family is a member of a community where his 
enjoyment of rights in land is community-based. In the property systems, 
differences iny^ules and the manner of land administration and the enjoyment 
of rights inpr?perc^rtainly exist in some respects in one community and 
another. However, there are certain central but common unifying factors 
which include:
(a) the community basis of enjoyment of rights in land;
(b) the recognition and protection of individually created wealth;
(c) the notion of land as a community asset and resource, an ancestral 
heritage which ought to be preserved for posterity and to which
no individual should be permitted to lay sin absolute claim sind;
(d) the similarity in the general rules governing the administration 
of the communal property.
(i) User Rights
Individual right:, in land under the traditional^tenure systems falls
a 72
short of ownership of the soil. It can be described as/user right.
70
71
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A. P. K. Kludze, op. cit., p. 1 1 4 j
R. J. H. Pogucki, Gold Coast Land Tenure, Vol. 1, p. 19.
Community-based prescribed user. right has been suggested as an 
appropriate terminology to describe such interest. See p.5 5 .
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The right of a member of the land holding group is to benefit from the
community resources, the land, through land exploitation. Rights are enjoyed
concurrently or in common in respect of things found naturally on the land.
73
The "public character" of such land is exemplified in the exercise of 
such common and concurrent rights. The collection of fruits growing wild 
on the land*such as snails and firewood, the cutting of timber for building 
shelter, common rights of game, water resources and the right to enter 
upon any unappropriated land without committing trespass are the exercise 
of rights all of which underscore the communal or "public character of 
landed resources."
Although such rights may be exercised in common, as soon as the indi­
vidual or group of individuals appropriate any of these things to themselves, 
there arises exclusive individual rights in respect of the thing appropriated. 
The acquirer of the thing is entitled to exercise exclusive individual 
rights in respect of it against the whole world including the community 
of which he is a member.
Apart from the common and concurrent rights the most important individual 
right is that which inheres as a result of membership of the community.
By the exercise of this right, individual and exclusive rights can be estab­
lished over a portion of the community's land. The individual cam do this
by means of any form of permissible development of the land. The wealth
created on the land through such individual enterprise becomes the creator's 
property to which he has an exclusive individual right. The property systems 
thus recognise and protect individual effort in the creation of wealth.
However, the important point which must be borne in mind in understand­
ing the indigenous land law is that, although through the exercise of his 
membership rights the individual cam establish exclusive individual rights 
to the. portion of the land reduced to occupation by him, he does not thereby
become "owner" of the soil in the sense in which the term ownership is
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applied to land under English conception of tenure. His right is to
exploit and to beneficially enjoy the wealth created on the land. So long
as he continues to use or work the land, no one else, not even the Stool,
the village or the family has a right to alienate that portion of the land
75
occupied by him without his consent.
Sir William Maixwell regairded all lands in the Colony as public lands 
having regard to their communal trappings, see p p . 137^140..
See the discussion of this point below at pp. 53-55.
The authorities on this point are numerous, some of which are the follow­
ing: Quarm v Yankah (1933) 1 W.A.C.A.80, Azuma III v Fissian (1955)
14 W.A.C.A. 287, Golightly v Ashirifie (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 676, Ohimeh v 
Adjei 2 W.A.L.R.275. Kakra v Ampofoa 2 W.A.L.R.303, Baidoo v Osei 3 
W.L.R.289 and Bruce v Quarnor /1959/ G.L.R.292.
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But where he abandons the land for a reasonable period of time so
that it can be said that he has no intention of working it any longer or
that no wealth of his creation is left on the land, that portion of the
land reverts to the community and other members are free to occupy it in
a similar way or the traditional land controlling authority may re-allocate
76
it without reference to the previous occupant. The right of the individual
can therefore be seen to be that of user and benefit. The retention of
such exclusive rights to the portion of the land developed depends largely
on continued occupation and user. If he is .no longer using the land or
ceases to derive benefit from it, and does not manifest his intention to
control or work it in the immediate future, then his individual right in
the land becomes extinguished.
It will be observed the way in which the indigenous society places
a premium on individual effort in the establishment of the right. The 
thus
systems /discourage unearned gain by making individual enterprise the means 
by which the right comes into being.
(ii) Duration of Interest
The way in which individual interest in land may come to an end or 
become extinct is through abandonment of land in effective occupation.
This phenomenon throws further light on the nature, extent and character 
of such rights or interests in land. Indeed, the extinction of the interest
on abandonment is in itself a logical consequence of how rights are estab­
lished. If the right does not usually come into being until some positive 
act of resource exploitation has taken place, a fortiori, the right must 
cease to exist on cessation of development and user.
Sarbah writing on the consequences of abondonment says:
"But where a person in possession of a portion of the public land 
abandons it, or his family have abandoned it for more than ten years
at least, the village headman and elders can allow another person
to occupy the same."77
Ollennu restates the ten-year period stipulated by Sarbah but lends
There is no specific period by which abondonment may become effective. 
It depends on the circumstances of each case. See Agyeman v Yarmoah 
(1913) D.&.F. "11 - "16, 56.
J. M. Sarbah, op. cit..,67. Emphasis supplied, it is interesting to 
observe that S & r b a h  himself regards unoccupied lands as public lands, 
although he sought to deny this later. See yfp. 155. .
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support to the view expressed in the Shai Hills Acquisition Case in which
it was observed that in communities where the mode of land exploitation
was by way of shifting cultivation, it might not necessarily amount to
abandonment by reason only that the land was not being used at a particular
time, either for farming or residence. Abandonment, the court said, consisted
not so much in allowing the land to lie fallow, but in the non-exercise
79
or non-active assertion of rights to immediate control.
It is not too clear what may amount to a non-active assertion of right, 
but it seems that an intention to exercise effective control manifesting 
itself in overt acts of protest against acts of others which are inconsis­
tent with the interest holders rights might be sufficient. It may well 
be that although an individual interest in land may become extinct on abandon­
ment, the courts will frequently lean against declaring land abandoned 
in order to protect individual interests in land.
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However, as Watson, J. observed in Agyeman v Yarmoah, not every
occupation of land cam be regarded as establishing rights thereover. He 
pointed out that it would be absurd to suggest that if an individual scratched 
a farm on a piece of waste land and then abandoned it, he or his descendamts 
could return years afterwards and oust anyone who happened to have followed 
them.
What must be noted is that apart from the ten-year period specified 
by Sarbah as at least, the time within which abemdonment might become effect­
ive, there is no other guide line as to what amounts to abandonment. The 
ten-year period cainnot be taken as an immutable stipulation and it appears 
that the courts have never regarded it as such. What constitutes abandonment 
must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
It is for this reason that the decision in Korney vKarkor must be regarded 
as unsatisfactory. In this case, the caretaker of a stool granted a building 
plot to the plaintiff, a subject of the stool. For six years the plaintiff 
did not put up the building and there was no evidence that he attempted 
to do so. The caretaker reallocated the same plot to another subject 
of the stool, the defendant, who promptly put up a building on the land 
in spite of the protests of the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued for trespass.
Reported by Ollennu, op. cit.,p. 177.
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ibid> ,at p. 179 *•
RO
D j F . "11 - "16, 56..
81 (1958) 3 W.L.R. 331 ,
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One of the grounds on which the plaintiff's claim was upheld was that 
the subsequent grant of the land to the defendant was without prior notice 
to the first grantee who was regarded by the courts as being in possession. 
Ollennu J., accepting the evidence of the Otsiame Yao Boi, linguist to 
the Asare Stool that the grantor Chief had no right to make the re-allocation 
without prior notice to the first grantee who ought to have been given 
a reasonable opportunity to exercise his right of effective occupation 
upheld the plaintiff's claim and granted the reliefs sought.
It is regrettable that although the court declared that it was applying 
the native law, the effect of this decision was to negate the very principles 
upon which the customary law thrives. It is well to remind ourselves that 
the rights of the defendant to ^acquire an interest in land or develop 
a vacant land is independent of a formal grant from the stool occupant 
or his representative. The defendant could have built on the land without 
prior requsstv from the chief. Merely by exercising his inherent right 
as a stool subject, he could have built on the land and acquired an interest
which the customary law will protect.
Surely, the chief had no legal right to oust the defendant on the 
grounds that the exercise of his right of land development was without
his prior consent. It is obvious that in city areas like Accra, it is
expedient for the chief to be allowed the exercise of land allocation powers 
so as to bring an order into the system. It is necessary that land development 
should conform to city lay-out plans. It may also be necessary that land 
acquisition by citizens should be regulated in relation to population so 
as to ensure fair and equitable distribution of land in the face of growing 
demands. Such regulation will rationalise the system so as to avoid conflict. 
It is for reasons such as these that the control function of the chief 
in land allocation can become vitally important.
But this does not make the validity of the exercise of the subject's 
inherent right in relation to the development of unappropriated land dependent 
on a formal grant or allocation by the chief. Therefore as in this case, 
where the defendant by his unaided effort, carried out development on vacant 
stool land with a formal grant from the stool, rights which he could lawfully 
have exercised without such formal grant, it is unfair to have deprived 
him of the fruits of his labour as did the court in this case.
It would appear from the evidence that the chief made the re-allocation 
without prior notice to the plaintiff. This may be a sufficient condition 
under certain circumstances to deprive the defendant the rights of beneficial 
enjoyment of his enterprise, but such a reason cannot be a necessary condition
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for the validity of the exercise by the defendant of his fundamental rights 
of land exploitation.
In this case, the first grant was made in 1946. The second grant 
was made in 1952, six years later. There was no evidence indicating that 
the plaintiff ever exercised any rights over the land granted to him except 
that during the course of development by the defendant, the subsequent 
grantee, he made protests. Are we to regard such belated protests as the 
"active assertion of rights" which will amount to effective occupation?
With respect, the court was wrong in assuming that the land was not abandoned 
by the plaintiff.
In fact, abandonment presupposes prior occupation. In this case the 
plaintiff was not shown to have at any time during the six years period 
ever physically occupied the land in question. Thus the land could 
be regarded as unappropriated land which the defendant lawfully occupied.
What the court ought to have done in this case would have been to order 
the chief to make a fresh grant to the plaintiff.
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As the High Court made clear in Oblee v Armah,
". . . b y  custom a subject who requires land for farming need not 
obtain expressed permission of the stool to occupy vacant land" . . . 
"But to avoid clash with other subjects already occupying land in 
the area it should become necessary for the stool to make an express 
grant of stool land to subjects for farming, all that the elders would 
do is to take this subject to the land and show him the boundary from 
which and the direction in which he can farm." 83
If this is the customary law, then an express : permission of the stool 
is not a necessary condition for the validity of land acquisition through 
the exercise of inherent community membership rights. In the case of growing 
towns like Accra, expressed permission may be required, as the court rightly 
observed in the above case, in order to limit the extent of land that each 
citizen may occupy so as to ensure fair distribution. Yet such a rule, if 
an exception to the general rule ought to be applied within the general 
principles and framework of the indigeous law which protects and places 
a premium on individual effort and industry.
As Bentsi-Enchill observes, the interest of exclusive occupancy acquired 
by the subject of a stool or family member in the portion of group-owned 
land reduced by him to his occupation is one of unlimited duration. It 
can lapse in the event of definitive abandonment, and in such an event
82
(1958) 3 W.L.R. 484. 
88 ibid, p. 492.
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becomes available for occupation by other members of the group.
What must be of considerable interest to us concerning the rules relating 
to abandonment is that they demonstrably show that individual interest 
in land comes into being principally through the exertion of individual 
effort. It manifests itself in the exploitation of resources. The cessa­
tion of the interest on abandonment is an indication that the right lies 
in the enjoyment of the fruits of one's labour. The wealth created on 
the land is regarded by society as belonging to the creator and not the 
soil;- itself. Individual rights inhere as a consequence of community member­
ship. But until such rights have been exercised by the exertion of individual 
effort in the creation of wealth on the land, the individual has no ex­
clusive claim to any portion of the land although he may acquire such rights 
by inheritance. In the light of these conclusions about the nature of 
individual rights in land under the customary schemes of tenure, the question 
is whether the notion of individual ownership of land as such, as the term 
is understood under Anglo-American conceptions of tenure, is a feature 
of traditional systems of tenure in Ghana? The answer to this question 
involves the consideration of some terminological issues under the customary 
laws which should receive attention in the next discussion.
G. Some Terminological Issues in the Customary Law
(i) Land Ownership
In discussing the vexed question of ownership in relation to land, 
the intention is not to delve into the usual jurisprudential questions 
concerning ownership and its related concept of possession in the common 
law. The aim here is to bring into relief some of the problems associated 
with the use of the English term to describe customary interests in land.
At present, Ghana regards the introduction of a system of land titles 
registration as a priority in her programme of land reform. The examina­
tion of the term "ownership" in relation to interests in land under the 
customary law is thus of great importance. Consideration of the issue 
will highlight some of the preliminary problems of identifying the various 
interests in land that may be recorded in the title register.
Under English law, to say of a person that he is an owner of a thing 
is tantamount to saying that he has a right to enjoy the property, to exclude
Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill, G.L.L., p. 280.
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others from using it and to destroy it if the law does not forbid it.
It imports in that person exclusive and unfettered right of alienation
and recovery of possession from all other persons. Such rights, as John
Saunders points out, are not conceived of as separately existing, but as
85
merged in one general right of ownership.
Although the term is generally applied to things, in so far as owner­
ship of land is concerned, the common law draws a distinction between ownership 
of goods and of land. Firstly, it did not recognise the possibility of 
goods being split up into lesser successive interests or estates, nor did 
it contemplate remainders or reversions in chattels. Secondly, the common 
law did not treat land as a subject of absolute ownership by the- King's 
subject, but only of tenure, the absolute ownership being theoretically 
in the Crown.®6
However, in practical terms, the holder of the greatest interest that
an individual can acquire under English system of tenure, the fee simple
absolute, is an absolute title in the sense that its holder can dispose
of it without reference to anyone. Under English system of tenure, it
is the person holding the fee simple absolute or the frehold title holder
that one would be looking for if the question arises as to who the owner
of a particular piece of land is.
The word ownership is however, a "nomen generalissimum" the meaning
of which may be gathered from the context in which it is used. Thus even
in England where the concept of ownership in relation to land is assumed
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by some to be "simple and intelligible to any human being anywhere",.
not infrequently Parliament finds it necessary to express the legal definition
of ownership in statutory form. Thus in the Housing Act of 1957, for
example, section 189(1) of the Act provides:
"'Owner' in relation to any building or land means a person other than 
a mortgagee not in possession, who is for the time being entitled 
to dispose of the fee simple of the building or land, whether in posses­
sion or reversion, and includes also a person holding or entitled 
to rents and profits of the building or land under a lease or agree­
ment, the unexpired term whereof exceeds three years."®®
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Words and Phrases Legally Defined, Vol. 4, London, 1969, p. 61.
86
Ibid.
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See S. _R. Simpson, "Towards a Definition of 'Absolute Ownership': II"
Q8 / 1961/ J.A.L.145 .
Emphasis supplied. See also section 295 of the Highways Act, 1959; the
Harbour Act, 1964, S.57; The Housing Act, 1964, S.44; the New Town Act, 1965,
S.4 and the Town and Country Planning Act, 1962, S.221. These definitions of 
land ownership would have been unnecessary if its meaning were so simple and 
intelligible to every one as Simpson would make it appear. With respect, his
view on the question is a narrow one which does not take into account its
special meaning in relation to land.
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The common features of all the statutory definitions of land ownership 
are the indications of a right in the 'owner' of the land to alienate 
the fee simple, appropriate the rent and to enjoy profits from the land 
owned by him. He can exercise these rights without reference to any one.
These statutory definitions of ownership do not appear to be different 
from the common law view of a land owner. What all these mean is that 
although under both English and customary law, land consists of a bundle 
of rights which can be created by the proprietor in various degrees of 
lesser successive interests or estates, in the case of the former the root 
of title is ultimately traceable to the fee simple absolute title holder 
as the proprietor or the owner. Such lesser interests are only encumbrances 
on the fee simple owner's title. Any one holding such lesser interest 
is not the owner of the land.
But when we turn to the customary schemes of tenure in Ghana, where as 
we have seen, the paramount title in lands is generally vested, not in 
individuals but in stools, families, clans and village communities, difficul­
ties arise as to where absolute ownership lies. Is it in the individual 
or the group as an entity or the management committee representing the 
group?
Such difficulties are clearly identified by Allott when he points
out that in the preparation of any register of title in England or other
countries whose law is based on English law, the most important register
will be that of "proprietors" entitled to "freehold" or sin "absolute title",
and there will usually be no difficulty in determining who such person
should be. But when we turn to Africsm countries where title to land is
governed in whole or in part by the rules of customary law, he stresses,
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the position is very different.
Outlining the problems, he writes:
"Here we are faced with such institutions as that of the paramount 
control of land by 'tribes', village-communities, or other territorial 
groupings, and that of 'family land' or 'clan land', where the individual's 
enjoyment of land may be fettered by the superiror rights of the social 
group to which he belongs. Often there is a hierarchy of such bodies 
or persons interested by different titles in the same tract of land, 
and the position is further complicated in many areas by the admission 
of individuals or groups of strangers not belonging to the land-controlling 
group into permanent or semi-permanent occupation."9^
89 — —
A. N. Allott, "Towards a Definition of 'Absolute Ownership'", / 1961/
J.A.L.99.
90 TVi ’ AIbid.
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In such cases, Allott asks, where is the absolute ownership to be 
said to lie? Which out of all the hierarchy of estates and interests in 
land which may be existing concurrently can be selected as being "truly" 
ownership?
These are the practical and theoretical questions raised by uncritical
application of the English word "ownership" for the description of customary
law interests in land. For instance, Sarbah says that:
"The head of the family owns the whole of the property, and all acqui­
sitions made by members of the family are made for him, and fall into 
the common stock." 91
What does this mean? Statements like these can mislead the foreign observer 
who understands land ownership in terms of Anglo-American conceptions of ten­
ure to think that the head of the family is a kind of land lord in whom 
the fee simple absolute or freehold title vests.
But as Sarbah himself points out, with the exception of the coastal
towns, where there is much contact with European ideas, "private property
92
in its strict sense does not exist." Confirming these views of the lack
of individual ownership within the customary schemes of tenure is Casely
Hayford who in his commentary on the Akan property systems observes:
"But in the customary law, we find no trace of individual ownership.
What the head of the family acquires today in his own individual 
right will in the next generation be quite indistinguishable from
the general ancestral property of which he was a trustee.
Rattray made a similar finding in Ashanti and states categorically that:
"There is in Ashanti no such thing as the individual ownership 
of land".94
One fact on which all are agreed is that the paramount title to land in 
the customary land tenure systems is vested in the stool, the village community 
or the family. When it is claimed that individual ownership of land does 
not exist under the customary law, it is the sense in which, as has already 
been explained, the term is understood in English law that the concept
is said not to exist in the indigenous systems.
Surely, the owner of land under the common law has an exclusive and 
unfettered right of disposal without reference to anyone. He may dispose 
of the entire property in the land and can do anything with it subject
J. M. Sarbah, op. cit.^p. 61.
92
Ibid., pp. 60-61.
93
J. E. Casely Hayford, The Truth About the West African Land Question, 
2nd ed., London, 1971, 56. Emphasis supplied.
94
R. S. Rattray, Ashanti, Oxford, 1933, p. 230.
51
only to the general laws of the country. The individual under the customary 
law has no such rights. 'His right is that of benefit from the wealth 
created through individual effort on the land. His interest at best may 
be regarded as sin encumbrance on the paramount title of the village community, 
the family or the stool.
It is in such respects that individual interest in land under customary 
law stands in a different order of property relations from those of the 
individual owner under English law. It is submitted that in order to avoid 
confusion and the creation of erronous impressiorS the term should be avoided 
and sparingly employed in the discussion of the customary land law.
Bentsi-Enchill does not agree with the view urged above. Applying
what appears to be English law ideas of rights which seek to define the
relation between persons and things, argues that the holder of any interest
less than the whole in property is apt to regard the limited interest
held by him therein as "owned" by him. Thus a main, he argues, may own
a farm or house or tree on land owned by another. The emphasis is on the
relation between the interest, however large or small, and the person in
whom it is vested rather than on the quantum of the interst owned by him.
Ownership, he therefore argues, could be defined as the widest liberty
95
that may be had in respect of the lawful uses of a thing.
It is in this sense of owning or belonging in accordance with which
a person may be described as the owner of a dependent or derivative interest
such as licence or lease or mortgage that the learned author regards the
96notion of individual ownership as "not foreign to native ideas."
What can be deduced from this argument is that individual interest in 
land under the customary schemes of tenure, though derivative or dependent 
as it is on the paramount title of the corporate group, is in itself an 
ownership. The principal difficulty about this argument, as indicated 
already, is that the term "ownership" does not sufficiently explain the 
nature and extent of such interests in terms of rights of benefit and the 
controls which the management committees exercise over the group-held prop­
erty. As the kind of interest which the term imports under English Common 
law with all its plenary dispositive rights stands in a different order
95
Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill, op. cit., p. 11.
96 TVs *Ibid.
52
of property relations from those of the customary interest, the use of 
the English term to describe the customary interest is bound to create 
erroneous impressions and lead to confusion.
Allott points out the defects in undue reliance on Hohfeld and his 
fundamental legal conceptions as a tool of analysis of African land tenure 
and stresses that such an approach is unrewarding and unilluminating 
because the Hohfeldian scheme does not sufficiently expose the hierarchical 
and concurrent aspect of African property systems or the radical distinction 
between control and benefit. He makes the point that in the analysis of 
property relations in African traditional law, we are concerned with permitted,
9
prescribed or forbidden modes of action in regard to exploitation of resources.
It is submitted that these distinctions between the nature of individual 
ownership under English law and individual interests in land under the 
customary law should continually be borne in mind in the analysis of customary 
tenure. It is the failure to recognise this dichotomy between African and 
Anglo-American land law that leads commentators, such as Simpson to adopt 
what would appear to be a very narrow view of ownership in relation to 
customary interests in land. He states that ownership is the foundation 
upon which all other rights in property stands "and comprises the entirety 
of the powers of use (including abuse) and disposal of what is owned."
Applying the Hohfeldian concept of rights in relation to ownership, he 
reached the erroneous conclusion that individual interests in land under 
African law necessarily amounts to ownership.
He writes:
"In seeking the owner, therefore, an adjudication officer must look 
for the person who has the residue of such power when every despatched 
and limited portion of it has been accounted for, and that person 
will be the owner even if the immediate power of control and use is 
elsewhere." ^8
The fact which the learned author overlooks is that unlike in England 
where it will be easy to "look for the person who has the residue of such 
power", under the customary law the task is not so simple. No single indi­
vidual has such residuary power when every despatched and limited portion 
of the land has been accounted for so as to be declared the owner. Such 
rights are usually vested not in individuals but groups or the collectivity.
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This is where the adjudication officers' problems will begin, particularly 
where the term "ownership" is applied to the customary law interests uncritic­
ally. Simpson mentions the Registered Land Bill proposed for Lagos
99
in which full provision for the registration of family land was made.
But it is the difficulties involved in determining the persons whose 
names shall be entered on the register as proprietors which are.partly 
responsible for the proposed Bill not being brought into force or applied.
It is submitted that Simpson's arguments are based on certain miscon­
ceptions about the way in which the customary law works both in theory 
and in practice and a failure to take into account the disparities that 
exist between individual interests in land under traditional African 
land law and individual ownership of land under Anglo-American law.
As a result of the difficulties and confusion which have already been 
pointed out, arise in connection with application of the term "ownership" 
to describe customary law interests in land, its use should be advisedly 
avoided. But if such a term is inadequate for application to individual 
interest in land under the customary law, what should be the appropriate 
terminology for describing it? This is the question which will be considered 
in due course.
(ii) The issue of an Appropriate Terminology
The individual interest in land under the traditional schemes of 
tenure we have been discussing has been variously described as "pre-emptive", 
"possessory" right or title, "usufructuary" title, "determinable estate", 
"customary" title, etc. None of these terms however, accurately describes 
the indigenous interest.
The obvious defect in all those terms is that it is hard to find 
any kind of interest under the customary law, an aspect of which may 
not be described by any of those terms. For instance, every kind of 
interest in land under the customary law can be described as a customary 
interest. It is therefore not meaningful to describe individual interest 
as customary interest. Similarly, every kind of acquisition of an interest 
in land involving occupation is a kind of possession. This possessory 
title is unhelpful either. In a similar way the term, determinable estate 
or title gives the wrong impression that the individual is a tenant of 
some Lord and whose right may therefore be determined at will.
Usufructuary title which.is widely employed is also unsatisfactory. 
Etymologically, its civil law connotations do not fit into the customary
"  Ibid., pp. 147-148.
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schemes of interest in land. For usufruct is the right to enjoy a thing 
the property of which is vested in another. The usufructuary could draw 
from the thing without altering the substance of the thing or damaging 
it.
But the customary law interest holder has a right to benefit from 
the land as a member of a group or collectivity to which the property belongs 
and not to another in the sense in which a usufructuary enjoys the thing 
belonging to another. Similarly, the civil law interest may be for life 
only while the customary law interest is inheritable and lasts so long 
as successors can be found and is not abandoned. The use of that term 
is therefore misleading in that it does not sufficiently illuminate its 
community-based and potentially durable character.
Having considered the ineptness of the terms such as these for appli­
cation to the customary law interest, Bentsi-Enchill suggests as an appropriate 
terminology, "Proprietary Occupancy" . 10 0 The word "proprietary" to emphasise 
the nexus of this interest with the allodial title of the owning group,
and its inheritability, and the word "occupancy" to suggest a broad confine-
. . .  1
ment to surface user, and the assertive character of the original acquisition.
With respect, this proffered terminology appears to suffer from the 
same sort of defects that can be associated with those already discussed 
above. One of the obvious flaws in the suggested nomenclature is that 
occupancy suggests that physical occupation or possession ought to be present
at all times in order that the interest must exist. But as cases, such
102 103
as Korney v Korkor and the Shai Hills Acquisition case already discussed
"have shown, beneficial interest in land may continue to subsist even where
the citizen has never been in physical possession or having been in physical
occupation, abandons it for a while but has the intention of physical control.
Thus occupancy suggests too readily actual physical possession as the only
essential attribute of the customary law interest.
To say that the word "proprietary" emphasises the nexus with the allodial 
title of the owning group and its inheritability seems to be a roundabout 
way of applying the term, ownership to the customary law interest within 
the framework of the Hohfeldian legal conceptions which seek to describe 
ownership in terms of relation between things and persons. We have already
Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill, op. cit., p. 231. See also his "Do African 
Systems of Land Tenure Require a Special Terminology?", / 1965/ J.A.L., 
Vol. 9, No. 2. p. 114, pp. 120-121.
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argued that this analytical scheme does not sufficiently throw into relief 
the community-based nature of the enjoyment of rights in land denoted by 
the exertion of individual effort in the creation of wealth, rights, the 
exercise of which is controlled by traditional authority administration.
These principal features of the customary law interest sire not sufficiently 
exposed or illuminated by the suggested nomenclature. Finally, it would 
appear that the term, proprietary occupancy casts dark shadows over the 
extent and duration of the interest which hsis been argued, subsists so 
long as the occupied or appropriated land continued to be used. The interest 
becomes extinct in the event of abandonment and the land reverts to the 
common fold. For these reasons, the proposed terminology does not seem 
to be apt for the customary law interest under consideration.
:.It may be suggested, though tentatively, that it will be appropriate 
to employ the term, "Community-based Prescribed - user Right" to describe 
the indigenous interest. "Community-based" to indicate the community-based 
character of the enjoyment of rights in land, connoted by the exercise 
of inherent rights premised on that membership. "User right", to throw 
into relief the nexus between use or the exercise of inherent right through 
land exploitation without which the right or interest may not be brought 
into being. "Prescribed" to expose and illuminate how the control function 
of the management committee representing the group or community in which 
the paramount title is vested regulates how rights to benefit may be exercised.
This suggested nomenclature has the merit that unlike the terms cur­
rently in use, such as "usufruct", individual 'ownership", customary "freehold" 
or possessory title, it does not convey any preconceived English or Civil
law ideas about the nature of the customary law interest or what it ought
to be. Thus students of the customary law are put on enquiry as to what 
the suggested terminology implies.
Inquiry concerning "community-based" leads to questions relating to 
the exercise of concurrent and common rights in respect of unappropriated 
land and the establishment of individual and exclusive rights through the 
exploitation of unappropriated land, rights the exercise of which ultimately 
depends on membership of a land-holding community or group, such as the 
family, stool or the village community. It is in this sense that the indi­
vidual right is community-based. Such rights are "prescribed" because 
the rules governing the enjoyment of the right say that the continued exist­
ence of the right or the duration of the interest depends on continued 
development and user. The interest is thus a "user right" - rights to benefit
from individual wealth created on the soil.
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Inquiry about the enforcement of the prescribed rules leads to questions
relating to the control function of the management committees. The sort
of investigations that the proffered teminology cam provoke leads to the
discovery and appreciation of not only the nature, extent and duration
of individual interest in land but the determination of such interests
104
which Allott describes as the rights of benefit and control.
(iii) The Trust Analogy
Another important area in which the misapplication of Anglo-
American terms tend to confuse issues under the customary land law, concerns
the administrative controls which the chief or the head of the family exercises
through the agency of the management committee over group-held property.
Sarbah for instance states that:
"At the most the King or head chief is but a trustee, who is much 
controlled in his enjoyment of the public lands by his subordinate 
chiefs and councillors as the head of a family by the senior members 
thereof." -^5
The inconsistency of the above statement with an earlier proposition
in which Sarbah claims that the head of the family "owns the whole of the
property, and all acquisitions made by members of the family are made for
106
him, and fall into the common stock" underlines the confusion and dif­
ficulties associated with uncritical application of English terms for the 
description of property relations under the customary law.
Danquah too falls into a similar difficulty in his attempts to describe 
the position of the chief in relation to stool lands when he writes:
"The stool occupier is in common parlance, or by courtesy', referred 
to as owner of the land; but he is only so in so far as he represents 
the sovereignty of the people, giving due respect to the sacredness 
of the stool . . .  In short Akan chiefs hold the lands and other stool 
property in trust for the Asamanfo and to the benefit of subjects
A. N. Allott, op. cit., p. 16.
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of the stool."
This tendency on the part of some jurists and students of the customary law
to employ English equity terminology to delineate the adminsitrative control,
of the chief or family head over group-held property is widespread in the
108
customary law literature. But the trustee beneficiary relationship which 
the application of the term such as "trustee" implies, confuses rather 
than illuminates the relation sought to be described.
Under English equity jurisprudence, the term trustee has acquired 
a technical meaning with a readily recognisable legal signification. Under 
such law, if a man is said to be a trustee of land for the benefit of another, 
it means that he holds the legal title to the land, while the beneficial 
interest in it vests in the cestui que trust. A trustee-beneficiary relation­
ship is established between the legal title-holder and those who are to 
benefit under the trust with certain legal consequences flowing from that 
relationship.
An examination of such legal consequences will reveal that the trust 
analogy with the position of the chief or family head is inappropriate.
The trustee under English law, being the legal title-holder, has the legal 
capacity to dispose of that title. However, under the customary law, neither.r 
the head of the family nor the stool occupant has such capacity. It is 
the management committee of the stool or the family which has such capacity.
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See Ollennu, op. cit., p. 46, where the author says: "the occupant 
of the stool or skin, or the head of the tribe or family, is a trustee." 
Gluckman also appears to see a relationship between property rights 
and status in African traditional law and seems to regard the King 
of Barotse land as the "ultimate owner of all lands", and referred 
to his position as that of a trustee. He says that the king may be 
called "owner of the land only as a trustee or steward for the nation".
See M. Gluckman, op. cit., p. 257. See also S. K. B. Asante, Property 
Law and Social Goals in Ghana 1844-1966, Accra, 1975, Parts I and II; 
and his "Fiduciary Principles in Anglo-American Law and the Customary 
Law of Ghana", (1965) 14 I.C.L.Q. pp. 1144-1188. The learned author, 
while recognising the inadequacies of the trustee-beneficiary relationship 
analogy with the customary law is of the view that the fiduciary prin­
ciples inherent in trusts under English equity law nevertheless exists 
under the customar^/cfri^^hus employs the term in his analysis of the 
customary land law. With respect, this is not a sufficient reason 
for using the term if it does not correspond to the customary law position.
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While the alienation of the legal estate in the property by a trustee 
to a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice of the 
defect in title could have the effect of extinguishing- the beneficial interest 
of the cestui que trust, the head of the family or the occupant of the 
stool will be unable to do so unless with the consent and concurrence of 
the accredited Elders. Under the customary law, the question of the purcha­
ser's bona fides is immaterial. If the rules prescribed by the customary
109
law are violated, the transaction is illegal and of no effect.
Under English law, the trustee is not expected to benefit directly
or indirectly from the administration of the trust property. Flowing from
this proposition is the strict accountability implied by the relationship.
The trustee is fully accountable to the beneficiaries. Unless the trust
expressly provides for remuneration in connection with the administration
of the trust, the law of equity will compel the trustee to disgorge any
benefit which he might have enjoyed under the trust.
As pointed out by Lord Upjohn, K.C., in In re Sykes, Sykes v Sykes:
"It is a rule of universal application that no one havirg fiduciary 
duties.to discharge shall be allowed to enter into engagements in 
which he has or can have a personal interest conflicting or which 
possibly may conflict with the interest of those whom he is bound 
to protect."
Fletcher Moulton (i. J., in a similar way was keen to point out in
111
Bath v Standard Land Company Ltd. that:
"the strength of the position of cestui que trust hitherto has 
been that no profit could be made by those administering the trust 
out of such adminsitration so that no question of self-interest could 
divert the trustee from the duty to use his powers solely in the interest 
of the cestui que trust."
Under the indigeous law, however, there are no such restrictions on the
traditional heads upon whom land administration responsibilities devolve.
The performance of their duties as land administrators does not preclude
them from beneficially enjoying rights in the property under their management
and control. The beneficial enjoyment of rights under the customary law
inheres as an incident of community' membership. The head of the family
109
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into account and decide on certain occasions that illegal alienation 
by the head of the family or head of the stool is not void but voidable. 
But such conclusions do not normally flow logically from the customary 
law on alienation of group-held property.
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sind the Stool occupant being members of their own communities have inherent
right to beneficially enjoy rights in the property administered by them.
Unlike the trustee under English law, therefore, no rule of customsiry law
prevents the chief or the family head from enjoying the property controlled
by him by reason only that he is discharging his duty as a land administrator.
Finally, the land-control function of the traditional authorities
under the customary law is devoid of the strict accountability which is
a characteristic feature of the trustee's obligations under English law
of equity. The Ghana courts have consistently held that neither the chief
112
nor the head of the family can be sued for an account. Although this
law has been severely criticised and its validity challenged on several
113
occasions, the law has not changed. The chief and the head of the family
are thus insulated from full accountability to the subjects on whose behalf 
they are supposed to be acting.
It can be concluded, in the light of the disparities that can be 
seen to exist between the duties and obligations of a trustee under English 
law and the land control functions of the stool occupant or the head of 
the family under the traditional law, that the trust analogy with the customary 
law is inadequate. It is submitted that, in order to avoid the wrong impres­
sions and confusions which such analogy creates in respect of property 
relations under the customary law it should be avoided in the law altogether.
H. Synopsis
This preliminary part sets out the main objectives of the thesis, 
the most important of which is to defend the land policies contained in 
the abortive Crown and Public Lands Bills of 1894 and 1897 respectively 
bf Sir William Brandford Griffith and Sir William Maxwell. It has been 
pointed out that the measures contained in the above mentioned Bills were
112
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prob lens of
designed to solve /insecurity of title and costly litigation which were 
central to land problems in the Gold Coast.
It has been pointed out that this work is not concerned with a detailed 
exposition and critique of Ghana land law. Hence, reference has only been 
made to the most central and common themes in the customary land law, the 
understanding of which will be necessary for the appreciation of colonial 
land policy in which the analysis of the Land Bills of 1894 and 1897 will 
feature prominently.
It has been indicated that the twin problems of title insecurity and 
costly litigation in the past and at present are due to:
(a) the recognition of tribal boundaries between the native polities 
that were absorbed into the Gold Coast Colony, although such bound­
aries remained undefined, undemarcated or unsuryeyed;
(b) the difficulty faced by outsiders in identifying the persons with 
legal capacity within the groups or community to deal with property 
and;
(c) the uncertainties concerning the rules governing the dispostion 
of interest in:', land and certain exceptions to such rules.
The wrong application of Anglo-American and Roman-Dutch law concepts and 
terminology for the description and analysis of customary schemes of interest 
in land has also been shown as one major source of confusion and misunderstand' 
ing of the customary law. Attention has been focussed on the nature of 
individual interest in land with a view to demonstrating that such rights 
are those of benefit from the land which is a community resource and asset. 
Such rights to benefit, as we have seen are controlled by prescribed rules 
enforced through the agency of the management committee.
The facts summarised here as a synopsis of the preliminary part, will 
have to be borne in mind continually in order to appreciate from the right 
perspective, colonial land policy to be discussed in due course. When 
this is done, it will be realised that Sir William Maxwell in particular, 
understood the land problenPof the Gold Coast well. The way in which he 
was quick to recognise the element of benefit and control as basic to the 
property systems, and how he saw that inappropriate application of Anglo- 
American tenural concepts and terminology to customary schemes of interest 
in land would obscure and confuse the nature of such interests, would 
be seen as clear demonstration of his wisdom and foresight.
P A R T  II
COLONIAL LAND POLICY
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CHAPTER I 
THE PERIOD OF THE MERCHANTS' RULE
A. Introductory
The independent government of Ghana inherited from the colonial admin­
istrators of her country in the past, some inconsistent and incoherent 
land policies, formulated without regard to their long-term effects on 
the socio-economic development of the country. Responsibility for this 
should not, however, be laid entirely on the shoulders of the colonial 
government.
A proper investigation and appraisal of the historical evolution 
of land tenure and administration during the Colonial era, would disclose 
that much of the land tenure problems of the past and the present were 
due in part, to some of the obstructive policies-: of the local native 
and European merchant opposition to measures adopted by the colonial government 
to solve land problems. In their opposition to the land legislation programmes 
of the government, the few native merchant class, lawyers and the educated 
elite allied themselves with European merchants, concession speculators 
and their African intermediaries to resist the land policies of both Govern­
ors, Sir William Brandford Griffith and Sir William Maxwell in the last 
decade of the nineteenth century.
The successful campaign against these policies which led to the with­
drawal of the Crown Lands Ordinance, 1894 and the Public Lands Bill, 1897 
is often hailed and regarded as an exemplary victory of a colonised people 
over an alien authority. Yet a closer examination of the facts would 
show that pressure from British firms, financial institutions and commercial 
bodies in Liverpool, Manchester and London was the decisive factor in 
changing the course of events at the time. Such commercial bodies as 
the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, the West African Traders Association 
and their lobbies in Parliament were able to bring pressure to bear on 
the Imperial Government and the colonial administration to withdraw its 
land legislation programmes.
Yet, if one takes a closer look at the factors and events which influenced 
the colonial administration to initiate such far-reaching programmes of 
land reform, one would discover and appreciate the political, economic 
and social justification of such measures. Some study and close scrutiny 
of their provisions reveal that the underlying principles of the land 
Bills were conformable to the indigenous notions of land tenure and resource
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management. The basic principles and philosophy of Griffith's and Maxwell's 
policies could be seen as the recognition of land in the traditional system 
as an economic asset and resource of the community to which no one individual 
should be permitted to lay exclusive and absolute claim. To ensure the 
fair and equitable distribution of such resources for the advantage of 
the community at large, the land and its resources must be efficiently 
managed and administered.
The Land Bills of the eighteen nineties sought to achieve this result. 
Despite any criticism that might be levelled at the colonial administration 
that it might use the law to further the economic interests of British 
firms, the fact remains that the provisions of the proposed Ordinances 
were mere re-statements of the traditional law. A distinction must be 
drawn between the possible manipulation of a good law to further certain 
interests for which it was not originally intended and the quality of the 
law in itself.
If these legislative measures had been allowed to become a reality,
most probably many of our present day land problems would be non-existent.
The present efforts to introduce a costly system of title registration, 
its
for example, with/possible economic and social consequences for the country 
would have been avoided. Instead, such fundamental questions as the efficient 
land use and development including the introduction of modern techniques 
of agriculture and food production would have been our major preoccupation 
in land matters.
The twin problems of uncertainty of title and costly litigation which 
have bedevilled land transactions in the past and the present day would 
continue to live with us unless there is a rethinking on a new basis for 
land administration on the lines similar to those objected to in the past. 
However, more than two decades after independence, the errors of the past 
have not been realised as yet.
Today, the various traditional states and communities comprised in 
the state of Ghana are still treated, in terms of land administration, 
as if they were separate independent polities. No clearly defined national 
land policies have been formulated as constituting the framework within 
which the development, use, management and administration of lands and 
its resources should be organised.
All these are happening in the face of obvious relative success of 
land administration in the Northern parts of the country, where colonial
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land policy was allowed to continue even after Independence. While
some African countries are beginning to realise the benefits of colonial
115
land policy of the past and returning to it, Ghana is making strenuous
efforts to undo even what remains of colonial land policy in the North 
116
of the country.
Our task in this part is to attempt an examination of the factors 
which influenced and shaped the Colonial administration's land policies.
It is proposed to do this from a historical perspective. In the evaluation 
of its chequered evolutionary history, attempts would be made to highlight 
the fundamental problems of the land tenure and administration systems.
Efforts would be concentrated on showing that there is the need for a reapprai 
sal of the land policies of the Colonial administration in the past, the 
main principles of which we believe are in accord with the fundamental 
principles of the indigenous systems of resource management and distribu­
tion. It will be submitted that a reappraisal of this kind could help 
in the formulation of future land policies based on the principle that 
Ghanaian citizenship should entitle one to enjoy rights in land in any 
part of Ghana and to do away with the present individual community membership
basis for the enjoyment of such rights.
B. The Nature of European Merchant Administration
It would seem anachronistic to talk of something in the nature of
colonial land policy in the Gold Coast prior to the last three decades 
of the nineteenth century. However, a brief historical review of the nature 
of European merchant administration during the period before the mining 
boom could assist in explaining some of the difficulties•concerning land 
tenure and administration in the closing years of the nineteenth century.
The Administration (Northern Territories) Ordinance of 1902, for inst­
ance, empowered the Chief Commissioner to take lands in those regions 
for public services and vested all lands then occupied as government 
property absolutely in the Colonial administration. See Cap. Ill,
1951 Rev., S.5. In 1931, the Native Rights (Northern Territories 
Ordinance1, Cap. 147, l£51 Rev., vested the administration of all 
lands in the North in the Governor for the common benefit of the natives. 
These laws were allowed to continue by L.I. 109 of 1963.
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Until about 1820, British trade to West Africa was controlled by the 
Company of Merchants trading to Africa. The most important function of 
the Company was the administration of the forts along the coasts of West 
Africa with governmental subsidies. The aim of the Imperial government 
in supporting the Company was the promotion of the export of goods from 
Britain to West Africa and imports from the latter region to the former 
country. This export-import trade, it was hoped, would stimulate industry 
at home and create a large market for British goods.
A Committee of nine men selected annually from the Ports of London, 
Liverpool and Bristol were entrusted with all the official and administrative 
responsibilities of the Company along the coasts of British West Africa.
In the Gold Goast, the head of the Committee was the President. Since 
the principal objective of the Company was the promotion of trade, it sought 
to protect the interest of British firms. In matters relating to politics, 
the preservation of the peace which was the necessary condition for regular 
commercial activites was their primary concern. The Committee of Merchant 
Administration, therefore, co-operated with the local chiefs and elders 
of the community. Being the traditional keepers of the peace, the Company 
policy was the establishment of a harmonious relationship with them. For 
this reason, no attempts were made to interfere with their traditional insti­
tutions or sovereign rights.
This was a convenient policy to pursue, for to assume sovereign rights 
would have involved the Company in the sort of expenditure associated with 
governmental functions. This the Company wanted to avoid and thus conven­
iently limited the scope of its administration to the British Forts along 
the Coast with its headquarters at Cape Coast.
For reasons of insecurity, European merchants were reluctant to venture 
into the interior of the territory. The intermittent raids on the coast, 
by the Ashanti constituted a sufficient deterrent to inland penetration 
by strangers. The export-import trade was^thus confined to the coastal 
towns near the forts. The trade was naturally in the hands of European 
merchants and a few educated native merchants and mulatos, most of whom 
were intermediaries between the European merechants and the local population 
of the hinterland. Few literate Africans and mulatos ordered goods, sometimes 
on credit from European firms and disposed of them through their intermediaries 
to their customers in the hinterland.
This kind of relationship between the coastal natives and the Committee 
of Merchants administration was adequate enough to accommodate the economic 
interests of British firms. Trade flourished and remained the basis of
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economic activity until the last > quarter of the nineteenth century. The 
traditional methods of collecting gold dust from river beds and sinking 
shafts and digging gold were employed to secure the gem in sufficient quantities 
to support the trade. The volume of trade was augmented by forest produce 
such as rubber, cola nuts and spices.
What is worthy of note about the trade is that, there was no need 
for European firms to get themselves involved directly in the production 
of these goods. If the Africans could procure them in sufficient quantities 
to support the volume of trade, then the risk of direct involvement by 
Europeans was not worth the trouble. As such, Europeans did not come face 
to face with problems relating to land acquisition. Not having been confronted 
with land tenure and administration problems, the tenure system remained 
uninvestigated.
Similarly, the acquisition of land by Europeans being unnecessary 
for the procurement of articles of commerce, the need to assume sovereign 
rights over the territory so as to be in a position to control land use 
and administration did not arise. Hence, until the late : nineteenth century 
when it became necessary for European firms to get involved directly in 
the mining industry, Britain did not take any direct or positive step to 
assume sovereign rights over the territory. Indeed, the British Government 
had, on many occasions, in official statements and Reports emphasised and 
reaffirmed the sovereign rights of the native traditional states. Their 
"immemorial" rights over lands within their jurisdiction were similarly 
proclaimed.
After the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, the need for increasing 
agricultural output to meet the growing demand for raw materials was recognised. 
The supply of these goods had dwindled over the years partly, as a result 
of the lucrative slave trade. With its abolition and the growth of the 
industrial revolution, the need was felt for encouraging legitimate trade. 
However, given the available level of technology and the technique of pro­
duction by native methods, the continued supply of goods in large quantities 
to satisfy demands could not be guaranteed.
See for instance, Leiutenant-Governor Maloney's statement as late 
as 1882 saying: "So far as I know there has not been any general acqui­
sition of the territory outside the forts on the Gold Coast either 
by conquest, cession, purchase or treaty, and if I am supported in 
my assertion Crown Lands do . not exist, whatever may be the right 
of the government in the matter of sovereign rights over land around 
the Forts for defensive purposes." Dispatch No. 511, 2 November,
1882, C.O. 96/144.
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One would have thought therefore, that at the height of the industrial 
revolution, attempts would have been made by British firms to get directly 
involved in'the mining and agricultural industries. Yet, this was not 
done. The climatic conditions, health hazards, lack of transport and communi­
cation and insecurity mainly due to internal wars proved formidable obstacles 
to European involvement in land development.
One way out would have been for the imperial government to assume 
sovereign rights over the territories so as to afford protection to the 
merchants and land developers. Prior to the mining boom of the eighteen 
eighties, this course of action was regarded as both politically and economi­
cally inexpedient. As pointed out already, the assumption of sovereign 
rights carries with it the burden of administration. It would require 
the maintenance of law and order which meant the keeping of a security 
force with the responsibility of policing the frontiers of the territory 
and maintaining internal security. This was thought to be politically 
and economically unwise to do. As the Under-Secretary of State declared 
as late as 1882:
"I do not think that the country is yet sufficiently civilized to 
require a universal detailed administration by European Commissioners 
nor sufficiently rich to pay for it ."118
Similar economic considerations influenced the Select Committee of 
House of Commons’ Report in 1842. In its recommendation on what the relation­
ship between the colonial administration at the coastal settlements and 
the Cape Coast chiefs ought to be, it recommended in one of its resolutions 
that these relations ought not to b e :
" . . .  the allegiance of subjects to which we have no right to pre­
tend, and which it would entail an inconvenient responsibility to 
possess, but the deference of weaker powers to a stronger and more 
enlightened neighbour, whose protection and counsel they seek and 
to whom they are bound by certain definite obligations."
As pointed out by Lord Hailey, it was largely as a result of this
recommendation and in order to define the nature of such ’definite' obligations
that Governor Maclean's successor negotiated the Treaties with a number
120
of Fante chiefs; Treaties which became known as the Bond of 1844.
It might be helpful to clarify certain points about these Treaties at this
early stage in the discussion. It is important to note that the Treaties
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were signed by certain Fante chiefs before the head of the quasi-colonial
administration along the coast. They were not treaties between the Gold
Coast as a colony on the one hand and the Colonial administration on the
other. The Bond was not regarded by the chiefs as having taken away their
sovereign rights. It merely acknowledged the power and jurisdiction of
the crown. Its chief objective was to reaffirm their acquiescence in the
trial of criminal offences by the Crown's judicial officers along with
the chiefs concerned. The customs of the native states be moulded according
to the general principles of English law and justice.
The treaty was silent on questions relating to land rights. In fact,
there was no pressing need for touching upon such sensitive questions when
the basis of the relationshp was purely commercial, an export-import trade
in which British subjects did not require land for actual production of
goods. The provisions of the Bond did not alter the traditional basis
of the relationship. It remained purely commercial.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, trade was considered
to be so bad that it was no longer commercially wise to retain control 
121
over the Colony. For this reason a Select Committee of Parliament 
went so far as to recommend withdrawal from the Colony altogether.
The Report said:
"On the Gold Coast there is no possibility of raising a sufficient 
revenue while the Dutch remain, and thwart our policy . . . The 
protectorate should only be retained while the chiefs may be as 
speedily as possible made to do without it. Nothing should be 
done to encourage them to lean on British help, or trust to British 
administration of their affairs whether militarily or judicial."122
As Lord Hailey has pointed out, one of the factors which influenced
the Fante Confederation to draw a constitution providing for an ambitious
programme of education, agriculture and improvement in communications
123
to be financed by taxation, was the recommendation of the Committee.
Under circumstances like these where there was feet dragging and 
vaseillation on matters relating to severeign rights and jurisdiction 
over the territory comprised in the colony, it would be fair to conclude 
that until after the Ashanti war of 1873-1874, one cannot meaningfully
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talk of a Colonial government, let alone a Colonial land policy. After
1874, however, the economic and political circumstances of the country
had so changed that British policy changed accordingly. Prominent among
these wgjftthe abolition of the slave trade and theA industrial revolution 
<***
in England which our next subject of discussion.
C. The Industrial Revolution and the Introduction of Permanent Agriculture
The industrial revolution which occurred in Britain in the eighteenth 
century and the abolition of the slave trade in the second half of the 
nineteenth century constituted two important events that influenced 
the pattern of land development in the Gold Coast. The abolition of 
the slave trade in 1807 served as a disincentive for local wars and 
this led to relative peace and stability. The growth of the industrial 
revolution was accompanied by increased demand for raw materials in 
the shape of agricultural goods and forest produce to feed factories 
in Europe. These factors had considerable influence on the ways in 
which the land tenure system evolved in the Gold Coast.
The abolition of the slave trade marked an important epoch in
the social and economic life of the Gold Coast. The Trans-Atlantic
Slave trade commenced at a time when the supply of gold and other commodities
began to dwindle over the years. It thus became one of the mainstays
of the triangular trade. Writing about the lucrative nature of the
trade, Lord Hailey wrote:
"If the Slave trade was sordid, it was nevertheless lucrative.
It is estimated that between 1680 and 1700 over 300,000 slaves 
were exported from West Africa, and that by the middle of the eighteenth 
century, the annual export amounted to 74,000 of whom possibly 
about half came from the Gold Coast."
It cannot be over-emphasised the fact that so long as the natives 
were able to supply commodities in commercial quantities to support 
the Trans-Atlantic trade, the need for either the Imperial Government 
to assume sovereign rights over the territory or for the European firms 
to engage in the direct production of goods in the Gold Coast was not 
felt. As Kimble has rightly observed:
124
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"Trade remained the main object of Anglo-African relationships, 
so' that when the Gold Coast settlements were taken over by the 
crown for a brief period, 1821-8 and more permanently in 1843,^25 
it was a case of the flag following trade and not vice-versa.
In line with this policy of non-interference in the political insti­
tutions of the colony, direct investment in land development by European 
firms was not seriously considered. Large scale development of land 
with modern equipment was thus out of the question and the slave trade 
remained until its abolition one major source of profit. In the words 
of Lord Hailey, "the chiefs of the time were the purveyors of slaves 
and the British concern with them was limited to the establishment of
120
relations which would secure the maximum supply of slaves for the trade."
With the abolition of the slave trade however, one of the major
sources of profit was lost to the traders. It became necessary to
supplement this loss by increasing the supply of precious metals, agricultural
goods and forest produce. The demand for these commodities grew with
the expansion of industry in the wake of the industrial revolution.
The desirability of encouraging legitimate trade in place of the slave
trade became obvious. These events had a direct bearing on land use
and development in the traditional systems of tenure.
The industrial revolution in England was accompanied by great increases
in its population. The increase in population gave rise to increased
demand for toilet soap and skin cream. By the end of the eighteenth
century, palm oil became one of the principal raw materials used in
127
the manufacture of stearic candles.
What the industrial revolution actually meant was the substitution
of metal for wooden machinery. Machinery was extensively used in the
process of manufacturing goods. For the machines to run smoothly, the
aid of lubricants such as fats and oils were required. By 1865, railways
alone required for truck grease in England over 13,000 tons of lubricant 
128
annually. British traditional sources of supply could not satisfy all the 
requirements. The palm oil trade in West Africa of which the Gold Coast was 
a part became an important source of supply during the period; 128&-
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These developments afford a partial explanation of- the abolition 
of the slave trade. Humanitarian considerations inspired such men as 
William Wilberforce, Granville Sharpe and Bowell Buxton at the Close 
of the eighteenth century to begin the movement aimed at the abolition 
of the obnoxious trade. But of equal importance was the change in the 
direction of commerce and industry. The need was felt at this time 
to check the further glutting of the British sugar market. It was believed 
this could be done by regulating the importation of sugar from the West 
Indies. An indirect way of achieving this result was the prevention 
of export of slave labour to the West Indian sugar plantation.
British sugar planters therefore, began an active campaign for
129
the abolition of the slave trade. By this time the British economy 
which had hitherto depended heavily on the West Indies was changing 
with the rise of the industrial revolution. What British industry needed 
was no longer slaves but raw materials to feed her growing industries.
The acquisition of such raw materials as palm oil, kernel oil, ground 
nuts, cotton, rubber and later cocoa and coffee became vital.
The effect of the abolition of the slave trade and the response
to growing demand for fats and oil from West Africa at the close of
the eighteenth century is reflected in increased export of the commodity.
Soon after the formal abolition of the slave trade exports of palm oil 
130
leapt high. The effects of these developments on the physical develop­
ment of land and the exploitation of its resources should, however, 
not be overplayed. Even at this period of increased demand for raw 
materials, such demands were not necessarily followed by any extensive 
cultivation of the land on such a permanent basis as to affect the tenure 
system significantly.
The reason was that most of the agricultural products and forest 
produce could be procured without necessarily having to grow them.
The oil palm, the nuts and kernels of which provided the fats and oil 
could grow wild. Many of the cola and rubber trees, and many of the
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spices which the natives supplied, grew wild. Hence, these commodities 
could be supplied merely by searching through the forest involving no 
large scale cultivation of the land. In the relatively primitive communi­
ties under consideration, there was little incentive for any large scale 
or extensive cultivation of the land. Production was largely limited
to subsistence levels. Hence, there-was very little demand for land,
131
the supply of which was far in excess of everyday requirements.
Although there was no official policy to encourage the natives
to go into commercial agriculture, some private firms tried to create
what Kimble has called "a race of native capitalists" in West Africa.134
The scheme devised to assist such natives however, involved the buying
and selling of goods which had no direct bearing on any land development 
133
scheme.
The acquisition of wealth by some natives meant the availability 
of capital for investment in the exploitation of land and its resources 
if they were minded to do so. For example, between 1837-40, James Swanzy 
was managing a coffee plantation on the basis of "pawned" labour.
The estate was later purchased by Reverend J. B. Bannerman, a Wesleyan 
general superintendent. The latter developed the area into a self-supporting
Christian community and an agricultural training centre with some degree
- 134of success.
Similarly a group of Cape Coast traders brought in an American
expert to advise them on the planting of 25,000 "cotton bushed" and in
1864, the Basel mission arranged the shipment of cotton grown in the 
135
Transvolta area. Although these projects suffered from labour shortage 
and lack of transport and communication facilities, the introduction 
of commercial agriculture based on permanent cultivation of the soil
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had begun in earnest.
However, these developments were not widespread on a scale that 
could affect the land tenure systems significantly. One would have 
expected official reaction to these developments to be the encouragement 
of the natives to step up development in this direction. But as McPhee 
has rightly observed, when relations were purely commercial, little 
responsibility was felt for the native as to the way in which they should 
develop. Things were thus left to be organised by the Africans themselves.
Despite the lack of guidance from official sources, something happened 
at the last quarter of the nineteenth century which changed the attitude 
of the natives to agriculture. This was the development of the cocoa 
industry. It had a far-reaching effect on the evolution of land tenure 
in the traditional system. Land use patterns in many parts of the country 
were transformed from mere shifting cultivation to the acquisition and 
development of land on a permanent basis.
The cocoa industry succeeded in the traditional system of tenure 
mainly because it did not require a large capital outlay for its development. 
The only capital the farmer needed was the cutlass and the land. Both 
could be obtained without difficulty. Apart from this factor, it should 
be noted that the cocoa industry is not generally difficult to manage 
by peasant farmers without expert advice. The cocoa tree provides its 
own manure. During the dry season, it sheds its leaves. When the under­
growth is weeded, it is left to dry on the farm. During the wet season, 
the leaves and weeds rot on the farm and serve as manure for the cocoa 
trees. This process continues for thirty years or more with increases 
in yields.
What is more, it is not difficult to preserve the cocoa seed.
It is a simple job of drying the seed in the sun after its fermentation.
To treat the seed in this way does not require any complciated scientific 
method. Storage facilities are provided by the buyers who normally 
supply the seller with cocoa sacks. There is often an added incentive 
that there is always a guaranteed price for the commodity so that the 
farmer can estimate his earnings. This means that it is not difficult 
for the money lender to give the farmer loans to devlop his farms.
It must be observed and borne in mind the fact that the success of the 
cocoa industry depends on these factors and not on any particular system 
of tenure.
As the superior technology of European mining firms ousted and 
killed the indigenous mining industry in the late nineteenth century,
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the economic opportunity provided by the cocoa industry was quickly 
recognised and seized and utilised. Reasonable expectation of pecuniary 
rewards from the cocoa industry thus encouraged the ordinary man to 
battle with the virgin forest with his proverbial tools of the hoe and 
the cutlass.
The rapid growth of this industry attracted a large number of farmers
and farm labourers from the Western part of the territory to the Eastern
136
Provinces of Akim Abuakwa in search of farming land. Few years after
its introduction, an experimental shipment of cocoa began in 1891 when
137
80 pounds weight of the commodity was shipped to England. Initially,
some European firms also planted cocoa on their concessions. Palm oil
corporation for instance, acquired two concessions in 1893. Over 200
133
acres of land was cleared and planted with cocoa and rubber.
This development gave rise to an increased demand for land by the
natives in areas beyond their traditional states and communities. While
this was happening, the increased demand for concessions which accompanied
the mining bocm during this period led to the high appreciation of land
values. In addition to its sentimental and religious significance,
land began to acquire monetary value. This trend increased with the
expansion of mining and cocoa growing activities. As land values appre-
or
ciated while boundaries remained unsurveyed ^ undefined-/ oundemarcated, 
the twin problems of uncertainty of title and costly litigation reared 
their ugly heads.
These problems would have been left for the natives themselves 
to solve, but the direct involvement of British firms in the mining 
industry compelled the flag to follow the trade at last. It is the 
development of the mining industry by British firms and the problems 
which attended the concession grants by native chiefs that we shall pre­
sently discuss. It will be seen from this discussion how the mining 
and the cocoa industries' development combined to affect the land tenure 
system and the problems associated with its administration.
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In 1916, the company shipped 61,772 lbs of its cocoa. In the follow­
ing year, it shipped 131,330 lbs of it in addition to 68 tons of 
palm kernel. In 1918 the company made a shipment of 33% tons of 
cocoa beans.
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D . The Development of the Mining Industry
Gold, cola and slaves had been sent across the Sahara to the Middle 
and Far East from very early times. Some of these commodities, parti­
cularly gold and cola nuts, were obtained from the Northern hinterland
139
of the Gold Coast. This trans-Saharan trade was interrupted by the 
collapse of the ancient empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai in the thirteenth, 
fourteenth and sixteenth centuries respectively. However, the arrival 
of the Portuguese in the Gold Coast in 1471 marked the beginning and 
the revival of the export of gold and forest products from the Gold 
Coast, this time, not across the Sahara to the fair and middle East, 
but across the Atlantic to Europe and the Americas. Yet, as has been 
pointed out earlier, it was not until the late nineteenth century that 
Europeain firms began the development of the mining industry on modern 
lines.
As early as 1554, the first Englishman to visit the Gold Coast,
Captain Thomas Windham, and his crew returned to England with 150 lbs
140
of gold dust procured from the natives of the Gold Coast. This could 
be seen as the beginning of more than four centuries of trade in gold 
and other products between the Gold Coast and the United Kingdom.
As noted earlier, the supply of goods to support the trade was 
controlled by native intermediaries and some Europeans who settled 
near the Forts along the coast. To ensure the continued supply of commod­
ities to support such a large volume of trade for so long a period, 
the introduction of modern techniques of mining and agriculture was 
necessary. This implied the supply of machinery and the necessary inputs.
But for reasons of insecurity, inland penetration was kept to the barest 
minimum. The frequent internal wars, sometimes encouraged by the slave 
trade, the unfavourable climatic conditions and tropical diseases kept 
Europeans away, thus preventing them from taking the risk of investing 
in this area.
The Portuguese were known to have worked two mines at Abrobi and
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Aboasi. But the former collapsed in 1662 owing to badly structured
141
tunnels. The latter met a similar fate in 1836 during an earthquake.
These misfortunes were regarded as supernatural vengeance and were some
of the reasons why the supply of gold remained in the hands of the natives
until the late nineteenth century. Thomas Hughes of Cape.Coast regarded
as the pioneer of modern mining in the Gold Coast imported heavy machinery
and began mining at Wassaw. After striking a rich vein in 1861, he
was forbidden by the chief to continue its exploitation and his equipment 
142
was destroyed.
However, after the defeat of the Ashanti in 1874, the military 
power of Ashanti no longer constituted an effective barrier between 
the coastal areas and the interior of the territory. Direct trade between 
European firms and people of the interior became easier. The abolition 
of the slave trade also had improved the internal security situation. 
Although the Colonial Office was opposed to the extension of political 
authority, it had no objection to the extension of trading frontiers 
northwards.
For these reasons, some adventurous and enterprising Europeans
began to push their trading activities inwards.
A Frenchman, Mr, J. M, Bonat was for instance a captive of the
Ashanti, and while in captivity he tried to find out what he could about
the gold bearing regions of the Kingdom. After his release, he undertook
a prospective journey to Salaga in the North of the country. He went
back to Europe where the results of his findings were given wide publicity.
He returned to the Gold Coast in 1877 and acquired a concession for
143
mining at Tarkwa on a modern scale. In 1881, a rich reef was struck 
at Abosso. The news spread fast and a greater interest in the mining 
industry was rekindled.
Interest in the mining industry and the wealth of the country was 
given added impetus by newpspaper reports and stories told by soldiers 
returning home from the Ashanti war, concerning the wealth and riches 
of the Kingdom of Ashanti. The Daily Telegraph, for instance, reported
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that the British Gold Field of West Africa Ltd., had acquired about
7,000 square miles of territory containing "rich deposits of gold, both
alluvial and reefs, copper, silver, cinnarbar and other metals". It
reported the presence in the Gold Coast of "ebony, cedar, boxwood, green-
heart, camwood, petroleum, rubber, oil palms, gums and fibre of valuable
144
kinds in immense quantities."
The editor of the African Times when promoting shares for some
companies, drew the attention of readers of his paper to the fact that
although the mines of the Gold Coast had not been thoroughly investigated
until lately, they had been the source of supply of gold for many years
and were among the most productive in the world. His assessment of
their richness was based on the fact that gold of the value of several
millions of pounds sterling exported from the ports of the Gold Coast,
derived solely from the surface washing of the metal or the rude crushing
1-
of gold-bearing quartz which was carried on by the hands of the natives. 
Lacking scientific skills and mechanical appliances, he pointed out, 
the natives had been unable to work below 70 or 80 feet from the surface, 
but the richest ore was to be found at and below that depth.
Apart from newspaper reports, travellers to the interior gave tanta­
lizing accounts of what they saw as the immense wealth of the country. 
George Ferguson, in his travel to Attabubu in 1890, took special note
of traditional mining and gave interesting accounts of nuggets worth 
146
£100. Eva Meyerowitz claimed to have seen in Wassaw stretches of 
earth bordering the streets where gold dust sparkled, even without the 
benefit of rain.
Some of these accounts were at times exaggerated deliberately by
certain concession speculators so as to increase the market value of
their concessions. Prince Owusu Ansah's accounts were for example,
intended to achieve such a result. He gave tantalizing accounts of
147
the Asantehene's wealth. It was believed that the richest deposits
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lay in what were called the fabulous Kong mountains which lay to the
north west of Ashanti and Techiman. It was thought these mountains
stretched right across the hinterland of the Guinea coast from Sierra 
148
Leone.
These interesting reports about the wealth of the country were
given credibility by official statements and reports. In 1895, Sir
John Kirk, Chief Commissioner who had arrived in England in the steamer
"Accra", in the course of an interview said the Western coast was far
superior to the Eastern, both in richness of its produce and in its
mineral wealth. The traders, so far, had only touched the fringe of
its capacities. He said the Gold Coast was a great country with a most
149
promising future and would "handsomely pay development."
In the 1899 Colonial Annual Reports, for example, it was stated 
that the mining industry was on the increase and that several companies 
had been formed during the year with a view to commencing mining operation.
It disclosed that experts who had gained experience in the Transvaal 
gold fields said that the banquette reefs in the Gold Coast were both 
similar and higher in grade than those in the Transvaal. It was estimated, 
the Report said, that there were about 20 miles of banquette reef formation 
in the Western Province. If estimated on the basis of those of Johannesburg, 
the Report continued, it would contain 13 million tons of banquette 
reef from which about 40 million pounds sterling worth of gold could 
be extracted during a period of ten years operation. It concluded that 
with an initial capital or investment of one million pounds sterling, 
the area of land described could return one and a quarter million pounds 
sterling annually.
These official reports were intended to furnish information to 
British firms and capitalists whose appetite for the exploration and 
the exploitation of the mineral wealth of the country might be whetted.
In response to these accounts, many firms followed Bonat's example and 
formed companies either for mining or for buying and selling concessions 
on speculative basis. Tarkwa became a mining centre where by 1897,
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the labour force had grown to about 554 including 17 Europeans. In the
Wassaw District there was a labour force of 628 including three Europeans, 
while in the Prestea area there was a labour force of 238 men including 
three Europeans.
It was not only the mining industry and speculation in mineral conces­
sions in which European firms and individuals became involved. In the 
1887 Report of the Commission appointed to investigate the agricultural 
potent'ial of the Gold Coast, it was noted that the forests of the country
formed an "untouched mine of wealth" which only required the introduction
152
of a cheap method of transport to be developed. The Commission expressed
dissatisfaction at the way in whcih the colony was importing timber from 
the United States while there was plenty of it in the colony. The report 
noted that the forests on the banks of the Ankobra, Prah, Amissah, Ayinsu 
sind Volta rivers contained "millions of cubic feet of valuable timber 
which might be cut within a short distance of the stream and floated down 
the mouth at the smallest possible cost for transport."
Three years after the publication of this Report, the situation com­
plained about changed dramatically. The felling of timber and lumbering 
became an important feature of the forest resource exploitation at the 
close of the century, its export increasing with the years. In 1889 for 
instance, the total export of mahogany from the Colony amounted to 250 
tons. This increased to 750 tons in the following year and between 1893 
and 1894 about 11,000 tons were exported to Liverpool alone, apart from
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sundry shipment to Hamburg and London where the demand was on the increase.
Unlike gold mining, lumbering did not require at the outset, a large 
capital outlay. The way in which timber was gathered during the period 
involved only the cost of labour, transport and supervision. Apart from 
the latter, these were cheaply obtained. These were added incentives 
for European and the few native concessionaires to clamour for concessions;; 
from native chiefs. These factors, the ^'development of commercial agriculture 
based on the permanent cultivation of the soil, increase in the exploitation 
of forest resources in which lumbering was the predominant activity, and 
above all, the euphoria with which mining concessionaires and speculators 
scrambled for concessions from native chiefs, brought into focus, certain 
fundamental problems concerning the land tenure system and which could
no longer escape official scrutiny. It is the problems arising from
these phenomena that we shall presently consider.
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It was reported by the District Commissioner for Tarkwa that 1,414 
oz of gold was produced within three months in Tarkwa. See District
Commissioner for Tarkwa to Governor, 17 Aprils. 1897, C.0. 96/297. It was
reported that in 1885, a total of £10,570,109 worth of gold was exported 
from the Gold Coast. See Maxwell to Chamberlain, 24 July, 1897,C.0.86/297.
152 Accounts and Pepers relating to H.M. Possessions, 1890, No. 110,'XHC1/5239 
152
C.0. 96/297.
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CHAPTER II 
THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER
A. Problems arising from the new economic order
Perhaps, at the root of the land problem was what McPhee has described
as the clash of an advanced civilisation on comparatively unsophisticated
peoples who, as in India, were in danger of losing their lands on the
introduction of a commercial and monetary economy by the manoeuvres
of concessionaires and money lenders, and accordingly needed protection
154
as much against their own simplicity as against the cunning of others.
The four centuries of European commerce in the Gold Coast had an 
important impact on the socio-economic lives of the people. It intro­
duced a market economy based on the exchange of goods for money. There 
also emerged a wage economy founded on employer-employee relationship.
This new economic system existed side by side with the subsistence 
economy in which the production of goods was limited to the amounts 
necessary for the sustainance of the family. These changes made serious 
inroads in traditional conceptions of tenure, social and economic values.
Religion played a significant role in matters relating to land 
tenure and administration in the past. In most communities, it has 
been pointed out, the land was regarded as a community asset and resource, 
an ancestral heritage to which no one individual should lay absolute 
claim. For this reason, it was believed that the ancestors would not 
tolerate any absolute alienations of the property which would have 
the effect of depriving the future generations yet unborn of the use 
thereof, unless it was absolutely necessary and was in the interest 
of the community to do so. Compliance with the equitable prin­
ciples underlying the distribution of the community resources were 
enforced by the fear of the ancestors' wrath which might be visited
154
McPhee, op.cit., 140.
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on "offenders”.
But continued compliance depended on the continued fear of the 
ancestors and the prevalence of superstition in the society. However, 
the impact of European economic, social and religious ideas produced 
certain attitudes in the most influential members of the community.
These ideas were in conflict with traditional norms. In illiterate 
communities where the ability to read, write and speak English assured 
one a privileged position in the community, the tendency was to imitate 
the life styles of the educated natives. Such literate natives had 
their formal education and training in mission schools. In such schools, 
t"he Christian religion preached the omnipotence of God and his power 
over the devil. It abhorred idolatory and ancestral worship.
To the educated, therefore, ancestral worship and superstition 
were marks of backwardness. The fear of the ancestors or the conception 
of land as belonging to them no longer constituted an effective barrier 
to the free alienation of property. Reinforcing these views was the 
reception of certain Anglo-American notions of tenure. The members 
of the African middle class who wielded considerable influence and 
commanded respect in the society were the lawyers. They were not 
only the intermediaries between the concessionaires and those responsible 
for land administration in the traditional system, they had a formative 
influence on the customary law.
Trained in the English law of property and conveyancing, their 
attitude was to employ Anglo-American terminology in the drawing up 
and the preparation of deeds of conveyance. Instead of investigating 
their own systems of tenure in order to deduce the appropriate terms 
to describe the interests which were transferable or the respects 
in which they differed from disposable interests under English law, 
the tendency was to use the English forms as the standard and to bend 
the customary ideas to conform with English feudal theories of tenure 
and terminology.
One of the reasons why it occurred neither to the native lawyers 
nor the colonial administration to carry out any investigation of 
the traditional system of tenure was the belief that English law would
-d *
necessarily be suitable for the territory. As McPhee has pointed
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For the discussion of religious aspect of land, see A. N. Allott, 
The Ashanti Law of Property, Stuttgart, 1966, pp. 139-143; K.
A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System 
of Ashanti, London, 1951, pp. 40-42 and Kludze, op.cit., pp. 105-
m r,---
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the nineteenth century was a period when the comparative analysis
of institutions of varying circumstances and place was considered
unimportant. English law was regarded to be the best law for any
156
country at any state of development. English law and feudal ideas
introduced the conception of individual ownership as a necessary step 
leading to the alienation and commercialisation of land.
Hence, before the problems associated with these developments 
came into ‘tbe fo^.the colonial administration encouraged this trend 
which was seen as a civilising influence on the traditional law.
Sir William Brandford Griffith (Junior) son of Governor Brandford 
Griffith for instance, suggested in 1894 that land in the Gold Coast 
as in all other places under civilised government should bear the 
burden of taxation, as such it was better that "the wretched" system 
of traditional tenure be got rid of as soon as possible before the 
mixed application of English law and native custom got things into 
an inextricable tangle.
It was soon to be realised that the failure to investigate the 
tenure systems and to dichotomise between traditional schemes of interest 
in land and English notions of tenure was a serious error. The
use of English terms to describe interests affecting land in the tradi­
tional law began to cause confusion and led to serious disputes.
As we have seen already, under the traditional law, absolute title 
in property is vested in corporate juristic entities such as the stool, 
the family, the clang or the company.
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Ibid., p. 158. Sarbah, the first legal writer on the customary 
law whose work was published in 1894, employed such feudal terms 
as "freehold" and "trustee", terms which do not represent the 
traditional law. See his F.C.L. 3rd.ed., London, 1968, pp. 65-66
Brandford Griffith Junior to Sir William B. Griffith,, 29 August^
1894. In Enclosure No. 2 C.0. 879/46, 21.
Maxwell summing up the debate on the Land Bill of 1897 in the 
Legislative Council said what it was necessary to do was to direct 
efforts towards the discovery of what principles lay at the root 
of African notions about land tenure, and the first thing to do 
was to get rid of English real property terminology and associations 
which were inseparable from the use of such terms as "freehold" 
and "leasehold". See C.0. 96/295, 484 ?
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Absolute titles not being generally vested in the individual, the
customary law requires that only accredited persons with the legal
capacity to dispose of such property could validly alienate it by
following certain laid down procedures.
Yet, in many of the documents disposing of concessions, language
was employed implying outright alienation of the group-held property,
although the procedural requirements of the customary law were not
complied with. The problem here was that the signatories to the documents
disposed of interests far in excess of what they though they were
159actually alienating. The problem was succinctly described by
H. J. Bell in 1893 as follows:
"The would-be concessionaire, who is usually a native with a 
certain amount of education goes to the chief of the locality 
where mahogany or gold is to be found and, in exchange for a 
few pounds induces him to affix his mark to a formidable-looking 
document which conveys to the concessionaire complete rights 
over a stretch of country, varying in extent from a few hundred 
yards square . . . to 30—40 miles in dimensions. The deed is 
usually a lease for 99 years and sets forth all various conditions 
and also the rent payable." 160
The question which must be asked is whether, under circumstances . 
of the kind described above, the illiterate chief understood the nature 
and quality of his acts relating to the transaction in question?
Did he know what he was doing? Take the case of Prince Albert Owusu 
Ansah's concession of 22 June»1894 for example, where chief Quacoe 
Attah purported to have granted him 200 square miles of land for a
1 fil
term of 99 years for £100. The lease described the grantor chief
as "bona fide owner" and conceded to the grantee the following rights:
" . . .  all rights, easements, privileges and appurtenances there­
to . . .  , with all mines, minerals and precious stones, trees 
and substances and things found upon and under any part or parts 
of the said lands, estates, hereditaments and properties, with 
full and absolute power and liberty for the said lessee, his 
heir, executors, administrators and assigns. For whom it shall 
be lawful . . .  to plant and transplant, to cut and convey away 
all trees, shrubs, vines and plants of any kind whatsoever found 
upon the said lands . . . estates . . . (and) to construct and 
make buildings, ways, roads, watercourses . . . and do all matters
See the case of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation above, p.89.
Quoted by Charles Udenze Ilegbune, British Concession Policy 
and Legislation in Southern Ghana, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis,
London, 1974, 31
Enclosures in R. J. Sheehy to colonial office, 26 October^ 1895,
C.0. 96/269
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and things as effectually as if his heirs and assigns were the 
absolute owners of the fee-simple or freehold of the said lands, 
estates . ! ! i7T62
The obvious problem about the transaction described above is
the misuse of terms which could, in principle, render the transaction
invalid and ineffective. It was not only misleading to call the chief,
who was only an administrator of the lands, the "owner" of the 200
square miles which was the subject matter of the transaction, but
the use of that term to describe the grantor chief mistakenly assumed
that absolute title in the property vested in him. The issues were
further complicated by the provision in the transaction that the grantee
had the right to "do all matters and things as effectually as if
his heirs and assigns were the absolute owners of the fee-simple or
freehold of the said lands . . . "
The description of the interests which the chief purported to
alienate in those terms was based on the mistaken premises that any
such terms as freehold and fee simple existed under the traditipnal
law and which the transferor had the legal capacity to deal with in
the manner described. As argued in part I, by the application of
the ordinary principle of English law and the customary law, the operation
of the nemo dat quod non habet rule could render the transaction invalid.
In addition, the question arises as to whether the necessary consents
and concurrences were obtained. Even granted that the procedural
requirements were met, was the transaction made in the interest of
the community on behalf of whom the grantors administered the property?
The problems arising from the unquestioning reception of Anglo-
American notions of tenure and the increasing use of their forms
and techniques of conveyancing in land transactions in the traditional
163
systems was amply demonstrated by a Tarkwa case of 1888. In that 
case, the chief, Kofi Chay, having granted a large tract of his stool 
land to Essaman Mining Company in 1888, allowed his subjects to continue 
digging on the land, apparently in genuine belief that his subjects 
still had the right to do so. However, the Company would probably 
have succeeded at the ordinary courts in the ensuing action of trespass
Quoted by Ilegbune, loc.cit., 33. Emphasis is supplied.
See pp.459-469.for a further discussion of the problems of conveyancing.
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and damages for £3,000. This was only prevented by the timely interven­
tion by the Governor, on the grounds that the terms on which the company 
had the grant was so one-sided and unreasonable that the legal action 
was entirely unjustifiable.
The injustices of this system, caused mainly by the ignorance 
of the chiefs and their weak bargaining position, is justifiably described 
by Ilegbune in the following words:
"The disadvantage of this kind of language in contracts with 
the generally illiterate chiefs seems obvious. It was beyond 
their comprehension and in most cases they signed without legal 
advice. The chief's misfortune of illiteracy thus became a contract­
ual fortune for the concessionaire. A chief who granted a concession 
over a stretch of land subsequently discovered that he ran the 
risk of action for breach of contract if he attempted to exercis^^ 
customary rights supposed by him to have been reserved for him."
Although the considerations for which the chiefs disposed of 
the community resources would appear to us as trivial and inadequate, 
as they did not generally apply them to the development of their communi­
ties, the little amounts they obtained were regarded by them as sufficient. 
Thus as the prospects of pecuniary gains ushered in by the new economic 
order, the reception of Anglo-American ideas of tenure and Christian 
religious ideas made serious inroads into the traditional beliefs 
concerning land, it was increasingly becoming a free marketable commodity.
One of the most serious problems which emerged at an early stage 
in these developments was the twin problem of uncertainty of title 
and costly litigation. As land values appreciated as a consequence 
of increased demand for mining and timber concessions, and for the 
cultivation of permanent crops,such as cocoa and coffee, rights over 
or title to landwere keenly contested. At the root of this problem 
was uncertainty of boundaries.
Before the introduction of permanent agriculture and the advent 
of the mining boom, the demand for land was negligible and for which 
reason it had not acquired such a commercial value as was the case 
in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. As the cultivation 
and effective occupation of the land were the means by which individual 
user rights were established over it in closely knit communities of 
the kind under consideration, everybody knew the developed areas of
Ilegbune, op.cit., p. 34
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each cultivator. Disputes over land rights among individual stool 
subjects or community; members were thus not expected to arise frequently. 
Even where it did arise, it was contained within the family.
Before Colonial rule and the extensive acquisition of land, there 
were large tracts of land between the various polities within the 
area known as the Gold Coast. Because land was so abundant, the need * 
for boundary settlements was not felt. Unless conquest was contemplated 
for political reasons, the need to settle boundaries or to dispute 
them was uncommon. However, the colonial government, having brought 
these polities under the protection of the crown, did nothing to encourage 
members of the various polities to regard themselves as members of 
one nation state of the Gold Coast. Instead, each traditional state 
was being treated as if it were an independent sovereign within the 
Gold Coast.
The result of this policy in terms of land rights was that,members 
of one traditional state regarded subjects of the other as strangers. 
Similarly, this policy implied the recognition of tribal territorial 
boundaries between the various polities comprised in the new state 
of the Gold Coast. While matters were left in this state, the supposed 
boundaries’which existed between these petty states remained undefined, 
not surveyed and undemarcated. Thus prospects of pecuniary gains 
by means of the disposition of stool or family lands led the chiefs 
of communities or polities bordering one another to make rival claims 
of rights over hitherto large tracts of unoccupied land lying and 
situate between them. The resolution of such disputes took many years 
to complete and the costs involved were high,rendering many families 
impoverished.
While the uncertainty of boundaries constituted a fertile ground 
for litigation, the problem was exacerbated by the traditional rules 
concerning the disposition of group-held property. We have shown
See the 1887 Report on the Agricultural Potential of the Gold 
Coast, op.cit.; the Belfield Report of 1912, Cmd. 6278;
Professor Shephard's Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1936 on the economics 
of peasant agriculture in the Gold Coast; C. R. Havers' Report 
of a Commission of Inquiry into Expenses incurred by Litigants 
of the Gold Coast and the Indebtedness caused thereby, 1944; 
and the Report of the Committee on Agricultural Indebtedness 
1957. The results of all these enquiries indicate the serious 
effect of litigation on the development of land and living 
standards of the people.
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that in the traditional law, absolute title in property is vested 
in corporate juristic entities which are separate and independent of 
its constituent members. Accredited persons, usually the chief and 
his councillors or the head of the family and his principal members, 
depending on the type of land in question, having the legal capacity 
to deal with such lands if certain procedures laid down by the customary 
law are complied with.
The difficulty for members of one polity seeking land for develop­
ment in another in which they were regarded as strangers was the identi­
fication of such accredited members with the legal capacity to deal 
with the property. The issues are complicated by the fact that even 
where such persons have been identified, the customary law is uncertain 
as to whether it is the unanimous or majority decision of the group 
that makes dealings with the property valid. The majority of the 
6ases disputed in the courts concern these problems of uncertainty 
of boundaries and questions relating to the capacity of transferors.
While the colonial administration found no easy answer to the 
solution of these problems, another social and economic evil, perhaps 
more serious than the latter, reared its ugly head. The appreciation 
of land values that accompanied the increased demand for concessions 
led to land speculation on a large scale. This particular problem 
was not only contrary to traditional property value systems which 
placed a premium on the exertion of effort and industry as the means 
by which individual user rights could ordinarily be established over 
communal lands, but it meant the introduction into the tenure system 
of the acquisition of unearned profit based on speculation.
This implied that large tracts of land could be acquired with 
no intention of immediate or future development. The only purpose 
was to hold such land until it appreciated in value so that the original 
acquirer could resell it to the next highest bidder in the open market. 
This had serious implications for the land tenure system. It meant 
that those individuals having the necessary capital for development 
might have to acquire the land through intermediaries. It followed 
that the tendency for land rights to pass through many hands before 
getting to a potential developer increased. This in turn would have 
the effect of increasing costs on development.
In the perpetration of this economic wrong, the native middle 
men were as guilty as the European capitalist entrepreneurs, if not 
more guilty. Take the case of a prominent Ashanti literate native,
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Prince Owusu Ansah for example. He devoted himselftf to the busines 
of buying and selling concessions oh speculative basis. In one trans­
action for instance, he managed to obtain a lease of 200 square miles
166
from a chief of Axim, Kwaku Atta at £100 for a term of 99 years.
This was in June 1894. In October 1896, two years after its acquisition,
he disposed of his interest to a firm, William Frederick Regan of
London for £800.167
Earlier Dr. J. B. Africanus Horton, who may be regarded as the
pioneer: of the busines of land speculation by people of African descent
in the Gold Coast, obtained 23 different concessions between 1878
and 1880 totalling over 200 square miles. In May 1882, he floated
a company, the Wassaw and Ahanta Gold Mines Syndicate Ltd., to which
168
he sold his assets. It would appear that initially, apart from
Dr. Africanus, the educated natives did not participate directly in
the concession business. Instead they simply acted as intermediaries
between the concessionaires and the land authorities.
However, the degree of land acquisition and speculation begari
to cause concern among the educated native class. It was not, however,
the evil consequences of these events which they were concerned with.
They were unhappy about the lack of interest in African participation
in the business. This anxiety was expressed in an indigenous newspaper
which appealed to the native middle class to get themselves involved
in the bussiness. The appeal was contained in the following words:
"This colony, we believe, has reached a most important epoch 
in her history. Societies and Companies hitherto unknown are 
springing up in our midst . . . Unmistakeably, the arrival of 
fresh companies will be the prelude for increased activity in 
their operations on the part of those mining bodies which first 
settled here . . .  We should not every day be passive onlookers 
at the operations of our foreign friends at Tarkwa. They only 
come to benefit themselves alone, if we are going to permit 
them to do on our soil what was done in New Zealand (sic) by its 
white population some years ago, we will be guilty of an act 
which bears upon its very face the impress of absurdity. The 
land is ours." 169
1 Rfi
R. J. Sheehy to Colonial Office, 26 October^1896, C.0. 96/269.
167 Ibid.
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Africanus had an initial capital of £10,000 divided into 200 shares 
of £50 each. See, Sir W. B. Griffith to Knutsford, received 24 
July, 1889, C.0. 879/46.
169
The Gold Coast Times, 22 November, 1881. Quoted by Ilegbune, 
op.cit., p. 28.
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The idea of the natives participating in the development of the economic
resources of the country was a laudable one. Yet the African middle
class, perhaps partly because they lacked the skills and the capital,
never actually engaged themselves in the mining business significantly.
Instead of opposing the speculation business, they joined the race
for the acquisition of concessions. As influential members of the
community, they could easily persuade the chiefs to dispose of large
tracts of land to them on the most favourable terms.
Thus, as if the newspaper publication was intended to prepare
the mind of the people for what was already a fait accompli, five
months after its publication, eight prominent members of the educated
native class, lawyers and merchants, including John Mensah Sarbah,
the proprietor of the newspaper, F. C.Grant and Prince Brew of Dunquah,
one of the most ardent critics of the Land Bills of the nineties,
170
formed the Gold Coast Native concession purchasing company. Ltd.
Apart from the above mentioned firms in which the latter had
an interest, he had other private concessions in several districts
of the colony. For instance, between 1890 and 1892, he succeeded
in the acquisition of timber and mining concessions from the districts
of Discove, Axim and Wassaw amounting to over 200 square miles of
territory. He established his base in London where he was engaged
in the buying and selling of concessions. In 1896, during the time
when the land question was coming to a head, he tried without success
171
to dispose of his assets to Ahanta Company.
As David Kimble has noted, enterprising groups of natives and
individuals continued in the field of speculation and of the concession
acquisition to such an extent that their speculative activities became
"a source of annoyance to the tidy mind of officialdom during the 
172
1890s". A detailed treatment of the part played by the native
170
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Naturally the 1882 edition of the paper hailed this development 
as "wholesome to the core". F. C. Grant, Proprietor of the news­
paper was the chairman of the new company, J. M. Sarbah was a 
member of the Legislative Council and later became president 
of the A.R.P.S. Other executives of the company included, G. E. 
Emingsang, J. E. Sey, all prominent and influential members of 
the community.
See letters from Messrs. Vranks & Timbrell to Colonial Office,
21 and 27 January 1896, included in enclosures 52 and 53, 879/46.
David Kimble, op.cit., p. 22
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middle class in concession speculation is not intended to underplay
the role of Europeans in this respect. The role of the former is
highlighted here as background to the assessment of their opposition
to the Land Bills of 1894 and 1897. For the moment, it is enough
to bear in mind that the economic interests of the native middle class
were, in a large measure, identical with those of the European merchants
and its financial institutions, a factor which placed both parties
on the same side in opposition to the land reform programmes of the
last two decades of the nineteenth century.
It is unnecessary to delve at length into the speculative activities
of European entrepreneurs and the agents of firms and their financial
institutions. It will be enough for our purposes to point out that
because of their superior skills, technology and availability of capital
to them, they played a greater part in the speculation. What happened
was that even where a "European firm was interested in real mining,
it normally acquired more land than it could really develop. The
intention was either to sell the undeveloped portion at higher prices
in the future or return to it in the distant future if it became possible
to expand their activities.
It was therefore normal to find companies acquiring large expanses
of territory with no possibility of developing all of it. Take the
case of the British Gold Fields of West Africa Limited, for example.
In 1895 it acquired about 7,000 square miles in extent, reported to
contain ’’rich deposits of gold, both alluvial and reefs, copper, silver,
cinnabar, and other metals, enormous mahogany forests, ebony, cedar,
boxwood, greenheart, camwood, petroleum rubber, oil palms, gums and
173
fibre of valuable kinds in immense quantities."
There were such large concessions as those of the Bolton Syndicate
of Johannesburg in which the syndicate's acquisitions comprised almost
174
the whole district of rTchuful the chief town of which was Mampong,
and the Ensor agreement by which over 100 square miles of territory
175
was acquired from certain chiefs in the Kwahn traditional area.
The Daily Telegraph, 25 July^l895. The Company had £235,000 
capital divided into'235,000 shares of £1 each. Firms usually 
exaggerate the richness of their acquisitions in order to boost 
their share prices. This is evident from how the concession 
was described here.
Sir Frederick Hodgson to Chamberlain, 11 August, 1899, C.0. 96/342 *
This was the agreement by which what became the lucrative Obuasi 
mines was acquired in 1896.
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On occasions chiefs entered into agreements with individual English
speculators not to allow others to prospect or mine gold in their
districts for a period of time until the latter were ready to do so
themselves. Such was the case of Castle Gold Exploration Syndicate
Limited. In 1897, Amoako Atta and his Councillors in the Akim district
entered into an agreement of a similar nature with Mr. Macdonald who
was acting on behalf of the company. The Chief and his Councillors
agreed not to assign mineral or concession rights to any person until
he had returned a year later. If at the end of the year he did not
176
come back, the agreement was to come to an end.
The disturbing features of concession agreements by which specula­
tors and mining concessionaires alike acquired rights to land, were 
to be found in the extensive nature of the rights, territory and privileges 
acquired. What gave rise to considerable concern was the vagueness 
of the descriptions which could enable the acquirer of the right to 
lay claim to unspecified areas of his choice. The extensive nature 
of the rights acquired by such concession agreements of which Captain 
J. A. Duncan's was representative, amply illustrate the point here.
In an agreement in which land was leased to him for one hundred years, 
he acquired exclusive rights to:
"all the lands of the lessors . . . and all the adjacent and 
intermediate villages and the rivers ^ 7  . . . and all the adjacent 
streams and the mountains together with the rights of the lessors 
in all rivers and water courses in the said lands with all metal 
ores and mineral precious stones rocks or other mineral substances 
or materials with an over and under the said lands with full 
power licence and authority to sink make and use any shafts 
adits levels and other mining works now existing or hereinafter 
to be constructed and to dig work mine search for win and carry 
away and make mercantile all such metals ores and metallic minerals 
precious stones rocks and other mineral substances or materials 
of any kind and convert the same to the use of the said lessees 
and for the purpose aforesaid to . . . build houses or any other 
buildings upon the said lands."
176
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Mr. Macdonald was in fact the Director of Education in the Gold 
Coast and acted on behalf of the company while travelling on 
duty in the District. For this agreement, the head chief Amaoko 
Atta obtained £10. His subordinate chiefs of Awhimasi, Dodo, 
Pano and Tette had £5 each. See Maxwell to Chamberlain, 24 
July, 1897, C.0. 96/297.
Emphasis supplied.
Hodgson to Chamberlain, enclosures, 16 May, 1896, C.0. 96/273. 
Quoted by Ilegbune, op.cit., 34.
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It is obvious that agreements such as these between illiterate 
chiefs and concessionaires sowed the seeds of dispute. The transactions 
were not only misunderstood by the chiefs, but they deprived the ordinary 
citizen of the right to collect and gather natural fruits of the lands 
in respect of which they were entitled to exercise common and concurrent 
rights. To describe the rights of the lessee as extending to "all 
the adjacent and intermediate villages and the rivers" was to lay 
claim to lands belonging to others who were not parties to the agreement. 
These were some of the common features of such transactions the conseq- 
ences of which became a source of worry to the colonial administration.
From what we have discussed so far, it can be seen that economic 
activity in the Gold Coast in the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
carried with it certain major land tenure and administration problems. 
Firstly, the introduction of commercial agriculture based on permanent 
cultivation of the soil and the development of the mining industry led 
to increasing demand for interests affecting land. This was attended 
with the appreciation of land values, rights to which became keenly 
contested. Secondly, as land became a marketable commodity, the tendency 
to acquire rights in it for speculation purposes increased with possible 
disastrous social and economic consequences for the country. Thirdly, 
the reception of Anglo-American ideas of tenure by the native middle 
class and elite, the hard core of which was the lawyers, led to the 
confusion of traditional schemes of interest in land with those of 
English feudal theories and tenurial concepts.
The combined effect of these events was to highlight the major 
inherent problems of the land tenure system exemplified by uncertainty 
of title and costly litigation.
At the root of these problems, as indicated earlier, lay:
i. the continued1 recognition of tribal territorial borders
between the various polities comprised in the Gold Coast 
even after their absorption into the Protectorate under
1 7Qthe colonial administration, '
ii. failure to survey, define and demarcate such boundaries;
iii. the difficulties faced by outsiders in identifying the
accredited persons in the traditional law with the legal 
capacity to deal with group-held property, and
iv. the failure to investigate and define the traditional schemes
of interest in land which were confused with English tenurial 
concepts.
For how and when these native states were absorbed into the protector­
ate and the Colony under British administration, see pp.92-95 below.
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Related to these problems was the general mismanagement of the 
proceeds of concessions by those entrusted with resource management 
responsibilities in the traditional shceme. These were the problems 
of land tenure and administration which confronted the colonial admini­
stration in the last two decades of the nineteenth century in the 
Gold Coast. In tackling them, it had to face formidable obstacles 
which will be our immediate subject of discussion.
B Problems relating to sovereign rights
The land tenure and administration problems outlined above, required 
for their solution, the exercise of some political and legislative 
powers. Constitutionally, such powers are normally exercisable as 
incidents of sovereignty. Therefore, in order for the quasi-colonial 
administration to be able to exercise them, it should have been in 
a position to justify its action by reference to a claim of sovereign 
rights over the territories in which such powers were to be exercised.
However, at the time when the land tenure and administration 
problems outlined above emerged, there were still great doubts concerning 
the Crown's rights over the territories. As will later become clear, 
the existence of such doubts provided the foundation for the future 
opposition to the legislative measures which were proposed to solve 
these problems. Hence, it is deemed wise, as a background to the 
understanding of the problems of the' Colonial
government, to outline the basis of the Crown's jurisdiction and political 
authority in the Gold Coast at the time.
We have already seen that until 1921, the British forts along 
the coastal belt had been administered by the Company of Merchants 
Trading to Africa. The coastal settlements were made subject to the 
laws of Sierra Leone after the Crown took over from the Company.
During the Presidency of Governor George Maclean, he established in 
the eighteen-thirties along the coasts a system of administration 
of justice on British lines; and many cases were brought to him in 
Cape Coast for trial. Although the exercise of such jurisdiction 
was criticised as being irregular, it was generally accepted by the 
inhabitants as fair.^^
Dr. R. R. Madden, the Commissioner who was required to investigate 
the system established by Maclean strongly criticised the system 
as being 'a species of irregular authority", but admitted that 
it was acknowledged by all parties. See Kimble, op.cit.%194 .
As we have noted earlier, the Select Committee of the House of
Commons had in 1842, acknowledged the fact that Britain had no sovereign
rights over the territories within which such peculiar jurisdiction
was being exercised. This was reflected in one of its recommendations
that their relations with the Cape Coast chiefs should not be at the
basis of the allegiance of subjects to which Britain had no right
to pretend, and which it would entail an inconvenient responsibility
to possess, but the deference of weaker powers to a stronger and more
enlightened neighbour whose protection and counsel they sought and
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to whom they were bound by certain definite obligations.
In order to regularise the jurisdiction thus established, the
182
Foreign Jurisdiction Act of August, 1843, was enacted in order to
remove any doubts as to the exercise of power and jurisdiction by
Her Majesty within diverse countries and places out of Her Majesty's
183
Dominions and to render the same more effectual.
On 6 March, 1844 a Bond was executed by certain Frante chiefs 
in the presence of Governor George Maclean. In it, they voluntarily 
agreed, inter alia, to mould the customs of their communities to the 
general principles of English law. The treaties were neither concerned 
with the cession of sovereign rights nor matters relating to land 
tenure and administration. It can therefore be concluded that as 
at 1844, there was no basis for the exercise of any powers in the 
nature of sovereign rights by the quasi-Colonial administration thus 
far established in the Gold Coast. The Report of the 1965 Select 
Committee which recommended gradual withdrawal from the Colony lends 
support to this view.
See page 68 and note 119above.
1Q<C 6 and 7, Vict.C. 94
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A British Order in September, 1844, constituted the Settlement 
of Cape Coast Castle and the Colony of Sierra Leone as British 
colonies in which Her Majesty's jurisdiction may be exercised 
over its subjects.
184
Resolution No. 3 of its recommendations declared that all future 
extension of territory or assumption of government or new treaties 
offering any protection to native tribes would be inexpedient; 
and that the object of British policy should be to encourage 
the exercise of those qualities which might render it possible 
more and more to transfer to the native authorities the administration 
of all the government with a view to the ultimate withdrawal 
by the Crown from all, except possibly Sierra Leone.
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However, the increasing penetration of the interior by Europeans 
after the Ashanti war of 1874 opened new avenues for trade and mineral 
exploitation. This partly influenced the Imperial government to change 
its policy towards the territory. In response to this new prospect 
of economic activity, certain positive steps were taken to strengthen 
the administration's grip on the territories comprised in the protector­
ates and the colony. Whether these steps amounted to Sovereign rights 
is still a matter for debate, but it was evident from henceforth that 
the flag was permitted to follow the trade and the country was practically 
ruled as if it were a Crown colony.
In line with this change of policy, the Treaties of Friendship 
and Trade entered into with certain traditional states were maintained, and 
certain proclamations and ordinances were introduced so as to lay 
the foundation for the exercise of political, judicial and legislative 
powers. In 1874, an Order in Council, for the first time authorised
the Legislative Council of the Gold Coast to legislate for the Protected 
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Territories. Such exercise of legislative powers was, however,
to be limited in scope, to such powers and jurisdiction as Her Majesty
may, at any time before or after the passing of the Order in Council
have acquired in the territories adjacent to the Colony. It will
be observed that this later qualification on the exercise of such
powers rendered the Order to fall short of a general power of enabling
legislation which the Sovereign characteristically exercises.
When it became necessary to define the nature and extent of the
"peculiar jurisdiction" exercised by the British in the territories
under British protection, it was acknowledged the fact that certain
rights and powers had been acquired by usage and long sufferance and
tacit assent of the inhabitants which exceeded those granted by the 
186
Bond of 1844. In order to delimit the scope of this authority
and to lay the constitutional foundations for the administration of
such territories, the Secretary of State, Lord Carnarvon proceeded by the
187
proclamation of Authority. This was drafted as a guide to the Legislature 
and the traditional authorities under British Protection.
±85
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Order-in-Council, 6 August, 1874., See also, Letters Patent 
dated 24 July, 1874, which revoked so much of the provisions of 
the Royal Commission of 1855 as affected the Gold Coast and Lagos. 
It erected both Lagos and the Gold Coast into a Colony under 
one administration.
Kimble, op.cit., p. 302
See the draft published in J. M. Sarbah,Fanti Customary Laws, 
London, 1904, Second edition, 293-5; also,.Kimble loc.cit.
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The Proclamation provided for the exercise of several powers, 
the exercise of many of which could only be justified on the basis 
of a claim to sovereign rights. They included:
i. the preservation of the peace;
ii. the administration of both civil and criminal justice;
iii. the establishment and regulation of courts of justice,
including native courts;
iv. the enactment of laws framed with due regard to native
law and customs where they were not repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience;
v. the hearing of appeals from native tribunals;
vi. the apprehension and trial of criminals in any part of
the protectorate;
vii. the abolition of human sacrifice, judicial torture and 
slave trading;
viii. measures concerning domestic slavery and pawning;
ix. the protection and encouragement of trade, by means of 
roads, bridges, telegraphs and other public works.
x. the settlement of chiefs' disputes;
xi. the promotion of public health and education; and
xii. the raising of revenue.
From this time onwards, the crown was held to be fully and legally
entitled to exercise all the rights and jurisdiction it had hitherto
assumed in the Gold Coast, as if the proclamation had in fact been
published locally. Having laid down this basis and guide lines for
183
legislation, the Supreme Court Ordinance was passed in 1876.
It was to apply in both the colony and the protected territories.
It provided that:
"The Common Law, the doctrines of Equity, and the Statutes of
general application which were in force in England at the date
when the colony obtained a local legislature, that is to say, 
on the 24th day of July. 1874, shall be in force within the juris­
diction of the Court."
lflfi
No. 4 of 1876
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This was followed by the enactment of a Criminal Law and Procedure
Ordinance which were made generally applicable in the Colony and
190the protected territories. In 1877, an Order-in-Council revoking
that of 1867, made provision for appeals to issue from the Supreme 
Court to the Privy Council in London as the final appellate court, 
instead of Sierra Leone.
The question is whether the 1874 proclamation of Authority and 
the subsequent legislation outlined above, did or did not amount to 
the assumption of sovereign rights over the Colony and the protected 
territories? An affirmative answer to this question is made difficult 
by the fact that even after all these laws had been passed with the 
exercise of powers, the underlying assumptions of which were claims 
to soveriegn rights, high ranking officials of Her Majesty's government 
continued to deny or express doubts about the existence of any such 
powers.
Even as late as 1882, the under - Secretary of State could still
be heard to be saying that the country was not yet sufficiently civilized
to require a universal detailed administration by European Commissioners,
192
nor sufficiently rich to pay for it. In the same year as the
Proclamation was made, Sir W. Lawson confirmed in the House of Commons
Lord Derby's doubts about British authority in the colony, expressing
great doubts whether any man in or out of the colonial office exactly
knew or could define the limits of Britains's responsibility with
193
regard to the tribes included within the protected territories.
The principal reason for the existence of such doubts concerning the 
sovereign rights of the administering authority was that which was 
regarded as the lack of any theoretical and doctrinal basis for such 
claims. The theory was that for sovereign rights to be acquired in 
a territory, it should be brought about either by conquest, cession, 
purchase or treaty, in the Gold Coast, none of these conditions had 
been satisfied. Therefore the administering authority had no such
190
The Criminal Law and Procedure Ordinance No. 5, 1876
191
Order in Council, 23 October, 1877.
192
Dispatch of 31 August, 1882, C.O. 96/147
193
House of Commons, 4 May, 1874.
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rights. Having regard to the fact that the colonial administration was 
acting practically as though it had such powers, the emphasis which was 
placed on the lack of any formal acquisition of sovereign rights could 
be seen as a distinction as to form and not of substance.
Yet, it was this formal distinction on which the opposition to the 
land reform programmes of the period was based. These were also problems 
concerning questions relating to sovereignty which the Colonial administra­
tion was to face in dealing with the land tenure and administration problems 
of the time. This particular aspect of the problem we should remark, 
was the creation of the Imperial government itself by insisting that it 
had no sovereign rights so as to avoid the responsibilities of expenditure 
incidental to the claims of such rights.
However, the change in the economic circumstances of the territory 
led to a change in policy where such rights were claimed so as to justify 
certain policies concerning land administration in the Colony and the 
protected territories. It is the events which culminated in the introduction 
of the Land Bills that we shall examine next.
CHAPTER III
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THE CROWN LANDS BILL, 1894
A. The Genesis of the Land Bills
Our previous discussion of the problems arising from the development 
of the mining industry and the introduction of commercial agriculture based 
on permanent cultivation of the land, gives an indication of the background 
to the measures to be adopted for their solution. While the doubts about the 
relationship of the Crown to the native^ polities persisted, the concession 
fever that gripped European capitalist speculators and some members of the 
native middle class alike, caused large tracts of territory to be concentrated 
in private hands for mining and speculative purposes. The need to do something 
about some of the anomalies in the system became apparent as the colonial ad­
ministration was swamped by Reports from District Commissioners from the Mining 
Districts of Tarkwa, Wassaw and Axim areas.
There were two options open to the government. The first was to allow 
the laissez faire atmosphere in which business had been conducted since the 
Company of Merchants rule to be continued. The other alternative would be 
for the government either to assume full control over land administration 
by vesting it in the Crown or at least controlling the way in which lands 
might be acquired or developed by means of statutory regulation. The Government 
decided to adopt the second alternative course of action.
One of the earliest suggestions that the lands be vested in the crown was 
made by the African Times which demanded that Governor Strahan should proceed
to lay down a sound foundation of a civilised state by declaring the whole of
194
the lands of the territory to be vested in and held from the Crown. As 
the events of the concession boom were being unfolded, it became clear that 
this suggestion was not a bad proposition.
For instance, in 1882 the Civil Commissioner, F. J. Higgins responsible 
for the Tarkwa area sounded a note of warning to the administration, stating 
that if steps were not taken early enough to control the mining industry by
19'means of legislation "confusion and probably disturbances would be the result." 
In his report, he complained that various mining companies had published in­
adequate maps of their concessions which merely indicated general ideas of 
areas. In addition to suggesting that the Tarkwa area should be surveyed soon 
to avoid confusion, he proposed that "eventually in the near future, the
question of seeking or making proper arrangement for the supervision of the
196
gold mining districts would have to be undertaken."
The Secretary of State's response two months later showed that he was
The African Times, 1 Aprilr1874.
Higgins to Governor, 6 June*1882, C.O. 96/140 
Ibid.
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not favourably disposed towards any form of control which might entail
the making of any serious inroads into the traditional rights of the chiefs.
As noted earlier, it was his personal wish that the territory should be
administered through the chiefs as a means of saving on costs.
However, in a move which was directly opposed to the views of the Under
Secretary of State, the Governor of the Gold Coast sent a secret despatch
to the Chief Administrator of Lagos, Lieutenant Governor Maloney, suggesting
the acquisition of certain parts of the territory as crown lands, noting
that the causes of "our exclusiveness as regards land in the past have almost
197
if not altogether disappeared . . . "  He expressed the opinion that the
provision of social services "may perhaps render it the more advisable to
acquire without delay, certain tracts of seaboard land to meet at least the
needs of the future before the further influx of capital and enterprise would
make future acquisition too expensive."
He argued that in view of the rush for concessions and gold mining
activities which brought in high returns on purchase money, it would be
necessary to take steps to acquire the areas adjacent to such forts. Such
land w.as needed for building warehouses at landing sites where customs duty
might be imposed on goods shipped from the colony. For this to be done
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easily, he called for the amendment of the Public Lands Ordinance under 
which a cumbersome and long procedure was to be gone through before such 
acquisition could be made. He thought that these cumbersome procedures 
were no longer adequate to meet the new demands of the colony.
Turning to the land problems that accompanied the rush for concessions, 
he said:
"Boundaries of concessions are often, generally I may say, of the 
vaguest description and advantage is no doubt taken of the indifference 
of the government and of the ignorance of the people." -^9
However, in proposing these measures within the framework of a new policy,
he envisaged opposition from those whose commercial and economic interests
might be affected. He thus recognised the need for legal and political
justification for action in this respect. Referring to the doubts which
persisted about the sovereign rights of the crown, he observed:
"So far as I know there has not been any general acquisition of the 
territory outside the forts or on the Gold Coast, either by conquest, 
cession purchase or treaty, and if I am supported in my assertion, 
crown land does not exist, whatsoever may be the right of the Government 
in the matter of sovereignty over land around the forts for defensive 
purposes." 200
It may be said therefore, he argued, that lands beyond the forts were
197
Dispatch No. 511, 2 November, 1882, C.O. 96/144
198 No. 8 of 1876
Loc.cit.
Ibid., See note -197.....
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the exclusive property of the people through their "Kings and chiefs".
The Governor observed however, that to a large extent, the term "waste 
land" might be appropriately applied to a great and considerable portion 
of the land, of which, as to its extent, value and in many instances owner­
ship indeed, complete ignorance prevailed. If this observation was meant 
to suggest that the "waste lands" were ownerless and therefore their taking
was justifiable, such an argument was never pressed forward at any stage
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of the arguments concerning the crown's rights over lands.
Concluding his case for taking steps to improve the land tenure and 
administration problems brought about by the new economic order, he suggested 
the introduction of a system of title registration as the ultimate solution. 
Although his suggestions fell short of a positive demand for vesting the 
lands in the crown, they set into motion a policy change towards the direct 
control and management of lands and the mining industry.
This change in direction of policy gathered momentum as the colonial 
administration was swamped by reports prepared by civil commissioners in 
the mining districts on concession anomalies and disputes arising therefrom. 
The move towards greater involvement in land matters was also dictated by the 
need to impose tax not only on goods exported from the colony but also on 
produce so as to enable the administration to obtain sufficient revenue for 
the provision of social services such as the construction of roads, telecom­
munications and other services that might assist the development of the 
mining industry. It was the increasing tempo of this policy change that 
culminated in the introduction of the ill-fated Crown Lands Bill of 1894.
B. Events and the Debates preceding the Bill
Following the reports on anomalies in the mining industry, Sir William 
Brandford Griffith, Governor of the Gold Coast, undertook a tour of some of 
the mining districts of the Western Province. His objective was to acquaint 
himself with the nature and extent of the problems. At the end of his tour, 
he became convinced from what he had seen that the best way to solve the 
problems was the vesting of all vacant lands in the crown from whom all 
titles to land may be held.
It may be recalled the discussion of the dispute in which he had
The doctrine that there is no land without an owner in the Gold Coast 
was generally accepted without question. Chief Justice Hutchinson in 
his memorandum on the Lands Bill in 1891 made this clear. See his 
memorandum, op.cit. Sarbah wrote that Mr. Justice Smith explained 
the doctrine in his "Report on Land Tenure in the Gold Coast."
F.C.L., London, 1904, 271-81. See also Wiapa v Solomon (1905) Renner, 
405. Dr. A. P. K. Kludze is the 'only one known to have doubted the 
validity of this rule. See his "Ownerless Lands of Ghana", (1974)
11 U.G.L. 123.
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had to intervene while on his tour between the Essaman Mining Company
202
and a local chief, Kofi Chay. When he returned from his tour, he
despatched a letter to the Secretary of State in which he outlined the 
203
problems. Commenting on the dispute referred to above, he informed
the latter that he did not think the sort of claims being made by the 
company was justifiable, having regard to the fact that the chief involved 
in the dispute was anxious to be on good terms with the "white man".
He noted that the rents being paid by the mining firms were "trifling 
amounts".
Yet, he felt it was inexpedient at that time to interfere directly.
The policy of interference should be limited to the levels necessary
with a view not to check the development of the mines which if they
succeeded "would open up the country and lead to a great revolution
and prosperity of that part of the Colony". The policy of non-interference
he thought could be justified, bearing in mind the fact that the natives
could only work the ore in small quantities while the great majority
of the European companies worked the mines below the surface far beyond
204
the power of any native could carry on successfully.
He expressed the need for some measure of control over the mines.
He required the Secretary of State to furnish him with copies of the 
mining legislation of British Guiana or South Africa which might help 
him enact a similar law for the Gold Coast. It will be observed here 
that, although the Governor found on his tour of the mining areas that 
the agreements by which speculators and mining firms obtained concessions 
were vague and "somewhat one-sided"in favour of the companies with which 
they were executed, and that the rents being paid were of "trifling 
amounts", his suggested solutions fell far short of any direct control 
of land use acquisition or its management.
Outlining the -.immediate policy, he said:
See page 83.> This section is based on Colonial Office Records. 
Some of the manuscripts are difficult to decipher and some of their 
authors sign their names without their initials. Thus some of 
the names may besupplied without the initials.
203
Secret dispatch from W. B. Griffith to Knutsford, 25 June, 1889,
C.0. 96/202.
204 Ibid.
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"Looking to the extreme primitiveness of the whole country at 
present, the insufficiency df staff of the government to exercise 
really much control over so large a space of territory, and the 
infancy of the industry, no steps should be taken which are not 
rendered immediately desirable for its regulation."
Envisaging a policy for the future, he continued:
"As regards the future, or the protection of the legitimate rights 
of the owners of the soil, the question arises whether the simplest 
course to take in the event of the mines beginning to pay, would 
not be to assume the whole country as Crown lands, preserving exist­
ing individual rights for the life time of the holders, and devote 
the revenue arising from the sale or lease of these lands for the 
exclusive benefit of the people of the district."
It can be seen from this projection of future policy on land tenure 
and administration that, in terms of applying the natural resources 
of the land, the Governor thought they must be used to the benefit of 
the people in the districts where such resources were to be found.
It follows that at this moment in time, the colonial government still 
regarded the natural resources, such as minerals, as not belonging to 
the Gold Coast as a nation, but to the communities in which they were 
to be found. Perhaps, because the question of British sovereignty was 
still unresolved, it would be asking for too much to expect the formulation 
of a national land policy for the Gold Coast at this time.
Five months after this dispatch to London, the Secretary of State 
responded favourably. In forwarding the mining legislations of British 
Guiana, Zululand and British Bechuanaland to the Governor as he had 
requested, the latter was reminded that these acts applied to Crown 
lands while in the Gold Coast, "except to a very limited extent, is
not British territory in the full sense of the term and the land is
206
therefore not the property of the Crown." He was thus required to 
ascertain if any of the provisions could be introduced in the Gold Coast.
Lord Knutsford wanted further clarification on the Governor's proposals:,. 
He would like to know if the scheme was to be applied to mining areas 
alone or to the whole of the protectorate. Lord Knutsford was prepared 
to admit that there were many reasons in favour of making the whole
205  r v ,  • ^Ibid.
Knutsford to Griffith, 4 December, 1889, C.O. ,879/46, No. 513, 
African West.
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of the colony and protectorate British territory, and therefore Crown
207
lands, and many advantages to be gained for it. He thought such
a measure "would no doubt get rid- of many troublesome questions of juris­
diction", particularly as the country was practically ruled "as if it 
were British territory, though nominally it is not."
Lord Knutsford believed that the conversion of the whole country 
into a Crown land would lead to a social revolution; therefore, before 
making such a decision, he would like to receive fuller reports on further 
development and a statement on how the scheme, if adopted, would be 
implemented without causing any serious trouble or disturbance. He 
further warned that although the change might be of advantage to- and * 
in the best interests of, the natives in the end, it did not necessarily 
follow that they would be prepared to accept it quietly in the first 
instance.
As the Secretary of State welcomed the idea of the Crown's assumption 
of lands, the Governor became committed to its implementation. But 
before carrying this intention into effect, he sought the advice of 
the chief Justice, Sir Joseph Hutchinson as to the desirability of such 
a measure. Hutchinson having seen Lord Knutsford's Dispatch, disagreed 
with him on several issues. In his memorandum to the Governor, he criti­
cised the Secretary of State's suggestion that the making of the country 
into a British colony involved the making of the lands Crown lands. 
"Perhaps", he argued, "all that the Secretary of State meant to suggest 
was that the result of making the country British territory would be
to make the Sovereign the ultimate lord of all the land, all private
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rights being left untouched." If this was the meaning of the propo­
sal, then he saw no objection to it. But if the proposals implied the 
appropriation of all the land by the Crown with or without compensation, 
becoming the immediate and not merely the ultimate landlord, the case 
would be very different.
"I believe", he argued, "that all the land in the colony and the
protectorate, whether occupied or not, . „ , .
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has according to native law an owner." He drew attention to the
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Hutchinson to Griffith, 7 April,1891, C.0. 879/46, No. 513, African 
West.
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fact that natives appeared to have a strong feeling of attachment to
their stool or family (lands. A large part of the litigation in the courts,
he pointed out, was about land, and he was often amazed at the pertinacity
with which the right tQ the possession of a small piece of land, sometimes
land which had hardly any value except the sentimental value arising
fpgm connection with the stool or a family member having been.buried
in it or from its association with some tribal or family fetish.
Like the Secretary of State, he conceded the fact that there were
many advantages to be gained if the scheme were to be implemented.
Some of these would be the possible increase in revenue from sales and
leases of the land and possible benefit to the community from the creation
of indisputable title to the land to be held from the crown. But he
did not think these advantages constituted a sufficient reason for the
introduction of a measure of such far-reaching consequences.
What he considered to be the strongest objections, to the measure
was that which he described in the following words:
"Perhaps the most important effect of expropriation by the Crown 
of the present owners of waste lands would be that it would perman­
ently lower the dignity of and importance, and therefore the power 
of the chiefs and heads of families." 2 10
He stated that the chief was the life owner of all the land, unoccupied 
or waste, belonging to his stool or family. It was he who had power 
to make grants of it upon the customary native terms and tenure and 
received the customary presents and tribute due from grantees. In Hutchinson's 
opinion, if this power and these emoluments were taken away from the 
native chief and the head of the family, it was impossible that their 
estimation in the eyes of their people should not be lowered. This 
consideration alone, would, in his view, be enough to make him reject 
the proposed legislation unless the reasons in favour of it were "over­
whelmingly strong".
He suggested that instead of a wholesale appropriation of lands 
by the crown, steps should be taken to control the mining industry by 
regulation. He conceded the fact that there were many reasons why 
the crown should control minerals and unused and unopcupied forests.
He observed that minerals in the country had not been a source of revenue 
to the country, except to a very few owners. Concessions of timber
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and mining rights were being made on a large scale to European companies
for speculation purposes. He expressed the opinion that it would be
a public misfortune if those rights over such large tracts of land
should fall into the hands of persons, especially absentees who for
reasons of speculation would not work them. He therefore concluded
211
that all minerals should be vested in the crown.
The issues discussed by Hutchinson deserve some comments. In the 
first place, he seemed to have fallen into the common error of confusing 
the control functions or the jurisdictional rights of the traditional 
authorities with proprietary rights over land. It is misleading to 
say that the Chief and the head of the family are the life owners respect- 
ively of stool and family land. Failure to draw this distinction was 
one of the principal misunderstandings concerning the land tenure system 
that misled many opponents of the Land Bills and caused them to reach 
erroneous conclusions about the measure.
Similarly, the Chief Justice erred in suggesting that the head 
of the family or the Chief had the legal capacity to deal with stool 
or family lands in their own right* The factor which the Chief Justice 
ignored in his argument was that the scheme was being designed partly 
to protect the citizen against the illegal alienation of the large tracts 
of land to which he referred in his memorandum. His confusion of the title 
situation misled him to overlook the interest of the communities of 
which the Chief and heads of families were representatives. He did 
not advert to the fact whether or not the revenue derived from the grant 
of concessions by the land authorities were applied to the benefit of 
their communities. Instead, he was concerned with the preservation 
of their "power" and "dignity". The overriding interest of the community, 
represented by the rank and file of its members ought not to have been 
thus relegated to a secondary position in this regard.
Happily, the Governor, Sir William Brandford Griffith, sought a 
second opinion on the matter. He sought the advice of his son Sir William 
Brandford Griffith, who had spent some years in the Gold Coast but was 
recently transferred to Jamaica, where he became a resident Magistrate.
In his letter to his father, he agreed with Hutchinson that the lands
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belonged to the natives of the Gold Coast, but the difficulty, he thought
212
was how individual claims were to be ascertained.
He disagreed with Hutchinson who seemed to be suggesting that if
the lands "were vested in the crown, it would amount to confiscation.
He argued that such a policy would not mean confiscation or spoilation.
He believed, it would simply aim at holding the land for them as a "trustee".
He argued that the land, once acquired by the crown would practically
be the "property of the Gold Coast". He wrote:
"The land so acquired would then be used for the benefit of the 
Gold Coast. Any revenue derived from such crown lands would go 
to the credit* of the natives and the few scores or possibly hundreds 
of Europeans temporarily residing on the Gold Coast." 213
He thought it was unnecessary to take account of any gain to the 
handful of Europeans who would then become joint owners of the land 
along with the natives. What could be done in their case was the imposi­
tion of a poll tax on them in order to compensate for the advantage 
they might gain from the scheme.
It will be observed that the scheme envisaged by Sir William Brandford 
Griffith (Junior), if accepted, could be of far-reaching consequence.
Unlike his father, Sir William Brandford Griffith, and Sir Joseph Hutchinson 
who both suggested the revenue derived from the minerals exploited should 
be applied to the exclusive benefit of the communities from where such 
resources were to be found, Brandford Griffith (Junior) saw the problem 
within the context of a wider Gold Coast national land policy. It was 
his opinion that such revenues as were derived from concession grants 
should go to the credit of the people of the Gold Coast as a whole.
As the assumption of control by the Crown would- have the effect of vesting 
the lands in it as a "trustee" for the benefit of the country as a whole, 
it could not amount to confiscation or spoilation as Hutchinson seemed 
to suggest.
Referring to the question of insecurity of title, he made the follow­
ing observations:
Brandford Griffith Junior, to Sir W. B. Griffith, Enclosure No.
2, C.O. 879/46, African West, No. 513.
Loc.cit.
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"No doubt the land will belong to some native, but what individual 
claims are, it will be hard to ascertain, probably numerous per­
sons would each of them possess some indefinite claim to the land.
Some of the claims would probably conflict, and if any person desired 
to purchase this land, he would experience great difficulty in getting 
a secure title owing to this indefinite and conflicting claim."214
One of the sources of such conflicting claims and uncertainty was 
what Hutchinson described in his memorandum as "great difficulty in 
discovering owners or persons entitled to sell or mortgage".
No doubt the scheme of land administration envisaged by young Brandford 
Griffith (Junior) could have successfully dealt with the land problems 
of the time and could have laid a firm foundation for the future management 
and administration of the land and its resources of the country on the 
basis of a sound national land policy. The far-reaching consequences 
of the implementation of such an elaborate programme of land reform 
would have been:
i. the abolition of the tribal territorial basis of beneficial 
enjoyment of rights in land;
ii. the establishment of the principle that membership of the
Gold Coast Colony and the Protectorate formed the basis for 
the exercise of inherent traditional rights in respect of 
land;
iii. the elimination of tribal territorial and family boundaries 
with their associated disputes; and
iv. the identification of social and economic problems with the 
Gold Coast as a Colony under British administration instead 
of identifying them with ethnic and tribal affiliations.
It is evident that if the servants of the Crown assumed control 
over the administration of all lands, prospective acquirers of interests 
in it would have had no difficulty in identifying the bodies which might 
be created to perform the functions relating to the allocation and dis­
position of interests in land. Similarly, if boundaries had ceased 
to matter so would disputes associated with them. Perhaps Brandford 
Griffith (Junior) himslef did not realise that his scheme would have 
all these effects, but his objectives were clear.
His main goal was the security of title and the creation of freehold 
titles. In this regard, he proposed the following measures to be the 
principal objectives of land policy:
i. the creation of freehold titles:
ii. that the system by which land is held may be simplified;
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iii. that unoccupied lands should become Crown lands; and that 
the present inconvenient distinction between the Protected 
Territories and the Colony be done away with.
He suggested a skilful scheme by which this programme might be
implemented. He recognised that it would be politically unwise to rush
the programme through. He therefore suggested a land tax system whereby
land for which such taxes remained unpaid for seven or ten years might
become liable to forfeiture. "Land in the Gold Coast", he said, "as
in almost all other places under civilised governments must bear the
burden of taxation, and it is better that the present wretched system
of land tenure should be got rid of as soon as practicable before the
mixed application of English law and native custom gets things into
215
an inextricable tangle."
Provision must therefore be made in the proposed Bill imposing 
tax on lands generally. Such a law, it was envisaged, would operate 
a gigantic partition suit, gradually working itself out with comparatively 
little friction. Families and tribes would agree to split up the lands 
jointly held by them or in common in order to pay tax on their individual 
holdings. In this way, individual titles would be created and freehold 
titles would become vested in such individuals. Large tracts of waste 
land would in many cases remain unpaid for and could then fall into the 
hands of the Crown.
It should be remarked here that the young Griffith being ignorant 
of the nature of the traditional schemes of interest in land, assumed 
erroneously, that the indigenous system was a wretched one and therefore 
ought to be done away with. Hence the evolution of tenure should be 
guided on the lines of English principles. Yet, greater insight into 
the systems would have made him realise that the policy advocated by 
him was not incompatible with the traditional notions of tenure.
For, the assumption of land administration responsibilities by 
the crown would amount to taking over the control functions which the 
traditional authorities had from time immemorial exercised over lands 
as the political leaders of the community. The role which the crown 
would be playing under the new scheme could therefore be seen as the 
natural consequence of the crown becoming the new head of the communities 
now absorbed into the Gold Coast nation without necessarily changing 
or infringing individual rights. Under such a scheme, the creation 
of freehold titles would not be a necessary condtition for the beneficial
215
Ibid. Young Griffith evidently had in mind the Indian land tax 
system in which the major source of government revenue was derived 
from taxation on land.
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enjoyment of rights in land.
In view of this, although the crown may allocate land to the subject
having an indisputable interest therein, the interest would subsist
so long as the subject continued in occupation and use. When he abandoned
it, it would revert to the crown for reallocation in the same manner
as it was the practice under the traditional system. The equitable
and economic principles underlying the traditional system has more to
commend it than the creation of freehold titles in the manner suggested
by young Griffith. His general approach to the problem however meant
that it opened the way for the discussion and consideration of land
problems in the Gold Coast in the context of a national land policy.
While the canvassing of opinion and the debates on the proposed
measures went on, Sir William Brandford Griffith asked A. Redwar, the
Queen's advocate to draft a Bill to vest the "waste lands" in the Crown.
The matter was however kept in abeyance as a result of Redwar having
been on holiday in England throughout the whole of 1891. Meanwhile,
the anomalies concerning the mining industry and concession grants were
being brought to the attention of the Imperial government in England.
Things came to a head when early in 1894, certain anomalies in concession
grants came to light in the Colonial Office in London. One Mr. Prosser
obtained some documents from the Gold Coast purporting to be concessions
granted to him there. By that document he was granted certain rights,
among others, the construction of railways from Elmina to Cape Coast
and hence to Prah.
The Secretary of State, the Marquess of Ripon, refused to entertain
the application because he discovered serious irregularities concerning
it. He sent a Dispatch to Griffith stating:
"The concessions alleged to have been obtained by Mr. Prosser appear
to be identical with the first three of the four so called concessions
to which you referred in your Dispatch No. 140 of the 8th May 1891 
. . .  I have to request you to inform me whether it is probable 
that other concessions of similar kind will be brought forward, 
and, if so, whether it may be desirable to issue a public notice 
to the effect that no concession purporting to be granted by Native
Ripon to Griffith, 1 May, 1894, C.O. 876/46. No. 513, African West. 
By this time the Marquess of Ripon succeeded Lord Knutsford as 
the Secretary of State. It would appear however that Ripon's views 
were not dissimilar to those of his predecessor.
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Chiefs will be recognised by the government in any way, unless ^^7  
approved by the Governor within one year of their being granted.”
He also expressed concern about the reports calling his attention
to the serious damage being caused to the Colony by reckless felling
of timber in the Axim district. He warned the Governor that the time
had come when the colonial government should seriously consider what
were the best means to adopt for the regulation of the mining and timber
industries. He therefore enquired to know what progress had been made
on the proposed Crown Lands Bill.
The Governor replied that he had delayed action on the matter in
order to write a full report regarding the problems and how he proposed
to tackle them. Meanwhile, Chief Justice Hutchinson, who had three
years earlier expressed some reservations about the feasibility of the
crown's control over lands, was forced to change his views. Having
had six years experience on the Bench in the colony, he became aware
of the serious consequences of uncertainty of title and its incidental
costly litigation.
In his memorandum accompanying the Bill he had drafted, he notified
218the Governor that he had changed his earlier views on the issue.
He regarded the failure of the traditional elders, particularly the
Chiefs, to apply the proceeds of concession grants to the benefit of
their subjects and the serious irregularities arising from such grants
as being "overwhelmingly strong" reasons why the Chiefs should now be
relieved of their traditional land control functions. He wrote:
"The right, if it exists, of making grants to strangers, particularly 
Europeans, of waste land, and of minerals, and of concessions of 
forest land, will be taken away. The practice of making such grants 
and concessions is quite modern and is probably illegal according 
to Native law and custom". 219
If the Chief Justice had certain doubts about the legality of such 
transaction, there was one thing of which he had no doubts in his mind. 
This was the desirability of some measure of control over the timber 
and mining industry. Referring to the Bill which he had drafted he 
stated:
2X8
Letter of 25 July, 1974. Enclosed in no. 513, African West, C.O. 
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"I think that an Ordinance on the lines of this Bill would secure 
for the government the main object which, I believe, your Excellency 
has in view - the control of the forests and the mines without^Q 
any hardship or injustice to the natives or to anyone else."
Armed with such words of support from his earlier critic and his
son who had suggested the ways in which the reforms might be carried
out,Sir Brandford Griffith was. now ready to give a full report on the
problems and the measures he proposed to adopt for their solution.
He assured the Secretary of State in his report that the kind of anomalies
221
in the Prosser concession would no longer occur in the future.
He believed the new Crown Lands Bill, the draft of which he enclosed
in his Dispatch, would take care of similar problems. He was therefore 
of the opinion that it was unnecessary to issue the notification referred 
to in Ripon's Dispatch.
C The Draft Crown Lands Bill of 1894.
i. Definitions
The Bill drafted by Hutchinson was a short and simple piece of
legislation. Section 1 vest in the Crown all waste lands in the country.
Clause 2 dealt with matters relating to definition. It defined "waste 
land" as land which for a period of 30 years next before the day on 
which the Ordinance was passed no beneficial use had been made for culti­
vation or inhabitation or for collecting or storing water or for any
222
industrial purpose. It also defined forest land as land which was
for the most part covered with trees which have not been planted or 
sown by man. Clause 3 of the draft Bill vested tfrelands so defined 
in the Crown for the use of the government of the colony.
Lands to be affected by the Bill were so defined so as to avoid 
the infringement of prior existing rights. A remarkable feature of
221
Griffith to Ripon, 29 August, 1894, C.O. 879/46 *
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This definition of "waste land" is a replica of Section 7(b) of/Public
Lands Ordinance, No. 8 of 1876 which defines unoccupied land in
a similar manner and which the government could acquire for the
service of the Colony without having to pay compensation therefor.
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of these definitions was that they were consistent with the indigenous
law under which rights to land were established by means of effective
occupation and inheritance of such acquired rights. Abandonment of
occupied land for a period of thirty years was considered as a sufficient
time within which such rights might cease to exist. This was a restatement
223
of the traditional law.
ii. Native Rights
Under Clause 4, the Bill sought to guarantee certain rights to
Natives. It provided that:
"Nothing in this Ordinance shall affect the rights according to 
native law of any head of a family or any Chief with the concurrence 
of those persons ( if any) where concurrence is required by Native 
law, either himself to occupy, or to give permission to Natives 
on the customary native term and tenure to occupy waste land belonging 
to such family, or to the stool of such chief (such waste land 
not being forest land), and the persons so occupying or permitted 
to occupy shall have the same rights of user of the land for culti­
vation or inhabitation, or otherwise, as if the Ordinance had not 
passed, and so long as their occupation continues the land shall 
be vested in the Queen as aforesaid subject to their rights."
This provision was obviously formulated to allow the traditional 
authorities to continue their traditional roles with respect to land 
allocation to members of their land holding groups. This was an important 
provision because it would allow the traditional leaders to assist in 
land administration until such time as government officials might be 
found to assume such duties. Serious anomalies in land alienation were 
not common among the members of the same land holding groups. The problem 
lay with the grant of concessions to strangers. It was therefore deemed 
unnecessary to prevent chiefs and heads of families from performing 
their land administration functions within their families or polities.
Just as before the Ordinance came into force, members of land holding 
communities or families could acquire rights to land by the exercise 
of their inherent rights of family or community membership by means
223
Although it is uncertain for how long abandonment becomes effective 
under the customary law, Sarbah suggests a ten year period might 
be sufficient. See his F.C.L., op.cit. p. 61.
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of effective occupation of "waste land". If the land was abandoned,
the right was to be extinguished and to revert to the crown. The significance
of this provision lay in the fact that although it would appear as a
mere reproduction of the customary law, abandonment under the new law
would have the effect of reverting the interest to the Crown, that is
to say, the right would revert to the state of the Gold Coast and not
to the particular community or family to which the original acquirer
of the interest belonged. This provision could have far reaching consequences.
It meant that all the waste lands, having been vested in the crown,
would have the effect of abolishing tribal territorial basis of beneficial
enjoyment of rights in land. In place of this would be established
Gold Coast citizenship by virtue of which the citizen would be entitled
to beneficially enjoy and acquire interests in land.
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Although the Bill sought to vest all minerals in the Crown,
Clause 8 preserved the right of the native to work and get minerals 
by himself or by any members of his family or household, who were entitled 
by customary law to do so before the coming into force of the Ordinance.
The only restriction in this respect was that this right did not extend 
to any mineral, the right to work or get which, the government had before 
the attempted exercise of these rights had already granted to any other 
person.
This early take-over of minerals by the government was the result 
of a recognition of the fact that the mineral wealth of a nation requires 
a greater protection against indiscriminate exploitation and must be 
prevented from falling into the hands of a small number of private indivi­
duals who might not manage or apply it to the interest of the community 
at large. The policy considerations underlying such a measure were 
set out 50 years later when the mining policy of the Imperial government 
was authoritatively stated to be as follows:
"There is a fundamental difference between mining and other forms 
of productive activity such as agriculture, animal husbandry or 
forestry. Whereas policy in the latter cases should aim at the 
preservation and improvement of the productive powers of the basic 
natural resources of a territory, mining essentially consists of 
the removal of valuable natural resources which once removed, cannot 
in the nature of things be replaced. The process is therefore 
in the nature of the realisation of a capital asset and the general 
aim of mining policy must therefore be to make the best possible
Clause 6 .
arrangement for realising such an asset."
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In what was regarded as five powerful arguments to be adduced for
the vesting of all mineral rights in the Crown, the 1946 Circular noted
that in the first place, the development of minerals in colonial conditions
frequently required considerable government expenditure, e.g. on survey,
transport ot other facilities and it was undesirable that the result
of such expenditure should accrue to private mineral owners. Secondly,
a multiplicity of owners was frequently an obstacle to the organisation
of economic units of operation. Thirdly, the payments made under contracts
betwen owners and mining companies did not necessarily accrue to the
benefit of the members of the community which had the most substantial
interest in the lands affected. Fourthly, minerals were important economic
assets to a territory and being the gift of nature, their benefits should
be shared by the community to which they generally belonged, and not
enjoyed solely by limited groups of private individuals who were often
not members of the community concerned. Finally, government, by possession
of the rights, was in a position to control the size of the concessions
226
and the rate and terms of exploitation.
The 1946 Circular noted that in pursuit of these objectives most 
colonial legislation had already provided for the reservation of mineral 
rights in any future sale or alienation of crown or public lands. It 
urged that in places where such provisions were not made, the government 
of those territories might well consider its adoption. Although policy 
considerations of this kind were not fully articulated in the memorandum 
to the 1894 Bill, the principles outlined above could be discerned from 
its provisions. Unhappily, as will be seen later, the opponents of 
the Bill could not see the merit in the scheme as their vision was blurred, 
in many respects, by emotion and their own selfish interest.
iii. General Provisions on Existing Rights
Under the draft Bill, all prior existing rights in respect of minerals
225
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Circular dispatched from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Mr. A. Creech Jones, 17 October^1946, See note 226 belowi
Ibid. This policy statement was influenced by the post-war Labour 
Party ideas concerning the important role governments should play 
in development programmes so as to rehabilitate shattered economies 
of the inter and post war periods.
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and timber were required to be registered in the land registry within
six months from, the date of commencement of the Ordinance. Failure
to do so within the prescribed period would render such grants absolutely 
227
void. This provision was aimed at compelling concessionaires to
survey and record their possessions. In this way, the government could 
determine the extent of individual acquisitions.
Clause 10 (i) provided that every grant of land in respect of timber 
and minerals which shall have been made within ten years next before 
the commencement of the Ordinance where the land to which the grant 
applied exceeded 500 acres, should be submitted by such person claiming 
any rights under it to the Governor in Council for approval. For approval 
of such grants to be given, certain prescribed conditions were to be 
satisfied. Firstly, the Governor in Council shall take into account 
the fairness of the transaction. In determining the fairness of the 
contract under which the rights were acquired, the Governor was enjoined 
to take into consideration:
a. the area to which the interest related;
b. the consideration given for it;
c. the purpose for which it was acquired, and in other respects. 
Secondly, where these conditions were satisfied, the Governor might
approve it subject to such exceptions, conditions or reservations if 
any, as may be agreed upon with the grantee. In any event, its approval 
was made subject to the absolute discretion of the Governor in Council.
Even where such grant had been finally approved such approval would
not confer on the grantee any validity which it would not otherwise
u „ 228 
have had.
If the Governor-in-Council did not approve a grant within one year 
after the commencement of the grant, it would become absolutely void.
In that event, if the Governor considered it just, he might direct payment 
to the grantee out of public treasury, the value of the consideration 
given for the grant. These provisions were apparently aimed at speculators 
and grantees of interest in land on unreasonable and unfair terms. 
Conditions such as adequacy of consideration, limitation as to size 
etc., which were required to be satisfied before the approval of such 
grants, implied that such transactions could be reopened. The effect 
of this provision would be to bring to an end the laissez-faire atmosphere
227
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in which parties were accustomed to conduct land transactions on the 
basis of ordinary principles of contract law.
Although this might be open to objection on the grounds that the 
exercise of these discretionary powers by the Governor would amount 
to interference or restriction on the private rights of individuals 
to bargain freely, the policy might be justified on the grounds that 
the natives needed protection against the sharp practices of the literate 
native middlemen and the European capitalist speculators who stood in 
a stronger bargaining position than the illiterate and ignorant native 
chiefs. The former more often than not took advantage of the weaknesses 
of the latter and acquired concession rights on unreasonable terms.
These provisions sought to redress this imbalance.
In order to strengthen the hands of the government against speculators, 
a provision was introduced under Clause 11 to declare unutilised concessions 
void. It thus provided that every grant in respect of forests, minerals 
and other rights in respect of lands which was made before the commencement 
of the Ordinance and which had not been utilised in good faith by cutting 
timber, oh the making of roads or the opening or working of mines, or 
erection or purchse of machinery or otherwise, should on the commencement 
of the Ordinance become absolutely void. In any such case, if the Governor 
in Council deemed it just, he might direct payment out of public treasury, 
the consideration or part thereof to the grantee.
These provisions on prior existing rights were those that provoked 
the strongest attack from Europeans and the African middle class alike 
on the proposed legislation. They could not easily accept a measure 
which could strike at the very foundation of their profitable gamble 
in concession speculation.
iv. Crown Grants
In order to lay down clear procedures for land grants and allocation 
under the scheme, the Ordinance empowered the Governor to make rules prescrib­
ing the mode of application for grants and such deposits as applicants
might be required to pay. Such regulations were also to define the
228
terms on which grants were to be made. Clause 14 prescribed the
procedures by which grants by the crown might be made. The Colonial 
Secretary or anyone appointed by him was required to cause notice of 
every application for a grant to be published in the Gazette. Such a
ppo
Clause 12.
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notice should also be conspicuously posted up for two weeks on the door
of the principal courthouse of the Commissioner of the district in which
the land to be affected by the grant was situate.
Similarly, a copy of the notice was to be served on the head chief
or head chiefs if there were more than one such head chief residing
near to the land in question. After the publication of the notice in
the manner discused above, anyone making an adverse claim in respect
of the land concerned was required to make his claim at the Divisional
Court of the province in which the land was situate. If a claim of
this kind was made, the court was to set up a date for the adjudication
of the claim in not more than three weeks from the date on which the
notice had been posted. Similarly, the claim must be made within the
229
prescribed period of three weeks. After the adjudication of the
claim or if no adverse claims were made, the Governor might proceed
to make the grant. Any such grant made would have the effect of con-
230
ferring on the grantee an absolute title to the interest granted.
It may be questioned whether the procedures laid down for publishing 
the notice of applications were adequate enough to furnish information 
on prospective grants. In the first place, the vast majority of the 
people were illiterate and would not be able to read the notices. It 
would appear however, that these provisions were more relevant to trans­
actions in which European mining firms, speculators and the native middle 
class were the main parties. For, it was this class of persons who 
were involved in the large concession grants for mining and speculation. 
This category of persons would have no difficulty in reading the Gazette 
and other notices.
It would thus appear that the method by which the Colonial government 
under Sir William Brandford Griffith sought to solve the land problems 
of uncertainty of title, costly litigation, speculation, illegal dealings
in land and the control of the mines and the forests was the assumption
A
by the Crown of some of the aministrative controls which the traditional
authorities had from time immemorial exercised over such lands.
When the Secretary of State, the Marquess of Ripon, received the
draft Bill and the memorandum thereon, he approved of it, but recommended
231
minor additions and alterations. He suggested that instead of imposing
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an obligation on the grantee to register his grant in the land registry
within six months of his grant, it might be better if the government
undertook that responsibility. A moderate fee could then be charged
to cover expenses of the registry and surveys. H.e believed this procedure
would simplify the system and pave the way for the establishment of
lines
a system of title registration on the tiens of the Torrence system in 
Australia. He suggested the publication of the Bill in the Gazette 
for three weeks before it should be brought before the Legislative Council. 
The obvious reason for this suggestion was to assess public opinion 
and reaction to the measures.
As might be expected, reaction was immediate and unfavourable.
The problem for the Gold Coast government was that, for the first time 
in the history of British administration of the Gold Coast, an attempt 
was being made to assert rights which were sovereign in nature. Yet 
it should be borne in mind that even as at this time, the Imperial Govern­
ment's position in relation to sovereign rights remained ambiguous.
This element in the situation was to prove quite damaging to the defence 
of the programmes being proposed.
There was also an additional factor which was to prove disadvantageous 
to the implementation of the programme. For a programme of land reform 
with such far-reaching consequences, the need for consistency and continuity 
in policy was essential. But the scheme suffered the misfortune that 
those who lived with the problems, understood them and initiated this 
programme of reform did not continue in office long enough to see the 
scheme through. This proved unhelpful to the pursuit of a coherent 
and consistent policy on these matters.
For instance, the brain behind the scheme was Sir William Brandford 
Griffith, but the Bill had only been read once in the Legislative Council 
before he left the Gold Coast on retirement. Both Redwar, the legal 
officer of the Colony, and Hutchinson were involved in drafting the 
Bill. The former left the Gold Coast at the end of 1891, while the 
latter was apppointed Chief Justice of the Windward Islands at the end 
of 1894. Lord Knutsford, who originally supported the idea, was succeeded 
by the Marquess of Ripon as the Secretary of State early in 1895. Although 
the latter had no objection to the plan, hardly had he had time to grasp 
and digest the problems before he was succeeded by Lord Chamberlain.
Maxwell who succeeded Griffith could have been firm and seen the scheme 
through. But before he could do so, he was taken ill and died at sea 
in the autumn of 1897. All these made the appreciation of the problems
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by government officials difficult and helped the opposition considerably. 
Therefore it was not surprising that when Maxwell was succeeded by Hodgson, 
one of the original opponents of the Bill, the scheme was doomed to 
failure.
It will be considered next, the nature of the opposition to the 
Bill, the assessment of the arguments for and against it, and the way 
in which the British government's ambivalence concerning its sovereign 
rights over the territory in the past years was employed by the opposition 
as a basis for challenging the administration's right to exercise the 
sovereign powers implied by the scheme.
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CHAPTER IV 
Opposition to the Bill
A. Introductory
It is often assumed erroneously that native opposition to the Land 
Bills of 1894 and 1897, spearheaded by the Aborigins Rights Protection 
Society, was the main cause of their withdrawal. An examination of the facts 
would, however, disclose that the importance of the part played by native 
protest and agitation in this respect was often exaggerated. At the end of 
the day, the most important factor in the issue was pressure from European 
merchants, financial and commercial organisations in Liverpool, Manchester 
and London. These trade associations had their lobbies in the House of 
Commons, and the pressure exerted by them was further helped by the opposi­
tion of certain government officials, both in the colony and thet Colonial 
Office in London. Instrumental in the withdrawal of the Bill was pressure 
from these groups. Had these financial and commercial institutions not 
found their interests threatened by these legislative measures, the Bill 
might well have been pushed through, protest from the natives notwithstanding.
One of the arguments advanced against the Bill by the natives was that 
if the lands were vested in the crown with power in the Governor to allocate 
land, the latter would dispose of all the lands to Europeans and deprive the 
natives of their lands. What this argument amounted to was in effect that the 
scheme was being designed in the interest of British firms. However, curiously 
enough, the latter in whose interest the scheme was alleged to have been 
designed, found themselves on the same side as the natives in opposition to 
the measure. This factor must continually be borne in mind in the assessment 
of the arguments advanced against the Bill. The fact was that those elements 
of the native middle class which were most unrelenting in their opposition to 
the Bill all had identical financial interests with Europeans which the 
measures threatened.
B. Opposition from Government Officials
Prominent among those government officials who raised objections to the 
proposed legislative measures were the Attorney General of the Colony, Bruce 
Hindle, and the Colonial Secretary, Sir F. M. Hodgson. Both men were away in 
London when Hutchinson made the first draft of the proposed Bill. Soon after 
their return, they wrote their comments in criticism of the Bill.
The Attorney General, Bruce Hindle, conceded the fact that when he was a 
District Commissioner in Axim in 1888 and became acquainted with land problems 
in the districts of Ankobra, Wassaw and Appolonia, he formed and expressed the 
opinion that the solution lay in the assumption of all lands under Crown con­
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trol to be administered for the general advantage. But he was now of the
view that the present measure went too far. His main reasons for his new
stand were stated as follows:
"All these years the Government has, without hindrance or warning, allowed 
speculators to spend health, time and money, in the acquisition of conces- 
sions, many persons having come out to this colony at the risk of life, and 
at great expense, only now to find that, by ex post facto legislation, 
practically all the grants that have been made are liable to be forfeited 
sind most of them are void absolutely, with a provision, however, which is 
not going to amount to much. Their interests have already been registered 
sind published from time to time in the Gazette. Most of the properties 
had been subject to costly litigation. All these are to go overboard if 
the concession has not been worked or the terms are unreasonable.232
It is interesting to note that Hindle's argument was not based on the fact 
that the anomalies in concession grants such as insecurity of title and costly 
litigation were on the decrease sinca he had ceased to be a District Commis­
sioner in 1888. Indeed, the evidence was overwhelming that such problems 
actually increased steadily with the years. In fact;, there was implied in 
his own argument the suggestion that the majority of the concessions were ob­
tained on unreasonable terms and were not being developed. If this were not 
the case he would not have entertained any fears that all those concessions 
were "to go overboard" if they were unworked or the terms were unreasonable.
Certainly, Hindle saw speculation in concessions as one of the legitimate
business activities which ought to be encouraged in the colony. He expressed
this objective in the following words:
"One chief hope of this Colony is that the speculative capitalist will be­
come interested, but I fear that this Ordinance, if passed, will frighten 233 
him off for half a century, especially as he won't know what is coming next."
He conceded the fact that many of the terms on which the concessions were 
obtained were apparently unfair "especially looking at the first considera­
tion". Yet, he believed this could be compensated for when the mines began 
production at which time high rents would be paid.
This argument presupposed the incorporation into the concession agree­
ments terms which provided for the payment of higher rents when the mines be­
gan production. However, as the examination of the concession agreements dis­
closed, no such clauses existed which would justify such a presupposition.
The factor which the learned Attorney General seemed to have overlooked was 
that even if clauses of the kind were included in the agreements, they could 
easily be evaded by selling off such grants to the highest bidder in the market 
before the grantee had even had time to work the mine and develop it. It 
might not be easy for the grantor to enforce the clause against the subsequent 
purchaser.
Similarly, the Attorney General's objections based on the fact that the 
concessions having been registered at the land registry and published in the
232
Attorney General to Colonial Office, 18 July,. 1895, C.O. 879/46, No.
513, African West.
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Ibid., emphasis supplied.
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Gazette could not be invalidated for their unreasonableness, could have no
legal validity. For Section 20 of the Registration Ordinance under which
these instruments were registered neither guaranteed title nor cured defects 
234
in it. It provided that registration shall not cure defect in any instru­
ment registered, or confer upon it any effect or validity it would not other­
wise have had. Jt follows that the validity of instruments so registered 
could be attacked without necessarily violating the law.
Although his arguments appear to be in defence of "speculative capital­
ists", he also commented on the way in which the proposed Ordinance would 
affect the interest of the natives of the Gold Coast. He believed the measure 
would in its effect treat them unfairly. If the Crown made grants of lands, 
then the chiefs "who were the owners of the waste lands" would be deprived of 
the revenue. It appeared to him unfair that no part of the consideration 
should be given to the chiefs whose stools the land belonged to. He regarded 
this legislation as the most important in the history of the country and was 
therefore unhappy about the way in which it was being dealt with.
As the Scheme stood, he did not see it as adequate to protect the natives. 
However, he was doubtful if the whole scheme was a good policy to press for­
ward at a time when Her Majesty's Government was considering the question of 
bringing the Ashantis into the protectorate. They might be reluctant to 
come into terms.
Turning to the feasibility of the scheme, he expressed doubts about its 
success. It was "curious" and "injudicious" that a grant not approved by the
Governor in Council within one year should render such a grant void. He
could not see how the Governor could examine the "innumerable" grants within 
the last ten years within such a short period. In order to perform this task 
efficiently, it would require land commissioners and land officers who would 
be responsible for the survey, definition and demarcation of boundaries 
between Crown and other lands.
Having regard to these administrative problems, he thought the measures 
went too far. He suggested the question of paying some of the proceeds of
land grants to the chief might be considered. He thought the period within
which a concessionaire should be required bona fide to begin working his con­
cession should be extended to ten years and that the size of concessions 
acquired ten years hence which should receive automatic recognition should be 
extended to 2,000 fathoms instead of 500 acres.
In support of these views, was the Colonial Secretary, F. M. Hodgson. In
a letter to the Governor, Sir William Brandford Griffith, he criticised the
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Bill on several grounds. Like the Attorney General, he expressed doubts 
about the availability of any machinery to bring to bear on the vast area of 
land to be affected. He repeated most of what the latter had said and was
234
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F. M, Hodgson to Maxwell, 13 September! 1895, No. 51 African West,
C.0. 879/46
almost in entire agreement with him. Like Hindle, he thought the Ordinance 
went too far in terms of principles and in the direction of "confiscation 
and spoliation".
Turning to the financial implications of the scheme, he drew the atten­
tion of the Legislative Council to the economic and financial constraints 
which might make the legislation a futile exercise. He argued that it would 
cost the government something in the range of £8,000 per annum at least if the 
programme was to be implemented. In his opinion, unless the Bill was to be a 
piece of meaningless legislation "encumbering the Statute Book and irritating 
the natives", then the government would have to accept the responsibility of 
making available all the staff necessary for such an elaborate scheme.
He saw, as the raison d'etre of the scheme, a belief on the part of the 
government that it could make better use of the land sind better conserve the 
interest of the natives with respect to it than "the present owners, who are
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in the main the native kings and chiefs." Where he disagreed with Hindle 
was his suggestion that only European capitalists should be encouraged.
In this regard, he wrote:
"The Attorney General makes a strong point against the Bill when he says 
that some of the provisions are calculated to frighten away capitalists, 
who are the people the Government has to encourage - (not the natives) to 
come here, but I will not travel the same ground with him."
In conclusion he suggested:
"What is wanted, in my opinion, is not a wholesale annulment of all exist­
ing ownership over vast tracts of land and forest, a step which will 
cause, has in fact already caused, extreme dissatisfaction and disgust, 
but a measure which gives the government the right to watch the land oper­
ations of the natives, and to insist upon the observance of certain regu­
lations with respect to them as may appear to be called for in the interest 
of the natives on the one hand and capitalists on the other.237
For this reason, he suggested that the principles of the Bill should
be abandoned. Instead, government inspectors of mines be appointed.
Officers responsible for the inspection of timber grants and more complete
arrangement for the registration and survey of grants be appointed.
Regulations for the conservation of forests and the working of grants
both in the case of minerals and wood could be an answer to the problems.
These objectives could be accomplished without the necessity of confiscating
the land. He believed that if his suggested course of action was adopted,
it would prevent the universal irritation, which although had not as
Ibid. It is not surprising that the policy which was later adopted 
and pursued after the withdrawal of the Bills embodied the principles
inherent in this suggestion, for Maxwell was succeeded by Hodgson as 
Governor and was therefore in a position to put his ideas into practice.
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yet found its full vent, the Bill had already caused.
Certain aspects of Hodgson's argument call if or comment. It would 
be observed that underlying his arguments was a basic misunderstanding 
of the traditional schemes of interest in land. He was mistaken in 
supposing that the "owners" of the land were "in the main, the native 
kings and chiefs". Had the land belonged to the "kings" and "chiefs" 
in their own rights, perhaps one would not have been too much concerned 
by the maner in which they were improvidently disposing of them for
paltry sums. Perhaps the fact which Hodgson did not appreciate was
that the "kings" and "chiefs" were administrators of the lands belonging 
to communities of which they were representatives.
The raison d'etre of the Bill was therefore not the protection 
of the interests of the "kings" and chiefs" as "owners" of the lands 
as such, but the safeguarding of the interests of the ordinary members 
of the communities whose resources were being mismanaged and indiscrimi­
nately alienated by their ignorant and generally selfish leaders.
The majority of the opponents and critics of the Bill based their arguments 
on similar mistaken premises, believing erroneously that the control 
function of the traditional authorities carried with it proprietary 
rights over the lands administered by them.
There were those who like Hindle sought to promote the interests
of "speculative capitalists" without regard to the social and economic 
consequences for the ordinary members of the society or for the country 
as a whole. Too, there were those who like Hodgson believed erroneously 
that vesting the lands in the Crown necessarily amounted to "a wholesale 
annulment of all existing ownership over vast tracts of land and forests."
As indicated earlier, vesting the lands in the Crown meant no more 
than the assumption by the Crown of the administrative controls which 
the traditional authorities, as the political heads of their respective 
communities, were accustomed to exercise over lands within the territo­
rial confines of their polities. If these traditional states had lost 
their sovereign rights by reason of their amalgamation into the territory 
of the Gold Coast, then the right of such administrative controls over 
lands could be seen to have passed to the new sovereign authority, i.e. 
the Crown.
Maxwell made this point, and rightly so when in defence of the 
Ordinance, he argued thus:
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"Now what is the position of the Government of this Colony in respect 
of public lands over which communities of this sort have a species 
of territorial rights? I claim that the right of the paramount 
power established here is to exercise any and every right which 
may be exercised by any chief. I claim as Governor of this Colony, 
and as representative of Her Majesty to have in this Colony any 
and every power which may be lawfully exercised by native custom 
by any chief, and further I consider that there is an obligation 
upon this Government - an obligation upon me, as the representative 
of Her Majesty to see that native chiefs do not abuse their position, 
and exceed their powers, by encroaching upon the rights of those 
for whom they are really trustees, and by dealing illegally and 
improvidently with stool lands which are in other words, the public 
lands of the Tribe." 236
Despite the apparent flaws in the arguments against the proposed 
measures initiated by Griffith and the forceful defence of them by himself 
and his successor, Maxwell, the Ordinance which could provide the basis 
for. their implementation could not come into force. The scheme fell 
through not so much because there were sound and cogent arguments against 
it. Its failure was due to the pressure and efforts of some powerful 
minority of economic and financial interest groups such as the Liverpool 
Chamber of Commerce, the West African Traders Association, businessmen 
and their lobbies in the House of Commons and native middle class of 
lawyers, elite and merchants whose economic interest were seriously 
threatened by the Ordinance.
Had Griffith or Maxwell remained longer in officer either of them 
could have been resolute sind pushed the scheme through. Their untimely 
departure, one after the other, helped the opponents of the measure 
considerably. The scheme was thus doomed to failure when Maxwell was 
succeeded by Hodgson in 1897. As it will be recalled, Hodgson had earlier 
criticised the measures when he was serving under Griffith as Colonial 
Secretary. It is therefore not surprising that the views outlined by 
him as the lines on which land policy ought to be formulated became 
the guiding principle for future legislation on lands during the colonial
C.O. 96/295. Emphasis supplied. On the public character of lands 
under African customary law, Casely Hayford wrote in 1912: "There
are the general lands of the state over which the king exercises 
paramountcy. It is a sort of sovereign oversight which does not 
carry with it the ownership of any particular land." See The Truth 
about the West African Question, London, 1912, 54-55. See also 
Sarbah, op.cit., 65-66, where he writes: "At the most the king
or head chief is but a trustee, who is as much controlled in his 
enjoyment of the public lands by his subordinate chiefs and coun­
cillors as the head of a family by the senior members thereof." 
Emphasis supplied.
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period.
C. Native Opposition
The criticism of the Crown Lands Bill of 1894 by Bruce Hindle and 
F. M. Hodgson was influenced in part by public reaction in the Gold 
Coast to the measures. When information leaked out on the proposed 
legislation, public reaction was that of fear and indignation. The 
protests of the native middle class and elite might well have been moti­
vated by nationalist feelings and genuine fears that private rights 
would be violated by the introduction of the law. But it was equally 
true that their economic interests were gravely threatened.
The Chiefs and traditional Elders having conceded much of their 
political and jurisdictional rights to the government, either by treaty 
or acquiescence, could not accept without opposition a measure the con­
sequences of which might well be the destruction of one major source 
of their economic and political power. As far as the ordinary main was 
concerned, his reaction depended on the way in which the measure was 
interpreted to him by those who could read and write. For the local 
press, the land question provided a useful opportunity for a rallying 
point to nationalism.
Much of the fear of the people could be justified by the attitude 
of the government itself. The Imperial government had all along insisted 
that it had no sovereignrights over the territories with the intention 
of avoiding the financial obligations that went with claims of such 
rights. Throughout the period of merchant administration, British policy 
hinged on the protection sind the preservation of British commercial 
interests. The quasi-governmental administration established at the
policy was the keeping of the colonial administration at a distance 
from the people of the territories. The government not being identified 
with the aspirations and interests of the people, it was only a matter 
of course that when they heard that an Act was to vest the lands in 
the Crown, the ordinary man should genuinely believe that he was to 
be robbed of his sincestral heritage - the land.
Long before the present crisis begsin, King Tackie of Accra had 
questioned the right of the government to acquire lands for public build­
ings. In what he rightly regarded as trespass on his stool lands, he 
complained:
rule pursued the same policy. The result of this
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"Since the English Government took possession sir they have not 
asked us for land. But we only see them building." ^39
When the Public Lands Ordinance was passed in 1876, the natives 
did not anticipate any large-scale acquisition of lands "for the service 
of the colony", as the administration was doing very little by way of 
infrastructural development. As Maxwell noted in his Secret Dispatch 
to the Colonial Secretary as late as 1896:
". . . of a machinery of a civilised government the people see 
little or nothing. No British officers are stationed in the interior 
except at TarkwaL; and Akuse. The remoter districts like Sefiwi,
Kwahu and Upper Wassaw and even near ones such as Denkyira . * and 
Akim, are seldom visited, unless some dispute or complaint compels 
the Government to despatch travelling commissioners to investigate 
it. I have been astonished when travelling through the protectorate 
to find how little there is of anything approaching to any system 
of district administration practice in any of Her Majesty's Eastern 
Possessions. No revenue is collected in the interior, no police 
are maintained or required there and there are no Government estab­
lishments except at the two places I have mentioned. The people 
are left to manage their own affaris in their own way . . . "  240
The Governor's observations give clear indications as to how distant 
the Administration was from the people. Their social, economic and 
political interests were not identical with those of the Colonial Admini­
stration. It was therefore not surprising that except the lawyers and 
the few educated elite, the people of the Colony and Protectorates knew 
little about the Public Lands Ordinance and its probable effects on 
land rights. Hence no significant opposition was raised.
However, when the establishment of the mining industry began on 
a large scale in the eighteen eighties, some educated African lawyers,
merchants and individuals joined the business of buying and selling
241
concessions, mainly on a speculative basis. This could be expected,
Report of a meeting between the British Administration, King Tackie 
and others in May 1887, C.O. 96/181, quoted by Kimble, op.cit., 
p. 331. Following this discussion, it was suggested that a retro­
spective statute should be enacted to legalise the lands acquired 
prior to the enactment of the Public Lands Ordinance. This idea 
was only discarded because the Secretary of State did not believe 
that the Crown's title was likely to be challenged.
Maxwell to Chamberlain, 28 January, 1896, C.O. 879/43, No. 490.
241
See pp. 87-88.
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since unlike their European counterparts, they had very limited opportuni­
ties for the acquisition of modern equipment, liquid capital and the
242
skills necessary for actual mining. These developments created
and established certain economic and financial interests relating to 
land rights which the proposed measures threatened to destory.
As David Kimble has pointed out, enterprising groups of natives 
and individuals continued in the field of speculation and of the concession 
acquisition and mining activities to such an extent that their specula­
tive activities became "a source of annoyance to the tidy mind of officialdom
243
during the 1890s". These new opportunities for easy acquisition
of wealth by the native middle class during the mining boom was threatened 
by the Ordinance. Kimble sums up what was at stake in the following 
words:
"It was not only the traditional authorities who profited from 
this new source of wealth. The services of African lawyers were 
in constant demand, acting on behalf of the chiefs and sometimes 
for the concessionaires. Others were encouraged by the prospect 
of tempting profits to enter the field directly, buying up concessions 
from the chiefs and then renegotiating them to European companies."
These developments provide a background to the natives' opposition
to the Ordinance. The economic and personal interests at stake were
so great that the arguments against the proposed measures became clouded
with emotion. Instead of analysing the Bill on its own merit, it was
condemned outright both on legal and political grounds. Admittedly,
it would be unfair to suggest that their opposition was based entirely
on selfish considerations. There were genuine fears as well. As the
Gold Coast Times had warned its readers in 1882, if the people of the
Gold Coast were to permit the Europeans to do on their soil what was
done in New Zealand by its white population some years ago, they would
be "guilty of an act which bears upon its very face the impress of absurdity."
245
The land was theirs.
J. P. Brown for exmample was connected with the Ashanti Exploration 
Company 1891, but lacked the capital and technique to develop the mines.
op.cit., 22.
Ibid., 21-22. A classic example of this was the negotiation of the 
Adansi sind Bekwai concessions of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation 
in which J. E. Ellis, J. B. Brown and J. E. Biney were the original 
acquirers of the concession which they later sold to Mr. Cade.
See note 169.
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Genuine fears of the kind expressed in the paper and the protection 
of personal, financial and economic interests provided the conditions 
under which the people became invited to mount a relentless opposition 
to the Bill on political and legal grounds.
As soon as rumours concerning the proposed Bill began to circulate 
around, the colonial administration was swamped with petitions from 
mining areas of the country and some parts of the coastal areas. Before 
some of these petitions could be despatched to the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, Prince Bew of Dunkwa from his base in London, where
’ A 1
he was engaged in the selling of concessions acquired in the Gold Coast,
246
sent a letter of protest to the Colonial Office. These were only
the beginnings. Numerous other petitions were sent from "kings", chief
and natives of the Gold Coast. People in the big towns along the coast
247
were already resentful of the Town Councils Ordinance which they 
regarded as an institution designed to mulct the people in taxes. Opposi­
tion to both the Crown Lands Bill and the Town Council's Ordinance was 
organised in Accra. It was led by Mr. Burtt, Swanzy's main European 
agent. A meeting held in early May, 1895*.ended with a petition from 
the "Kings of Accra, Christianburg and others" against both Bills.
The substance of their protest consisted of the assertion that the 
people were not ripe for municipal government. Even if such government 
was desirable, it was unnecessary for its establishment that tax should 
be imposed on the people. For, it was argued, there was "sufficient 
funds in reserve from customs duties and other sources." As to the 
Crown Lands Bill, it was argued that there were no lands in their dis­
tricts coming under the definition of "waste lands or forests" which 
were not "owned by the kings, chiefs,, village communities or families
by right of purchase, inheritance, gift, concession or other means as
248
time honoured propertybelongingto particular towns. The petition
called for the repeal of the Town Council's Ordinance and the withdrawal 
of the Crown Lands Bill.
Included in Dispatch No. 187 of 18 May, 1895, from Maxwell to Ripon,
C.O. 96/257 .
247
No. 17 of 1894.
248 Petition from King, chiefs etc. of Accra to Secretary of State,
11 May,1895, C.O. 96/257
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In what amounted to the repetition of similar points, the petition
from the "king, chiefs, natives and other inhabitants of Cape Coast"
noted that the greater part of the country was covered with forests
and was "incapable of cultivation". Yet the colonial government it
argued, did not find it necessary to give any assistance or encouragement
to the natives in its cultivation and utilization in the Gold Coast.
"It is only now that private enterprise has proved their value", claimed
the petitioners, "that an Ordinance is to be passed to deprive the
249
natives of their property in them and vest them in the Queen."
The petitioners from Cape Coast continued their case by pointing .
out that the Gold Coast was famous for its mineral wealth and derived
its name from it and that the exploitation of such wealth was not
neglected by the natives. This fact was provable by the constant
supply of gold from many parts of the country. The owners of the
lands derived revenue and profit from it _by leasing and working such
lands. If the Bill was passed, it would have the effect of forbidding
such landowners to "treat with any European any land defined as waste
or forest" however great the sum offered by the latter. It would
also prevent the native from going into partnerhship with any European
with the purpose of working such lands.
A remarkable feature of all the petitions was the identical nature
of the points raised, the language employed and the manner of their
presentation. The scholarly manner in which they were presented was
an indication that the opposition was organised around the hard core
of the African middle class and elite. So identical were the arguments,
language and the manner of their presentation that one might be tempted
to conclude that they were presented on behalf of the petitioners
by the same person or group of persons.
For instance, in almost all the petitions of protest I have seen,
there was the usual repetition of the following statement:
"From time immemorial the land in the country was owned and 
possessed by some king, chief, private individual, family or 
community."
It is not being suggested that the native middle class was trying
to foment trouble by misrepresentation of the people's feeling through
Petition of 25 May, 1897, to Governor and legislative Council
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these petitions. What could happen, however, was that as literate members 
of the community, the duty of interpreting the Bill to the people devolved 
on them. Reaction to the Ordinance would, therefore, depend on the way 
in which this duty was performed. Not unnaturally, as they opposed the 
measures, they gave prominence to the possible dark side of the measures 
and played down the brighter side.
It would appear that Maxwell was misled by the identity of form and 
language of the petitions to conclude that they were all the work of the 
educated African and that resentment against the Bill was exaggerated.
Thus in a letter to the Colonial Secretary on the Axim petition for instance , 
he observed:
"The framers of the petition from Axim addressed to you have inserted 
into (paragraphs 5 and 6) implied threats of disturbance if the proposed 
Ordinance is passed and enforced. This is to be regretted, but I 
do not consider the native chiefs, who are illiterate, to be respons­
ible for the contents of the document drawn up for them. The Colonial 
Government will be prepared to deal with any case of rioti^ that 
may occur, but I do not apprehend anything of the kind." ^
The Governor might be right in his belief that the chiefs were not
responsible for all the contents of the petition. But he was mistaken
as to the extent of feeling and resentment against the Bill. Before the
Elmina petition to which the Governor referred above was sent to the Secretary
of State, an emotionally charged meeting had taken place in February 1895
at Elmina market place where messengers were despatched to Accra with
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petitions of protest against the proposed Bill. The King of the Abura
division journeyed to Cape Coast to enquire from the District Commissioner
if there was any truth in the "rumour" he had heard and then summoned
252
his chiefs, headmen and councillors.
The way in which the proposed Bill was understood in the1country, 
at least the manner in which it was presented to them was what the chiefs 
smd headmen of Himan complained about in their petition. Their fear
250
Maxwell to Secretary of State, 15 July, 1895, C.O. 96/275
251
Report of District Commissioner for Elmina, 31 March, 1895, Enclosure 
No. 265 from Maxwell to Ripon in June 1895, C.O. 96/288.
252 See Kimble, op.cit., 336.
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was that the Bill was designed to oust them with their families and
their people from the land of their ancestors. They prayed that the
253
proposed Ordinance be "dropped and thrown overboard". Similar fears
were expressed in the lengthy petition addressed to the Secretary of 
State by the chiefs, merchants and residents of Accra. The people under 
British Protection, they said, had been told on many occasions that 
the Queen did not claim any rights over the land outsdie the walls of 
the forts. "Now, however, with a stroke of his pen, this Governor is 
depriving us of our lands, our gold mines, our gum trees, our rubber 
trees, our cola trees and everything of ours that is worth having and 
which descended to us from our ancestors." 254 David Kimble has rightly
observed that the heart of the controversial matter was contained in
the widely quoted clause vesting all waste and forest land in the Queen
255
for the use of the government of the Colony.
Were the various small traditional states being treated as united 
under one government within the protectorate, it might have been easier 
to explain that the law meant no more than the administration of the 
lands by the government for the benefit of the country at large. But 
this position would have been difficult to maintain, having regard to 
the fact that the government by itself had done nothing to foster national 
unity among the different polities with varying ethnic and tribal affilia­
tions. The government's attitude in this respect was exemplified in 
Governor Griffith's earlier suggestion that the revenue accruing from 
minerals exploited should be applied to the benefit of the particular 
communities from which such revenues were derived.
Under these circumstances, any suggestion at that time that the 
land was to be vested in the Queen for the use of the colony would be 
met with arguments from the peoples of the communities from which such 
wealth was derived that there was no basis or justification for applying
resources found in their areas for the development of communities with
256
which they had nothing in common. As far as ordinary people were
concerned, vesting the land in the Queen meant taking them for the latter 
as her perspnal property; hence, the fears that they were to be ousted
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Petition of 29 March,1895 to Governor and Legislative Council, included 
in Dispatch No. 196, of 11 May, 1895, from Maxwell to Ripon, C.O.96/257.
Petition of 30 March^lSGS^o Secretary of State. Enclosure No. 140 of
6 April,1895,.from Griffith to Ripon, C.O. 96/256.
Op.cit. , p. 336.-
See Governor Griffith's views on this issue at page 102..
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from their lands and to deprive them of "anything that was worth having".
Maxwell made the defence of his policy and its explanation even
more difficult by declaring that the question involved in the matter
was whether or not "the waste should belong to the Queen or the petty
i257
chiefs of the African tribes inhabiting the Colony!1 He even suggested
that the scheme was necessary to give the government a free hand when
the need arose to import Indian coolies to work in the mines or to establish
258
West Indian settlements in the Colony.
In a country where the government was apparently not felt to be
identified with the people, statements such as those referred to above
could only tend to confirm the fears of the inhabitants that the measures
were actually designed to vest the lands in the Queen in her own right.
The fact was that even if the opponents of the Bill, the educated class,
did not understand the measure in this way, they could not be expected
to explain the true meaning of the Bill to the chiefs and their subjects.
The government therefore had the serious handicap that its traditional
channel of communication was through the Chiefs. Language constituted
a strong barrier between the government and the ordinary man. Now that
the chiefs through whom the measures could be explained to the people
were on the other side of the dispute, the government was placed in
a difficult position in this respect. As Maxwell lamented when summing
up the debate in the Legislative Council, in 1897:
"I am sorry there has been no means of explaining fully throughout 
the country the purport and intent of the Bill. It is sad that 
the chiefs should employ counsel at their expense to represent 
them." 259
The Governor regretted that although meetings with the chiefs and 
people could be convened as was the normal procedure, there was no trust­
worthy native to do such explanation.
The best medium of communication would have been the press. But 
the general illiteracy of the people made this impossible. In fact, 
the local press regarded the matter of organised opposition to the Bill
as its duty. The Gold Coast Chronicle for instance, was one of the
260
several critics of the Town Council's Ordinance. It once again
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Dispatch No. 187 of 9 May, 1895, from Maxwell to Ripon, C.O. 96/257
258 Ibid.
259
Legislative Council Debates, enclosed in Dispatch from Maxwell to 
Chamberlain, 19 August, 1897, C.O. 96/295
260
See the 19 November, 1894, issue of the paper.
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took up the issue of the Crown Lands Bill. In the 11th January 1895
issue of the paper it wrote:
"Our authorities are never tired of making laws, and the latest 
news is that a new Ordinance has been passed to legalise the seizure 
by the Government of all lands in the Corlony that are unoccupied.
This is to say the least a direct blow at private rights. A greater 
mistake could not have been made by any Government, it does not 
follow that because land is not occupied, there is no owner for 
it." 261
A correspondence of the paper under the pen-name of Bones in the 
same issue of the paper appealed to the emotions of the chiefs by recalling 
the way in which their slaves were set free without any compensation 
being paid to their owners. "We are poor people in this part of the 
world", it said, "our houses are now to be taxed, and we are to forego 
our lands". The intention of the government, the correspondent stated, 
was no doubt to "lower us to the very verge of poverty". He asked:
"Because we want to be civilised, we must be stripped naked? Why . . . 
in the name of humanity is all this?" It concluded that the measure 
was not far from robbery. In its commentary on the Bill no arguments 
were adduced to prove why it was undesirable, all that the paper did 
was to whip up emotions.
The Gold Coast Independent, like the Chronicle did nothing to illumi­
nate the issues involved in the measure. It questioned the moral basis 
of the Ordinance. It wrote:
"The Bill is only the thin end of the wedge and its provisions 
do not speak much for the public morality of its authors. Questionable 
proceedings of this character can only tend to sully the honour 
and good name of the British nation both for their love for 
justice and the protection of the weak; and it is earnestly to 
be hoped that the Secretary of State will see that if this Bill 
be allowed to become law, it will be a fragrant violation of the 
most elementary principles of justice, a despotic use of power, 
a cruel wrong, and unjustifiable oppression of the poor of this 
country." 262
In support of similar views was Reverend S. R.Solomon, the Editor 
of the Methodist Times from Cape Coast who declared that he could no 
longer restrict himself to religious matters because there had arisen
in all quarters a "fiery indignation likely to devour the Colony on
263
account of the Bill entitled Crown Land Ordinance."
Quoted by C. Ilegbune, op.cit., 185.
9 February, 1895, enclosed in C.O. 96/267
Gold Coast Methodist Times, Vol. 1, No. 12, 1895.
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The Chronicle returned to the issue in March. It accused the autho­
rities of trying to conceal their real intentions by making the Bill 
difficult to understand. It commented:
"If a person owns property, why should he be compelled to part 
with it? Fancy going to some wealthy squire in England who owns 
scores of land, and telling him that all the land that was not 
under cultivation would be taken from him and declared the property 
of the Crown. In no time there would be such an outcry. . . that 
the whole Kingdom would shake . . . But out on the Gold Coast, 
things are of course different. We are in curious latitutdes."
D. Maxwell's Defence of the Bill.
Despite these attacks on the Ordinance, Maxwell was dauntless. He 
was determined to push the measures through. Although it was Griffith 
who introduced the measures, their defence fell on Maxwell. The former 
did not stay in office long enough to face the problems himself. As 
all the petitions looked almost identical, he chose that of Prince Brew 
of Dunkwa, the first to be received in the Colonial Office in London 
as representative of all of them. Indeed, that petition contained all 
the political and legal objections raised against the Bills in the country. 
The Governor therefore dealt with it in some detail, while making passing 
references to some other relevant points in others. He believed this 
would serve as a complete answer to the petitions. Prince Brew's petition 
echoed and repeated much of what was contained in other petitions which 
swamped the offices of the Colonial administration. In a summary, he 
outlined his case against the Bill on eight grounds, namely:
i. long before the advent of European contact with the Gold
Coast, the lands of the country were owned and possessed 
by some kings, chiefs, private individual, family or com­
munity;
ii # there was not an inch of land which was not so owned or
acquired;
iii. the Gold Coast Protectorate had not been acquired, either
by conquest, cession or treaty;
iv. the kings, chiefs, communities, families and individuals
had retained their rights tacitly recognised from time to 
time when the colonial government had paid money for lands 
purchased from native kings and chiefs;
Quoted by Ilegbune, op.cit., p. 187.
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v. these rights of the natives had been recognised by the Public 
lands Ordinance of 1876 which regulated land acquisitions 
for the service of the public and for which compensation 
had been regularly paid;
v i . a circular about the acquisition of concessions in 1891
had declared that the colonial government had no intention 
"to interfere in the country";
vii. the people of the Gold Coast had inherent legal rights to
deal with the lands of their own soil, and
viii. the courts and judges had questioned the right of the govern­
ment to deal with the lands of the Colony. 265
Before dealing with the issues raised by the points outlined above, 
Maxwell clarified matters relating to the misuse of terms. Referring
to the petitioners' claims that lands in the Gold Coast were "owned"
and "possessed" by some kings, chiefs, family, or individuals, Maxwell 
pointed out rightly in our opinion, that in talking about traditional 
schemes of interest in land it was necessary to be careful in accepting 
without qualification, the appropriateness of the use of such terms
2 66
as ownership and possession in their full English legal signification.
History was inaccurate, he argued, when the petitioner alleged 
that the British Government purchased land from kings and chiefs to
erect forts in the Gold Coast. Such purchases were made, if any, not
267
by the British government, but by trading companies. Maxwell argued
that reference to the Public Lands Ordinance as giving recognition to
native ownership rights was unfounded. He observed that section 7 (b) 
of that Ordinance specifically provided that where land was taken for
265
Dispatch No. 187 of 18 May, 1895, from Maxwell to Ripon, C.O.
879/46.
There is a great deal to be said for clarifying issues relating 
to the misuse of terminology. James Brew, the petitioner, was a 
British-trained lawyer and apparently fell into the common error 
of viewing the customary land tenure in terms of English law and 
its conceptions of tenure. This had been one of the key obstacles 
to the understanding of the Bills introduced by Maxwell.
267 Ibid. This aspect of Maxwell's argument does not dispose of the 
petitioner's argument on the question of ownership. Mr. Brew was 
using the fact of purchase from kings and chiefs to support his 
argument that before the arrival of Europeans the lands had owners 
from whom such lands had been purchased. It is therefore immaterial 
whether or not such purchases were made by the British government 
or trading firms. This factor would therefore make no difference 
to the validity of Brew's argument.
266
137
a public purpose, compensation shall not be awarded to any party in respect 
of unoccupied land. The Governor believed this would seem to be a precedent 
for the modification by the local legislature of what Mr. Brew was dis­
posed to claim as native rights..
The substance of His Excellency's arguments seems to be that if land
was unoccupied in the sense that no individual rights had been established
on it through the exertion of effort and industry, then such land was
public land. Therefore where such land was taken for the service of
the Colony or for public service, compensation need not be paid for
such taking. Section 8(b) of the Public Lands Ordinance was based on
the recognition of this principle in the traditional systems of tenure,
for which reason it provided that compensation should not be paid for
lands taken for the use of the public to which the land rightfully belonged.
The underlying assumption of this argument was that the colonial 
government had abolished the tribal.territorial basis of enjoyment of 
rights in land by bringing all the various polities in the Protectorates 
under British administration in the Gold Coast. It is however, obvious 
that until this time, there was no clearly defined law or policy statement 
defining the position of the government vis-a-vis the native polities.
But as far as Maxwell was concerned, the proclamation of Protectorate 
over the traditional states implied a sovereign right in the Protector 
to deal with the lands within the areas affected by the proclamation.
In this view however, he was far ahead of his time in the Gold 
Coast. In the face of opposition from the natives, European merchants 
and financial institutions, some of his own senior officials, and the 
disclaimer of rights over the territory by official statements, the 
Governor proceeded to assert the right of the protecting power’to exercise 
sovereign rights. He said.
"The very theory of Protectorate seems to imply something in the
nature of sovereign rights in the protecting power." 268
He cited the examples of other British colonies in support of his 
theory. For example, he argued that as soon as protectorates were declared 
and established in the Malay Peninsula, the native rulers were taught 
that the advice of the protecting authority must in future be obtained
Ibid. It should be remarked that Maxwell's proposition may be 
open to doubt on legal or constitution grounds. But it would be 
unrealistic not to concede his point when the Colony and Protectorates 
were practically ruled as a British Possession. The validity of 
native laws was subject to British law, the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court overshadowed the chiefs' jurisdiction, taxes were 
being levied and a police force was maintained. These were all 
acts of sovereignty.
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before any act of sovereignty could be performed by them. Therefore, 
no grant of concession made by a native ruler after the establishment 
of the protectorate was recognised unless it was countersigned by 
the Chief Resident's authority.
He argued that this was what should have been done as soon as 
concessions in the Axim District commenced to cause embarrassment.
A law should have been passed making the consent of the Governor a 
necessary condition for the validity of grants by native chiefs and 
regretted that this was not done at that early stage. He drew attention 
to the fact that:
"Much of the territory comprised within the protectorate is described 
by travellers as 'dense brush'. Even where the country is open 
the. greater part of it is waste. Sir J. Hutchinson in a letter 
dated 2nd August 1894 gave it as his opinion that perhaps more 
than nine-tenths of the lands in this Colony are unoccupied and 
uncultivated." ^69
He pointed out the fact that when Mr Brew referred to there being 
not an inch of land unowned, he must not be understood to be referring 
to land beneficially occupied. He saw the issue as involving one 
of two alternative questions.
It was whether the waste lands should belong to the Queen or 
to the petty chiefs of the African tribes inhabiting the Colony.
"The African view of the position", he lamented, "is apparently that, 
within the protectorate, the Colonial Government may collect revenue 
on imports (paid in the first instance by merchants on the coast, 
and therefore not understood by the African consumer to really fall 
upon him), provide the machinery of administration, make roads and 
maintain order. But anything like direct taxation is resented and 
sovereign rights are claimed over land, the rights of Her Majesty 
being denied in respect of any land not purchased from a king, chief, 
community or individual.
This situation, he believed, could not be accepted. It was intoler­
able that the protected African chief and tribe should receive everything
269 Ibid.
270
Ibid. It should be remarked that this was the view of British 
entrepreneurs as well.
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and yield nothing. He could not see why notwithstanding the sacrifices 
of the British government in freeing the protectorate from the Ashanti 
invasion of 1873-4, claims of sovereign rights over the forests, waste 
lands and minerals on the part of the petty chief were to be recognised.
He continued:
"I entertain no doubts whatever that it is right and politic to 
restrict the power assumed by certain native kings and chiefs to 
deal with waste lands, forests and minerals." 271
British interests and the interests of the Gold Coast at large,
he emphasised, demanded that the relative positions of the Colonial
government and the native population in respect of real property should
be clearly laid down by law. In the absence of any such definite orders
or laws on the subject, supposed rights had been acquired from native
chiefs in some districts by speculators. In some cases, the development
of lands known to contain metalliferous deposits had been retarded by
the cupidity of the local native authority while the government was
in the ridiculous position of being unable to erect a building or lay
out roads on waste lands without having to do so through the tedious
legal process usually concluding with the payment of compensation to
some individual or community who the prospect of gain had prompted
to lay claims to the land. He believed that this situation should not
be allowed to continue for too long.
An additional reason why these circumstances must not be allowed
to remain unaltered, he thought, was that it would be difficult, if it
became necessary to import Chinese or Indian coolies for public works,
272
and as settlers, it would be impossible to act quickly in this respect.
However, it is difficult to go along with the Governor as to his 
views concerning the importation of Chinese and Indian coolies. To 
say that this was an additonal reason for restricting the power of the 
chiefs would rather tend to confirm some of the fears of the people. 
Questions relating to the settlement of foreign nationals in another 
country could have such far reaching political and economic consequences 
for the country that it would not be "right and politic" to embark on 
such a programme without wide consultations and consent of the people 
of the home country. Such programme would involve the transposition 
of people of different cultures to another which could not be treated 
lightly.
271
Ibid.
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Maxwell, by introducing such questions into the arguments in defence 
of government land policy could open the policy to objections on the 
grounds that the real intentions of the government were to deprive the 
people of their lands which were their ancestral property. This view 
could be considerably reinforced by the fact that the government was 
not identified with the people. Surprisingly however, the opponents 
of the Bill did not seize upon this aspect of the matter.
Similarly, the way in which Maxwell dealt with the question of 
Crown rights would tend to obscure the principles inherent in the proposed 
measures. For example, to pose the question whether the land should 
belong to the Queen or the petty chiefs of the African tribe would suggest 
that the lands if vested in the Crown would become the personal property 
of the Queen. The correct view, though would appear to be that vesting 
the lands in the Crown implies conferring a right of administering all 
such lands in the Colonial government of the Gold Coast. The lands 
would then be administered by government bodies and servants on behalf 
of the Colony and Protectorate at large.
This would seem to be the view of Maxwell also. For in reference 
to Brew's assertion in his petition that the people of the Gold Coast 
had inherent and legal rights as to the possession of their soil, the 
Governor pointed out that no interference of any kind was contemplated 
with the free use of land by Africans for all the purposes for which 
they used it before the establishment of the Protectorate. They would 
be deprived of nothing which was the result of industry. What the scheme 
contemplated was "the right of the paramount authority to deal with
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the natural products and with the land being declared and asserted."
He disposed of Mr. Brew's arguments suggesting that the registration
274
of instruments affecting land under the Registration Ordinances 
amounted to a tacit acquiescence of the government in the present state 
of affairs. Maxwell referred to Section 20 of the 1895 Ordinance, which 
distinctly provided that registration did not cure defects in title.
In conclusion, he called for a firm and resolute action so that Hutchinson's 
Bill, which was much required could be passed.
He made certain suggestions, however, as to some modifications 
of the Bill in its original form. He disapproved of the way in which 
"waste lands" was defined. The definition, adoped from Section 7(b) 
of the Public Lands Ordinance of 1876, limited the sort of lands which 
might be vested in the Crown to those which 30 years next before the
Ibid. Emphasis supplied.
274
No. 8 of 1883 and no. 1 of 1895.
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commencement of the Ordinance, "no beneficial use has been made for 
cultivation,., or inhabitation or for collecting or storing water or for 
any industrial purpose." Maxwell believed this definition would give 
rise to endless litigation and the giving of false testimony.
He argued that as the land was not kept under continuous culti­
vation, any attempt by government to take any land under the proposed 
Ordinance just outside the town of Accra as Crown land under Section 
3 might be defeated on production of witnesses to swear that they took 
a crop of yams or cassava off it within the last 30 years. "There can 
be little doubt that the witnesses would always be forthcoming." He 
believed that nothing but a complete survey of the colony would make 
it possible, with reasonable accuracy, to see what land was beneficially 
occupied.
There is much to be said for the views expressed by Maxwell here.
Even under the traditional law, where no crops or wealth of any individual's
creation can be found on the land, it is regarded as unoccupied and
therefore as land "belonging" to the community or corporate group having
title to it. No limited period is specifically prescribed within which
275
land could become "waste" or abandoned. The vesting of any land
in the Grown under the Ordinance as "waste" might therefore prove difficult, 
since land might have been cultivated 30 years next before the commencement 
of the Ordinance without necessarily leaving any signs of previous occu­
pation. Proof of past occupation would thus depend largely on sworn 
statements of the claimant and his witnesses which Maxwell rightly believed 
would always be forthcoming.
Maxwell also took exception to the recognition in the draft Ordinance 
"of something quite unknown in the shape of native law". If there were 
certain native laws and customs he would like them to be ascertained 
and enacted as part of the measure. "But I should be sorry to imnperil 
the working of a system", he said, "by making it liable to be modified 
at any time by any proposition or doctrine accepted by a judge as native 
law."
The firm sind resolute defence of the government's land policy by 
Maxwell had wholehearted support from his retired predecessor, Sir William 
Brandford Griffith. At his home in England, the Colonial Office required 
him to report on all the petitions of protest which he had received 
in the Gold Coast before his departure for England. Lending support
Sarbah suggests that a 10-year period might be enough, see the 
discussion of abandonment at pp. 43-47.
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to the uncompromising stand taken by Maxwell, he wrote:
"If I may venture to say so, I think a very decided stand must 
be taken with regard to the objects stated in the Crown Lands Bill. 
Africans are rather peculiar to deal with . . .  If they detect 
anything like hesitation or indifference in transacting with them, 
they will give a great deal of trouble, if on the contrary, they 
consider that the Government is determined upon any particular 
matter, knowing, the strength of the Government, they will acquiesce 
in its decision almost without a murmur." 276
For these reasons, Griffith urged the Colonial Secretary to let
the natives understand that Her Majesty's Government "wills that the
Crown Lands Bill, possibly with some amendments, shall become law".
If this was done, "no further opposition of any consequence will be
made to it". He concluded by saying that it was merely "a quibbling
contention" against the Bill to suggest that it amounted to confiscation
or spoliation. He contended that the interpretation placed on the Ordinance
was a result of misunderstanding. He maintained that the Bill treated
the positive rights of the people carefully and provided safeguards.
Ifcertain aspects of it were evil, he argued, it was a necessary one.
Griffith was probably right in thinking that, if a resolute stand
was taken on the matter it would be accepted without a murmur by the
natives. The fact which he seemed to have overlooked, however, was
the strong opposition from financial institutions and big business interests
in London, Liverpool and Manchester, in addition he failed to take
into account the opposition of some of his government officials, some
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of whom might have their personal or financial interest to protect.
Yet, it was the pressures from the latter groups more than anything 
else which prevented the passage of both the 1894 and 1897 Bills. No 
doubt, African protest was taken into account, but it was not the decisive 
factor.
What misled both Maxwell sind Griffith not to take account of European
Griffith to Colonial Office, 8 July 1895, C.O. 879/46, African 
West, No. 513.
For example, in 1897, Mr. G. Macdonald, Director of Education in 
the Colony while on official duty at public expense in the Akim 
district, acted on behalf of a local Solicitor, Mr. Osborne, in 
matters relating to concession grants from native chiefs. He managed 
to obtain an agreement \from King Amoako Atta and his Council not 
to allow any person to prospect for gold on the lands belonging 
to them until his clients, Castle Gold Coast Exploration Syndicate 
Limited came from England within a years time. For this agreement 
he paid a consideration of £35 to the chiefs. See C.O. 96/297i
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protest was that, at the time, opposition from Europeans was rather mild.
Under the 1894 Bill, the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce merely complained
that they were not consulted before the draft was published. They thought
278
the Bill concerned the natives much more than it did Europeans. In
this view, the Chamber was mistaken. When the details of the expanded 
Bill under Maxwell was published, the latter realised it could even affect 
them more than the natives. It was then that their opposition became 
strong and decisive. Before dealing with the nature of European merchant 
opposition to these land reform programmes, it will be necessary to set 
out the main provisions of the expanded version of the Bill under Maxwell ‘ s 
Government.
Deputation of Accra branch of Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to 
Maxwell, 24 June,1895, C.O. 96/257
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CHAPTER V
The Public Lands Ordinance of 1897
A. Introductory
When Maxwell succeeded Griffith as Governor of the Gold Cast in 1895, 
opposition against the latter's Crown Lands Bill was just beginning. The 
new Governor, as we have seen, from his defence of his policy was not to be 
deterred by these protests. His confidence was built on experience in such
matters. Before assuming office in the Gold Coast he had been sent on deputa­
tion to Australia in 1881 for the purpose of studying the Torrens system of
land registration there. On his return to England he was appointed as
Commissioner of Land in the Straits Settlements, and became recognised as a 
local authority on land questions there. The Governor was therefore experi­
enced in matters relating to land problems of rural societies.
He drew upon such experiences to recommend certain modifications of the 
Draft Bill. His dealing with the problems showed how quickly he was able to 
understand the land tenure system and the problems associated with the mining 
industry. Although like Griffith, he would have liked to take a decided stand, 
he could not fail to take into account the mounting opposition against the 
measure. He thus considered it expedient to delay action on the Bill until he 
had studied the question further. An additional reason why the immediate 
introduction of the Bill might be unhelpful was the desire to bring more 
native polities under British protection.
Therefore in a letter to the Secretary of State he wrote:
"With the Ashanti question still unsettled, I would rather postpone for 
a short time, the passing of a measure which might possibly result, tem­
porarily, here and there, in disaffection within the Protectorate." 279
However, further delay in the passing of the Ordinance meant the continued
perpetration of the evils at which it was meant to be directed. Maxwell found
a temporary remedy in reviving the idea of the publication of a notification to
the effect that the Government would not recognise land grants made without the
Governors consent- Therefore, pending the introduction of the Bill in a
modified form, a government notification was published as follows:
"Whereas grants and concessions have been made by chiefs within the pro­
tectorate without the consent of the Governor of this Colony. Notice is 
hereby given that no document hereafter made purporting to grant or con­
vey any rights over or interest in, land, save and except the right to 
occupy agricultural land for the purpose of native husbandry or the right 
to occupy building land for the erection of a native house, will be recog­
nised unless it shall bear the signature and seal of the Governor, or of 
such officer as he shall appoint for the purpose, in token of Her Majesty's 
approval. "28°
The publication of this notification was followed by keeping the 1894
279 Maxwell to Ripon, 7' June»1895, C.O. 879/46.
Published 5 October, 1895, in Enclosure No. 32, 11 October, 1895, C.O.
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draft Bill in abeyance. But it led to organised opposition from natives and
Europeans alike. Three days after Maxwell had asked the opinion of the Se«-
cretary of State as to the desirability of publishing the notification, he
sent another Dispatch in which he sought advice on the propriety.of providing in
the Ordinance a provision which would enable the Governor in Council to impose
28T
at his discretion an export duty on timber and other forest products.
Although Maxwell did not think that the time had come to levy tax upon 
produce, whether in the shape of an export duty on timber or royalty on gold, 
should these industries become largely developed, the situation would have to 
be altered, for the roads, railways and river improvements required by miners 
and timber merchants could only be undertaken if they contributed materially to 
the revenue. He thus suggested inclusion in the Bill of a provision empowering 
the Governor to secure the payment of royalties of not more than 10% in kind 
or in money. Such money, if paid, a portion of it might be given to the local 
chief.
Chamberlain, who succeeded Ripon, replied that export duties were undesir­
able and inconvenient but there could be no objection to royalty on minerals and 
he approved, so far Maxwell's suggestions as one method of raising revenue.
"If mineral deposits are vested in the crown", he wrote, "it would seem to be
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only logical to provide that they shall be liable to the appropriate incidence.
Although the Government notification of October 1895 increased tension and 
opposition to the 1894 Bill, convinced as the determined Governor was that he 
was pursuing the best policy for the country, in 1896 he proceeded to cause 
altogether a new Bill to be drafted in an expanded form to include the establish­
ment of a Concession Court. This Court was to examine and approve the validity 
of concessions.
B. Objectives
The main objectives of the new Bill, which was published in 1897, were 
contained in the preamble. The introductory part stated that the Bill was 
being introduced to regulate the administration of public lands, to define 
certain interests therein and also to constitute a concession Court. The 
preamble outlined several reasons for the introduction of the Bill.
In a summary, it stated that:
i. from time to time various instruments purporting to create interests 
or rights over land in the Gold Coast colony, especially in regard 
to mining and timber had been executed by natives claiming to be 
chiefs or persons in authority;
ii. the claims of such persons to have the requisite authority to create 
such rights and interests was not in all cases admitted, and that it 
was doubtful if the disposition of the land of a native tribe or 
community to foreigners was lawful according to native custom;
Maxwell to Ripon, 10 June, 1895, C.O. 879/46
Dispatch from Chamberlain to Maxwell, 10- September, 1895, C.O. 876/46. 
No. 513, African West.
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iii. there was reason to believe that certain of the instruments referred
to above had been made improvidently and without adequate consideration;
iv. in respect of certain alleged concesssions, nothing had been done to
develop the land in respect of which such instruments were created; and
v. uncertainty concerning native customary tenure was calculated to 
retard the development of the country.
Therefore, it was expedient to provide for the proper exercise of the 
powers by those entrusted with the disposal of public lands and to prevent 
the improvident creation of interests therein and rights thereover. It was 
also necessary to facilitate the acquisition of public lands by private per­
sons on proper conditions and to decide upon the validity and scope of claims 
founded upon grants of land or mineral rights or other concessions alleged 
to have been already acquired from native chiefs or other persons.
It will be seen from these stated objectives of the new Bill that its 
principles did not differ significantly from those of the suspended 1894 
Bill. Like the later Bill, the present one was based on the principles of 
governmental control and administration of lands generally. The intention 
was to protect the generally illiterate and ignorant land authorities, 
including the ordinary man, against the sharp practices of the urbanized 
natives and European capitalist speculators who more often than not took 
advantage of the former in land transactions.
What was new about the new Bill was the omission from its provisions of
any clause vesting waste lands in the Queen. The reason for this is obvious.
The provision vesting the lands in the Queen in the previous Ordinance was 
construed by the natives as taking the land for the Queen as her personal 
property. Therefore a similar formulation in the vesting clauses was avoided 
in the new Bill. Similarly, the much criticised phrase "waste lands" and its 
previous definition was omitted as its definition was criticised on the grounds 
that there was no land without an owner in the country.
C. Rights of the Government
Part II of the draft Bill dealt with the rights and the powers which the 
government could generally exercise in matters relating to land administra­
tion in the country, 'clause-. 4 of the Bill conferred power on the government
to administer all public lands. Public lands were defined as "land over
which there has not been one of the inferior rights mentioned in Section 13
and which has not been, or may not hereafter be acquired or reserved for any
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public purpose."
By adopting the procedures prescribed by the Bill, the Governor,
232 clause
See /.2. The rights mentioned under clause 13 were those the
exercise of which could result in the establishment of rights to
land by means of effective occupation or land development under
the customary laws.
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by the exercise of the powers conferred on him under section 5, could
reserve or except from occupation, either temporarily or permanently,
any portions of public land required for any public purpose whatever.
The validity of any grant or the creation of any interest affecting
land in favour of a non-citizen, whether in writing or otherwise, was
283
made conditional upon the prior consent in writing of the Governor.
Legal action in respect of any transaction not sanctioned by the Governor
in favour of either the original grantee or anyone claiming through
him was barred by this provision.
One of the most important functions of the Governor was prescribed
by clause 21. This section in effect transferred the control functions
of the traditional authorities to the Governor. It conferred power
on him to authorise any person, whether a native or a foreigner, to
occupy public land. In doing so, he could impose any consideration
and conditions as he thought fit. The grant of any such occupational
rights was to be in a prescribed form of a land certificate signed by
the Governor. The certificate may authorise land occupation in perpetuity
284or for a term of years.
One of the conditions which must be satisfied before a land certi­
ficate could be obtained was the survey and demarcation to the satisfac­
tion of the Governor, of the land which the interest acquired related 
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to. Action in respect of any land being the subject of a land cer­
tificate was prohibited in any court of law. However, a land certificate 
could be revoked if a condition therein was broken. Similarly, it might
2Q0
be forfeited where it was obtained either by fraud or mistake.
Persons who obtained grants from natives before the Bill came into
force were required to apply for the exchange of their titles for land
28^
certificates from the Governor. Power was conferred on the Governor
under Section 26 to issue licenses to interested persons to dig for 
and take away minerals. He could also give such licences in respect 
of timber and other forest produce. The consideration in respect of 
the issue of such licences was left to be determined by the Governor 
at his discretion.
Before dealing with native rights under the Bill it is deemed neces-
283
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286 
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Clause 10.
Clause 23 made the grant of a land certificate in the prescribed 
form valid against the whole world including the Government.
Clause 24 (1).
Clause 30.
Clause 24.
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sary to make certain observations on the discretionary powers conferred 
on the Governor under the proposed Ordinance and its effect on tradi­
tional land rights. It will be observed that the law sought to vest 
the administration of what was defined as "public lands" in the Governor. 
Unlike the 1894 Ordinance, it was the administration, not the land itself, 
which was vested in him. The effect of these nrovisions empowering 
the Governor to exercise the powers outlined above, was to reduce substan­
tially, but not completely the control function of the traditional authoritie 
in matters relating to the administration of the lands referred to in 
the Bill as public lands.
As will be seen presently when we discuss native rights under the
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Bill, no prior existing rights, relating to the beneficial enjoyment
of rights in land under the indigenous law had been taken away by
the proposed Bill. What the law did was to reproduce in clear language 
already existing rules. Maxwell, having studied the traditional systems, 
came to the conclusion that they were.what he called, superior and inferior 
rights under the systems. There were superior rights in the representa­
tives of the tribe or family, and inferior rights in individuals. Summing 
up the debates on the Bill at the Legislative Council he said:
"From what I have learned since I have been here, and from the 
practice which I have observed in several cases, the deposition 
of a chief (and I presume, also the head of a family) is possible 
if a combination of dissatisfied members of the tribe, community 
or family is strong enough. If these facts be granted, how can 
it be argued that there is in a chief or in a head of family any 
interest approaching to a freehold interest or any right to make 
any legal permanent sale or concession of land which is the common 
inheritance of all." 289
Maxwell regarded the protected territories as united under Her 
Majesty's Colonial government of the Gold Coast. He was therefore entitled, 
as the head of the new state to assume "superior powers" in the represen­
tatives of the tribe or family over the lands which were the "common 
inheritance of all", that is of all the people of the country. He thus 
declared:
"I claim that the right of the paramount power established here 
is to exercise any and every right which may be exercised by any 
chief. I claim as Governor of this Colony, and as the representative 
of Her Majesty, to have in this Colony every and any power which 
may be lawfully exercised by native custom by any chief; and further,
See pp. 151-156 below.
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Legislative Council Debates,included in C.O. 96/295.
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I consider that there is an obligation on me, as the representative 
of Her Majesty to see that native chiefs do not abuse their position, 
and exceed their powers by encroaching upon the rights of those 
for whom they are really trustees and by dealing illegally and 
improvidently with stool lands, which are in other words, public 
lands of the tribe." ^90
The Bill therefore, sought to distinguish between public and private 
rights in respect of lands. It was to be made more efficient, fair 
and just for the benefit of the community at large, the administration 
of stool lands which were really public lands of the Colbny. It was 
to achieve this result that the Governor was empowered under clause 
9 to divide the country into districts if he found it expedient to do 
so for land administration purposes. He might also sub-divide districts 
into towns and might by a proclamation published in the Gazette define 
the boundaries of such districts or towns.
He had power under this provision to distinguish between each district 
or town by name. Where a district was named and proclaimed, it would 
hence forth be recognised and known by that name. He could, if it was 
in the interest of efficient administration to do so, diminish or extend 
the boundary of any district. He could also alter boundaries or names 
of any districts. This provision was very important to the scheme of 
land administration envisaged by Maxwell's policy. As he regarded the 
lands as public assets of the Gold Coast as a whole, and not the individual 
assets of the various polities comprised in the Colony and Protectorates 
under British administration, it was thought expedient to divide the 
country into the administrative units described above.
The latitude given to the Governor in the matter of dividing the 
Colony into districts would make it possible for the Governor to divide 
the country into convenient political and land administration units, 
not necessarily on tribal or ethnic lines, but on the basis of geographical 
suitability and political and administrative epxediency. Had the Bill 
become, law, the scheme devised under Clause 9 could have become one 
of the ways in which the welding of the Colony and Protectorates together
as a nation might be encouraged.
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As we shall see later, the pursuit of a similar policy in the 
Northern Territories had proved successful in establishing a sound basis 
for land administration and the enjoyment of rights in land. Like the 
North of the country, the beneficial enjoyment of rights in land would
291 See pp. 254-293
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have become dependent on Ghanaian citizenship and not on membership
of a particular stool community, a traditional state, a tribe or a family.
However, the advantage of a scheme like this was not recognised
by its opponents. Sarbah, one of the counsel hired by certain chiefs
to represent them at the Legislative Council, was for example quick
to point out that the provisions conferring powers on the Governor to
authorise the occupation of public lands amounted to vesting "what was
and the
practically all the soil of the Gold Coast/Protectorate in the Govern- 
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ment." He contended that if the Bill was allowed to become law, 
the control which the community leaders of each locality or the headman 
of a family had over his people would be destroyed.
It would be observed, however, that Sarbah confused the vesting 
of land administration in the government with the acquisition of the 
land compulsorily by the government. In the case of the latter, all 
existing rights would be extinguished where the State would become the 
ultimate owner. In the case of the former, existing rights would not 
necessarily be affected, but their administration would be organised 
by the government and its agencies. In either case, the way in which 
private rights are determined depends largely on the political and econo­
mic policy objectives of the government concerned. Any criticism of 
state or governmental control of lands or its administration can only 
be meaningful if such criticism is related to the underlying principles 
and objectives of the measure.
In Sarbah's attempt to do this, he fell into the common error of 
confusing the jurisdictional rights and the land control functions of 
the traditional authorities with proprietary rights in the lands admin­
istered by them. There was nothing in the proposed Bill to suggest 
that the family or local communities were to be prevented from continuing 
the organisation of production or economic activities on a co-operative 
basis within the family milieu. There is no doubt that the proceeds 
from concessions granted to foreigners, parts of which they were entitled 
to as remuneration for their control functions, became a new source 
of economic and political power for the chiefs and family elders.
But to suggest, as did Sarbah, that to take this right away from 
them would necessarily break family ties and the esteem in which chiefs
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and the elders were held is not borne out by experience in those parts
of the country in which chiefs exercise no such rights over lands at 
293
all. As will be seen presently, the provisions relating to the
rights of chiefs and their subjects under the Bill confirmed the already 
existing rights under the customary laws.
D. Native Rights and the Control Function of Chiefs
Clause 11 of the proposed Bill dealt with the rights and duties
of native chiefs. The traditional rights of chiefs and family heads
to allocate land to stool subjects and family members were confirmed
under this provision. The provision made it clear that "it shall be
lawful for a native, recognised by the Government as a chief, having
by native custom, as a chief or head of a family the right to do so,
to authorise the occupation by a native of public land being land subject
to native customary rights." Such recognised chiefs or heads of families
were not required to obtain the consent of the Governor before exercising
these traditional rights mentioned over lands falling within their spheres
of jurisdiction. It is thus clear from the provisions under Clause
11 that the traditional rights of the chiefs and heads of families to
allocate unoccupied land to members of their communities were not to
be done away with under the Bill. The respect in which the exercise
of their rights were to be curtailed was in the area of granting unoccupied
land to strangers, particularly Europeans.
Clause 13 of the Bill sought to reserve certain rights to the natives
and native authorities. The provision confirmed the exercise by the
latter, "superior customary rights" in respect of land appurtenant to
their stools, subject to the limitations contained in the Bill regarding
the exercise of such rights. Under clause 14, a well established rule
of customary law to the effect that long possession of stool or family
294
land does not mature into absolute ownership was restated. In a 
summary, it provided that no person or a .family shall acquire or be
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In such Chiefdoms as those of the Ewe and some Ga-Adangbe like the 
Krobos, chiefs do not normally exercise any administrative control 
qua chiefs over lands within their areas of jurisdiction. In the 
accephalous societies of the upper Regions of the country also, the
political heads of communities do not normally perform land control 
functions. Yet, we have not seen any evidence of disintegration of 
family ties and the lowering of the chiefs in the estimation of their
subject any more than other areas where chiefs perform such functions.
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deemed to have acquired absolute rights to the land on which he or the
family had been practicing shifting cultivation, no matter how long
or frequently such occupation or possession had been resorted to. The
results of such long occupation or possession would be the acquisition
of exclusive individual rights to the wealth created on the land. For
this reason, where by the exercise of any of the powers conferred on
the Governor, the occupier of such land was to be dispossessed, compensation
would not be paid for the soil on which such development was made.
What would be compensated for would be the cost-replacement value of
the wealth created on the land.
In a similar way, citizens were free to occupy land in the normal
customary way for actual residence and cultivation of the land on a
permanent basis or for use for industrial or trading purposes. In such
cases, the citizen was not required to seek the permission of the chief
295
or local ruler unless the local law required him to do so. Common
and concurrent rights of collecting forest produce or to take timber,
to work and get minerals, stones and building materials according to
native methods and customs were reaffirmed under clause 16 of the Bill.
In respect of such common or undeveloped land no compensation was to
be paid to anyone if it was affected by the exercise of any of the powers
conferred on the Governor. The rationale for this provision seems to
be that the collection and gathering of such products which were not
brought about by industry and individual efforts did not create any
exclusive individual right for which compensation might be paid.
.The Bill included a provision for the acquisition by natives of
certain rights described as "a settler's right." A native might be
able to acquire this right at the date on which the Bill would come
into force, if before that date he had been in. lawful occupation of
a portion of public land on which he made the development other than
shifting cultivation. Alternatively, where, before the coming into
force of the Bill, he was in effective occupation for three consecutive
years, he would be entitled to acquire the settler's right. Such right
was to be "a permanent heritable and transferable right of occupancy"
296
in the land affected by the right.
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Clause 15.
296 Clause 17.
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However, the free transfer of such right was permissible among natives
only. For it to be assigned to a non-native the Governor's approval to
do so was required. If approval was not given by the Governor within
one year of the assignment of any such right by a native to a foreigner,
297
the transaction shall become absolutely void. On acquisition of
a settler's right, the acquirer of such right might be issued with 
a land certificate, on application to have it exchanged for such a 
land certificate provided the land to which the interest related was 
surveyed and demarcated.
Clause 18 of the Bill prescribed two conditions under which a 
settler's right might become extinguished. Firstly, where the land 
was used for agricultural purposes, the right of occupancy would become 
extinct if it had not been cultivated for three years and contained 
no economic trees planted by man. Secondly, if the site of a building 
or quarry or a place from which water could be drawn or brick earth 
taken had remained uninhabited, unworked or unused for three or five 
years, the interest created in respect of it would come to an end and 
the land would become public land.
It must be pointed out that there is very little novelty about 
the prescribed rights of the native authorities and their subjects 
outlined in the provisions above. What the provisions sought to do 
was to lay down dna prescribed form rules which were already firmly esta­
blished in the indigenous law. Taking clause 14 of the Bill for example, 
it can be observed that it was merely a restatement of the customary 
law which states that land to which a citizen has acquired rights reverts 
to the stool or family if it is abandoned. What is not clear about 
this rule is the time period within which abandonment becomes effectual.
The provision under consideration sought to clarify this issue by .pre­
scribing three or five years period within which abandonment might 
become effectual according to the nature of development on the land.
As Maxwell rightly pointed out in the Legislative Council, under 
the Bill, the people might continue in the usual way to take lands 
for development. But a person might not "simply by resorting to a 
piece of land for shifting cultivation acquire any title in the piece of land
297
Clause 20.
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Clause 24 (1).
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or any interest therein beyond the ownership of the crops which he plants." 
There is no doubt that this is a principle well understood in the tradi­
tional law. The Governor considered it necessary to reformulate 
and lay it down clearly in a statutory form because he thought it would 
be "monstrous" if it was the case that because a man planted a crop 
of cassava or yam on a piece of public land and then abandoned it, he 
might nevertheless at any time return and lay claim to it and might
stand by in the "dog in the manger" attitude and say that nobody was
301
henceforth to take ny crop of it because he once did so.
Maxwell insisted that the land was common land and it ought to 
be understood that any one of the group or community of cpeople who 
had a customary right to resort to it might do so. The rationale for 
clause 14 of the Bill conformed to the same principles and objectives 
stated by Maxwell. Its provision that long possession and occupation 
did not mature into absolute ownership of the land possessed or occupied 
was in accord with the customary principles which placed a premium on 
wealth created by individual effort rather than the acquisition of absolute 
right to land which was undeveloped.
Similarly, the limitation placed on the right of individuals to 
transfer interests in lands to which they had established rights to 
foreigners was nothing new. Under the traditional law, the transfer 
of such interests inter se was permitted. But any transfer to a stranger 
which would have the effect of irrevocably divesting the community of 
absolute title thereof was unpermitted. The restriction placed on the 
power of the native including the chief and his councillors and the 
head of the family and its principal members to alienate interest in 
public lands to strangers, particularly to Europeans, was regarded by 
Maxwell as a necessary consequence of British rule over the protected 
territories within the Gold Coast. As the political head of these states, 
the exercise of such traditional rights passed to the Governor. But 
of equal importance was his desire to prevent the anomalies which frequently 
occurred in land transactions as between chiefs and Europeans. He wanted 
to avoid the possibility of collusion between natives and land speculators
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This meant that the right which might be acquired were those of 
user and not individual ownereship of the soil itself.
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which might defeat the whole purpose of the Bill.
Therefore, stating the objectives of these provisions, Maxwell
said:
"I want to give to the natives of this country the right of proprietor­
ship, which in many cases, especially as regards people who have 
had or whose forefathers have had the status of slaves, they have 
not got. 302 i should like to see every man with a proprietorship 
tenure and in a position where he will be safe from oppression 
on the part of any native authority. But on the other hand, I 
do not think that he ought to be in a position to part with his 
land to a foreigner . . .  we must not do anything which would lead 
to collusion between natives with customary rights and foreigners 
without any. otherwise land might be temporarily taken up by natives 
simply in order to have something to sell to a white man." 303
However, Sarbah did not accept the view that the Bill did not seek 
to alter the customary rights of the natives. He regarded these provi­
sions as having altered the traditional law fundamentally. He was parti­
cularly critical of clause 17 of the Bill which was to accord a settler's 
right to natives in certain cases. He criticised this provision as
having practically altered the customary law "under which the land owner
304
is an absolute owner". He argued on behalf of the chiefs that the
present Bill was an elaborate and expanded form of the Crown Lands Bill
of 1894. He pointed out that the latter Ordinance was even more favourable
to the natives. While it referred to "waste lands" and "forests" only,
the present Bill referred to the whole land of the Gold Coast "depriving
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the aborigines of their rights in the soil of their native land."
Sarbah criticised clause 16 of the Bill which sought to accord 
common rights of enjoying things found naturally on public or unoccupied 
lands to all natives irrespective of the tribe or community to which 
they might belong. He argued that the provision was based on the mistaken
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one branch of a family was being denied the right
'to be consulted before the alienation of family land on the grounds 
that they were descendants of slaves underscores the Governor's 
concern in this respect.
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Ibid. Compare this statement with what he says in his book,
F.C.L., op.cit., 61-62. "In this country, joint property is the 
rule . . . Absolute, unrestricted, exclusive ownership enabling 
the owner to do anything he likes with his immovable property, 
is the exception."
Ibid.
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assumption that strangers and aliens had customary and other rights 
to collect rubber, palm kernels, cola nuts and other natural products
on anybody's land.
These arguments of Sarbah underlined the fact that while Maxwell 
saw the land problems in terms of national land policy for the Gold 
Coast, Sarbah and the majority of opponents of the Governor's policies 
saw them from a narrow tribal territorial perspective. The main diffi­
culty here was that not only were the people not identified with the 
government, but the latter had itself done virtually nothing practical 
to encourage the people to think of themselves as people of one united 
Colony and Protectorates. What seemed to have united them instead was 
the way in which they regarded the Colonial administration as a common 
enemy seeking to deprive them of their lands. These circumstances were 
to prove damaging to the success of the policies which the Bill was
designed to put into operation.
E . The Concession Court
One of the reasons why it became necessary to establish a concession 
court was stated in the Legislative Council by the Attorney General 
as follows:
"For the last 20 years and more, and especially recently, native 
chiefs have made alienation sometimes by way of out-and-out convey­
ances, and sometimes by way of long leases of lands for very small
remuneration or consideration." 306
For this reason, Maxwell thought it was necessary for the establish­
ment of a concession court to conduct "a very thorough examination of 
claims . . . founded upon documents which . . . natives may have been 
induced to sign . . . "
The concession court was established under clause 37 of the Bill 
to carry out this responsibility of investigating the validity of past, 
present and future instruments affecting land. The court was to be 
properly constituted where one or more commissioners appointed by the 
Governor by notification in the Gazette was or were either sitting separately
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or together. The court was to have a secretary who would exercise
the powers conferred on the Registrar of the Supreme Court and shall
duly preserve the records of the court's proceedings.
Although the court was required to follow the procedures and rules
of court and practice established and followed-under the Supreme Court,
it could nevertheless frame other rules and procedures it might deem
309
necessary to follow. The most controversial and the most criticised
provision was cLause 41. It conferred power on the Court to enquire
into and decide upon the validity and scope of any claims founded upon
grants of land or timber or other concessions which were alleged to
have been acquired from native chiefs or other persons before the coming
into force of the Ordinance.
The Court also had power to make such enquiry even if the alleged
grant or document had been registered under the Registration Ordinances
310
of 1883 and 1895, or having been so registered were specifically 
referred to it. : To widen the scope of its enquiry into past transactions
clause 42 provided that even matters conclusively decided upon by the 
Supreme Court in respect of grants could be reopened by the concession 
court and no writ of prohibition was to issue from the Supreme Court 
to stop such enquiry or restrain any person from taking any action to 
the court.
Upon the notification establishing the court being published, all
proceedings in the High Court in respect of land titles were to be stayed
unless the Governor consented that any such proceedings shall continue.
So long as the Court was in existence, the determination and the establish
ment of the validity of claims to land was to be exclusive to it and
the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over it unless by the consent 
311
of the Governor. Clause 46 provided that the Colony was to be
deemed a party in respect of all matters coming before the Concessions 
Court for enquiry, and might therefore appoint counsel or an attorney 
to intervene or plead or lead evidence on behalf of the Colony. This 
provision was in line with the principles of the Bill that the govern­
ment, being the paramount authority, represented the state as the ultimate
308 _ ,
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controller of land use, development, disposition of interest thereof 
and its general administration as a national asset and resource of the 
country.
Clauses 47-50 dealt with matters relating to procedure, adopting 
so much of the rules regarding civil procedure in the Supreme Court 
Ordinance of 1876 as part of the provisions establishing the Concessions 
Court. Clause 54 prescribed five conditions under which the validity 
of a grant might be impeached. Grants might be invalidated if:
i .. the grant was made by a chief without the express consent 
or concurrence of the councillors (if any) whose consent 
was required under native law;
ii. made by a chief in respect of land in possession of another 
chief or his people without the express consent of that chief 
and his council (if any) whose consent might be necessary 
under customary law;
iii. made by fraudulent or improper means or without adequate 
or valuable consideration;
iv. the Court shall find that any of the terms or conditions
upon which such grant or concession has been made have not 
been duly or satisfactorily performed; or
v. the Court shall not be satisfied with the authenticity of 
the grants relied upon or that the grantor or grantee well 
understood the terms, conditions and nautre of the grant.
Under Clause 55 of the Bill, the inclusion of certain conditions 
in a grant was to become void. Any condition in a grant which purported 
to confer a right of exemption from taxation, create or confer monopoly, 
any role or exclusive right of trading or carrying on any commercial 
operation or undertaking, or any chemical operation concerning the 
recovery of precious metals, or the reduction of refactory ores was 
declared null and void under this provision.
Clause 50 of the Bill prescribed certain conditions under which 
grants declared and certified to be valid by the Concession^ Court should 
be held. If the land affected by a valid grant was located in a town 
within the meaning of the Town Councils Ordinance of 1892, then a quit 
rent of two shillings per annum for every thousand square feet was to 
be paid to the Government. On the other hand, if the land fell outside 
a town and was acquired for agricultural purposes only, then an annual 
quit rent of one shilling per acre was payable to the government. Simi­
larly, where the grant was a mining concession or right to fell timber, 
to extract or take rubber or other vegetable products,a royalty not 
exceeding 5% on the gross value of all gold, precious stones and other
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minerals or timber, rubber or other products obtained from such land 
was to be paid. However, the Governor in Council had power to change 
the rate of royalty from time to time by notification in the Gazette.
Wide discretionary powers were conferred on the Governor under 
Clause 57 to modify terms of transactions. He could if he was satisfied 
that a claim based on an alleged grant was immoderate or unreasonable, 
modify the terms, conditions or the scope of the grant. He might impose 
at his discretion equitable limitations, restrictions or conditions upon 
the execution of any grant or concessions.
F. The Objections of British Subjects and Financial Institutions
While the debates on the merits and demerits of the Crown Lands 
Bill of 1894 were raging on, European merchants, who were mainly British 
subjects, received the measures with mixed feelings. There were certain 
aspects of the proposed Bill to which they would have no serious objection. 
British merchants could obtain several advantages from the implimentation 
of the measure. Firstly, by the direct acquisition of lands from the 
government, greater security concerning land titles could be assured.
Secondly, land grants could be negotiated directly with the government 
instead of having to pass through native intermediaries.
For such reasons, at the initial stages of the campaign against
the Bill, British subjects did not raise any serious objections to the
proposed enactment. For instance, as we have seen earlier, Mr. F. Fitzgerald,
the London editor of the African Times, who had advocated the creation
of "a race of native capitalists" in the Gold Coast, had called on Strahan
to declare the whole of the lands of the protectorates to be vested
in and held from the Crown. This he believed would lay a sound foundation
312
for a civilised administration.
This attitude was typical of that of British merchants at the time, 
who on appearance expressed only mild objections to the Bill and that 
was mainly in respect of the proposed control of the mines by the government. 
They were accustomed to the traditions of free enterprise based on laissez- 
faire notions of freedom of contract and private enterprise in the Gold 
Coast for more than three centuries. The idea that the government should 
break this tradition by having the power to police their activities 
in the mines and to interfere with their profitable bargains in land
3 1 2  • C QQSee p.
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transactions was not received favourably. What they feared most was 
the proposed imposition of custom duties on exported goods, the limitation 
to be placed on the size of land holdings, and the general onslaught 
on speculation which the proposed measures implied.
The first direct European merchant opposition to the 1894 Bill
was demonstrated by a deputation of the Accra branch of the Liverpool
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Chamber of Commerce to Governor Maxwell in 1895. The deputation
met the Governor to complain about two Ordinances, viz. the Town Councils
and the Crown Lands Ordinance. As to the former, the Chamber did not
think that there was serious objection to it in principle. What it
disapproved of was the way in which it had been introduced. It was
an Ordinance, the Chamber complained, which naturally affected a very
large section of the community, "especially the more intelligent and
educated sections", and they knew nothing about it until it was passed
"behind their backs". As to the latter Bill, although it was regarded
as very important, the deputation believed it was one which concerned
the native much more than it did Europeans. The only opinion expressed
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on it then was that it was capable of considerable amendments.
A remarkable feature of the Chamber of Commerce's objections to 
the 1894 Bill was the mild tone in which they were made. Although they 
had some misgivings about certain aspects of the Bill, their main complaint 
was the failure of the government to consult them before introducing 
it. However, in terms of their economic interests, British entrepreneurs 
were soon to realise that they were mistaken in believing that the Bill 
concerned natives much more than it did Europeans. When the details 
of the expanded version of the Bill under Maxwell became known, with 
its new title of "Public Lands Bill", the mild protest begun by the 
Chamber of Commerce in Accra developed into a vigorous campaign against 
the Bill.
When the extended Bill was introduced containing a provision to 
set up a Concessions Court to investigate past transactions, it gingered 
and frightened concessionaires and speculators. Reaction to the new 
Bill from British business organisations and finaincial institutions 
was quick. Even before the Bill had reached the Legislative Council 
for debate, the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce sent a telegram from London 
asking the Governor not to proceed with its passage until he had received
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representation from their members.
The nut of the controversy between British businessmen and financial
institutions, the native middle class, the chief and people on the one
hand, and the government on the other, was, stated by the Financial Post
in England as follows:
"The Bill also provides that the Government receive a royalty of 
5% on the gross value of all gold and other mineral, timber, rubber 
or other products obtained from the land where the concessions 
are granted. The 5% which is tantamount to export duty appears 
to be one of the main causes of the objection raised by natives 
and Europeans in the colony. Another matter to which they take 
exception is that the Bill is to be retrospective where land which 
has been owned for years and years, but not developed, will come 
under the terms of the new Ordinance." 316
The publicity accorded the proposed measures in England was an 
indication of how seriously the matter was regarded in business circles 
in Liverpool, Masnchester and London. Certainly, if the Bill had come 
into force, it would have had a damaging effect on speculators whose 
main business was the buying and selling of concessions with no intention 
of actually working them. Unlike the government, individual British 
businessmen were not so much concerned with the social and economic 
development of a country where they were not going to reside permanently. 
If they were paying tax in England to which they would return, they 
saw no justification in the payment of the prescribed 5% royalty on 
produce.
The general view of British businessmen was that which a director 
of a mining firm in the Gold Coast expressed in his letter of protest 
as follows:
"In respect of the proposed royalty on timber and gold, I must 
crave your excellency's pardon in saying that such a step would 
be a grave error, calculated, as it is to scotch the industry it 
is supposed to foster and promote. As regard gold, it has never 
been found necessary on any goldfield in the world." 317
In the face of mounting opposition, Maxwell had to defend his policy 
before the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce in England before presenting 
the Bill to the Legislative Council for debate. At a meeting of the 
Chamber of Commerce and other trade associations concerned in the business 
of concessions in the Gold Coast, he tried to explain the issues involved
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in the matter to these interested bodies. In his defence of his policy 
of vesting the administration of all lands in the government, he 
made strenuous efforts to find a theoretical justification for it.
He pointed out that in colonies which had become British territory by
conquest or cession, the land was theoretically vested in the Crown, and
318
owners held by grant or lease according -to English law. He conceded
the fact that the Gold Coast, which was "a group of native territories
taken under British protection and moulded by the force of circumstances
into something approaching a Colony", differed altogether from the
colonies and possessions under British rule with regard to the manner
in which land was acquired and held.
In the Gold Coast, native rights had not been interfered with and
the Crown had not insisted on full control over the disposition of waste 
319
or forest land. Maxwell's opinion*? was^however, that even if all
the theoretical and doctrinal basis of the Crown's sovereignty was not
satisfied in the Gold Coast, the country was in practice ruled as a British
320
colony. Sovereign rights were regularly exercised. It was therefore
unrealistic to ignore this fact and to leave matters to be mismanaged
to the disadvantages of the Colony as a whole and to the advantage of
a few individuals.
He argued that the lack of clarity and obscurity which existed with
regard to the real nature of the rights of native chiefs, landholders and
cultivators "leads to all kinds of mischief" in the Protectorate. He
told the Chamber of Commerce:
"It encourages the African native, if he be a 'scholar' and knows 
something of English tenures, to claim a great deal more than his 
native customs really give him. Misrepresentations of all kinds 
are made from sordid notives, men whose real duty it is to administer 
public rights for the benefit of a tribe, dispose of them for their 
private benefit, and the greatest uncertainty exists, the result 
being endless litigation." ^21
He warned the meeting against what he called the tendency of Englishmen
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to reason about land tenures as if English theories and practice regarding 
freehold and leasehold, mortgages and the disposal of real property by 
will were common to all the world. He stated that these concepts might 
not readily apply to native ideas of occupancy founded upon community 
rights. There was therefore a danger that such persons would be disposed 
to recognise absolute rights in systems where none existed.
■Maxwell described the dangers and the problems inherent in the confusion 
of English tenurial concepts with native tenure in the following words:
"Now to a native community so constituted, there comes a white man 
or an African ’scholar' and demands a concession of mining, agricultural, 
or residential rights, in consideration of a payment. He very possibly 
succeeds, by giving what is really a very small sum, but one which 
seems to the up-country native a very large one, in obtaining a document, 
duly signed by various persons purporting to give him rights of all 
kinds, over an unsurveyed and imperfectly described track, for 
a long period or in perpetuity. Now, what has he really got?
If the head chief had made the concession, has he any power to 
do so without the concurrence of his Council? Who are they, and 
have they concurred? If the concession was made by the subordinate 
chief within his supposed local jurisdiction, has he any power 
to act independently of the paramount chief?" 322
Anyone familiar with Ghana's land tenure problems will readily 
recognise from the issues raised by Maxwell's questions that he had 
great insight into the land tenure problems of the country. The questions 
raised by him nearly a century ago are still being asked today. His 
problem was that the aims and objectives of his social and economic 
policy as Governor of the Gold Coast were different from those of the 
financial and business concerns. While Maxwell's social policy goals 
were the provision of social services and the development of the infra­
structure by the construction of roads, railways, schools, health facilities
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etc., as a justification for British rule over the country, the
entrepreneurs' objectives were the promotion and the protection of 
their commercial and economic interests based on maximization of profit.
For these reasons, Maxwell's speech fell on deaf ears. He made 
his case worse by outlining those aspects of the proposed Bill which 
provoked the strongest criticism from the business community. For 
example, he concluded his speech by saying that because of the problems 
he had outlined, legislation was urgently required in line with his 
general policy as follows:
i. the rights of the native chiefs must be defined;
ii. concessions by native chiefs must be made impossible except 
with the concurrence of the Governor.
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iii. the recognition of mining and timber concessions must be
. accompanied by a condition that substantial payment, either 
in cash or in the shape of royalties should be secured to 
the government, the native chief or tribal representative 
getting a share;
iv. concessions upon which bona fide work was not being done
or upon which there was no reasonable prospect of bona fide 
work being done within a reasonable time, say five years 
from the passage of the Ordinance, should be liable to cancel­
lation;
v. all dealings with and payment to native authorities in respect 
of lands must be conducted through the colonial Government. 324
By insisting that the mining firms and concessionaires should pay
"substantial" royalties either in cash or in kind, Maxwell was attempting
to give effect to his policy founded on the belief that "the construction
of roads and railways by Government in mining districts was not to
be expected, if companies and individuals who would profit by them
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were not ready to contribute to their cost."
British businessmen took two different objections to the Bill.
The first was the payment of royalties. The second was the proposed
limitation on the size of concessions. Chamberlain had suggested two
types of concession for Maxwell's consideration. The first type was
concessions involving the creation of monopoly rights over large tracts
of land. The second type was to be of much more limited kind which
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would not require a large sum for acquisition and devlopment.
In the first class of concessions, concessionaires might be required 
to pay large sums of money either in cash or by instalments to be 
used for construction of roads and railways. In the second category 
of concessions, the government might be satisfied with guarantees that 
their development would be speeded up together with the payment of 
royalty of some kind on minerals and profit.
British firms and individual entrepreneurs down from the start 
had hoped for the first category of concessions. This would have enabled 
them to acquire monopoly over large areas of land on the same scale 
as the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation. In such cases, even if they 
were unable to work all of it, the rest could be sold on a speculative 
basis in the open market. However, Maxwell opted for the second class
Ibid.
See Secret Dispatch from Maxwell to Chamberlain, 19 August, 1897,
C.O. 96/295. Maxw:ell made the same point in 1895 when he wrote 
to Ripon saying " . . .  the roads, railways and river improvements 
required by miners and timber merchants can only be undertaken if they 
materially contribute to the revenue". Dispatch of 19 June*1895,
C.O. 879/46
Dispatch from Chamberlain to Maxwell No. 72, 13 March,1896, C.O. 
879/46, No. 513, African West._______________ ’____________ ________________
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of concessions and placed a time limit on their development, without which 
they might be cancelled. This would have the effect of putting a brake 
on speculation, which was one of the main business concerns of some 
British firms and individuals, including prominent members of the native 
middle class. This was a bitter pill for such persons to swallow.
Unimpressed by Maxwell's reasons for the proposed imposition of
royalty on produce and the ending of speculation, British firms and
business organisations concerned intensified the opposition to his
policy and lobbied in Parliament for support. Not long after Maxwell's
speech, Mr. Goddard requested the Secretary of State for the Colonies
to state to the House of Commons his views on Maxwell's speech at Liverpool
which indicated that he was trying to make it impossible for native
chiefs in the gold Coast to make a grant of their lands, and to state
327
whether he approved of such a policy. Chamberlain replied that
there were many good reasons why such a policy should be approved of, 
repeating what Maxwell had said about the confusion of English notions 
of tenure, conveyancing practice and terminology with Gold Coast customary 
land law and tenure, which was causing problems and confusion.
These answers did not satisfy the critics of the Bill. In May 
1896, the African Trades section of Liverpool Chamber of Commerce met 
and agreed unanimously that the proposed royalty of 5% on the gross 
value of all minerals produced in the country was too high. They agreed 
that they would not accept anything beyond 1% royalty on profits.
They complained to the Colonial Office that, if the royalty of 5% was 
allowed to stand, existing industries would be crippled and further
328
investment of capital in the mining industry would be discouraged.
They also complained about lack of good roads and communications.
In what was essentially a repetition of Bruce Hindle's argument in 
1895, the Chamber of Commerce complained that the firms were working 
under difficult conditions risking life and capital in the Colony.
One would have thought that these conditions could only be improved, 
as Maxwell had been arguing all along, if the firms agreed to pay the 
suggested levies on produce.
Certain high officials in the Colonial Office in London who had 
little understasnding of the problems lent their support to the critics
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House of Commons, 28 July, 1896, C.O. 879/46, No. 513, African 
West
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Dispatch from Maxwell to Chamberlain, 8’ May* 1897, C.O. 96/293
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of the proposed measures. Sir J. Bramston, for example, commenting 
on Maxwell's address at Liverpool and on the proposed Bill observed 
that although the Bill in its expanded form was a great improvement
329
on the 1894 Ordinance, some of the old objections still persisted*
It was Bramston's opinion that the practice of alienating stool
lands to str&ngers had grown up in native tenure and there was abundant
evidence of the practice, which was extensive and well recognised by
the natives. Since this had been acquiesced in by the government for
so long, it was now too late to reverse that trend. He further argued
that Governor Maxwell had in his address confused the question of the
right of property and that of the right of alienation. There could
be no doubt that practically all the lands in the Gold Coast were "subject
to private ownership", and there was no difficulty in determining who
the owners were. What was difficult, Sir J. Bramston pointed out,
was the determination of rights, that was whether any one man or number
of men had rights to alienate property.
He rejected Maxwell's views that stool land was public land which
ought to be administered by the public for the benefit of the public:
"They are certainly not public lands in this sense. They have 
in every case determined owners and do not belong to the general 
public."
Bramston regarded as fallacious Maxwell's argument that, as the 
Governor of the Gold Coast, the latter possessed every power which 
might be lawfully exercised by custom by any chief. So far as tribal
J.
property was concerned this was probably incorrect; and SirABramston
expressed his surprise that the Governor laid down "so superficial
^ „ 3 3 0  a doctrine".
In the light of what has been discussed about the nature of indivi­
dual rights in land under the customary law, it can be observed the 
mistaken premises on which Sir J. Bramston based his arguments in criti­
cism of Maxwell. In the first place, unlike Maxwell, Bramston did 
not understand the nature of individual rights in land in terms of 
rights of benefit and rights of control; nor did he appreciate the 
community basis of enjoyment of such rights. This misconception of 
traditionalschemes of interests in land was reflected in the latter's 
statement that practically all lands in the Gold Coast were "subject 
to individual ownership" and that there was no difficulty in determining
Colonial Office Minutes No. 531, 19 August.-1897, C.O. 96/295. 
Bramston was the Assistant Under-Secretary dr State for the Colonies. 
330 Ibid.
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"owners".
Bramston fell into the common error of confusing English tenurial 
concepts and terminology with customary tenure, a tendency against 
which Maxwell had warned continually. Sir J.Bramston's argument that 
stool lands were not public lands, did not take into account the communal 
principles underlying customary tenure and distribution of resources 
in the indigenous systems. Maxwell reached the conclusion that vacant 
or "waste lands" were public lands or should be regarded as such on 
the basis of his understanding and appreciation of such underlying 
principles of the customary law.
Unhappily, decisions taken in the Colonial Office in London carried
greater weight than those carefully tlought out by men who studied,
understood and lived with the problems. Indeed, the final decision
to abandon the original principles of the 1894 Bill was based on Sir
J. Bramston;'s views, Maxwell informing the Secretary of State that
on the basis of the consultations which he had had with the former,
he was abandoning the principles laid down originally in Sir Joseph
Hutchinson's draft Bill of 1894. By the end of September, 1896, Governor
Maxwell was forced to agree that it would be sufficient to establish
the principle that waste land was public land and that it might be
administered by the Governor or Government for the best interest of 
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the Colony.
It was this amended version, embodying the principles stated above, 
which became the subject of criticism by Sir J. Bramston, the Liverpool 
Chamber of Commerce, firms and individual businessmen.
As we have seen earlier, it was not only European firms and individuals 
who were engaged in the concession business and land speculation.
Some prominent Africans, particularly of the merchant class and the 
elite, took an active part in the buying and selling of concessions.
The proposed measures threatened their economic interests even more 
than Europeans. As they lacked the capital to undertake actual mining, 
speculation in concessions was their main area of business activity.
The common threat this posed to the financial and economic interests 
of Europeans and natives of this class united them against these measures.
One must remember that the European firms and financial institutions 
with their representatives in England were in a position to lobby Parliament
Maxwell to Chamberlain, 28 September, 1896, C.O. 96/286.
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and the Colonial Office, and were therefore in a better position to
influence the course of events than organised native opposition in
the Colony. There was no doubt that native protests were taken into
account in the decision to withdraw the Bill, but they were not the
crucial factor. Surely, if these measures had been supported by the
European firms, the Bills would have been passed, native protests
notwithstanding. The prominence given to native opposition to the
measures creates the wrong impression that such protests were the
332
crucial factors in the withdrawal of the Bill.
332 •
See David Kimble's discussion of the issue in his book, A Political History 
of Ghana 1850-1928, London, 1963, pp. 338-362; see also Francis Agbodeka, 
op.cit., p. 146, where he expressed the view that the protests of the 
A.R.P.S. and the deputation from the Chiefs to the Queen in 1898 were 
effective against the Bill. C. Ilegbune's discussion of the issue creates 
a similar impression, op.cit. pp. 180-196.
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CHAPTER VI 
CHANGE OF POLICY
A. Introductory
In a summary, it may be said that political expediency was one of the
key considerations that compelled Maxwell to postpone the passage of the
Crown Lands Ordinance of 1894. The need to bring other areas, including
Ashanti, which was not yet under British '’protection” into the Protectorate
made it expedient to delay action on the Bill, and it was finally abandoned.
The 1897 Public Lands Bill met a similar fate, mainly because of the objections
raised by British businessmen, their financial institutions and native opposition
Left to themselves, Sir William Brandford Griffith and Sir William Maxwell
would certainly have resolutely insisted on pushing their policies through.
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But this was not to be. As we have seen earlier, Lord Knutsford and his 
successor as Secretary of State, the Marquess of Ripon, were favourably dis­
posed towards the implementation of the schemes proposed by the two Governors.
The Chief Justice, Sir Joseph Hutchinson, had since his objection to such poli­
cies in 1891, changed his views and lent his support to these Land Reform 
programmes. However, by the end of 1895, all the advocates of this policy, 
except Maxwell, left their posts and were succeeded by persons who either 
adopted a via media or opposed these land policy objectives altogether.
Therefore, when by misfortune Maxwell lost his life in the autumn of 
1897 and was succeeded by Sir Frederick Hodgson, one of his land policy 
critiques, the stage was set for a change in direction of policy. The govern- 
ship of Sir F. Hodgson marked the end of a gradual but progressive development
of a national land policy, the effect of which would have been the harmoniza­
tion of the land tenure systems of the country on the lines of land tenure and 
administration in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast and Northern 
Nigeria.
In place of a policy of this kind, the new Governor proposed to intro­
duce a measure which would give the government the right to:
"Watch the land operations of the natives, and to insist upon 
the observance of certain regulations with respect to them as 
may appear to be called for in the interests of the Natives on 
the one hand and capitalists on the other." ^34
3 3 3
See pp. 109-110 .
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Sir Frederick Hodgson proposed this measure as an alternative to Griffith's 
policy in his comments on the Crown Lands Bill. As the new Governor 
of the Gold Coast, he was now in a position to implement this policy.
See the Dispatch from Maxwell to Chamberlain, 13 September .1895, C.O.
879/46, No. 513, African West.
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On the basis of such a policy, government inspectors of mines and officers
to supervise mineral and timber concessions would be appointed and
"a more complete arrangement for survey and registration of grants 
as well as regulation for conservancy of forests and the working 
of grants, both in case of minerals and woods'*
335
should be made.
Previous reaction to land legislation had taught Hodgson that before 
introducing any new measure he should have wide consultations with those 
whose interests might be affected. While he was in England at the end of 
1898, he therefore used the opportunity to discuss the subject of the kind 
of legislation required for regulating concession grants and the mining 
industry with the Secretary of State and Foreign Office officials. Following 
these consultations, it was agreed that legislation should be introduced 
to provide for the establishment of a concessions court with the power to 
examine the validity of concessions and to ensure compliance with certain 
rules prescribed by law. But before doing so, British business men and 
their commercial bodies were widely consulted in order to enlist their 
views and support for the Scheme.
One of the main objections to previous land bills on the part of British 
business men was the tax and royalty which the law sought to impose on timber 
and minerals. The Secretary of State, therefore, summoned many of the inter­
ested business organisations to the Colonial Office in order to discuss matters
relating to the mining industry, particularly those concerning taxation and 
royalties. At the meeting, the latter explained to the firms and their rep­
resentatives the need for imposing some form of taxation on minerals and tim- 
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ber. He stressed the fact that concessions were obtained on a large scale 
and some of them had been very productive, yielding enormous profits. Chamberlain 
referred to the Ashanti Gold Field Corporation in particular,,- whose paid up capi­
tal was £125,000 with shares at £18 per share. He noted that:
"a paper profit of two million pounds sterling was made by its share­
holders entirely because of the expenditure of treasury / sic_/ by 
the Imperial Government and the Gold Coast Colony." 337
The Secretary of State was of the opinion that under such circumstances
there was no justification for non-payment of tax. "They have got to be
taxed", he declared. He proposed that beside seeing to the interest of the
natives, the government should be entitled to a sum down which should be
in some way proportionate to the amount of concession obtained.
"A moderate sum, in return for the title which we have made possible, 
would be recognised, I think, as a fair demand",he emphasised.
He regarded the five percent royalty on all gold won as proposed in the
abortive Land Bill of 1897 as insufficient. If profits were what they were
expected to be, then this percentage was too small. He noted that this was
335 ~T.
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23 7 1899, C.O. 879/59, No. 592, African West.
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nothing comparable to what was obtained in the Transvaal or Rhodesia. While 
he did not grudge any profits made by those who were the first in promoting 
the mining industry in the Gold Coast and did not intend to curtail them, 
the payment of royalty could not be avoided.
He assured the businessmen that the Imperial Government's policy 
was not to hamper the development of the industry. Where there were genuine 
reasons to show that there were mines which would not sustain a tax levied 
on output, some other means of taxation might be found. In such cases a tax 
on profits might be imposed?but in other cases a five per cent royalty on total 
output would not be too excessive. As far as large companies were concerned, 
Chamberlain believed, such a tax might not be too difficult to collect, because 
its returns might be passed on to shareholders. As far as small firms were 
concerned their books of account would have to be inspected and profits 
ascertained. In conclusion he declared:
"I do not mean to oppress or in any way to hamper this industry, but
I do not mean all the profits to go to the private individual." ^ 8
Mr. Moorcroft, Tarquah and Abosso Mining Company's representative at 
the meeting, argued that miners had to deal with low-grade ore apart from 
expenditure on transport and that this factor alone threatened to kill 
almost every undertaking in the Colony. For this reason, the Imperial 
Government would have to adopt a lenient policy with regard to taxation 
on minerals. Firms, he suggested, should not be made to pay tax until 
they began to reap the benefit from railways. He thought that should 
there be taxation at all, tax on profit rather than on gross produce would 
be the fairest means of income tax. Mr. Hunt, on the other hand, was not 
particularly concerned with the mode of taxation, but thought it would 
be inconvenient to impose tax ad valorem. The Ashanti Gold Field Corpora­
tion representative, Mr. Gordon, expressed the view that the simplest form 
of taxation would be tax on output but the fairest method would be tax 
upon profits. The only problem would be the complicated method of profit 
calculation which would be involved, having regard to the considerable 
amount of expenditure on development. Mr. Tarbut, representing British 
Gold Fields Syndicate, on the other hand was prepared to accept a percentage 
tax on output because, as he argued, tax on profit in the Transvaal.- had
caused a great deal of problems and was therefore objectionable. It was
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finally agreed after a long debate that tax should be levied on profit.
Although the majority of the businessmen were forced to agree in 
principle that some form of taxation on minerals and timber was required, 
they could not agree on the percentage of tax which must be imposed on 
profits. Chamberlain thus secured only a partial support
Ibid. 17 persons voted in favour and 9 against.
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from the business community for his concession and mining tax policy.
But this did not mean the problem of finding a definite land policy 
which should replace the Public Lands Bill and its principles was nearer 
to solution. Divergent opinions on what the position of the Government 
in relation to lands ought to be persisted both in business and official 
circles.
When the Land Bill was withdrawn Chamberlain sent a confidential
dispatch to Sir F. Hodgson in which he outlined the conditions under
which provisional recognition could be accorded to concessions acquired
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from native chiefs. Hodgson understood the dispatch to mean that
the government would provisionally recognise concessions acquired from 
native chiefs if certain conditions were satisfied. Firstly, the govern­
ment should be satisfied as far as it could be that the concessionaire 
had obtained his right in a manner which made the provision for remunera­
tion for the chiefs conceding the mining or other rights. Secondly, 
apart from being certain that the terms of the grant were fair, the
government must satisfy itself that the concessionaire meant bona fide
341
business and was not "concession mongering". When these conditions
were satisfied, the government could recognise the concession provisionally, 
subject to any conditions which might be prescribed by the government.
It should be observed that these policy statements did not differ sub­
stantially from what Maxwell had proposed in his Land Bill. If the 
government recognised the right of traditional authorities to make 
valid disposition of lands under their control, then there would seem 
no reason to question the validity of any such transactions even without 
the recognition of the government. However, from the conditions set 
out above, it could be inferred that the validity of such transactions 
was being made subject to governmental recognition.
In what would appear to be a clear departure from the policies 
of the past,/Mercer expressed his views on what official policy on 
concessions ought to be in his comments on certain problems arising 
out of concession agreements entered into between the representatives 
of Obuasi Gq-ld.mining Syndicate and certain government officials. He 
criticised the underlying asumptions of the agreement as following 
the mistaken theories of Sir William Maxwell as to the ownership of 
the soil. He argued that in concluding the agreement, it was erroneously
Chamberlain to Hodgson, 8 December,1898, C.O. 96/241* 
Hodgson to Chamberlain, 12 August,1898, C.O. 96/342,
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assumed that native chiefs had accepted the government as the veritable
paramount chief and as such had authority to dispose of lands. He
stressed the importance of obtaining the consent of the chiefs with
342
regard to acquisition of interests in land.
On the other hand, he recognised the advantages to be gained from 
providing that the government, and not the "concession-hunter", should 
deal with the chiefs. This would maintain the authority of the government 
which the native understood and at the same time prevent abuses and 
mistakes. Under this plan, anyone who desired a concession would apply 
to the government, who would then make enquiries and if it was thought 
proper would make an agreement with the native owners, on the authority 
of which a grant would be made to the applicant. In such cases, grants 
might be drawn at once and placed before the ''owners" for their consent 
which should be given in writing before the execution of the grant.
Mercer believed that this process would avoid the legal question 
of ownership and might constitute the best solution to a problem which 
was difficult and complex. It should be pointed out that the suggested 
machinery for the acquisition of landed interests could not be adequate 
to avoid the legal issues involved. If as he argued, Sir William Maxwell's 
theories of the government becoming the "veritable paramount chief 
of the tribe" was wrong, and the native chiefs were still "owners" 
of the soil, then his suggested procedure would still run counter to 
the rights of the "owners" to conduct transactions in respect of what 
belonged to them without let or hindrance. As Wingfield had rightly 
pointed out, Mercer's suggested procedure formed a sort of intermediary 
position between ownership by the crown and ownership by the chiefs 
and would help the government authorise concessions and open up the country, 
a development which the government desired. Bjut in his opinion from 
the legal and legislative viewpoint, the proposed solution still left
343
the question of ownership of the land in a "somewhat nebulous condition".
It will be observed that the government in its search for a new 
policy to replace those of Maxwell came face to face with the fact 
that a large measure of governmental involvement in land transactions 
was inescapable. In this respect, government officials were forced 
to admit one way or the other, the utility of the principles underlying
342
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the abortive Public Lands Bill. But the respect in which Maxwell 
and advocates of his policy differed substantially from successive 
colonial Governors and officials in the Gold Coast was the way in which 
either of them understood traditional schemes of interest in land.
Maxwell's approach was influenced by his greater insight into 
the nature of the systems and their inherent problems. Other officials 
and Governors succeeding him fashioned their policies on the basis 
of a superficial understanding of the tenure systems of the country 
and the confusion of English tenure concepts with indigenous notions 
of tenure. It will be observed from the above treatment of the land 
problems by Hodgson and his officials that they still saw the problems 
in terms of "ownership" by chiefs and traditional elders. Their primary 
concern was the safeguarding of the chiefs' interests, not the interest 
of the community at large or the ordinary citizens. While Maxwell 
saw the problems in terms of protecting the interest of the ordinary 
citizen against their generally ignorant, illiterate, improvident and 
selfish leaders who were representatives of the community, his successors 
regarded the latter as "owners" and therefore needing protection against 
British concessionaires and the educated native. This was the fundamental 
difference between Maxwell's policy and those of his critiques.
However, some of the colonial administrators learnt from experience
that the best solution for the land problems was that which Maxwell
had proposed in his Public LandsBill but thought it was too late to
return to it. Thus although Chamberlain regarded the principles underlying
the Concessions Ordinance which was to replace the Public Lands Bill
as materially different from the latter, he considered it "absolutely
necessary for the Colonial Government to supervise grants of Land",
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so as to protect all parties against fraud or misrepresentation.
This policy was enshrined in the Concessions Ordinance under which a 
>GbncessionSCo-urt was created to deal with concession and other dispositions 
of interests affecting land. As will be seen presently, this machinery 
was ineffective- against the evils at which it was directed and the 
problems magnified as its administration was attended with many difficulties.
Chamberlain to Hodgson, 22: December, 1899, C.O. 879/57, No. 578.
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B . The Concessions Ordinance
i . The Objectives of the Bill
The principal goals of the Ordinance were contained in a memorandum
to the draft Bill. In his Memorandum, Chamberlain stated that the
basis of the new Statute was to be materially different from the Public
Lands Bill. Unlike the latter Ordinance, which sought to vest the
administration of all vacant lands in the government, the new Bill
would recognise the right of the traditional authorities to exercise
their traditional rights of land control functions. The government
would perform a supervisory role in land transactions in which chiefs
and Europeans might be the contracting parties. Chamberlain hoped
that this supervisory role of the Colonial Government would help to
protect all parties against fraud and misrepresentation. It was essential
to secure to all parties the rights given or reserved in concession
agreements and to guard against results prejudicial to the public interest.
Also important was the need to obtain for the government a reasonable
income from profitable operations. These objectives could be achieved
through the supervision by the government, land grants by native chiefs.
However, the Secretary of State did not wish to make "any fundamental
alterations in the rights of the natives such as was apprehended by
345
the Deputations."
Accordingly, Chamberlain was emphatic that the Ordinance did not
purport to confer on any government authority the right of claiming
or making any grants of land whatsoever which was "owned" by natives
of the Gold Coast. The idea of vesting any unoccupied land in the Governor
as Crown land was to be abandoned. The memorandum stated:
"The native owner is left free, as now, to make his own bargain 
if he wishes to sell to a European, and the benefit of his bargain 
is not interefered with, but on the contrary more effectually 
secured to him by the conditions which the Bill imposes on the 
grantee." 34®
The main objectives to be deduced from the Memorandum to the Ordinance 
would therefore appear to be an attempt to confirm the rights of chief
345
Ibid. Reference to Deputation of traditional Elders to the Queen 
in 1898 protesting against the Public Lands Bill of Sir William 
Maxwell.
346 TV.Ibid.
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and Elders to exercise their traditional role of land administration 
and to ensure that in the course of transactions with strangers, advantage
was not taken of their ignorance to defraud them. The procedure suggested
Vv ''H
by7Mercer to form an intermediate position between "ownership by the 
Crown and ownership by the chiefs" was thus repudiated. The government 
was therefore to be in a position of a referee, superintending the 
conduct of the parties to land transactions under the indigenous systems.
This supervisory role was to be played by the Concessions Courts 
which were to be created under the Ordinance with wide discretionary 
powers to declare valid or invalid land transactions if certain prescribed 
conditions were not met.
As will be seen presently, henceforth, the principles inherent
347
in the Concessions Ordinance became the guide line for the formulation 
of land policy during the colonial period. Its most important effect 
was the foreclosure of all avenues for the development of a national 
land policy on the lines begun by Maxwell. Unhappily, apart from the 
Northern Territories, which were singled out as separate provinces 
in which the inherent principles of the abortive Public Lands Bill 
should be made to apply, the new policy of the Concessions Ordinance 
has survived Colonial rule and remains the basic policy of land law, 
legislation, management and administration, even in modern Ghana.
ii. The Main Features of the Ordinance
The memorandum to the Bill summarised the main features of the 
Bill. It provided for the establishment of a concession court in the 
Gold Coast. The court would have to be notified of every concession 
granted by a native, together with the particulars of the concession 
and the documents on which the claimant relied in support of his claims. 
The court was to have power to certify that concessions were valid 
under certain prescribed conditions. However, any concession acquired 
before 10th October*1895, duly registered and undisputed was to be 
automatically certified as valid if the court was satisfied that the 
rights granted under such concession had in fact been exercised and 
that the natives residing in the locality in which it was acquired 
acquiesced in the exercise of such rights.
Ordinance No. 14f1900 
348 IbidSee, para. 4 of Memorandum.
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The court was to place limitation on the grant of a term of years.
A term of a concession was not to exceed 99 years and that of prospecting
349
licence was limited to three years. It was to restrict the area
of concessions in the case of mining rights to five square miles and
in the case of rights to take timber, -rubber or other products of the
soil, 20 square miles. Similarly, no one person or corporation was
to be permitted to hold, at one time, concessions the aggregate area
of which would exceed 20 square miles in the case of mining rights
or 40 square miles in the case of rights relating to timber, rubber
, 350
or other products of the soil.
The Ordinance was to provide for the levying of a tax of five
per cent on all profits made by the holder of a concession from the
date on which the Ordinance came into force. Prospecting licences
were to be made subject to a stamp duty of one pound sterling per square 
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mile. A remarkable feature of the final draft was the wide powers
conferred on the courts to make enquiries into concessions. It adopted 
many of the provisions of the 1897 Public Lands Bill dealing with conces­
sion courts. It had powers of re-opening transactions and making enquiry 
into their validity. It had exclusive jurisdiction over land matters 
and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was ousted in this regard, 
although appeals could issue from the -Concessiore Courts to the latter.
Before the final draft was made, the original draft was circulated
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to interested individuals and commercial bodies for their comments.
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Ibid.> Para. 5.
Ibid., Para. 6 * the
Ibid., Para. 7. In two special agreements made with/Ashanti Gold 
Field Corporation and the Castle Gold Exploration Syndicate prior 
to the enactment of the Ordinance, a tax of 5% on profit was imposed 
on the former company and on the latter a tax of 2Y2% on the gross 
value of minerals got. See Section 61 of the Ordinance by which 
the two companies were excluded from coming under the purview 
of the Ordinance and therefore the Concessiore Courts.
Copies were sent to the following Chambers of Commerce: London, 
Liverpool and Manchester. Copies were also circulated to the 
West African Trade Association, Messrs. Ashurst, Morris, Crisp 
& Co., Mr Irvine, Mr Tarbutt, Mr Parks, Mr Kempf, Castle Gold 
Exploration Syndicate, West African Mahogany and Petroleum Co. 
and African Estates Co.
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But most of the persons to whom the draft was sent were European business­
men and financial institutions. During the course of our research, we 
found no evidence that either at the early stages of consultations 
with commercial firms in England on the question of taxation or after 
the original draft was made, the native chiefs or any member of the 
native business community was consulted on any of the issues concerning 
the Concessions Ordinance, the declared objective of which was the protection 
of native rights against foreign concessionaires.
It may well be that the chiefs were regarded as too ignorant about 
the technicalities of the Ordinance to be consulted on the matter. But 
this cannot be said of the native middle class of lawyers, business-men 
and elite who had been very vocal in their opposition to previous enact­
ments concerning lands. Yet it was not deemed necessary to consult this 
class of natives on the matter at the preliminary stages. This attitude 
of the government and the Colonial Office lent further support to the 
view that the protests which carried weight with the Imperial Government 
to withdraw Sir William Maxwell's Bill were those of the British business 
men and trade organisations and not so much native protest as it is often 
made to appear. It was assumed that once European traders consented 
to the introduction of the measure there would be no great difficulty 
in putting it through, native protests notwithstanding.
Thus when Chamberlain sent the draft Bill he did not regard it
as necessary to require Sir F. Hodgson to circulate it among the natives
in order to solicit their views and comments. He indicated that in drafting
the Bill regard was had to previous native protests in connection with
the withdrawn Public Lands Bill. Perhaps, believing that this was enough,
he simply required the Governor to explain to the natives the character
of the new Bill, the basis of which was fundamentally different from
353
that which was proposed by Sir William Maxwell.
C . Opposition from British Entrepreneurs
We have seen from the discussion which ensued at the Colonial Office 
between the Secretary of State and commercial bodies trading in the Gold 
Coast that an agreement was reached that tax should be levied on profits 
gained from mining and timber operations. However, the percentage by 
which profits should be taxed was not agreed upon. When the draft Ordinance
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was circulated among the business community it provoked strong opposition.
As in the past, five main objections were raised to the Ordinance. They 
included:
i. The retrospective character of the Ordinance, under which it 
would be necessary for all concessions, however old, to be 
referred to the Concessions Court and by which restrictions 
as to area would be applied to concessions not dated prior 
to 10th October 1895;
ii. the requirement that the concessionaire should prove the adequacy 
of consideration and consent on the part of those with legal 
capacity to alienate the property in question;
iii. limitations as to area of concessions;
iv. the tax of five per cent on profits and
v. the power of the court to modify terms of any concession.
Mr Irvine commenting on the memorandum to the Ordinance reminded 
the Secretary of State about the objections raised against the retrospective 
aspect of the Ordinance by the representative of the West African Trade
354
Association during their previous meeting with him at the Colonial Office.
In the views of his Association all concessions acquired before the coming 
into force of the Ordinance should be declared valid and should not come 
within the ambit of the Concessions Ordinance. The Association was also 
unhappy about the limitation which the Ordinance sought to place on the 
size of concessions, particularly those affecting timber rights. Mr 
Irvine wrote:
"What is the object of having small concessions of 20 or even 40 
square miles? It can only be that all the country should be developed 
rapidly; but what does this mean in the case of mahogany? It means 
that Europe would be simply swamped with that product resulting ^ 
in ruin to the importer and years of stagnation to the Colony.
It will be observed that Mr Irvine and the West African Trade Associa­
tion were concerned that limitations on the size of concessions would 
enable small firms with little capital to get involved in the timber 
business. This would have the effect of preventing the creation of monopoly 
rights over large areas of timber land enabling few large firms to control 
the timber business, and therefore the market. Yet this was exactly 
what the large firms did not want to happen. In Irvine's opinion, if 
the provisions relating to limitations on size of concessions were not
354
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altered substantially, the infiltration of small firms would devalue
the commodity. Expressing his views about what the disadvantages of
such a restriction would be for large firms, he wrote:
"I am myself a director, and the largest shareholder in a timber 
company which was formed in 1895, and up to the present moment, 
we have sunk about £10,000 in systematically opening out the enter­
prise, but if small concessions are going to be the rule, I, for 
one, shall be tempted to cut my loss now and be done with it, as 
the importer can never be controlled with an indiscriminate number 
of people importing." OOD
The objections raised by Messrs. Ashurst, Morris & Co., were on
similar lines. Apart from associating itself with what Irvine wrote
on behalf of the West African Trade Association, the company attacked
the retrospective nature of the Ordinance. It objected to concessions
not acquired before 10th October,1895 coming under the purview of the 
357
Ordinance. The company believed that only one per cent tax on profits
could be acceptable. In a similar way, the London Chamber of Commerce
associated themselves with the case made by Mr Irvine on behalf of the
West African Trade Association. The Chamber complained that the provisions
relating to the inspection of books of account were unacceptable because
it would be difficult for traders to render statement of profit at the
end of every six months.
Both the Chamber of Commerce and the Association,even before the 
come out,
memorandum on the Bill had/insisted all along that if the Gold Coast
had to be developed by private enterprise, then the facilities had to
be provided by the Government. Qne such important facility was regarded
359
to be the creation of freehold titles in the land tenure system. It was
their belief that:
"with a view to the expenditure of capital and the development 
of the country, it is very desirable that it should be made a 
condition that tenure should be freehold." 360
As far as leaseholds were concerned, merchants would not lay out 
capital to any large extent unless they were satisfied that their tenure 
would be secure.
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The London Chamber of Commerce, in particular, urged the Colonial 
Office to adopt one of two policies. If it was decided that the creation 
of freehold titles was impossible, then leaseholds in respect of mining 
and timber rights should be granted for not less than 99 years with a 
right to renew at any time during the period and at a fixed scale not 
exceeding the original consideration. Conveyancing should be made simple 
and cheap. Having regard to the primitiveness of the Gold Coast, abstract 
of title should not be required to prove title.
The main provisions of the proposed Ordinance were inconsistent 
with the creation of these facilities. The firms and individuals were 
therefore unhappy about most of its provisions. On the vexed question 
of taxation, most firms wanted it to be made clear in the Ordinance that 
the percentage tax was on net profit and not on gross profit. They wanted 
provision to be made for appeals to lie to the Privy Council in London 
and would like the Concessionscourt to consist of equal numbers of business 
men and government officials and with the Governor of the Gold Coast 
for the time being having a casting vote.
Despite these objections to the Bill, no substantial alterations 
were made to the original draft. The main concession to the firms was 
a provision enabling appeals to lie from the Concessions Courts to the 
Supreme Court and the Privy Council in London. The provisions relating 
to limitations as to size of concessions and tax clauses remained almost 
the same. As will be seen in due course, these objections foreshadowed 
the way in which the hated provisions were violated in the teeth of the 
law and thus defeated the whole purpose of the Ordinance.
D. Violations of Conditional Clauses
The preliminary part of the final draft of the Ordinance dealt 
with matters relating to definition' of terms and the powers of the Governor. 
The objections raised to certain aspects of the Bill by those in the concession 
business were early indications that any loopholes in the Ordinance might be 
exploited to evade those provisions. It was exactly what happened.
Indeed, so frequent were the breaches of these provisions that it might 
be concluded that they were rendered ineffective against the evils at 
which they were directed.
The main duties of the Concessions Courts consisted in the exercise 
of the power and authority to declare as valid or invalid concessions 
if certain prescribed conditions were satisfied. These conditions were
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set out under Section 11 of the Ordinance. Under this provision, no 
concession was to be declared as valid,:
i. "Unless made in writing signed by the grantor or some person 
duly authorised by him;
ii. unless the court is satisfied that the proper persons were
parties to the concession and that it may be reasonably 
presumed that they understood the nature and terms thereof;
iii. if obtained by fraudulent or other improper means;
iv. if made without adequate or valuable consideration, regard
being had to the circumstances existing at the time of 
the concessions;
v. unless all of the terms and conditions upon which the con­
cession was made, which ought to have been performed, have 
been reasonably and substantially performed;
vi. unless the court is satisfied that the customary rights
of natives are reasonably protected in respect of shifting 
cultivation, collection of firewood and hunting and snaring 
game;
vii. if it grants or purports to grant rights to collect natural 
produce other than timber, to the exclusion of natives;
viii. if it grants or purports to grant rights to remove natives
from their habitations within the area of such concessions;
ix. unless the court is satisfied that the customary rights
of natives are reasonably protected in respect of fetish
lands."
The only concessions excluded from the ambit of these provisions 
were those acquired prior to the 10th day of October 1895, duly registered 
under the Registration Ordinance before the commencement of the Concessions 
Ordinance. Even in respect of such concessions, they could come under 
the purview of the concessioqscourts if despite their registration under 
the Registration Ordinance, there was an action pending in the courts 
in respect of them at the date on which the Ordinance came into force.
Yet again, although an action might not be pending in any court of the 
Colony in respect of this class of concessions, the courts would certify 
them as valid unless the latter were satisfied that the rights granted 
under such concessions had been exercised in fact and that the natives 
resident in the locality in which the rights were acquired,and the natives
by whom such concessions was acquired had known of and acquiesced in
the exercise of such rights. 33^
361 S. 11, No. 14 of 1900, Cap. 97, (as amended by S. 20 of 1901, S.6, 
No. 16 of 1912, S.6, No. 16 of 1912, S.2 and 22 of 1918).
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It will be observed that although section 11 purported to exclude 
concessions acquired prior to the specified date from the operation of 
the Ordinance, it virtually brought them under its scope by providing, 
though indirectly, that they could only be certified as valid where the 
conditions specified above were satisfied. The rationale for this provision 
was consistent with the objectives of the Ordinance which sought to enable 
the courts to conduct retrospective investigation into many land transactions 
believed to have been tainted with fraud and various forms of illegality.
Apart from these requirements, the Ordinance also prescribed other 
conditions, the non-compliance with which could render concessions invalid. 
Sections 19 and 20 for instance, placed limitations on the size of concessions 
which could be acquired by a person or corporation. These provisions 
were aimed at concession "hunters" and speculators who acquired large 
areas of mineral and timber land with no intention of working them but 
to hold them until they appreciated in value so that they could sell 
them in the open market to the highest bidder at fantastic profits.
In spite of these detailed provisions setting out conditions under which 
concession could be validly acquired so as to ensure fairness and the 
prevention of fraud in land transactions, concessionaires were able to 
acquire interests in land in clear violation of these provisions.
This was possible, not only because certain loopholes in the Ordinance 
were exploited to their own advantage, but mainly because of the attitude 
of the courts in the application and interpretation of certain provisions 
of the Ordinance. The preliminary part of the Ordinance which dealt with 
definitions, described a "concession" as:
"Any writing whereby any right, interest, in or over land with respect 
to minerals, precious stones, timber, rubber or other products of 
the soil, or the option of acquiring any such right, interest or 
property purports to be either directly or indirectly granted or 
agreed to be granted by a native, but shall not include an assignment 
of a concession as above described." 362
It was the interpretation placed on this definition that gave 
rise to problems. When during the course of determining the validity 
of concessions, the issue arose as to what amounted to a concession within 
the meaning of the provision referred to above, the courts in certain 
cases drew an artificial distinction between two types of concessions.
Any writing whereby a concession right was acquired in respect of minerals
5.2 No. 14 of 1900. The interpretation placed"' on it gave such 
problems that it was amended soon after it came into force by Ordinance 
No. 20 of 1901, S.6, again by S.6 of No. 16 of 1912 and again by
5.2 of No. 22 of 1918.
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and other products of the soil fell within one category and the option 
of acquiring such rights fell into the other. This distinction often 
became crucial in determining whether or not a concession agreement 
fell foul of Sections 19 and 20 of the Ordinance prescribing the minimum 
size of concessions which a person could acquire at a time.
Section 20(1) of the Ordinance provided that no concession should 
be valid which purported to confer any rights over sin sirea exceeding:
a. "in the case of land in respect of which mining rights are 
conferred by such concessions five square miles;
b. in the case of land in respect of which rights to cut timber 
or to collect rubber, or relating to other products of the 
soild are conferred twenty square miles."
The section also provided that no person should hold at one time 
concessions the aggregate area of which should exceed in the case of 
mining rights, twenty square miles, or in the case of rights relating
363
to timber, rubber or other products of the soil, forty square miles.
From the following provisions it becomes evident that one of the 
conditions which must be satisfied before a certificate of validity might 
be issued in respect of a concession was the limitation of the size of 
the concession to the areas prescribed by the provisions. However, the 
court had in certain cases taken the view that the provisions did not 
place any limit on the amount of concessions which might be acquired 
in the case of concessions falling under the second class described above,
i.e. concessions being a writing whereby an option of acquiring any 
right, interest or property in minerals purported to be granted by a 
native.
To take an example, in Concession Enquiry Number 767 at Accra, a
concession in which exclusive rights to take up mining and timber leases
within an area of approximately 120 square miles for one year with an
option to renew on the same terms were certified as valid by a concessions
court, although this would appear to be a concession the area of which
365
exceeded by far the limits imposed by section 20 of the Ordinance.
The Court's view was that this agreement being an "option" fell outside 
the definition of a concession so as to become subject to the restrictions 
imposed by the area clauses of the Ordinance. In another Concession 
Enquiry, a certificate of validity was issued in respect of a concession
Emphasis supplied.
See Certificate of validity No. 214 in respect of "Wallace's Western 
Axim Option", in Gold Coast Gazette No. 71, 3 October, 1909. For 
the facts see MLB Syndicate Ltd. to Crown Agents for the Colonies,
25 November, 1909, C.O. 879/109, No. 977, African West.
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acquired by William Ambrose Pritchard in September 1909. The terms of 
the transaction were the same as those described above except the area 
of the present concession which was 80 square miles. Here again, the 
size of the grant exceeded the limits imposed by the Statute. In the 
present case, the NLB Syndicate Limited discovered after the notice of 
the Certificate was published in the Gazette that many of their concessions 
in respect of which a certificate of validity had been granted earlier 
were absorbed by the possessions of the Western Akim Option.
When the Syndicate discovered the anomaly, it drew the attention
of the Colonial Office to it complaining that the concession in question
violated the area clauses. The Colonial Office admitted that the matter
was prima facie a violation of the provisions and therefore a matter
367
for the courts to adjudicate upon. The Colonial Office advised the
Syndicate to consider itself as aggrieved by the Court's Order and should
take, without delay, such proceedings as the law of the Colony sanctioned
under such circumstances. One of the things the company might do was
to apply for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under rule 11, Order
52 of the Supreme Court Ordinance.
When Purcel, J., the judge who made these decisions, was required 
to justify the basis of his action, he defended his stand by reliance 
on the artificial distinction drawn between the two types of concessions. 
The learned judge argued that there was no provision in the Ordinance 
placing restriction on the size of options which only granted the right 
of acquiring mining rights. He referred to a precedent where a certificate 
of validity was issued by Pennington, J., in 1903. He noted that in 
that concession, , the grantee secured an option to acquire mining rights 
over an area of 15 square miles. Yet the validity of that decision had 
bever been questioned.
It should be pointed out that the fact that the decision referred 
to by the learned judge had never been questioned could not dispose of 
the issue as to whether options to acquire mining or other rights fell 
within the definition of a concession so as to bring such agreements 
under the ambit of the provisions restricting the size of concessions
366 See Concession Enquiry No. 772 in respect of which a "Certificate
of validity was issued in the name of "Pritchard Western Akim Option", 
7 Spetember,1909, Cert. No. 215, Gold Coast Gazette, No. 71, 3 October, 
1909.
Colonial Office to Governor, 11 December, 1909, C.O. 879/109, No.
988, African West.
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to specified limits. It would amount to begging the question simply
to refer to a similar decision by another judge in the past as constituting
a precedent. Purcel, J.'s decision can be seen to be indefensible if
we read the whole of Section 20 together. Sub-section-(3) of Section
20 provided that where a concession or concessions purported to confer
308
rights or an option of acquiring the same in respect of any area
or areas exceeding the limits imposed by the Ordinance, the court might
issue a certificate of validity in respect of a portion of such area or
areas as might be selected by the grantee and declared void the excess
by which it exceeded the prescribed limit.
Certainly, if the Ordinance purported to exclude options from the
operative effect of these relevant provisions, then it would be superfluous
to include an option of acquiring mineral rights "in respect of such
area or areas" in the sub-section. Surely, the fact that the Ordinance
conferred power on the courts to declare valid an option to acquire mineral
rights which might be within the required limits and to declare void
the residue by which it might exceed the limit implies that options were
not excluded from the purview of the relevant provisions. Both the Attorney
General and the Governor, John Roger came to a similar conclusion.
The latter, for instance, expressed the opinion that the interpretation
placed on the "area clauses" would have the effect of stultifying the
369
whole object of the Statute. Referring to Wallace's Western Akim
Option case discussed above, he regretted that the case was not appealed
against, the parties concerned "finding it more profitable to divide
370
the spoil between them."
In view of the problems raised by cases of this nature, and the 
way in which the Concessions Courts were issuing certificates of validity 
in respect of concessions in clear violation of the provisions and the 
purport of the Ordinance, the Secretary of State had to issue a press 
statement reminding the business community of the conditions under which 
grants of land or other rights relating thereto by natives in West African 
colonies, could be recognised as valid. It stated that such grants were 
not valid and would not be recognised by the Imperial Government unless
308
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certified by the Colonial Government in pursuance of the laws of the
371
dependency concerned-
Despite measures such as this, one often found in the Gazette notices 
of certificates of validity in respect of concessions in clear violation
i
of Section 20 of the Ordinance. For example, in 1906, Of in River Gold 
Estates Limited acquired four blocks of five square miles each, the aggre­
gate of which amounted to twenty square miles. A certificate of validity
was issued in respect of them; just what Section 20 (2) of the Ordinance
372
declared should not happen. In a similar way, the Equatorial Rubber
and Mahogany Company claimed to have acquired a concession of over 50
square miles in 1910 and Panni Lands and Rubber Estates Limited made
a similar claim in respect of a lease of 64,000 acres for 99 years.
The mining lease of 20 square miles acquired by the Boinsu Rubber Company
Limited and the acquisition in the Axim District by the Aywara Rubber
and Cotton Estates Limited, a lease aggregating 30 square miles in area,
all provide good examples of the way in which certificates of validity
were issued in respect of concessions in clear violtation of the provisions 
373
of the Ordinance.
The evidence so far suggests that the machinery devised to tackle
the land administration problems after the withdrawal of the Public Lands
Bill suffered from many defects. In the first place, it is evident that
the Ordinance was ineffective against speculation, in that the relevant
provisions could not prevent the acquisition of concessions in excess
of the prescribed areas. Also the overlapping grants of the kind which
occurred in the Wallace's Akim Option case, showed that the inherent
problems of insecurity of title persisted under the system. The scheme
administered by the courts suffered from the defect that the Ordinance
did not provide as one of the conditions for the issue of certificates
of validity that the land to which the interest related should.be accurately
surveyed. Section 16 (9) provided that every certificate of validity
slrould state the boundaries, the extent and situation of the land in respect
of which the certificate was given and Section 16 (b) provided that the 
the
nature of/concession should be specified briefly. But these provisions 
did not impose any obligation on the grantee or grantor of the right
371
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to make an accurate survey of the land in respect of which a grant was made.
In a land tenure system like the Gold Coast, where boundaries between 
various land-holding corporate groups of communities and families, were recog­
nised, problems of title insecurity were bound to be prevalent if the defini­
tion, demarcation and accurate survey of boundaries and areas of land subject to 
agreements were not made sin essential part of land transactions. These problems 
were made more difficult by the courts' attitude in not paying sufficient atten­
tion to provisions of the Ordinance dealing with description of psirticulars of 
concessions subject to enquiries before the courts. In deciding on the vali­
dity of a concession, the Ordinance required that not only should the name, 
situation and boundaries of the land to which the concession rights related be
given, but the area of the land, whether for mining or an option for acquiring
374
such rights and rents therefore, should be distinctly stated.
But taking ten concesssions in respect of which certificates of validity
were issued and published in the April of 1910 for example, it can be observed
375
that out of the lot, not a word was said about six of them as to their extent. 
This meant that either the claimant ignored Section 9 of the Ordinance by not 
giving the prescribed particulars of the grant or the officials concerned in 
the publication of the notice ignored the provisions. Whichever was the truth, 
failure to indicate the area and extent of the land in respect of which a con­
cession right was conceded meant that grantees of such rights could conceal any 
acquisition of rights in excess of what the law permitted. It also meant that 
prospective acquirers of interest in lands could not be put on the enquiry with 
regard to such lands already subject to transactions. The result would be 
overlapping grants and greater insecurity of title with its consequential 
costly litigation.
When the anomalies in the administration of the Scheme devised to replace 
Sir William Maxwell's programme of land reform began to cause concern in offi­
cial circles, the Governor, John Roger, conceded the fact that having regard 
to what had happened since the withdrawal of the Public Lands Bill, it was re­
grettable that it was not made to succeed. He, however, thought it was too
376
late then to resurrect the Bill. But in respect of such land as had not as
yet been alienated, four policy objectives ought to be pursued. These were:
i. restriction of areas to be acquired;
ii. preservation of native rights;
iii. continuous and effective working of what was acquired and
iv. reasonable payments to be expended for the benefit of the tribe 
concerned. 377
See Sections 9 and 10 and Schedule A thereof.
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It will be observed that apart from the last policy objective, the
rest were simply a re-statement of what had already been provided for
in the Ordinance. Further examination of the operation of the Ordinance
would reveal that the administration of the scheme by the courts had
not been effective in achieving any of the stated objectives. The Ordinance
itself was so defective in many respects that within 18 years of its
operation, apart from several regulations to supplement its provisions, 
for
it was amended/more than 14 times. However, it should be pointed out 
that the judges should bear the greater responsibility for its failures.
For, it was their failure to exercise the wide discretionary powers conferred 
on them within the context of the clearly stated objectives of the Ordinance 
that accounted for many of the problems. This point would become clear 
as we proceed to consider the protection of native rights and adequacy 
of consideration under the administration of the scheme.
0. Protection of Native Rights
One of the declared objectives of the Concession Ordinance was the
protection and preservation of native customary rights in land. Section
11 (6) of the Ordinance accordingly provided that no concession was to
be valid unless the court was satisfied that the customary rights of
natives were reasonably protected in respect of shifting cultivation,
collection of firewood, hunting and game. However, ten years after the
Ordinance had come into force, it became obvious that this objective
had not been achieved. In 1910, the Governor, John Roger, was forced
to admit that the provisions of the Ordinance were not affording to the
native the sort of protection contemplated under it. Commenting on the
effect of Section 11 (6), he said:
"I fear that concession holders pay little attention to any customary 
rights that interfere with their mining, planting and woodcutting 
privileges. To render this reservation effective, the courts must 
standardise their requirements and the District Commissioners should 
subsequently enforce them."
These views were shared by a correspondent of the African Mail who 
observed that the framers of the Ordinance were well aware of the fact 
that many leases were granted for the period of 99 years with an option 
to renew for the same period. Such concessions conferred on the lessees 
rights to use the interest acquired as if they were freeholders. In 
the result, people‘were restricted from exercising their communal rights
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of farming, hunting, snaring game and the collection of firewood was
379
forbidden in many cases. Commenting on the failure of the judges
to apply the provisions of the Ordinance with its objectives in mind,
the correspondent observed:
"In spite of the objects of the Ordinance, and the plain meaning 
of its provisions, some of the judges appear to be spellbound by 
the .fetishism of the sealing-wax affixed on a paper writing and 
make a distinction between a lease under seal and a plain agreement, 
where the law makes none." ^80
This attitude of the court, the correspondent pointed out, was incon­
sistent with policy objectives of the Ordinance. It will be difficult 
to disagree with the views expressed here because the success of the 
scheme depended on the understanding and awareness on the part of the 
judges, the policy considerations actuating the introduction of the measure. 
What is more, on many occasions, concession agreements were ingeniously 
drawn with the deliberate intention of evading the provisions of the 
Ordinance.
A classic examples of an agreement of the kind was one described
381
as not only "inequitable but iniquitous". In this agreement, the
vendor agreed to sell and the purchaser agreed to buy all mahogany of 
marketable quality found on the vendor's land. The purchase price for 
every felled mahogany trunk accepted by the purchaser shall be one pound 
sterling. The agreement provided further that for every felled mahogany 
trunk accepted by the purchaser, the vendor agreed to give the purchaser 
10 mahogany trunks of marketable quality free of charge. This was, in 
effect, an indirect way of fixing the price of each trunk at less than 
one shilling. The vendor agreed not to sell any felled mahogany trunks 
or standing mahogany trees nor grant any timber concession over the land 
for a period of two years from the date speciftied in the agreement except 
to the purchaser. One provision carefully provided that in the agreement, 
the expression "felled mahogany trunk" shall not be construed to include 
standing mahogany trees.
Apparently, the parties to this agreement drafted the contract in 
such a manner as would exclude it from the class of agreements which 
fell within the meaning of "concession" as defined under Section 2 of 
the ConcessionsOrdinance. This would remove the agreement from the scope
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and purview of the concessions courts. The framers of the contract obviously
conceived of the definition of land in terms of English law where land
is regarded as including things attached to the land but excluding things
detached from it- As the mahogany trunk was detached from the land before
its sale, it ceased to be part of the land and therefore an ordinary
chattel, an agreement in respect of which would fall outside the definition
of a concession defined as
"anything whereby any right, interest or property in or over land, 
or in or to minerals, precious stones, timber, rubber or other products 
of the soil, in or growing on any land, or the option of acquiring 
any such right, interest or property purports to be either directly
or indirectly granted or demised or agreed to be granted or demised
by a native . . ." 383
The subject matter of the transaction being "felled mahogany trunk",
it did not .only become detached from the land but was no longer a "product
of the soil in or growing on any land." Similarly it could not be described
as a right to land in the strict sense of that term. Both the Colonial
Secretary and the Attorney General agreed that the agreement by its ordinary
meaning was not a concession, but to the layman the fact that timber,
felled or unfelled, was a product of the soil, would seem to bring the
agreement within the wide definition of Section 2 of the Ordinance as
384
granting an interest in land, although indirectly.
However, it is arguable that considering the transaction as a whole, 
it could be held to fall within the general framework of the definition 
which it sought to avoid. Having regard to the objects of the ordinance, 
it should not be difficult to argue that in any land transaction by which 
mineral or timber rights were acquired, the right to take and enjoy the 
product of the soil was always contemplated. But such rights could only 
be enjoyed if the right to take or detach the product of the soil was
accorded. It will be seen that the only distinction between the agreement
under discussion and those falling within the definition of "concession" 
was that in the case of the former, the subject matter of the transaction 
was assumed to have been detached from the land at the time of the contract 
while in the case of the latter, the subject matter of the transaction 
would have been in, under or attached to the land. But in both cases 
the grantees would enjoy timber or mineral rights. The distinction can
384
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therefore be seen as one only as to form and not of substance.
On the basis of this reasoning, a concession court, alive to its 
duties and aware of the underlying policy basis of the Ordinance, should 
have had no difficulty in bringing agreements like this one under the 
scope of the Ordinance, particularly when, as in this case, it became 
apparent that the agreement was calculated to evade the provisions of 
the Ordinance. The court could achieve such results by the exercise 
of additional powers conferred on it in its discretion to make such modifica­
tions in the terms of any concession and to impose such conditions with
regard to the issue of any certificate of validity as to the court may
385
seem just. In the Cankinbamu Concession Enquiry referred to by the
386
West African correspondent of The African Mail for instance, Nicol
J., decided at Axim that no freehold right could be acquired, for to
hold otherwise would have left the door open for "company promoters and
financial speculators from abroad to despoil the inhabitants of their
inheritance". He accordingly reduced the freehold title which the grantee
purported to have acquired to a lease for a term of 99 years.
However, not many of the Judges in the concessions courts were willing
to exercise the discretionary powers conferred on them so readily. The
general view of the Courts was outlined by the Chief Justice, Brandford
Griffith, when defending the accusations levelled at the manner of the
courts' administration of the scheme under the Ordinance. Griffith admitted
that some of the certificates of validity issued in respect of certain
concessions evidently omitted to state their situation and areas, but
argued that little harm could have resulted from that. He believed that
the object of the notices in this regard was to inform the public so
387
that interested persons could enter caveats.
We can agree with the Chief Justice that the purpose of such notices 
was to inform the public so that those persons who might find their rights 
threatened by grants should enter caveats, but we disagree with him in 
believing that failure to state the situation and areas of land affected 
by concessions would cause little harm. How could this objective be 
achieved if the area and location of a grant was not specified in a notice?
For example, if I issue notice to the whole world that I have acquired 
timber or mineral rights in Warsaw or Appolonia without indicating the
Ordinance No. 20 of 1901, S.8 which became Section 12(a) of the 
Principal Ordinance.
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exact location and size, how can anyone know if his rights are affected?
With due deference to the Chief Justice, his arguments would seem uncon­
vincing.
In what would appear to be the policy considerations guiding the
courts in the administration of the scheme, Griffith said:
"Gold mining is largely a lottery, and people will not put down 
their money unless they are assured that the prize will be substantial.
The Gold Mining industry has not yet reached such a height of certainty 
and prosperity that we can afford to check would-be mining companies, 
a reduction from 99 to 70 or 75 years, as is suggested, would take 
off some of the gilt." 388
It was because of reasons such as these that he fully supported 
the artificial distinction drawn between agreements whereby mining rights 
were acquired and those in which an option to acquire those rights was 
obtained. In his defence of Purcel, J.'s issue of certificates of validity 
in respect of concessions the areas of which far exceeded those prescribed 
by the Ordinance, he declared that agreements of the last category were 
not concessions at all. In other words, options to acquire timber and mineral 
rights did not come under the scope of the Ordinance at all. The exclusion by 
the Courts, of this class of land grants, from the scope of the Ordinance 
meant that the Courts had left the door open for concession hunters and 
speculators to acquire large areas of land far in excess of what the 
law permitted.
If it is realised the fact that an option to acquire mining or timber 
rights virtually accorded the grantee the right to do on the land, under 
the guise of prospecting, what a concessionaire was permitted to do with 
his concession rights, then the seriousness of Griffith's conclusions 
can be realised. This attitude of the courts in not taking into account 
the policy goals of the Ordinance during the course of the interpretation 
and application of its provisions, tended to defeat the object of the 
whole scheme. In the result, the Act was unsuccessful in imposing the 
limitations which the framers of the Act sought to place on the size 
of concessions so as to curb speculation and its consequential evils.
The general outcry against the anomalies which occurred in the administra­
tion of the scheme by the courts, both from official circles and the 
public at large would suggest that the scheme was, to a large extent, 
unsatisfactory. The frequent amendments of its provision designed to 
fill the gaps, some of which were created by the interpretations placed
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on them by the courts, underline the fact that the administration of the 
scheme suffered from many defects.
D. Inadequate Consideration and the Protection of Native Rights
Among the stated objectives of the scheme were the protection of the
natives' rights in the exercise of their inherent customary land rights
such as shifting cultivation,, collection of firewood and snaring game.
It was also declared that the purpose of the Ordinance was to protect
the natives against fraudulent and unfair transactions in which land
rights were acquired without adequate consideration therefor. In order
to achieve this objective the Ordinance conferred power on the courts
to declare concessions invalid even where the chief or the person granting
them raised no objection to the terms. The judge was to exercise this
power where the terms and conditions were plainly fraudulent. Similarly,
where the grant was made improvidently, having regard to the bargaining
positions of the parties, locality and future requirements of the natives,
the court might exercise its powers to declare the transaction invalid
389
notwithstanding the contract between the parties.
However, the courts were not favourably disposed towards the exercise
of these discretionary powers with the results that some agreements which
might be regarded as being in breach of some of the conditions prescribed
by the Ordinance were certified as valid. In certain cases the exercise
of traditional customary rights were qualified on the grounds that they
could only be exercised if the rights conferred on the grantee were not
'390
to be prejudiced. As the West African correspondent claimed:
"Instead of protecting the customary rights in a fair and reasonable 
manner against the exercise of timber or rubber rights, the judges 
inexplicably support the lessee, who has things all his own way 
as soon as he says or thinks the exercise of these reserved rights 
by natives is prejudicial to him". 391
Some of these accusations had not been denied by the Chief Justice 
in his defence of the courts. In fact, official reports and his own 
comments confirmed these criticisms of the concession courts. There 
was his own admission that certificates of validity were issued in clear 
violation of the provisions of the Ordinance but defended such action 
on the grounds that mining was a gamble and the price should be high
See sections 11 and 13.
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in order to attract capitalists to invest in the industry. On questions 
relating to the exercise of discretionary powers by the courts to protect 
the native community against improvident alienation by chiefs and Elders 
of the community and family lands, the Chief Justice said:
"I doubt whether it will be within the power of a judge to withhold 
a certificate, of validity from a concessionaire because the native 
grantor would not consent to a portion of his rent being withheld 
for educational or road making, or sanitary, or economic, agricultural 
or other purposes. It is not the province of the judges to decide 
upon what policy each native chief should pursue in spending his 
rent." 39^
It will be observed that what the Chief Justice overlooked here
was the fact that the Concessions Courts were special courts created
to deal with land problems involving questions relating to political
and socio-economic issues the policy objectives of which were clearly
stated. The powers conferred on the Attorney General to intervene on
behalf of the government in certain cases where it appeared to him that
a certificate of validity was granted in "contravention of the true intent"
393
of certain sections of the Ordinance, underscores the fact that in
applying the letter of the law*the economic and social policy objectives
underlying its provisions should not be ignored.
It is submitted that the Chief Justice was mistaken in treating
the Concessions Court on the same footing as a regular court which often
operates on the doctrine that the judges declare and apply the laws and
394
do not make them. Another factor which Griffith,C.J.,seemed to have
overlooked was that which Mr Eliot rightly stated in his notes on the
395
"Alienation of Stool and Tribal Lands", Mr Eliot rightly observed
that in order to determine whether or not the Concessions Ordinance protected 
native subjects, it should be borne in mind that the chiefs were custodians 
of the lands and not their owners. He drew attention to the fact that 
there was a distinction between the family land of the chief and the 
communal lands under his control.
Although a chief might be destooled, he would still retain his right
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in his own family land. For this reason, he was far more ready to dispose 
of the communal lands than his own family lands which he reserved for 
a rainy day. The only check on the chiefs' activities in respect of 
land alienation was the admonition of their Councillors who generally 
preferred to retain their positions
"rather than raise their voices against the mulcting of the rights 
of the community by serious inroads into the rapidly decreasing 
supplyof common land." 396
The evidence supplied by Mr Eliot's notes showed that subjects of 
the community were often unaware of the concessions conceded by their 
Chiefs. In those cases where the subjects' interests were to be affected, 
they were accommodated on other stool land not yet leased or sold and 
in some cases, the affected subjects were allowed to remain temporarily 
on the land so as to comply with those sections of the Ordinance reserving 
to them the exercise of customary native rights.
The recognition of these factors in the land tenure and administra­
tion system in the country was one of the key considerations which influenced 
Sir William Maxwell to introduce his Public Lands Bill framed on account 
of the communal principles of the traditional system.. Although that 
system was rejected, the Concessions Ordinance replacirg it retained some 
of its laudable principles seeking to protect the ordinary subjects against 
the dissipation of community resources through improvident alienations 
of stool lands by their generally illiterate and ignorant Chiefs for 
paltry sums, These were some of the factors which the courts ought to 
have borne in mind in the course of determining the validity of concessions. 
It was for the protection of the ordinary subjects of the community that 
wide powers were conferred on the courts to re-open transactions relating 
to concession grants in spite of the fact that under the ordinary principles
of contract law, a binding contract could have been held to exist between
the parties.
Under the Ordinance, therefore, the courts need not have adopted 
the view that the parties should keep their eyes open during the course 
of negotiations. If the judges were to have adopted such a legalistic 
approach to the administration of the scheme laid down in the Concessions 
Ordinance in the manner demonstrated by the Chief Justice, this would 
have been to shut their eyes to the peculiar problems with which the 
courts were created to deal.
Loc cit.
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The general illiteracy of the population, the ignorance of the chiefs, 
and the peculiar systems of land tenure in the country called for the 
creation of these special courts to deal with peculiar problems. To 
treat land transactions on the same footing as ordinary contracts in 
which the outward manifestation of the parties' intent rather than their 
actual intent form the basis of a contract, and to view the work of the 
Concessions Courts in terms of regular courts applying rules and regulations 
in their adjudicative processes would be to overlook the clearly stated 
policy objectives of the Ordinance. If that was the original intention 
of the legislature, the creation of these special courts would have been 
unnecessary. It would have been a simple job of expanding the already 
existing regular bourts.
As the courts seemed to have been oblivious to the aims of the Ordinance,
they treated many of the concession grants as ordinary contracts. It
was largely as a result of this attitude of the courts that certificates
of validity were granted in respect of concessions which might be regarded
within the context of the general policy of the Ordinance as invalid
for want of adequate consideration. The idea of acquiring a lease of
3,300 acres at £12 a year for 99 years and, say, 10,000 acres at £5
397
a year for 99 years would evidently sound unjust. Further examination
of other concessions declared valid by the courts would disclose numerous
transactions of similar nature. The acquisition of over 50 square miles
of concession by Equitorial Rubber and Mahogany Concession Limited for
an annual rent of £52, the acquisition from Axim chiefs a lease of 64,000
acres by the Rubber Estates Limited for 99 years at an annual rent of
£21, the 20 square miles of concession conceded by Bonsu chiefs to Boinsu
Rubber Company Limited for an annual rent of £5 and those acquired in
the Axim district by Aywara Rubber and Cotton Estates Limited aggregating
30 square miles for 65 years at an annual rent of £102 were all not only
in clear violation of the area clauses but they provide evidence of what
398
could be regarded as want of adequate consideration.
Although the terms of transactions like these would appear ridiculous 
to the layman, one must recall that under the ordinary principles of 
contract law, consideration need not be adequate. Provided the parties 
with their eyes open are agreed on the terms, a contract might be held
397 T V i  • ^Ibid.
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to exist if it is not tainted by any vitiating factors such as fraud, 
deceit, undue influence, mistake, fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation 
or illegality. Apparently, the courts tended to treat agreements relating 
to concession grants on the same footing as ordinary contracts. Yet 
this was certainly not the intention of the framers of the Ordinance.
It was in order to treat such transactions differently from ordinary 
contracts that a special machinery in the shape of GoneessionsCourts 
was created with wide discretionary powers vested in the judges to deal 
with the special problems relating to them.
However, ten years after the introduction of the Ordinance by Sir
Frederick Hodgson, it became obvious that the judges were not administering
the Scheme established under it satisfactorily, mainly because of their
legalistic approach to its administration. Indeed, in 1910 a Colonial
Office memorandum admitted that, although the provisions of the Ordinance
were fair and reasonable, their administration by the courts was not
wholly satisfactory. It was noted that "one at least of the judges has
399
been lax in giving effect to its provisions". It was clearly admitted
that at the time the Ordinance was being drawn up, the main problem was
that of mining concessions. But later^after 1905 people acquired land
on a large scale for growing rubber and cocoa, and increased the difficulty
to
of protecting native rights to snaring game and/practise shifting culti­
vation. The Memorandum stated that it was extremely undesirable that 
a large proportion of the land in the country should fall into private 
hands, for this would destroy the tribal system and was likely to reduce 
ordinary subjects to the position of day labourers.
The evidence later supplied by actual experience of the application 
of the Ordinance suggests that where the interests of the community had 
been in conflict with those of the concessionaire, the courts have been 
more favourably disposed to resolve the conflict in favour of the latter 
because of their purely legalistic approach to the administration of 
the scheme. At the end of the day, the powerful business men, large 
corporations and the native middle class had their way.
Having regard to the continued existence of the problems which the 
Scheme was designed to solve, long after its inauguration, it would be 
fair to conclude that the Concesions Ordinance could not prove to be 
a better alternative to the 1897 abortive Public Lands Bill of Sir William
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Maxwell. It is arguable that the administration of the Scheme by the 
courts even exacerbated the problems. In the Colonial office memorandum 
referred to above for example, it was admitted that the problem of identifying 
those persons with the legal capacity to dispose of property in the tradi­
tional system was one of the difficulties faced by the Concession Courts.
In the absence of a Domesday Survey of the country, it would be impossible
for the judges to go behind the evidence adduced before them by chiefs
401
who were anxious to dispose of their supposed rights.
The fundamental problems of the land tenure system, which were the 
twin problems of uncertainty of title and costly litigation, themselves 
incidents of uncertainty of boundaries and the inability to identify 
persons with legal capacity to deal with property, had persisted under 
the Scheme. The fact that these problems became so serious that Sir 
Conway Belfield was required to investigate them in 1912, and that a 
West African Lands Committee was set up in 1913 to enquire into them, 
underlines the magnitude of the problems which had persisted long after 
the Scheme was introduced.
G. Policy towards Ashanti
i. Questions relating to Sovereign Rights
When a combined force of British and the allied forces of certain
native chiefs in the southern part of the Gold Coast Colony defeated
402
the Ashanti in 1874, Britain did not proceed to assert sovereign 
rights over that State as a conquered territory. This was in line with 
her policy of avoiding the costs involved in claims of such rights over 
territories in which Her Majesty's subjects were engaged in trading acti­
vities. However, when Sir William Brandford Griffith was introducing 
his Crown Lands Bill in 1894, he realised that land problems in the Protected 
Territories and Ashanti were similar to those of the Colony in the south. 
Therefore he did not see any good reason for keeping up the distinction 
between the Colony and the Protectorate in the Gold Coast.
Making his case for ending such a distinction he informed the Secretary
401
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of State, Chamberlain that it appeared to him that the Colony and Ashanti
were virtually the same. Having regard to the distinction which rested
in the native mind upon the subject, unless there were strong reasons
of state why it should not be done, he would suggest that the term protectorate
should be discontinued. A short Ordinance should be passed if necessary
unless the matter could be dealt with by an Order in Council to authorise
the change so that the whole territory of the Gold Coast may be known
403
subsequently as that of the Gold Coast Colony.
This suggested move was intended to pave the way for policies directed
towards the harmonisation of the tenure systems of the country. Five
years earlier, Lord Knutsford was prepared to admit that there were many
reasons in favour of making the whole of the Gold Coast Colony and Protec-
404
torates British territory, and therefore Crown Lands. It was his
belief that many advantages would be gained from such a measure as it 
would get rid of many troublesome questions of jurisdiction, pointing 
out that the country was being ruled practically as if it were British 
territory though nominally it was not.
Despite these declarations of intent, no immediate steps were thken 
to declare Ashanti to be annexed as British Territory. Apart form seeing 
to it that Ashanti honoured her treaty obligations arising from the 1874 
war, sovereign rights were not proclaimed over the province as arising 
out of conquest. Such rights were waived. Thus, at the time of the 
Crown Lands Bills of 1894 and 1897, sovereign rights of the Crown over 
the Colony were being denied by the natives. There were even stronger 
arguments for saying that Ashanti was independent of Britain. Such argu­
ments could be buttressed with the open admission by Lord Knutsford that 
Ashanti was not a British territory.
In 1896 when the Asantehene Prempeh I was captured, an opportunity 
occurred for the Imperial Government to assert its sovereign right over 
that territory but it did not do so until after the Yaa-Asantewa War 
of 1900. When Kumasi v?as occupied by British troops in 1896 and the 
Asantehene was captured, taken to the coast and virtually deposed, the 
quasi-federation of which he was a paramount chief was broken up. Separate
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treaties were made with individual chiefs within the federation, who 
were treated by the colonial administration as being entirely independent 
of Ashanti.
Any future permanent arrangement for the administration of Kumasi 
and the adjacent territories which had hitherto been under the direct 
domination of the Asantehene was left undetermined. A committee of admini­
strators consisting of three chiefs was appointed to exercise, within 
the dominion of the King, the powers which were traditionally vested 
in a King and his Council, subject to the control of a British Resident 
at Kumasi. The British Resident, the only token of British authority 
in the area, was stationed there with the main purpose of dealing with 
matters relating to the performance of Ashanti's treaty obligations, 
and not necessarily to administer the territory as a conquered state 
in a representative capacity of Her Majesty.
Here again, it can be seen that the declaration of sovereign rights 
over that territory as a conquered state was avoided. It was decided 
not to annex even the Asantehene's dominions, much less the rest of Ashanti, 
whose chiefs accepted British protection and entered into "Treaties of 
Friendship and Trade" with the Queen. For these reasons, during the 
period when Griffith and Maxwell were introducing their Land Bills of 
such far-reaching consequences, they were not, in principle, to apply 
in Ashanti. At least, there was no legal basis for claiming that such 
laws would have applied there.
Noticeable in this regard was the absence of any petition from any 
Ashanti King or Chief against the Land Bills. One obvious reason why 
no such petition of protest ensued from Ashanti was not so much because 
those Bills were arguably inapplicable there, but more so because, until 
1895, no mining on modern lines had begun in that region. Moreover, 
by that time, unlike the Colony, no educated class of native lawyers, 
merchants and elite around which an organised opposition could centre 
had as yet appeared there. Hence, although they might have heard rumours 
of what was happening in the South, there was no rallying point of protest 
in the matter.
At the close of the last decade of the nineteenth century, however, 
the acquisition of land in Ashanti for mining and timber works had increased 
considerably with its incidental problems. Thus when the Concessions 
Ordinance was being introduced, the colonial administration had in contem-
Chamberlain to F. M. Hodgson, C.0. 879/57
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plation its application in Ashanti as well as the Colony. The problem 
for the colonial government was that there seemed no legal basis for 
declaring the Ordinance operative in Ashanti. Chamberlain’s answer to 
this problem was that there was no good reason for treating Ashanti chiefs 
in the matter of concessions differently from the rest of the chiefs 
in the protectorate in the South. In the same way as the chiefs in 
the Colony had not been conquered, the Secretary of State declared, 
so were the Ashanti Chiefs not conquered:
"The British Government waived any right of conquest over them which
could be implied therefrom by entering into treatise with them."
In support of his argument, Chamberlain referred to the concession 
acquired by the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation in 1895 from certain Ashanti 
Chiefs. This was a sure indication that the Chiefs still had the power 
to alienate such lands and the right to do so had not passed to the Colonial 
government. He was therefore in favour of accepting certain arrangements 
which the British Resident at Kumasi proposed to adopt for land transactions 
in that province. These arrangements were to be based on the willingness 
of the chiefs to grant concessions. Under this arrangement, the desire 
of the chiefs to grant a concession would be ascertained by prospective 
grantees of such rights. The consent of the Chief to make the grant 
would be recorded in a document to be signed before the Resident at Kumasi. 
When this was done, the grant might be approved by the Governor.
The Secretary of State saw no significant difference between this 
procedure and what obtained in the Colony and other protectorates.
He therefore saw no reason why Ashanti should be excluded from the applica­
tion of the Concessions Ordinance. Chamberlain could therefore be seen 
to be advocating a policy which would treat Ashanti Chiefs on the same 
footing as those of the Colony in the matter of legal capacity to grant 
concessions. This he did, although it could be argued that it was as 
a result of "conquest" that the chiefs submitted to British "protection" 
and entered into the treaties of friendship and trade.
The Governor, F. M. Hodgson, disagreed with these views. He believed 
it was a questionable policy to raise the status of tribal kings and 
to a certain extent weaken the power, which according to native custom, 
the paramount authority possessed over them. He regarded the separate 
agreements which the colonial government made with individual Ashanti
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Chiefs after the immediate occupation of Ashanti as an administrative
blunder. Hodgson argued that the administration of the Asantehene's
Kingdom by a committee of chiefs appointed by the colonial government
under the imemdiate supervision of a British Resident at Kumasi was clear
evidence of their submission to British authority. It was therefore
not good policy to treat those native states with which treaties had
been signed on the same footing as those in the Colony. To do so would
make them think that they held a more favourable position by virtue of
those treaties and they would be acting under the assumption that it was
only the people of Kumasi that the government wished to bring under subjection
It was administratively inexpedient to create such an impression in their
409
minds so as to engender any idea of independence or semi-independence.
Hodgson believed that the best policy to adopt was to maintain the
position that the Government
"has taken the place of the native paramount authority; that the Resident 
as representing the Government stands in the place of that authority; 
and that agreements notwithstanding, the tribal Kings and Chiefs are 
under the same obligations of service to the Government as they were 
to the King paramount before the change took place." 410
The Governor agreed with the Secretary of State that it was within
the power of chiefs and their councils to grant concessions; but at the
same time he considered it necessary, in order to preserve the "feeling
of subservience to the paramount authority", that the government should
have its hand upon every stage of the proceedings in the matter of granting
land concessions. It was his view that the entire freedom of control which
was enjoyed by native "Kings" and "Chiefs" within the colony, a freedom
which would soon be curtailed by the Concessions Ordinance, should not
411
be accorded to the "Kings" and "Chiefs" of Ashanti. Thus while Hodgson
agreed with Chamberlain that Ashanti should be brought within the scope
of the Concessions Ordinance, he regarded it as important that the power
412
of the Chiefs in respect of Concession grants should be curbed.
It will be observed that the sort of land policies advocated for Ashanti 
by Hodgson were not significantly different from what Sir William Maxwell 
proposed in his abortive Land Bill. The argument of Maxwell had all along 
been that the paramount authority of native chiefs was superseded
F. M. Hodgson to Chamberlain, 20 November, 1899, C.0. 879/57.
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by the sovereign rights of the Imperial power established there. Therefore,
the colonial government as representing that authority was entitled
to exercise the powers of land control which the traditional authorities
had been accustomed to exercise before the creation of the colony and
protectorate. It will be recalled that Hodgson had rejected this argument
before and agreed with Sir Joseph Hutchinson that*it- was inexpedient
to weaken the power of the Chiefs by taking away from them their traditional
413
land control functions.
ii. The Concessions Ordinance and Ashanti
It may well be that five years after his criticism of Maxwell,
Hodgson had realised the wisdom in Maxwell's policies, particularly as 
in his position as Governor, he became directly confronted with the problems. 
The Secretary of State, after consulting his Law Officers of the Crown, 
was in entire agreement with the Governor that in any legislation as 
to land, no distinction should be made between "Coomassie and the rest 
of Ashanti". The concessions Ordinance should therefore be made operative 
in that Province. He approved of the instructions which Sir William 
Maxwell gave to the Resident at Kumasi four years earlier. It was stated 
that no concession of any land in any part of Ashanti, whether dated 
before or after 20 January^1896 (the date of the deposition of Prempeh) 
was to be recognised in any way by the Resident, but that for every conces­
sion to be valid, it should be sanctioned by the Governor. The instructions 
also warned all the Chiefs of Ashanti that the grants of any rights without
His decision that the Concessions Ordinance should apply in Ashanti 
was in sharp contrast with his earlier decision to exclude the appli­
cation of the Supreme Court Ordinance there. The question of juris­
diction in Ashanti was raised in a trial of the European Manager 
and two native assistants of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation 
on a charge of torturing persons in order to obtain evidence in 
connection with a robbery committed at the Obuasi mines. The Supreme 
Court ruled that it had jurisdiction in Ashanti and thus heard the 
cases. But Hodgson, by an Order in Council under Section 20 (a) 
of the Supreme Court Ordinance, excluded Ashanti from the jurisdiction 
of the Court. See Order in .'Council, 12 March 1900. A similar 
Order, 23 February 1900 had earlier excluded the Northern Territories 
from jurisdiction of the Court.
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the Governor's authority was not permissible. Every demand for concession
in Ashanti was to be filed in the Resident's office, and there enquired
into whether the chief concerned had in fact authority to transfer interest
in the property in question and whether he thoroughly understood the 
414
transaction.
In what could be seen as an unqualified approval of the basic premises
of Sir William Maxwell's policies of the past, Chamberlain approved the
above policies, saying:
". . . a s  under native rule no King or Chief had power to give away 
any of his tribal land or to enter into any agreement with foreigners 
without the consent of the paramount King, and as the British Government 
is now recognised by the Ashantis as standing in the place of the 
paramount King, the Ashanti Kings and Chiefs should not be allowed 
to grant concessions with the same freedom from control as those 
of the old Protectorate." 4^
For these reasons, Chamberlain agreed with Hodgson that it was very 
important that the procedure prescribed by Maxwell's rules should continue 
to be followed in Ashanti. From a legal point of view, he argued that 
those rules took their sanction only from the fact that the Governor 
would not recognise concessions obtained or rights acquired otherwise 
than in accordance with the rules, and without such recognition any conces­
sions or land rights in Ashanti would be unmarketable, and had no commercial 
value. He therefore authorised the Governor to provide a legal basis 
for the application of these rules. He advised Hodgson that as soon 
as an Order in Council had been passed authorising the Governor of the 
Gold Coast to legislate by proclamation for Ashanti, the rules prescribed 
on the lines of Sir William Maxwell's should be embodied in a legislative
proclamation applying the concession Ordinance to Ashanti making the
416
rules part of the laws of the Ashanti Protectorate.
Accepting the Secretary of State's advice, Hodgson made -the rules 
operative in Ashanti, subject to the provisions of the Concessions Ordinance. 
They were as follows:
" i. Any person desiring to obtain concession in Ashanti must 
in the first instance apply to the Governor through the
414
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Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast at Accra for permission 
to hold a prospecting licence.
ii. The Governor, if the application appears to him to be one 
which should be granted, will so acquaint the Resident at 
Coommassie and will also advise the applicant.
iii. The applicant must present his letter of advice to the Resident
at Kumasi who if he is unaware of any local objection to 
the application will issue a licence to prospect in the locality 
named by the applicant and will at the same time acquaint 
the Chief or Chiefs concerned and instruct them to give the 
necessary facilities.
iv. In the case of a licence to prospect for minerals within
the meaning of the Concession Ordinance the licence fee 
prescribed by the said Ordinance and in the case of a licence 
to prospect for timber, rubber or any other product of.the 
soil a licence fee of £10 must be paid by the applicant upon 
the issue of the licence for the payment of which he will 
be given a receipt.
v. A licence may be issued to different prospectors for the 
same locality.
vi. The holder of a prospector's licence may remove from the 
locality in which he has prospected a sufficient quantity 
of quartz or alluvial gold or of timber, rubber or other 
products of the soil to serve as specimens but he must declare 
them to the Resident and state the name or positions of the 
place or places from which they were taken.
vii. The holder of a prospecting licence may apply to the native
chief or chiefs concernhed for a concession of gold mining 
or other rights over land in the locality in which he was 
licenced to prospect and the native chief or chiefs concerned 
may grant the concession if they are willing to do so but 
no such application or grant may be made in respect of any 
land which has not been prospected under a licence granted 
by the Resident.
viii. Every application for a concession of mining or other rights
must be notified to the Resident who will instruct the native 
chief or chiefs concerned to appear before him and will ascertain 
from him in the presence of the applicant whether they sire 
willing to grant the concession applied for and are prepared 
to co-operate in the supply of labour and so forth. He will 
arrange with the applicant in the presence of the native 
chief or chiefs concerned, the sum which they should receive 
annually in consideration of the concession.
ix. The terms of the agreement made between the applicant and 
the native chief or chiefs concerned are to be embodied by 
the former in a deed of agreement which is to be signed by 
the interested parties in the presence of the Resident.
The deed is to contain full particulars of boundaries and 
a suitable plan showing the same.
x. No concession or licence or interest therein may be consigned
without the consent of the Governor.
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xi. Every notification of application for a concession which 
must be accompanied by the prospector's licence will upon 
receipt by the Resident be marked by him with the date and 
time of receipt and applications for concessions in the same 
locality will be considered and dealt with in the order of 
their receipt.
xii. Where there is any variance between the concession Ordinance 
and those provisions the latter shall prevail." ^18
It will be observed from these rules that apart from the consent 
of the Chief which was required by the prospective grantee and the recog­
nition of the right of the chiefs to make the grant, much of the authority 
in connection with concession grants was left for the Resident to exercise. 
Despite the declared right of the chief to make the grant, he could be 
prevented from doing so if the Resident refused to grant a prospecting 
licence to a prospective grantee of a concession. For under Rule 7, 
the acquisition of a prospecting licence from the Resident was made a 
condition precedent to the grant by the native chief of concession to 
an applicant. The Proclamation made the Concessions Ordinance specifically 
applicable in Ashanti subject to the foregoing rules. It stated:
"The provisions of the Ordinance of the Gold Coast Colony entitled 
the Concessions Ordinance 1900 shall subject to the provisions herein­
after contained apply to Ashanti and for the purposes of such Ordin­
ance, the concessions court established in the Gold Coast Colony 
under the provisions of the said Ordinance shall within the limits 
of Ashanti have jurisdiction in all matters relating to the aforesaid 
concessions and licences in the same manner and to the same extent 
as if Ashanti formed part of the Colony."
It should be remembered that by this time Ashanti was still recognised 
as separate from the Colony of the Gold Coast and there was no formal declara­
tion of sovereign rights over its territory. Yet the Colonial Government 
found it necessary to adopt policies and apply rules from which such 
rights could be implied. There was nothing in the customary land tenure 
of Ashanti to suggest that its problems were any different from those 
of the Colony, and for which reason these policies were to apply there 
but not in other parts of the territories controlled by the Government.
This return to the policies of Maxwell at this stage could be seen as 
the recognition of the wisdom of his policies and the misunderstanding 
of the problems by his critiques of the past among whom was the present 
Governor, Sir Frederick Hodgson.
In pursuit of the present policy, any doubts which might have existed
See the Draft Proclamation of July,1900, C.0. 879/57, No. 578*
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in the past about the right of the Colonial Government to exercise juris­
dictional, legislative or other rights in Ashanti was removed by 1901.
An Order in Council declared Ashanti a conquered territory. It provided:
"Whereas the territories in West Africa situate within the limits 
of this Order therefore known as Ashanti have been conquered by 
His Majesty's Forces and it has seemed expedient to His Majesty 
that the Said Territories should be annexed to and should henceforth 
form part of His Majesty's Dominions and that provision should be 
made for the peace, order and good government of the Said Territories 
. . . the Government of the Gold Coast Colony may on His Majesty's 
behalf, exercise all powers and jurisdiction of His Majesty within 
Ashanti and to that end may take or cause to be taken all such measures, 
and do or cause to be done all such things therein as are lawful 
sind as in the interest of His Majesty's Service he may think expedient, 
subject to such instructions as he may from time to time receive 
from His Majesty or through a Secretary of State."
Having formally established the legal basis for the exercise of
sovereign rights in Ashanti, legislation on land matters no longer faced
siny theoretical problems. This Order in Council was soon followed by
the Administration (Ashanti) Ordinance under which all lands premises
and buildings occupied as government property were declared absolutely
419
vested in the Crown. The 1901 Order in Council and subsequent legis­
lation clearly showed that Ashanti was a conquered Territory. It could 
therefore be inferred that Ashanti lands became Crown lands. Yet in 
matters relating to land tenure and administration, apart from the Northern 
Territories, all parts of the Gold Coast including Ashanti, were placed 
on the same footing. In spite of the fact that there were special rules 
to be observed by prospective acquirers of interest in land in Ashanti, 
rules which were made subject to the Concession Ordinance, the work of 
the concession courts came to overshadow the procedure under which conces­
sions were acquired in Ashanti.
This became much more evident when the Ashanti Concessions Ordinance 
420
was passed. A remarkable feature of the working of the system in
Ashanti was that greater official influence and participation in land 
transactions ensured that anomalies concerning transactions between 
Europeans and Ashanti Chiefs were not after 1901, as rampant as was the 
case in the mining areas of the South. In fact, such serious problems 
as arose from the Ensor agreement and the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation's
419
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acquisitions in Bekwai referred to earlier, occurred long before the 
introduction of the rules of procedure, and their enforcement as part 
of the Concessions Ordinance. Section 9 (2) of the Ashanti Concessions 
Ordinance, for example, ensured more diligent action on the part of appli­
cants for concessions and Section 10 provided that survey fees should 
be deposited within a six month period from the date of acquisition and 
the transaction would become void if such a fee was not paid.
The relative success of the Scheme established to administer land 
transactions in Ashanti with greater official controls within the scope 
of the Concessions Ordinance, underscores the fact that having regard 
to the ignorance of the people, such controls were necessary if many 
of the problems within the system were to be avoided. If it is realised 
the fact that such policies were just part of what Sir William Maxwell 
had proposed, then the wisdom of his policies would be appreciated the 
more. However, although it was later realised that his policies were 
sound, it was considered too late to resurrect them completely. Moreover, 
the policy of indirect rule pursued by the administration was inconsistent 
with Maxwell's policy and therefore a policy of via media was adopted. 
However, the full significance of Maxwell's policy will be recognised 
when we discuss and assess the implementation of his policy in full in 
the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast.
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CHAPTER VII
The Consolidation of Chiefly Authority and the 
Misuse of Stool Land Revenue
A. Introduction
It is considered necessary to summarise the main features of Colonial 
land policy so far discussed as an introduction to the examination of 
how such policies enhanced the power of traditional authorities and the 
way in which such powers were exercised in land matters.
It will be recalled that between 1891 and 1897, two unsuccessful 
attempts were made to vest the administration of unoccupied lands in 
the Crown. These measures failed because the chiefs and traditional 
elders, the native lawyers, the nascent middle class, the educated elite 
and the European firms who were accustomed to their profitable gamble 
in speculation and direct negotiation with the land authorities united 
to oppose these measures bitterly.- Under pressure from the Aborigines 
Rights Protection Society, representing the interest of the traditional 
Authorities and those of the lawyers, middle men and the merchant class, 
and with protests from presssure groups of influential business concerns 
such as the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, the West African Traders 
Association etc., the two legislative measures which would have had the 
effect of harmonising the land tenure systems were withdrawn.
The interest groups which stood to gain from the chaotic system 
then prevailing won the day. The Crown Lands Ordinance of 1894 and the 
Lands Bill of 1897, having been withdrawn, the Colonial Government saw 
a solution in the establishment of a Concessions Court whose main job 
would be to scrutinize the validity of land transactions in which concessions 
were granted.
As the examination of the Concessions Ordinance and its working 
in practice has shown, the Concessions Courts failed to provide a cure 
for the ills associated with land transactions conducted by the traditional 
authorities. It has been pointed out that frequently, agreements were 
ingeniously drawn to evade the intention of the Ordinance establishing 
the Concessions Courts, and on m.any occasions, concessions were approved 
in clear violation of the provisions of the Ordinance.
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In a summary, the Concessions Ordinance was unable to check the 
malpractices of the traditional authorities who were blinded by their 
lust for money, ignorance and temporary pleasures, such as drinks and 
tobacco which the firms used to lure them into signing away in a reckless 
manner, the rights of their subjects and the resources of the community.
So rapacious they were that no writer on the subject has ever found a 
kind word for them. Asante, for example, commenting on their role as 
people placed in positions of trust made the following accurate observations
"Thus, the mining boom of the late nineteenth century resulted in 
alienation of vast expanses of land. A new land market emerged 
and the prospect of ready cash began to erode the fabric of religious 
and other restraints upon the alienation of land. Traditional author­
ities showed themselves utterly insensitive to their fiduciary obli­
gations to the community. Not only were concessions granted indis­
criminately, often in flagrant violation of the vested usufructuary 
rights of their subjects, but also the proceeds were invariably shame­
lessly misappropriated by the chiefs and their elders. The dictates 
of the ancestral cult and the solemn incantations of the trusteeship 
idea appeared to have been forgotten in this obsession with ready 
cash." 421
This sad commentary on the control function of the chiefs and their 
Councillors during the period is reflective of their general pattern 
of land administration even in the present day of modern Ghana. Unfor­
tunately the colonial administration was not bold enough to relieve them 
of their land administration responsibilities on the grounds of their 
ignorance, incompetence and inefficiency.
B. Public Opinion
The problems associated with traditional authority land administration 
began to cause concern in official circles. The numerous correspondence 
on the matter and the ridiculous terms of concessions which appeared 
in British newspapers exposed the problem to the public and the Imperial 
Governments -
On many occasions, the matter was raised in the House of Commons.
In one such parliamentary question time, Mr. Cathcart Wason demanded 
to know from the Secretary of State for the Colonies if his attention 
was drawn to a statement in the prospectus of Boison Rubber Company that
S. K. B. Asante, Property Law and Social Goals in Ghana, 1844-1966, 
Accra, 1975, p. 35
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the Boison Lands comprising some 20 square miles in the Aowin district
of the Gold Coast had been granted under a lease to Mr. W. S. Rogers
for 79 years for £5 per annum; whether he would ask the Governor of the
Gold Coast if the lease had been submitted to him for approval and whether
any adequate protection was secured to the native whose lands had thus
422
been disposed of.
Similar questions were put to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
in the 4th July., 1910 session of Parliament. In the House of Commons 
that day, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald's questions reveal the nature of transactions 
the basis upon which companies were being floated in London, Liverpool 
and Manchester. It is apposite to quote in full Mr. Ramsay Macdonald's 
question which is reflective of the nature of these transactions. It 
is as follows:
"Has the Secretary of State for the Colonies any information that 
the Equitorial Rubber and Mahogany Concessions Limited claim to 
have acquired a Concession of over 50 square miles in the Axim 
District of the Gold Coast for a t&tal annual rent of £52; that 
the Panni Lands and Rubber Estates, Limited claim to have acquired 
from the chiefs of Axim a lease of 64,000 acres for 99 years at 
an annual rent of £21; that the Boinsu Rubber Company Limited claim 
to have acquired from the chief of Boinsu a lease of 20 square miles 
for 99 years at an annual rental of £5; and that Aywara Rubber 
and Cotton Estates claim to have acquired four leases aggregating 
30 square miles in the Axim District for an annual rent of £102; 
whether he could state if certificates of validity under the Concessions 
Ordinance have been granted to all or any of the claimants." 423
The honourable member went further to enquire whether the Concessions 
Ordinance was giving adequate protection to the natives. He questioned 
the validity of these sorts of agreement entered into by chiefs which 
had the effect of binding their subjects. Parliamentary debates of this 
kind began to mould public opinion against these practices.
Apart from raising the matter in Parliament, there were such persons 
as Mr. E. D. Morel, the Editor of the African Mail, who had become something 
like a specialist in West African affairs and who brought to the attention 
of the public through his African Mail the iniquities of land tenure 
based on chiefly administration. A West African correspondent, for instance , 
published in the African Mail the grant of certificates of validity to 
firms by the Concessions Courts in flagrant violation of the provisions 
of the Ordinance. Commenting on the profligacy of traditional authorities 
concerning improvident alienation of the communal lands for trifling
422
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amounts the editorial of the African Mail said:
"An improvident dealing with property means not only an inadequacy 
of consideration or rent, oppressive covenants against the grantor 
and conditions of fraudulent nature in favour of the lessee, but 
also extravagant use of and reckless waste of the rent received 
from such lessees and undue interference with the rights, possession, 
usufructury and customary of any persons a^^ffects them and their 
successors to the said property or land."
These sort of familiar expressions of dissatisfaction concerning
traditional authority resource management were not confined to improvident
alienation of mineral bearing lands only. Allied to the mining industry
was the extensive use of logs, not only for firewood but for props in
the underground workings. In their mining operations, the firms used
a lot of timber as fuel because it was cheaper to use such wood for charcoal
instead of coal which was relatively more expensive.
Apart from these uses of timber for mining purposes the export
425
trade in timber was flourishing since the eighteen nineties. Chiefs
were giving out licences to timber merchants who were felling timber indis­
criminately without regard for age or girth. This process, the West 
African Chamber of Mines informed the Colonial Office, if allowed to 
continue unchecked would lead to the destruction of the forests, posing 
a threat to the future supply of water resources and could affect the 
climate generally.
In response to these public reactions to the problems and the volumes 
of correspondence piling up on the matter, certain steps had to be taken 
to curtail the difficulties. On matters relating to forest administration, 
the advice of the Conservator of Forests in Southern Nigeria, Mr. H. N. 
Thompson, was sought. He was commissioned to make a four-month study 
of forestry problems in the Gold Coast Colony and to submit a report 
thereon. Following his report, a Forest Bill was introduced in 1907 
to supplement the ConcessionsOrdinance. When the Bill was introduced, 
as was the case of the Crown Lands Bills of 1894 and 1897, it was strongly 
opposed and rejected by the traditional authorities and the European
424
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The export of mahogany from the Gold Coast in 1899 amounted to 250 
tons, this increased to 750 tons in 1890, 4,300 tons in 1891, to 
7,000 tons in 1892 and between 1893 and 1894 about 11,000 tons were 
exported to Liverpool alone, apart from sundry shipments to Hamburg 
and London where the demand was high. Between 1902 and 1906 the 
value of timber export was £285,411. See CO 879/99, No. 972, p.5* 
426 Ibid. For a fuller discussion on the issues raised by the Forest 
Ordinance and the Thompson Report, see pp.307-318.
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firms. The African members of the Legislative Council argued that the
Forest Bill should deal with the export trade only. To prohibit the
cutting of "immature" trees which the native considered suitable for
erecting houses, making furniture etc. was not, in the opinion of Sarbah,
one of the African members of the Council and an opponent of the Bill,
427
a wanton destruction of forest.
As far as the traditional authorities were concerned, they became 
alarmed, because they saw in the proposed Forest Bill the resurrection
of the previous abortive Bills of the eighteen nineties. As in the past,
the duty fell on the innocent and poor subjects to contribute money for
the purpose of sending a delegation to London to appeal to His Majesty
to withdraw the Bill which sought to take away their "immemorial rights."
The truth of the matter, it must be admitted, is that, as far as 
the traditional authorities were concerned, they could not understand 
enactments relating to forest reserves implying prohibitions on cutting 
of certain trees which were naturally growing wild on the land. Before 
the export trade in timber began, the huge trees in the forest had no 
significant economic or market value. However, with the now thriving 
timber trade, they could earn money on an otherwise "useless" commodity 
for the felling of the large timber which was previously not being felled.
Under these circumstances, it was beyond the comprehension of the 
chiefs and Elders that restrictions in any form should be placed on cutting 
such wood. These measures were therefore regarded as an unnecessary 
encroachment upon their immemorial rights.
The main problem was the lack of public education and ignorance.
The people whose responsibility it would have been to explain these 
matters to the chiefs and educate them on the future consequences of 
uncontrolled destruction of the forests should have been the "educated" 
natives. Unhappily, however, it appeared that their interests coincided 
with those of the timber firms for which they acted as middle-men and 
thus allied themselves with the latter to oppose the introduction of 
a measure which would have introduced some discipline into the exploitation 
of the forest resources.
Unhappily, on such occasions, the Colonial Government, because of 
its policy of indirect rule, found itself unable to be firm enough to 
push its measures through. This was mainly because it had not itself 
formulated any clearly defined land policy as a framework within which
427
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it could direct its actions. Faced with such problems, it would postpone 
its solution by setting up a commission of enquiry. It was in response 
to the protests which were raised against the Forest Ordinance that Sir 
Conway Belfield was despatched in 1912 by the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies to investigate and report on land problems in the Colony 
and Ashanti.
C . The Belfield Report
In the midst of all these land problems, Belfield was sent to the
Gold Coast to investigate and report on the legislation governing the
alienation of Native lands in the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti with
428
some observations on the Forest Ordinance. His main task was to
make enquiries into the system of land administration prevailing in the
country. He was also to enquire into the question relating to the Forest
Ordinance the wording of which had caused fears in the minds of the community
As references in some detail will be made to this Report in the
treatment of forest law and policy, it will be sufficient for present purposes
to deal with those aspects of the Report which are relevant to the Land
Control functions of the traditional authorities. The final Report which
the Sole Commissioner submitted bears witness to the incompetence, greed
and the inefficiency of the chiefs and the subordination of the interest *.
of the community to those of their own. Referring to the land control
functions of the traditional authorities the Report said:
"When the resources of the country began to attract the attention 
of European miners and capitalists, and the chiefs were approached 
with requests that they would alienate land for industrial purposes, 
in respect of which substantial sums would be paid, they were quick 
to recognize the advantage which would accrue to themselves from 
the exercise of their right of disposition of Stool land. Their 
sense of obligation to the tribe in respect of their trusteeship 
was frequently obscured by their greed for money, and some cases 
have certainly occurred where the proceeds of Concessions granted 
have been misappropriated to their own personal use."
The Report noted that the only check on such misdeeds was the subjects' 
reactions to such acts by removing the chiefs from office. This remedy 
was however not frequently applied because of the subjects' unwillingness 
to press their leaders unduly. The ineffectiveness of this method of 
control over the chiefs' conduct must however be seen in terms of political
See H. Conway Belfield, Report on Legislation Governing the Alienation 
of Native Lands in the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti with some observa­
tions on the Forest Ordinance, 1912, Cd. 6278.
H. Conway Belfield, op.cit., Para 29.
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constraints on the subjects' assertion of rights in this respect.
To make a move for the deposition of a chief within the traditional 
political system is to chart a dangerous course. If the subject making 
the move does not command the necessary support, his action could be 
regarded as a conspiracy against the ruler, a rebellion, if nottreason 
itself. The political system thus to a large extent insulates the chief 
from the serious repercussions which would otherwise have flowed from 
his mismanagement of the community resources. The problem is made even 
more difficult by the fact that the King makers are themselves Elders.
To avert strong objections to their misdoings, the chiefs merely gave 
a certain proportion of the money to those whose words might carry weight 
in matters affecting their position and thus protect themselves. Concerning 
the mismanagement of stool land revenue, the Report makes the following 
points:
"Notwithstanding the communal principles on which the native system 
of land tenure was based, and the unquestionable right of every 
member of the tribe to participate in the use of the land and in 
the profits accruing from it, the result of the administration of 
the reserve land by chiefs and head men had been that they have 
by degrees arrogated to themselves the profits arising from such 
administration, until at the present time, the mass of the people 
derives from it no advantage other than privileges of cultivating 
alloted portions, and any revenue which is obtained from it is absorbed 
by their superiors." 430
These findings of fact give indications as to the violations by 
the chiefs, the fundamental principles upon which land tenure and administra­
tion is based. Under the customary law, there are clear rules prescribing 
the distribution of revenue accruing from the public lands of the community. 
Despite the fact that in Akan systems of law, some land is often attached 
to the stool the revenue of which is intended to be used for the maintenance 
of the chief, certain proportions of the public revenue is paid to the 
chief for the maintenance of the stool.
Hence, when stool property is sold for instance, the law provides 
that a third of that amount be paid to the chief as remuneration for 
his services. With such revenue he could acquire property to improve 
his pomp and pageantry. He could build houses and decorate his habitation 
and do all such things as would improve his comfort and dignity. He 
could at times use part of this money to liquidate debts incurred by
231
members of his tribe or family, although this is not obligatory.
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A third of the amount is paid to the stool. What this means is
that this proportion of the revenue goes into the community's account
as a general revenue of the polity. As found by Belfield, this proportion
going to the stool is for the liquidation of stool debt, the acquisition
432
of regal furniture ssid. to meet the cost of ceremonies. This must 
not however be regarded as being exhaustive of all the public services 
that such revenue should be applied for provision. The money is public
revenue and ought to be used in the public interest, having regard to
the priorities of the community's requirements. As Belfield himself 
observed:
"The inability of the mass of the people to share either directly 
or indirectly in the revenues accruing from concessions is an object­
ionable feature of the present system, and an improvement would
be effected if part of the money were set aside to be expended on
4 0 0
works for the public benefit of the community . . . "
It is clear from his comments that the uses to which such revenue 
may be put can include a wide range of services such as Schools, Hospitals, 
Water supplies, etc.
The remaining proportion of the revenue goes to the Elders or the 
Councillors with land administration responsibilities and other matters 
incidental to acts of government. These monies are receivable by the 
members of the management Committee, not because of their status as 
Councillors, but as remuneration for their land control functions. It 
will thus be seen that as far as the general population is concerned, 
the only way by which the ordinary citizen can benefit from the stool 
land revenue is by the enjoyment of such public services as may be provided 
with the public revenue. The enjoyment of the public revenue by the 
ordinary man being indirect, he is denied his rights of such beneficial 
enjoyment if the chiefs fail to provide the services.
Yet, as the evidence from the Report shows, it was those leaders 
of the community whqc. 1 received the largest amount of revenue from stool 
lands and who therefore should have improved the material conditions 
of their subjects who were the ones who lowered the standard of living 
of their subjects the most. The Report said:
"It appears to have been the case that the chiefs who have had the 
best opportunity of raising money by concessions are those who have 
plunged their stools most deeply into debt. Conversely in the 
mining districts the stools which are receiving substantial revenues 
are for the most part deeply involved."
Ibid., Para. 33.
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One of the principal reasons for this indebtedness was the extra­
vagance and the ostentatious living of the chiefs who were keen to display 
their wealth through the performance of expensive ceremonies, funerals 
and:, acquisition of costly regalia. Apart from this form of expenditure 
there was the major one described by the Belfield Report as "the joy 
of life for the native". It says:
"To the native mind litigation seems to be one of the joys of life, 
and differences with his neighbours regarding the ownership of land 
which has vastly appreciated in value has supplied the chief with 
the opportunity of indulging his weakness. The debts, which in 
some instances show a total of four figures in sterling, have been 
incurred in respect of what was of the most part unnecessary reference 
to the courts, with attendant expenses in the form of law costs 
and lawyers' fees." 435
The unfortunate aspect of this ignorant attitude of the chiefs is 
that, it was the ordinary citizen who suffered at the end of the day. 
Normally the land, the subject matter of litigation was stool land.
This meant that all subjects of the stool were obliged to make financial 
contribution towards the cost of litigation so as to save the land for 
the community. Also important was the fact that the dispute often involved 
one community and another. Community sentiments were thus frequently 
whipped up in order to make the subject a willing contributor to the 
funds for the purpose of fighting the legal suits.
In this way, the unreasonableness of the litigation and the primitve 
attitude of the chiefs to litigation as being one way of displaying their 
wealth and importance were obscured by community sentiments and emotions.
The practical results are however clear. Through the unreasonable conduct 
of leaders of the community, the community suffered in several ways.
granting vast areas of land away for paltry sums, the areas of land 
in respect of which the Subject could exercise his inherent right through 
the exploitation of vacant land was considerably reduced. Despite this, 
they derived no benefit from the proceeds of such grants to compensates 
for the loss of the community resource. What is more, as a result of the 
improvident dealings in land by the Elders, the Subject became liable 
to contribute money to pay for the expenses which the chief incurred 
through overlapping grants which ended up in litigation.
This incompetent and inefficient administration of lands and stool 
land revenue had an adverse effect on the standard of living of the
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Subjects and the economic life of the people. The misuse of the public 
revenue and the plunging of the stools into debt had prevented the accumu­
lation of capital for community development. Instead of exploiting the 
communal principles upon which land tenure is premised by organising 
production and channelling resources through the family milieu by co­
operative effort, litigation and uncertainty of title which had character­
ised traditional authority land administration had diverted attention 
from such progressive development plans to costly litigation and unnecessary 
self-indulgent extravangance and expenditure.
D. Belfield's Recommendations
The Sole Gommissioner, Sir H.Conway Belfield recommended a kind of 
official intervention which would curtail the subordination of the community 
interest to those of greedy and selfish land administrators who, for 
pecuniary gains whittled down the inherent rights of the Subjects. It 
was his opinion that such intervention should be organised in such a 
way as to assure the natives that their rights of alienation were not 
to be taken away but to supplement their knowledge in land administration 
with the expert knowledge of official administrators.
In effect, he suggested, a formula whereby the alienation of interests 
in land by those having the legal capacity to do so might be supervised 
by Government appointed officials whose responsibilities in this regard 
would be the demarcation of the boundaries of any land to which an interest
to be transferred related and making sure that the consideration therefore
^ * 436 was adequate.
It would appear that the Commissioner was influenced by his Asiatic 
experiences in this suggestion. He was accustomed to commercial treatment
of land in the Far East and seemed to him the only feasible way of action.
437
A policy of land control by the State seemed unfamiliar to him.
It was perhaps because of such influences that, even in the face of such 
demonstrable incompetence, inefficiency, corruption and maladministration, 
his recommendations fell short of suggesting the takeover by Government 
of the land control functions of the chiefs.
On the subject of disbursement of stool land revenue, the Commissioner 
recommended a scheme whereby the bulk of the money would be expended 
on works of permanent benefit to the community. His recommendation was
436
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that one-fourth of the proceeds from concession grants should be retained 
by District Commissioners of the traditional areas in which the grants 
were made. The amount so retained should be paid into a fund out of 
which monies could b e ’drawn to defray or contribute to costs of construc­
tional works of permanent utility in the stool area from which the revenue 
was derived.
The kind of services contemplated were the building of roads, schools,
waterways, river cleaning, wells, washing places and other elementary
forms of sanitation. It may be anticipated, the Commissioner observed,
’’that chiefs will raise objection to the arrangement, for most of them
really care nothing for the progress of their country and the welfare
of its inhabitants, and if left to themselves they will never study any
438
interest other than their own." This recognition on the part of
the Commissioner of the attitude of the chiefs should have made him realise 
the need to relieve the latter of their traditional burdens of land admi­
nistration and to vest such rights in the government to be exercised 
in the public interest. Possibly, the Commissioner was being realistic.
He was making these recommendations in the face of the formidable obstacles 
in the way of reforms implying governmental control. The alliance of 
tribal chiefs, native lawyers, ’’educated" elite, the nascent merchant 
class and European firms accustomed to their profitable gambles in direct 
negotiation with chiefs was a powerful force to reckon with in any land 
reform programme.
The Report however, urged the Colonial Administration to overrule 
firmly any objections which would certainly be raised with the justifica­
tion that the welfare of the community as a whole had not been advanced 
commensurate with the increase in revenues of the rulers of the tribe 
and that the Government had undertaken to protect the interest of all 
classes. The Government, it was recommended, should intimate that it 
was determined "to divert a portion of these revenues from the pockets 
of the chiefs to improve the condition of life of the people because
439
the rulers have so signally failed to perform that Idiity themselves."
As was rightly anticipated by the Commissioner, there was strong 
opposition from the chiefs. Not surprisingly, some of the lawyers who 
stood to gain from the chaotic system prevailing at the time, supported 
the chiefs in their opposition to the disbursement of stool land revenue 
in the manner proposed by the Report. Casely Hayford, one of the ardent
Belfield Report, Para. 110. Emphasis supplied.
439 Ibid.
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opponents of the Forest Bill, a lawyer and President of the A.R.P.S., 
argued that "the use of a certain proportion of the consideration money
440
for the benefit of the tribe as a whole had better be left to the chiefs."
Unhappily, the Colonial administration was not firm in this matter 
as recommended by Belfield, and once again as in 1897, the local opposition 
carried the day. This inactivity in this regard was much aided by the 
arrival of a new Governor in the Gold Coast in the person of Sir Hugh 
Clifford who believed firmly in the policy of indirect rule and the strength­
ening of the hands of traditional authorites to enable them te have firm 
control over their subjects. In the result, the recommendations of Belfield, 
which may be regarded as one which though not going far enough, could 
have gone a long way in solving some of the land administration problems 
of the Gold Coast, merely became part of the historical documents kept 
on the subject of land administration in the archives. The examination 
of the role played by the policy of indirect rule in achieving this result 
for the chiefs will be the immediate subject of discussion.
E . The Policy of Indirect Rule and the Enhancement of Chiefly Authority
Apart from the opposition from the chiefs and the educated natives, 
it was the policy of indirect rule more than anything else which enhanced 
the authority of the chiefs and proved a formidable obstacle in the way 
of land law reforms which might ensure equitable distribution of community 
resources in accordance with the communal principles inherent in the 
traditional schemes of tenure.
As indicated earlier, contrary to the recommendations of Belfield, 
the assumption of the Governorship of the Gold Coast by Sir Hugh Clifford 
saw the beginning of an era of consolidation of the power of chiefs and 
traditional authorities. It also marked the beginning of a kind of tacit 
alliance between the colonial administration and the chiefs for administra­
tion purposes.
The Governor was one who firmly believed in political and social 
controls through chiefs. Therefore, under his administration, he directed 
his attention to the strengthening of the power of the chiefs and prevented 
any land iref^orm. policies which might antagonise or incur the displeasure 
of the chiefs from being formulated or implemented. He thus not only 
failed to consider the implementation of any of the recommendations <?f
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Belfield, but he went further to write an apologia to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies in defence of a policy of non-interference in
441
the administration of stool lands.
The Governor, consistent with his policy of chiefly administration, 
approved a memorandum by C. H. Harper in which he suggested that as 
between the chiefs and the Government, it was better that the former 
managed stool revenue. The memorandum said:
"The choice is between the Government and the stool drawing the 
rents. If the stool is to prosper and to retain its hold on native 
sentiments it is necessary that it should retain its, interest in 
the land." 442
Hence, in 1917 when the issue arose as to whether or not the Government
or the chiefs should receive ground rents in respect of Koforidua Township,
the Governor approved of a recommendation that the Government should
not share in the revenue accruing from such ground rents. The reason
assigned for this decision by the Governor was that a claim by the government
of a proportion of the rent was likely to discourage initiative on the
part of chiefs of independent undertakings. What ought to be done, the
Governor thought, was to investigate how far the chiefs recognised their
443
obligation towards their subjects.
Needless to say, there was sufficient evidence, from official correspond­
ence, commissions of enquiry and from empirical evidence from which the 
Governor could have been informed of the chiefs' attitude towards their 
subjects in this regard. The concession anomalies and the misuse of 
stool land revenue which was a marked feature of land transactions could 
not have been unknown to the Governor in his four years stay in the Gold 
Coast, the time during which he was making this proposition. It is very 
doubtful indeed if His Excellency needed any further investigation before 
coming to the conclusion that the chiefs never recognised their obligations 
and responsibilities towards their subjects.
The Govern's Policy with respect to stool land administration had 
little to commend it. By ignoring the Belfield recommendations completely, 
and strengthening the hands of the traditional authorities in this regard,
See his memorandum on the Land Question, C096, No. 583, 26 December, 
1917.
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he had contributed in no small measure to encouraging the chiefs in their
maladministration and the perpetration of injustices which deprived the
ordinary subject of his right to benefit from revenues generated by the
natural resources of the community.
It was during this period that diamonds were discovered in Akim
Abuakwa in 1919 by the Geological Survey Department. Through the assistance
of the Government officials, the Omanhene, Ofori Atta, was able to negotiate
a relatively high rent, having regard to the kind of rents obtained by
chiefs for concessions in those days. Apart from the rent;, he was entitled
to 5% of the profits accruing from the diamonds obtained from the mining 
444
operations.
One would have thought that the subjects of Akim Abuakwa stool should
have derived substantial benefits from the exploitation of their natural
resources, yet it brought them stool debts. Apart from the over 70 square
miles of Eastern and Western Akim lands alienated, boundary disputes
and litigation concerning certain traditional rights robbed the stool
of its revenue. In what may be regarded as one of the most expensive,
longest and frivolous legal disputes in the history of land litigation
in Ghana, the Omanhene of Asamankese and that of Akim Abuakwa disputed
certain traditional rights concerning the alienation of stool lands.
The main issue was whether or not the former needed the permission
of the latter in order to make valid alienation of stool land under the
jurisdiction of the former. If this question be answered affirmatively,
then whether the latter was entitled to one third of the proceeds of 
445
such revenue.
Peter Greenhalgh, commenting on this case, writes:
"It was the development of the Akwatia Diamond Concessions and the 
Royalties paid that enable litigation to be pursued with such vigour 
as far as the House of Lords, and involved the employment of the 
best lawyers in the country, who were the main beneficiaries of 
the estimated £20 0 , 0 0 0 spent on the case." 446
Thus, in the face of continuing dissipation of the Community resources, 
endless litigation, and self-indulgence, the traditional authorities 
were aJItowed to have their way in matters concerning stool land administration 
and disbursement of revenues accruing therefrom. Gradually becoming 
powerful allies of the Colonial administration in matters relating to 
social controls, they became the untouchable human parasites on the 
Communities of which they were supposed to be representatives.
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F. Reaction of the Educated Natives
The growing rapprochement between the Colonial Administration and 
the traditional authorities within the context of the policy of indirect 
rule during the Governorship of Sir Hugh Clifford saw the beginning of 
a cleavage between the nascent middle class, the educated African elite 
and the lawyers on the one hand and the traditional authorities on the 
other. This new alliance was viewed as a threat to the power and influence 
of the former.
As we have seen earlier, in order to protect their economic interest, 
among other things, the former formed an alliance with the latter in 
order to oppose land reform measures which the Colonial Administration 
sought to introduce and which might prejudice such common interest.
However, with a vigorous pursuit of the policy of indirect rule in 
which the power of the chiefs was being enhanced, the Colonial Administra­
tion which in the past was inclined to curb their powers in respect of 
their land control functions, was now prepared to give the traditional 
authorities a large measure of latitude in this regard. It appeared 
therefore that the chiefs no longer need rely heavily on the educated 
native in order to maintain their position or retain their "immemorial 
rights.M
Instead, they quickly realised it was better and safer to lean on 
the government rather than on a less powerful educated class which had 
been the traditional opponents of the Colonial authorities. The latter 
also recognised that the chiefs could be powerful and useful allies not 
only against some of the opposition from the educated natives, but also 
in matters relating to maintaining law and order at little administrative 
costs.
It would seem that because the government was keen to cement the 
new relationship with the traditional Elders, until 1927, no serious 
attempt was made to introduce legislative measures for the proper control 
and regulation of stool land revenue. Such a law could have made provision 
for the establishment of treasuries, for instance, into which chiefs 
might be enjoined to deposit stool land revenue. Yet this was not done.
Under these circumstances, the chiefs and traditional land administra­
tors were left with the freedom to dispose of the proceeds of concessions 
and the revenue derived from the sale or leases of stool lands as they 
pleased. As Lord Hailey has pointed out, the only check on them was
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the discontent of those who had not shared in the proceeds.
One of the ways in which the power of the chiefs was enhanced was by
allowing them to have jurisdiction over certain matters. As early as
1883, Native Tribunals were established under the Native Jurisdiction
Ordinance empowering certain categories of chiefs to have jurisdiction
over all personal suits in which the debt, demand, or damage did not
448
exceed seven ounces of gold or £25 sterling. They could also have
jurisdiction over all suits relating to the ownership or possession of 
land held under native tenure and situate within the particular juris­
diction of the Tribunal. These Tribunals could even exercise jurisdiction 
over certain criminal matters with the prior approval of the Governor.
As Court fines were retained by the chiefs, the right to hold Native 
Tribunals became a valuable privilege and in the absence of any procedure 
that tribunals should be constituted by warrant or order, many petty tribunals
were established by minor chiefs who would not have been permitted this
449
right under the Ordinance at an earlier period.
The power of the chiefs began to alarm certain elements of the educated
natives. Indirect rule, as Lord Hailey points out, "was viewed by progressive
opinion in the Gold Coast as a retrograde system, which might transform
the "Constitutional" Gold Coast chief into autocrats, and would foster
a form of organisation in which educated commoners would neither command
450
influence nor find employment."
The members of the Aborigins Rights Protection Society which had 
previously been the champions of the traditional cause began to express 
views favouring a more direct administration through a Cadre of African 
officials. They wanted the Native Tribunals to be replaced by inferior 
Courts, subordinate to the Supreme Court. These pressures including 
the general disapprobation of the misuse of stool land revenue by the 
traditional Elders, general maladministration of stool property and mal­
administration of justice at the petty tribunals forced the government 
to take certain legislative measures for the regulation of stool land 
administration and the proceeds therefrom.
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(?. Statutory Control of Stool Land Revenue Administration
In response to public opinion with regard to the dissipation of 
stool land revenue by chiefs, certain enactments were introduced in 1927 
making provisions for the establishment of stool Treasuries. The Native 
Administration (Colony) Ordinance, for example, conferred power on every 
paramount chief of everyState, with the concurrence of the Divisional 
Chief, Chiefs, Linguists, Headmen, Elders and Councillors of State, 
to make bye-laws:
a. establishing and constituting stool treasuries;
b. specifying what stool revenues were to be paid into the stool 
treasury,';;
c. controlling and regulating expenditure from stool treasuries 
and revenue, and providing for such control and regulation and
451
d. providing for the matters incidental to the foregoing.
The Ordinance, however, did not make the establishment of such Treas­
uries mandatory. It merely conferred power on the persons mentioned 
in the Ordinance to establish such Treasuries without any compulsion 
on them to exercise the powers conferred. It is therefore not surprising 
that none of such treasuries were established by the chiefs out of their 
own volition. The use and administration of stool land revenue was 
thus left uncontrolled by the Ordinance. Revenue accruing from Court 
fines also continued to be shared by members of the native tribunals. 
Litigation had plunged many stools into debt. Since it was customary 
to meet such debts by special levies on the subjects, it was the ordinary 
man who suffered most under the traditional authority administration 
system.
i. The Native Administration (Treasuries) Ordinance
For the purpose of ameliorating the deteriorating situation in the
stool land administration and the misuse of its revenue, a new legislation,
452
the Native Administration (Treasuries) Ordinance, was passed. The
Ordinance provided that a State Council may establish a Treasury if required
453
in writing by the Provincial Commissioner to do so. Failure to do
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so within three months of being required, may cause the Governor to order
454
its establishment for the State concerned.
Any Treasury established under the Ordinance was to be managed by 
455
a Finance Board. If it was the Governor who established the Treasury
under the powers conferred on him under Section 5(2), then the appointment
456of the Finance Board became his responsibility. The Governor was 
given power under Section 6 of the Ordinance to direct the reconstitution 
of the Board if a previously constituted Board was not discharging its 
duties satisfactorily.
It may be observed"that here again, the Statutory provisions did 
not impose any obligation on the State Councils to establish treasuries.
For Section 3(1) of the Ordinance merely provided that the Councils 
"may" establish a treasury if required to do so by the Commissioner.
This implied that the State Councils could ignore the Order of the Provin­
cial Commissioner without infringing the provisions of the Ordinance. 
Although the Governor could order its establishment where a State Council 
failed to comply with an order within three months after being ordered 
to do so by the Commissioner, the former was also under no legal obligation 
to exercise the powers conferred on him by the Ordinance in this regard.
The only indirect compulsive element in the Ordinance was the Finance 
Board which the Provincial Commissioner might appoint under Section 4 
of the Ordinance in which case the State Council might be deprived of 
the opportunity of doing so by itself under the powers conferred on it 
by Section 5(3). It would appear that the colonial administration was 
pursuing a policy of leaving room for negotiation in a matter where a 
clear provision prescribing peremptory duties and responsibilities for 
the proper regulation, management and administration of stool land revenue 
would be regarded as desirable.
The reason for pursuing this kind of policy seemed to be that the 
Government had learnt from past experiences that any measure introduced 
with a view to streamlining the administration of stool land revenue 
would be met with resistance if an element of compulsion was detected
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in the policy. It was inexpedient to exert undue pressure on its traditional 
allies, particularly during the inter-war period when nationalist agitation 
by native politicians in its embryonic stage could be precipitated and 
triggered by policies, though desirable, which might be exploited to 
reunite the nationalist educated natives, and the traditional authorities. 
These factors might explain the cautious attitude to the legislative 
reforms being initiated to solve land problems which were endemic.
Nevertheless, there was one respect in which the Government was 
not prepared to allow the chiefs to have their way. In matters relating 
to the payment of Royalties, it was inexpedient to wait for the traditional 
authorities to establish treasuries and make regulation for their administra­
tion. It was thus provided under the 1939 Concessions Ordinance that
457
such monies should be paid to the Accountant General. This requirement
was peremptory, not permissive. Unlike in previous legislation concerning
the administration of stool land revenue where the duties imposed by
the Ordinances were permissive, the present Section provides:
"Any rent or other periodical sum payable under any certified Concession 
to any native shall be paid in the prescribed manner by the holder 
of such Concession to the Accountant-General and by the Accountant- 
General to such native, and such payment to the Accountant-General 
shall be a complete discharge to the person making the same." 458
It is noteworthy the fact that this provision merely sought, not 
necessarily to regulate the administration or the disbursement of the 
revenue, but to facilitate and ensure its payment to the native, usually 
the chief. In fact, what it did in effect was merely to relieve the 
traditional authorities of the burden of collecting such revenue by them­
selves. For this reason, the Accountant General was not given any direction 
under the Act as to how such monies received might be disbursed. Instead, 
he was required to pay the money, not to a treasury established by a 
State Council or a Native Authority, but to a native, the chief. The 
provision thus did nothing new either for the control or the administra­
tion of stool land revenue.
ii. The Native Administration Treasuries Regulation
In what may be seen as a further legislative measure designed to
457
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bring some order into stool land revenue administration, certain regulations
were made to supplement the main Ordinances dealing with the question.
The Native Administration Treasuries Regulation was one such subsidiary- 
459
legislation.
The Regulation indicates the sources of revenue for Native Authorities.
It says that it shall comprise:
Mi. All monies payable to the Native Authority or stool or to agents
or representatives of either in respect of rents, royalties,
profits or other revenue derived from lands the property of 
the Native Authority or stool. 4^0
ii. All profits derived from the cultivation of farms belonging 
to or under the control of the Native Authority or Stool."
The Regulation made imperative the payment of all revenue of the
462
Native Authority into the appropriate Treasury. It also provided
that the control and regulation of a Treasury should be vested in a Financial
Board which was to consist of five members including a Chairman and a
463
Treasurer. This Financial Board was to be responsible for keeping
an exact account of all revenues and expenditure supported by the necessary
464
vouchers m  connection therewith.
The remarkable feature of these regulations was that, it was a roundabout 
way of making mandatory what might be regarded as permissive. Although 
the main Ordinance, the Administration (Treasuries) Ordinance, did not 
make the establishment of the Treasuries obligatory, by making the payment 
of revenues due to the stool into the appropriate Treasury imperative, 
the receipt of that money became an impossibility unless a Treasury into 
which it could be paid was in existence. The Regulations thus made the 
establishment of the treasuries under the present Ordinance inescapable.
Also noticeable was the absence in both the main Ordinance and the 
Rules made thereunder any direction to the Finance Board how such revenue 
should be controlled, or disbursed. It indicated that it should be 
responsible for keeping exact account of all revenues and expenditure 
but how such monies should be received or paid into the treasury or expended
459
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was left undetermined. Thus apart from those monies which were required 
to be paid through the agency of the Accountant-General no machinery 
was provided for collecting revenue from all the sources indicated by 
the Regulations. Before commenting fully on some of its defects it may 
be convenient to direct attention to some related Ordinances dealing 
with the same problems.
iii. The Stool Property Protection Ordinance
The Stool Property Protection Ordinance was an Act made specifically 
465
applicable to Ashanti. As its title suggests it was intended to make
provision for the protection of stool property. It would appear to be
a belated attempt, for the first time in the history of governmental
control over stool land administration in the Gold Coast, to place some
limitation on the plenary dispositive rights of chiefs and their Councillors
in respect of stool lands in Ashanti.
Significantly, Section 3 of the Ordinance seemed to echo Governor
Maxwell's Notification of 10 October, 1895, in which he sought to make
the validity of concessions granted by native chiefs, subject to prior
4G6
approval by the Governor. The Section provides:
"3(1) It shall not be lawful without the consent in writing of 
the Chief Commissioner for any Native Authority or other person 
to alienate, pledge or mortgage any stool property and any instrument 
or transaction (whether in writing or not) which purports to effect 
any alienation pledge or mortgage in contravention of this section
shall be null and void provided that nothing in this section contained
shall apply:
(a) To any pledge or mortgage by any native in his personal 
capacity of any right vested in him (whether by writing 
or otherwise) in any form made upon stool land.
(b) To any concession within the meaning of the Concession 
Ordinance, 1939 whereby any right, interest or property 
or minerals, precious stones or timber is granted to a 
non-native".
These provisions were clearly aimed at controlling stool land aliena­
tion by chiefs. Although they did not purport to take away the right 
of chiefs and their Councillors or head of families and their principal 
members to alienate property under their management and control, the 
validity of the exercise of their rights in this respect was made subject
465 No. 22 of 1940.
466
This Government notification was published in the Gazette on 10 
September, 1895, as a prelude to the Abortive Lands Bill of 1897. 
See the Enclosure in Maxwell to Chamberlain, 11 October, 1895, . 
CO/96/261, No. 409.
231
to the prior approval of the Commissioner. The fact that the Ordinance 
was specifically designed to control the power of the chiefs with regard 
to the alienation of stool lands is evident from sub-section (a) of section 
3 which excluded, by implication, the subjects' right to deal with lands 
in their occupation from this restriction. Subjects could thus have 
the right to alienate their interests in land without the prior approval 
of the Commissioner.
In order to prevent a situation where stool land could be seized 
in execution at the suit of persons to whom chiefs or other persons might 
be indebted, Section 4 of the Ordinance provided that no stool property 
would be liable to be seized in execution at the suit of any person or 
should be sold in pursuance of any pledge or mortgage unless such property 
had been pledged with the consent of the Chief Commissioner. This restric­
tion was, however, made inapplicable to those cases in which the debt 
had been incurred or the property had been pledged or mortgaged before 
the date of the coming into effect of the Ordinance.
Similarly, no monies belonging to a Native Treasury were to be liable 
to be seized in execution at the suit of any person, save in the discharge
of a debt which had been approved under the Native Authority Treasury
1 467rules.
These provisions were subsequently supplemented by the relevant
468
sections of the Kumasi Lands Ordinance of 1943. Section 17 of that
Ordinance made provision for the proper administration of stool land 
revenue. It introduced modern accounting procedures into the revenue 
administration. In spite of the fact that it dealt with stool lands speci­
fically referred to under Section 4 of the Ordinance, and might therefore 
be held inapplicable to Ashanti or the Gold Coast in general, it provided 
a guide as to how future administration of stool lands,- its revenue and 
accounting procedures might be conducted. The Section provides:
"17. The Asantehene shall, through the Kumasi Native Treasury, 
collect all rents as they become due and all arrears of rent in 
respect of lands vested in him under the provisions of this Ordinance 
(excepting lands described in the Second Schedule) and for such 
purposes, he shall establish and maintain a proper Staff and books 
of account and render to the Government on or before the 30th day 
of September and 31st day of March in each year a proper statement 
of rents received in arrears together with cash statement thereon".
Ibid., Section 6.
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This provision was revolutionary. It made possible the inspection
by the public, the state of the finances of the community and went a
long way to make a serious inroad into the long established view that
neither a chief nor the head of a family can be sued to account under
470
the traditional law. For if the Asantehene is under legal obligation
to establish, maintain and render to the Government a proper statement 
of account, the existence of a rule which might insulate him from being 
sued to account would make nonsense of the provision itself. Unless 
of course, it could be argued that the rule which insulates the chief 
or the head of the family from accountability applies only to the rights 
of the stool - Subjects or members of the family to sue in this regard 
and not to the Government.
This Section of the Ordinance has as its underlying principles and 
justification, the recognition that stool lands sire public assets and 
resources the revenues of which ought to be properly accounted for.
Consistent with this view, Section 19 of the Ordinance provided that 
the Minister or any representative duly appointed by him for the purpose, 
should at any time during office hours have access to and the right to
inspect the rent ledgers, records and books of account kept by the Asantehene
in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance. He could also take 
such extracts therefrom as might be deemed expedient.
It will be noticed that this provision did not go far enough in 
making the accounts subject to the scrutiny of the Accountant-General.
Yet that possibility has not been excluded. For the minister could make 
the Accountant General his agent or "representative” if the need arose.
Both the stool property Protection Ordinance and the relevant provisions 
of the Kumasi Lands Ordinance could thus be seen as the best legislative 
efforts made by the government to bring some order into stool land and 
its revenue administration in conformity with the demands of social, 
economic .and political conditions of the inter-war period. Regrettably 
however, these Ordinances were made applicable to Ashanti only.
iv. The Native Authority Colony Ordinance
Consistent with the policy of the Colonial Administration of treating 
different regions of the country as if they were separate independent 
sovereign polities or federated states of the Gold Coast, the last two
See the leading case on the subject, Abude v Onano (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 
102,
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Ordinances discussed above were made applicable to Ashanti only.
By the nineteen thirties and the early forties many stools had been
plunged into debt mainly because of litigation and the mismanagement of
stool land revenue. This was greatly aided by the great depression of
the thirties which reflected in cocoa prices unfavourably and thus reducing
stool land revenue considerably. This period also saw the emergence
and proliferation of local money lenders who took advantage of the situation
471
and charged high rates of interest on loans. The problem of stool
indebtedness became so acute that the government had to appoint a committee
472
to investigate the causes of such indebtedness.
Even before the Report had been published, a need was felt to pass
an Ordinance some of the provisions of which should deal with stool land
revenue and its administration. This was done in 1944 when the Native
473
Authority (Colony) Ordinance was passed. Some of its provisions
drew heavily on the relevant provisions of the Kumasi Lands Ordinance
and the State Property Protection Ordinance both of which applied to
474
Ashanti only. Its provisions described as revolutionary, give indication 
as to the sources of revenue to Native Authorities. Section 32 of the 
Ordinance provides that the sources of revenue to Native Authorities 
include:
(a) all monies payable to the stool of a chief or to his agent 
or representative of the stool in respect of rents, tributes, 
Royalties, Profits or other revenue derived from lands, which 
are the property of such stool and
(b) all profits derived from the cultivation of farms in the occu-
pation of the stool of a chief.
As pointed out earlier, when discussing similar provisions under 
the Native Administration (Treasuries) Ordinance and the rules made there­
under, one of the principal defects in these provisions was the lack
of any machinery for the collection of the revenue from the sources indicated
471
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by the Ordinance. The latter identified the sources of revenue, but
as the Jackson Commission pointed out, it did not provide for a corresponding
liability to pay. MIt was merely a statement of the sources of revenue
alone, without any provision as to how they should become vested in the
476
Native Authorities”, the Commission observed.
By making all profits derived from farms made on stool lands a source 
of stool revenue, the Ordinance purported to be imposing a form of land 
tax or what may be termed a property tax on the subject occupant of the 
stool land including stranger cultivators of the land. In the case of 
the latter, this would amount to a restatement of an already existing 
obligation, but to the former this would have been an introduction of 
property tax which would affect their incomes if the law were to be enforced. 
This indeed could be very hard on the subjects of the stool. The sub­
ject, as we have seen, did not benefit directly from stool land revenue.
Nor did he benefit indirectly by way of the provision of social services 
with revenue derived from stool lands. It was customary for their leaders 
to misuse such funds for their personal comfort. In spite of this, when 
the stool was plunged into debt due to the ignorance, improvident and 
the maladministration of the chiefs, it was usual to levy special funds 
on these subjects so as to meet such debts. Under circumstances like 
these, it would appear unfair to make them liable to pay such tax. It 
is thus not surprising that the Jackson Report described the provision
as an encroachment upon the private rights of the stool occupant and
477
the stool subjects alike.
As might be expected, none of this sort of revenue was actually
collected. The sources of revenue thus remained the traditional ones
from rents and royalties paid by the commercial firms to the Accountant
General, who in turn paid such monies to the Native Authorities in compliance
478
with Section 35 of the Concessions Ordinance.
In consequence, by the mid nineteen forties there was still no com­
prehensive legislation affecting stool lands, their revenue, administration 
and management. Nothing was done by way of regularising the disbursement, 
control sind distribution of such funds in a manner justifying the communal 
character of the resources from which such revenue was derived.
Loc.cit. Para 418.
477
See Para. 418 of the Jackson Report.
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Legislation in this regard remained ad hoc, tailored to suit and 
solve particular problems at particular places or localities. The various 
polities or provinces comprising the Gold Coast were still being treated 
as if they were separate independent states. This is rather surprising 
because apart from the Northern Territories which were treated as being 
under a different system., land administration in almost all parts of 
the country were identical.
Differences did and still do exist at the present times. But the 
distinctions exist in particulars of detail only and are quite insignificant 
in so far as they relate to the problems under discussion. One would 
have thought therefore that a single comprehensive legislation for the 
whole country should have been considered with a view to harmonising 
the systems. A measure of the kind could have been aimed at providing 
a common solution to a common endemic land problem in a united country. 
Unhappily, it would appear that the Government did not direct its attention 
to this form of approach to the resolution of the problems.
Thus these hotchpotch of Ordinances discused above remained the 
main instruments of reform and amounted to mere stop-gap measures scratching 
the surface of the problems. They neither went far enough nor were they 
sufficiently comprehensive to tackle the problem at its roots. The tradi­
tional authorities meanwhile remained in full control of stool land revenue 
and were at liberty to dispose of such funds in the manner they were 
accustomed to do since the mining boom of the eighteen eighties.
During the post war period, the alliance between the traditional 
authorities and the Colonial Administration deepened the rift between 
the progressive elements of the educated natives and the chiefs. Therefore, 
unlike the late nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth 
century when the two groups united to mount protests against any land 
reform enactment which might prejudice their common economic and political 
interests, the educated native was -now prepared to support and even call 
for measures which could curtail the land control functions of the traditional 
authorities.
As was observed by the Jackson Report on Akim Abuakwa State, in
the late nineteen forties, the debates in the legislative assembly clearly
demonstrated that the chiefs and the traditional Elders would in the
future have to rest content with a much smaller share of stool land revenue
479
than they were accustomed to enjoy previously. The general disapprobation
The Jackson Report, Para. 431.
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of the land control functions of the traditional authorities and the 
manner in which they subordinated the interests of the community to those 
of their own found expression in the Coussey Committee Report. The
Committee directed its attention to these land administration problems.
Its final recommendations laid down the principles upon which subsequent 
enactments on the subject in the early fifties were based. Such Statutory 
Provisions will be the next subject of inquiry.
But before doing so, it is apposite to quote in full the relevant 
observations and Recommendations upon which such laws were basedi It 
says:
"206 The stools hold communal land in Trust for the people. In 
the past, all revenue and services in relation to land have gone
direct to the chiefs and it has been left to them and their councillors
to determine what proportion would be made over to their subjects.
In these days of rapid economic development with the consequent 
enhancement of the value of land, some regulation of the uses to 
which stool land revenues should be put is vital so as to ensure 
that the people have their due share in the form of social and other 
services."
The recognition of public character of stool lands and the desirability 
for clear stipulations as to how revenue derived from them should be 
utilised so as to "ensure that the people have their due share in the 
form of social services" is the basic principle underlying the committee’s 
recommendations. It thus recommends the following:
"207 We recommend therefore, that in each local authority area, 
by agreement with the traditional authority of the area, a fair 
proportion of the sum thus collected should be paid to the local 
authority. The actual proportions should be determined "in situ" 
and will depend on local circumstances and on the amounts involved.
The remainder of the money will remain the perquisites of the tradi-^g^ 
tional authority for the maintenance of the position of the chiefs."
v. The Local Government Ordinance
Local Government featured prominently in the move towards self government 
in the nineteen fifties. The Local Government Ordinance which was enacted
following the Recommendations of the Coussey Committee established District,
482
Urban and Local Councils. These statutory bodies took over many
of the functions which were traditionally the prerogatives of the chiefs.
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This was a Committee appointed between 1948-1949 on Constitutional 
Reform.
See Report of the Committee on Constitutional Reform 1949, H.M.S.O. 
Colonial No. 248. The paragraph is quoted from Paragraph 92 of 
the Jackson Report on Akim Abuakwa State.
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As earlier noted, the principles laid down in the Coussey Committee Recom­
mendations were substantially embodied in its provision.
Significantly, the relevant provisions of the Ordinance made the
management and administration of stool lands the responsibility of the
483
urban or local councils as the case may be for the areas concerned.
Although such administration was taken over by'these statutory bpdies, 
the Ordinance carefully provided that except specifically stipulated, 
nothing in the Statute should be deemed to affect the ownership of stool
i  ^ 484lands.
One major defect in previous legislation on stool land revenue admini­
stration was the lack of any provision directing how and by whom such 
revenue should be collected. This defect was evident in the Native Authority
(Colony) Ordinance, identifying the sources of revenue without an indication
485
as to how it might be collected. The present enactment is an attempt
to cure some of these defects. Section 74(1) provides that the revenues
from stool lands within the area of authority of an urban or local council
should be collected by such council and to be deposited in such special
fund or funds in the custody of the Accountant General in such manner
as the Minister may direct.
On the disbursement of such revenue, the present Ordinance does
not follow the path of previous statutes which remained silent on the
matter. It provides that such revenue shall be distributed between the
urban or local council as the case may be and the stool concerned. Such
distribution should be made according to such proportion as may from time
to time be agreed between the stool and the statutory body concerned.
During the interim before such proportion is agreed upon or settled, the
revenue shall be distributed in such proportion as may be specified in the
486
instrument relating to the Council concerned. In the case of any
diasgreement on the proportion in which the revenue shall be distributed, 
the matter may be referred to the Minister whose decision thereon shall
K 1 487be final.
In what may be seen as the resurrection of the 10 October, 1895 
Notification which it has been observed Section 3 of the Stool Land Protec­
tion Ordinance seemed to echo, Section 75(1) of the present Ordinance
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Ibid., S.73(1).
Ibid., S.72(2).
No. 21 of 1944, S.32.
Loc.cit., S.74(2).
Ibid., S.74(3). It may be noticed that these provisions merely 
put into statutory form the recommendations of the Coussey Committee 
to which reference was made earlier.
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significantly contains the following provisions:
"Any disposal of any interest or right in land which involves the 
payment of... any valuable consideration or which could by reason of 
it being to a person not entitled by customary law to the free use 
of land, involve the payment of any such consideration which is 
made:
(a) by a stool; or
(b) by any person who, by reason of being so entitled under 
customary law, has acquired possession of such land either
without payment of any consideration or in exchange for
a nominal consideration; 
shall be subject to the concurrence of the urban and local council, 
as the case may be, for the area concerned, and shall be of no effect 
unless and until such concurrence has been obtained in writing under 
the hand of the chairman or clerk of the Council.11
The above quote provision is clearly designed to enable the Councils 
to monitor land transactions in which the traditional authorities might 
be engaged. It will not only assist the Councils to become aware of 
the transactions but it will also help them know the consideration which
passed under the transaction so that the appropriate revenue could be
collected. The clerk or the Chairman of the Council who would normally 
be literate could refuse its consent to a transaction if there are such 
vitiating factors as inadequate consideration, or where the transaction 
is not regarded by him as being in the interest of the community.
Hence, although these provisions do not purport to take away the 
traditional rights of the chiefs and their Councillors to exercise their 
traditional rights of disposition of interest in stool lands, the exercise 
of such rights has been restricted in certain important respects. Section 
75 of the Ordinance is revolutionary, because for the first time, a principle 
which was rejected in the abortive land Bills of 1894 and 1897 has been 
embodied in traditional land administration in a statutory form. A signi­
ficant feature of this Ordinance is that, apart from the Northern Territories, 
it is am enactment applying to the whole of the country and which is 
intended to regulate amd control the management and administration of 
stool lands and its revenue by a statutory body, independent of traditional 
authorities.
In effect, the land control functions of the chiefs and their councillors
Emphasis supplied. It is interesting to note that a survey carried 
out on 80 sample villages by the Land Administration Research Centre 
between 1975-1976 revealed that less than 2% of all the stranger 
tenants interviewed were aware of a similar provision under S.8(1) 
of the Land Administration Act 1962 (Act 123).
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have been curbed, at least in theory. This was now possible because 
the Colonial Administration did not expect any strong opposition from 
the. majority of the educated natives. At the same time, the chiefs could 
not expect support from the latter if they were minded to launch a protest 
against these legislative measures.
Yet it must be admitted that even at this stage a lot remained to 
be done before an equitable distribution of the community resources could 
be assured. The steps taken to bring such ideals into fruition saw the 
introduction of further enactments to deal with the question and it is 
the discussion of such statutes that our efforts will be directed in 
due course.
vi. a. The State Councils Ordinances of 1952
The Local Government Ordinance of 1951 was a sequel to several Ordinances
some of the provisions of which dealt more specifically with the question
490
of stool land revenue administration. The principles upon which
such Ordinances were based recognised the communal basis of the enjoyment 
of rights in land. The provisions were intended to provide in concrete 
terms, the means by which just and fair proportions of the proceeds from 
the community resources can be applied to the benefit of the whole body 
politic of the traditional states from which such resources were to be 
found.
In order to examine how effective these legislative measures have 
been, we shall take a critical look at the way in which the new system
was operated in two traditional areas. The choice falls on the Kumasi
traditional area and the Akim Abuakwa State. The two areas have been 
chosen for several reasons. Firstly, they both appear to have the best 
organised Land Departments under the traditional system. Secondly, there 
are better records concerning their activities including Reports of Commis­
sions of Enquiry on their performance. Thirdly the present writer has
had the opportunity of seeing in person how the system operates in practice
at Kumasi. Finally, both traditional areas provide good examples of
It is significant to note that both Nana Ofori Atta II, President 
of Abuakwa State Council and Dr. J. B. Danquah, the Council's Legal 
Adviser were members of the Coussey Committee whose recommendations 
favoured these reforms.
See State Councils (Ashanti) Ordinance, No. 4 of 1952; State Councils 
(Northern Territories) Ordinance, No. 5 of 1952; State Councils 
(Colony and Southern Togoland) Ordinance, No. 8 of 1952.
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how selfish considerations tend to blur the vision of traditional 
rulers when matters relating to stool land revenue administration is 
called into question.
b . The Akim Abuakwa State
One of the remarkable features of the State Councils established 
under the Ordinances was that each Council was a statutory body having 
a small bureaucratic structure consisting of few literate clerks performing 
official duties. These few clerks and officials may not necessarily 
be elders or chiefs. The main operators of the system remained the same 
chiefs and elders against whose conduct in respect of land administration 
the Ordinances were directed.
For instance, the State Councils (Colony and Southern Togoland)
49
Ordinance prescribes the manner of regulating membership of State Councils.
Under its provisions the membership of the Akim Abuakwa State Council
was made to consist of Nana Ofori Atta, the Omanhene of Akim Abuakwa
as the President and some 62 chiefs and Councillors as members. It is
therefore not surprising that the activities of the Council were not
dissimilar from what the traditional authorities were accustomed to before
the creation of these institutions. The administration of the State
Councils was governed by the customary law.- One of their important functions
was stool land administration.
In discussing the performance of the Akim Abuakwa State Council
it will be worthwhile to note that before the coming into force of the
492
Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance, there were established in Akim 
Abuakwa, many subordinate stools in the hierarchy of the political struc­
ture. These stools were occupied by petty chiefs of varying ranks.
Each of such stool possessed certain rights in the land appurtenant to 
its stool. Part of the revenue derived from such lands, by reason of 
usage, went to the paramount stools. However, in matters concerning 
the distribution, management or control of such revenues, the paramount 
stool exercised very little control, its general jurisdictional right 
over the State as a whole notwithstanding. The bulk of the revenue derived
from such petty "stool lands" was thus enjoyed by the petty chiefs occupying 
493
such stools.
491
No. 8 of 1952, S.3.
492
No. A  of 1944.
493 See the Jackson Report, Para.84.
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It was such revenue that the Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance
494
identified as one of the sources of revenue to Native Authorities.
Even though that Ordinance did not provide the machinery for its collection, 
some of that revenue found its way into the coffers of the Native Authorities
/
at least, those paid through the agency of the Accountant General by
did.495
commercial firms in compliance with the Concessions Ordinance/
When the Local Government Ordinance came into force in 1952, the 
revenues from all stool.lands within the area of authority of each local 
council were collected by each council and deposited in the special funds 
in the custody of the Accountant General. The details of such land revenue 
as was collected in the Akim Abuakwa State had been kept and recorded 
in the Registers maintained by the officer in charge of the Lands Department 
of the Akim Abuakwa State.
It was a key register containing all the items set out in sub-registers 
kept at various centres of the traditional area. When the local councils 
took over the duty of revenue collection, these registers were handed
496
over to the local council but no receipt was obtained in respect of them.
The initial problem of auditing and rendering an accurate account thus 
became a problem.
Another problem faced during the transitional period was the disagree­
ment concerning the proportion of revenue that ought to be given to the 
local councils and the stools. According to Section 74(1) of the Local 
Government Ordinance, the responsibility of collecting stool revenues 
devolved on the urban or local councils. But the proportion in which 
such revenue was to be distributed between the stools and the councils 
concerned was left to be decided between the two bodies.
This provision presented some problems. In the early nineteen 
fifties the debates in the Legislative Assembly clearly indicated that 
the traditional authorities and chiefs would have to rest content with
497
a much smaller share of revenue than they were accustomed to enjoying.
But the chiefs still wanted a larger proportion of the revenue than the 
local councils were prepared to give them. As both the council and the 
stools could not agree on the right proportions in which the revenue 
should be distributed, the revenue remained un-utilised with the result
No. 21 of 1944, S.32.
(Cap. 136) 1951 Rev., S.35. According to the evidence at Para. 
86 of the Jackson Report, the Local Council succeeded to £37,000 
of such revenue.
See Para. 88 of the Jackson Report.
Ibid., Para 431.
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that the salaries of many elders and chiefs fell into arrears for several 
months. 498
Acting under Section 74(3) of the Ordinance which confers power
on the Minister to determine the issue, the Regional Officer of the Eastern
Province, under the direction of the Minister, devised a formula whereby
the Akim Abuakwa State Council would receive 50% of the gross total of
stool land revenue in the state each year, and local councils the remaining
50%.. If in any particular year the 50% of the revenue should be less
than £45,000, then the local council would be required to make a grant
to the state council by the sum of which 50% of the revenue falls short 
499
of £45,000.
C. Problem of Revenue Collection
Between 1944 and 1948, there were a lot of arrears in respect of 
concessions and other rents. This was a period when the traditional 
authorities were directly responsible for the collection of stool land 
revenue. Between 1951 and 1952 when the local councils took over that 
responsibility much of these arrears were brought to account. Apart 
from the revenue which was collected through the agency of the Accountant 
General, comparatively little revenue was collected by the Native Authority 
revenue collectors. The average amount collected each year was within 
the range of £30,000. 500
This meant that before the creation of the local councils, the tradi­
tional authorities could not have been expecting an annual revenue exceeding 
£30,000 per annum. Yet under the present system, not less than £45,000 
was to be made available to them each year, at a time when their functions 
have been considerably reduced as a result of the local councils having 
taken over most of their responsibilities.
Thus if the local councils were to justify their existence in terms 
of the provision of social services, the purpose for which they were 
brought into being by the Ordinances, then much more revenue would be 
required than the Native Authority collectors had been collecting previously. 
While the Native Authority collectors had on the average, collected not 
more than £7,000 per annum, the local councils were expected to collect 
over £60,000 each year after deducting £30,000 paid through the Accountant
499
Ibid., Para. 387.
Ibid., Para. 432. This amount included those collected through
the Accountant General. The average amount collected by Native
Authority Revenue collectors was £7,000 a year. See Para. 433.
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General directly.
What made the task of the local councils in respect of revenue 
collection difficult was that, like Section 32(1) of the 1944 Native 
Authority (Colony) Ordinance which indicated that occupants and developers 
of stool land were to be taxed but providing no corresponding provision 
imposing an obligation to pay such tax, Section 74 of the Local Government 
Ordinance in a similar manner identified rents and profits accruing from 
the occupation and cultivation of stool lands, as being the source of 
revenue without making such developers liable to pay under the Ordinance.
Another difficulty was that stranger occupiers had contractual obli­
gations towards their landlords, the stools. There was no direct or 
indirect contractual relationship between the local council and the stranger 
tenant or the stool subject cultivator of stool land. In the agreement 
between the tenant and the stool, the former's obligation was to pay 
rent to the latter. One way of solving the problem would have been for 
the stools to pay such monies to the local council, but there was no 
statutory provision imposing an obligation on the stools to pay such 
monies to the local council.
Yet it was estimated that provided all tenants paid rent to the 
local council and disregard their contractual obligations towards the
stools, a sum of £90,000 could be collected from the land situated in
501
the local council areas of Akim Abuakwa. Notwithstanding these diffi­
culties the records indicate that the collection of such revenue by Local 
Council officials was far more efficiently done than the Native Authority 
collectors with the result that such revenue increased considerably.
Certain paragraphs of the Jackson Report make this clear. It says:
"315 Following the recommendation of the Coussey Committee in 1949 
the estimated Revenue jumped from £34,000 to £44,000 whilst in the 
year before the date when this revenue would become apportionable 
between the local councils and traditional authorities the actual 
collection is observed to have increased by nearly one hundred per 
cent, i.e. from £34,328 in 1948-49 to £67,879 in 1951-52, during 
the latter part of which year the duty of collection fell on the 
shoulders of the local councils."
It is evident from the above quoted passage that the collection 
of stool land revenue through the agency of local councils greatly increased 
the revenue of the State Councils. Yet when it came to the utilisation
501 Ibid., Para. 392.
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of such revenue, it was attended with difficulties. The administration 
of such funds were characterised by the inefficiency and corruption which 
have over the years been a marked feature of chiefly administration of 
resources.
For example, when the Akim Abuakwa State Council was established,
the council employed a treasury staff of which one Mr. Ofori Ware was
the treasurer. A finance committee was appointed within the meaning
502
of Section 22(1) of the Ordinance to manage the revenue. The Adontenhene
Nana Kwabena Kena II was the chairman of this committee. It would appear
that the treasurer of the finance committee was also a treasurer of a
political party. Under the influence of the Paramount chief and his
council, the treasurer diverted part of the revenue of the State Council
to other sources. Some of the revenue found its way into the funds of
the political party of which Mr. Ofori was the treasurer; with the result
that many of the subordinate chiefs, particularly those who did not support
the political party of the Paramount chief’s choice remained unpaid for
more than six months. 503
It was not only the misuse of funds or improper accounting which
marked the administration of the revenue. The traditional authorities,
through the exercise of their power to determine their own salaries,
indirectly absorbed all the funds for their personal use by salary increases.
As was justifiably noted by the Jackson Report, with the increase in
stool land revenue, through the efficient collection of such revenue
by local councils, there was no reason why with the exercise of ordinary
prudence, the requirements of the traditional authorities should not
have been met. The Report continued:
"But they were not prudent. Whilst their expenditure upon general
administration costs fell far below the estimates of their require­
ments recommended by the Chief Regional Officer in 1953, i.e. £21,360. 
the cost of the salaries of the traditional authorities were progressively 
increased in the estimates for 1954-55, 1955-56 and 1956-57, when 
they had an increase from a sum of £21,643 (Chief Regional Officer's-£ 
figures) in 1952-53 to a sum of £55,077, an increase of more than 150 
per cent, the salary of Nana Ofori Atta II having advanced from
502
No. 8 of 1952.
503 See Para. 159 of the Jackson Report. The Paramount Chief and most of 
his councillors supported the National Liberation Movement, the 
(N.L.M.) which had a terrorist wing known as Action Troopers. The 
troopers were in the habit fo beating opponents, destroying their 
crops and property. Some of the Revenue was set aside for the defence 
of any such troopers arrested in connection with such terrorist
acts.
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£1,500 per annum to £3,000 per annum at a time when it will be re­
membered, his official responsibilities were far less than they 
were during the period of the native authorities".
The above quoted paragraph, once again underlines self interest 
as the guiding principle, in the majority of the cases, for traditional 
authorities when questions relating to the administration and management 
of community resources are called into question. It is significant to 
note the way in which stool land revenue increased even under difficult 
circumstances during the period when local councils, divorced and independent 
of traditional authority influence, undertook the duty of revenue collection. 
Also important is the fact that no general allegation of corruption, 
ignorance, inefficiency, incompetence and discrimination has been levelled 
against the local councils during the time when they took over these 
responsibilities.
These factors must be borne in mind when considering suggestions 
that state agencies, such as district councils, town and country planning, 
survey, forestry and land departments should take over completely, the 
land administration responsibilities of the chiefs and their councillors.
For allegations of possible corruption by state officials and abuse of 
power would seem to be the strongest points against any such suggestion.
Such allegations might be very attractive in systems where corruption 
on the part of such officials is generally assumed. However, a comparative 
study of the performance of state agency and traditional authority land 
administration will reveal that a great deal of the corruption is to 
be found in the traditional system rather than in the state agency admini­
stration.
It is difficult to find any state agency whose administration could
justifiably be described as "one of salary inflation at the expense of
505
administrative requirements". These considerations lead us to the
discussion, and the examination of the traditional authorities' performance 
under the Asanteman and the Kumasi State Councils during the same period.
I I .  The Kumasi State and the Asanteman Councils
It will be recalled that attempts to bring an order into the administra­
tion of stool lands and its revenue in Ashanti by means of legislation
504 ,
Ibid., Para. 330.
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Ibid., Para. 339.
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antedates the Local and Municipal Councils Ordinances which followed
the Coussey Committee Recommendations of 1949. Apart from the Stool
506
Property Protection Ordinance which was made specifically applicable
507
to Ashanti, the 1943 Kumasi Lands Ordinance made provision for the 
proper administration of stool land revenue and devised a machinery of 
an accounting procedure on modern lines.
As indicated earlier, Section 17 of the 1943 Ordinance enjoins the 
Asantehene, through the Kumasi Native Treasury, to collect all rents 
as they became due and all arrears of rent in respect of lands vested 
in him under the provisions of the Ordinance. The Section makes man­
datory, the establishment and the maintenance of a proper staff and books 
of account by the Asantehene through the Kumasi Native Treasury. It 
is imperative under the Ordinance for accounts to be rendered to the 
Government on or before the 30th day of September and 31st day of March 
in each year.
When, the Kumasi State and the Asanteman Councils were brought into 
being by the State Councils (Ashanti) Ordinance in 1952, the relevant 
provisions relating to stool land revenue administration did not make 
any alteration in the law as it stood in 1943 in this respect. What 
the new Ordinance does is to move a step forward by providing a more 
elaborate machinery for the proper adminstration of stool land accounts. 
Financial control is regulated by Section 36 of the Ordinance.
The statue makes it imperative for every state council to keep account
5C
of all revenue and expenditure in such form as the Governor may prescribe.
The account is made subject to inspection and audit at such time and
509
by such persons as the Governor may from time to time direct. In 
compliance with Section 36, regulations were made in 1954 prescribing 
the accounting procedure.
Section 3 of the Regulation provides that each state council shall:
a. keep a cash book in which all items of revenue and expenditure 
shall be recorded; and
b. issue a counterfoil receipt of each item of expenditure incurred;
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No. 22 of 1940.
507
(Cap. 145).
508 No. 4 of 1952. S.36(1).
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Ibid., S.36(2).
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State Councils Ashanti Ordinance No. 4 of 1952 Regulation, (L.N.209 
of 1954).
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By Section 4 of the Regulations,^ each state council is under an obli­
gation to prepare:
a. a statement of revenue and expenditure, and
511
b. a statement of assets and liabilities.
The main sources of revenue for the Kumasi State Council is derived 
from rents in respect of Kumasi lands, which rents are collected under 
the authority of Section 17 of the Kumasi Lands Ordinance of 1943. As 
successor of the Kumasi Native Authority Treasury, the responsbility 
of collecting such revenue and the administration of these lands on behalf 
of the Asantehene devolved on the Kumasi State Council.
It is interesting to observe the introduction into the traditional 
schema of stool lands and its revenue administration, complex modern 
accounting procedures. These machineries devised under the Ordinances 
for the administration of the community resources were devoid of traditional 
superstitions, beliefs and the cult of ancestor worship that often charact­
erized land transactions in the past.
Also noteworthy is the introduction into the stool land and revenue 
administration system a scheme whereby literate officials could carry 
out, through modern bureaucratic processes, functions which were hitherto 
the preserves of traditional authorities. If the collection of rents, 
the administration of the funds, their disbursement and the use to which 
they may be pi^ t is determined by officials who are to be guided in their 
action by statutory provisions, then one of the key roles which traditional 
authorities have hitherto played in land administration matters has been 
taken away from them. Their land control functions are thus limited 
to the rights of land allocation to subjects in areas where the exercise 
of such rights may be necessary; and the alienation of stool lands to 
strangers the validity of which is made subject to the concurrence of 
the local or urban councils established under the Local Government Ordinance.
Section 4 of the State Councils (Colony and Southern Togoland) (Accounts) 
Regulations 1954 (L.N. 208 1954) had a subsection, 4(2) which provides 
that such statement of account shall be opened to inspection by 
the public. For some unexplained reason, this sub-section was omitted 
in the Regulations applicable to Ashanti. It would appear however 
that this omission was not deliberate. It was an oversight which 
may not prevent such public inspection of the accounts in Ashanti.
812
(Cap. 64) 1951 Rev.
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i . The Asantehene * s Lands Department
The Asantehene has a land department which is also a part and department 
of the Kumasi State Council. In the day to day administration of the 
department, the officials have continually been under the influence of 
traditional authorities. As a result, the inefficiency, maladministration 
and the dissipation of community resources which are usually a marked 
feature of chiefly administration became also a characteristic of the 
department1s operations.
It would appear that when the department was established in 1943 
under the Kumasi Lands Ordinance, the Lands Department of the National 
Government was of assistance to it for some time. It seems that such 
assistance did not continue for long in spite of the fact that in 1947 
the Department took over the work of suburban land administration and 
dealt with all matters pertaining to land within the Kumasi Divison.
Branches of agriculture and forestry were also attached to the office.
It took over the duty of granting concessions of mining and timber.
A Survey Branch was opened and the post of Assistant Lands Officer was 
created.
The duties entailed by these responsibilities as will be noticed, 
required for their efficient execution an adequate staff consisting of 
qualified surveyors, draughtsmen, land officers, cartographers, valuers, 
legal officers and administrative staffs of clerks, accounting clerks 
and book-keepers. In spite of this, since its inception in 1943, the 
only officials appointed to the department were two typists, one cashier, 
a draughtsman, one bailiff and a messenger.
Despite the mandatory provisions of Section 17 of the Kumasi Lands
Ordinance which requires that sin adequate staff and proper books of account
be maintained, the Kumasi State Council which has since taken over the
control of the department had not deemed it wise to increase the staff
commensurate with the increasing volume of work. The truth of the matter
is that the Council was not keen on exercising any control over or super-
513
vising the department. It did not realise the need to employ competent 
staff with the necessary qualification to cope with the additional work 
and skills required in the management of the department.
As a result, the department was incompetently run with a degree
As of August 1977, no additional staff has been employed.
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of laxity bordering on negligence. Such was the general allegation of 
corruption and maladministration levelled against the department that
514
a Commission of Inquiry had to be set up to investigate its activities.
Some of the main complaints about the running of the department were 
that there was discrimination, on political grounds in the allocation 
of plots. It was alleged that the department was negligently and ineffi­
ciently managed, and that the statutory duties of rendering proper accounts 
and maintaining an adequate staff were being breached.
The terms of reference for the Commission appointed to investigate 
these allegations therefore were:
a. to investigate to see if there had been an abuse of power by
the Kumasi State Council or the Asanteman Council;
b. to enquire whether stool property has been dealt with improperly
by the said Council or by any of their officials purporting
to act on their behalf and
c. to investigate any financial transactions which have been entered
into directly or indirectly between the said Council and any 
political party or parties.
Obviously, the number of staff referred to above cannot be said 
to be in conformity with the requirements of the law that an adequate
staff be maintained. Having regard to the volume of work involved and
the expertise required to carry out the responsibilities of the department 
efficiently, a cashier, a bailiff, two typists and a messenger as constitut­
ing the only staff of the department makes nonsense of the requirement 
of maintenance of an adequate staff.
Notwithstanding the lack of an adequate staff, since its establishment 
in 1943 and until the time of the Commission of Enquiry in 1958, no entries
of rents received were ever made into the books of account. This shows
that there was no record of stool land revenue received in respect of 
rents for a period of fifteen years. This was in direct breach of Section 
17 of the Kumasi Lands Ordinance which required the recording of such 
receipts into the books of account. Neither was any account ever rendered
to the government twice in every year as the Ordinance provided.
The cashier admitted before the Commission that he had never made 
an entry into the books of account since he joined the department in 
1943 and justified his action on the grounds that he thought he was doing
See the Report of a Commission appointed to enquire into the affairs 
of the Kumasi State Council and the Asanteman Council, Accra, 1958; 
Chairman, Justice Sarkodee-Addo.
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the right thing because that was the procedure he followed since joining 
515
the department.
Thus contrary to the provision of the State Council's (Ashanti) 
Ordinance and the rules made thereunder in 1954 and the relevant sections 
of the Kumasi Land Ordinance of 1943 which required the rendering of 
proper accounts, the staff of the State Council ignored these statutory 
obligations. Under such circumstances the traditional authorities were 
free to take funds and dispose of them as they pleased. As there was 
no record of accounts there was no way anyone could audit them.
Accordingly, although the chiefs were not collecting and administering
the revenue directly, they had control over the funds. In those cases
where there was a lump sum in bank accounts, they were able to divert
all or part of it to be applied for purposes other than those for which
they were intended. For example, in one of their Council meetings in
1954, the majority of the chiefs passed a resolution in which they agreed,
and in fact, withdrew an amount of £19,000 from the stool funds to be
516
used to finance a political party to which they gave their support.
In a Report of a Commission of Enquiry, the following finding of 
facts was made about the running of the department: 
i. want of efficient supervision over staff;
ii. the absence of well constituted land allocation committee 
to ensure a fair and equitable distribution of plots;
iii. undue and needless latitude in the collection of arrears of 
rents resulting in considerable loss of revenue since 1943;
iv. non compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Kumasi 
Lands Ordinance;
v. general maladministration in all sections of the department.
The Government in accepting the Report noted in its White Paper 
thereto that the Asantehene's Lands Department had all along dealt not 
only with the collection of rents in respect of the Kumasi Lands but 
with various mining and timber concessions in other parts of the Kumasi 
District from which rents were collected. As a result the name of the 
Asantehene has been involved in a great number of commercial transactions 
for which he has had no responsibility. The White Paper said:
See page 11 of the Report.
See the Minutes and books of Kumasi State Council, 11 October, 1954.
53 chiefs had sworn the great oath of Ashanti to give their support 
to the N.L.M.
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"The Government consider that it is derogatory of the position of 
the Asantehene and of theGolden Stool that they should be involved 
in the day to day dealings of the Asantehene's Lands Department, 
particularly when, as the evidence before the Commission showed, 
many of these dealings have been of most unsavory nature".
The manner in which the Kusasi State Council and the Akim Abuakwa 
State Council performed their duties relating to stool lands and its 
revenue administration under the reform Ordinances is illustrative of 
the general attitude of the traditional authorities to land administration 
under the indigenous system. The failure of the institutional arrangements 
provided by the reform Ordinances to have any impact on their attitude 
and performance highlights the fact that legislation in itself cannot 
be a panacea for these problems.
The main problems that stand out from the discussion so far appear 
to be the lack of probity on the part of chiefs and their councillors, 
their ignorance, self-interest, inefficiency and above all, lack of expert­
ise and the skills necessary to cope with land control responsibilities 
attendant upon contemporary economic changes in society. It is submitted 
that the best way of solving these problems is to relieve them completely 
of their traditional duties of community land management; alternatively 
they should be given that kind of education which can equip them with 
the necessary skills required to cope with modern techniques of land 
administration.
I . Comments
*
were -
The legislative measures discussed above/introduced, among other 
things, to help the chiefs draw on the expertise of competent officials 
and the skills of trained personnel. But as the evidence has shown in 
the case of the Akim Abuakwa, the Kumasi and Asanteman Councils, the 
chiefs were only interested in the collection of revenue through the 
agency of the new bodies created by the Statutes. They were neither 
prepared to spend the money which was necessary to employ skilled and 
competent staff, nor interested in learning or acquiring the expertise 
necessary for a modern system of land administration. Their roles in 
the workings of the institutional arrangement statutorily devised for 
the administration of stool land and its revenue were rather obstructive 
and retrogressive.
See paragraph 6 of the White Paper on the Report.
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Their cupidity and ignorance had always obscured their sense of 
judgment and made them shirk their responsibilities towards the communities 
they were supposed to represent. The way in which the chiefs in Akim- 
Abuakwa indirectly drained the revenue of the State Council treasury 
through such unusual progressive salary increases, the case of the Kumasi 
State and Asanteman Councils, where for fifteen years, in the teeth of
the law, no record of rents received in respect of Kumasi stool lands
was kept, and the case of the £19,000 improperly diverted to other sources,
all make the story sin unhappy one.
All these events happened because the chiefs have been treated for 
all these years as if their land control functions were indispensable.
Indeed, it will be observed that under the local government Ordinance, 
where the local councils took over the responsibility of revenue collection 
and the sanctioning of land grants, the chiefs had virtually no practical 
role to play in land administration other than the receipt of the monies 
allocated to them by the local councils. In the Northern Territories 
where by reason of state agency administration, no chiefs are directly 
involved in land administration, one does not encounter the kind of problems 
just discussed.
In fact, in communities where the chief plays no role in land admini­
stration no problems of this magnitude are observable. Through self-indulgence, 
improvident alienation of the community resources for paltry sums, dissi­
pation of stool revenue and costly litigations which were in themselves 
brought about by indeligent dealings with property, the chiefs incur 
debts for which their communities become responsible. The ordinary subject 
becomes liable to pay such debt through the imposition of special levies 
on them. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the chiefs 
can be seen to be serving their communities and not the communities on
which they have become human parasites serving them.
the
Once it is borne in mind that the lands/management and administration 
of which they are responsible are communal assets to which no one person 
including the traditional authorities themselves has a greater claim 
other than through the exertion of effort in the creation of individual 
wealth on the land, then the injustice of the chiefs' conduct in respect 
of these resources can be appreciated.
It is submitted that a lasting solution lies in a national land 
policy designed and formulated to harmonise the whole land tenure system 
under the administration of State agencies on the same footing as the 
Northern Territories where the continuation of Colonial policy in this
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regard has steered these regions clear of such land problems. There 
seems no reason why if that system works in one part of the country it 
cannot be made to work in another. The key obstacle to such reform 
would be the traditional authorities and some few interest groups whose 
selfish interests ought not to be made to override those of the majority 
in the country.
It will be observed that if the Land Bills of the late nineteenth 
century had been pushed through and land administration were organised 
on the same principles governing their administration in the Northern 
Territories of the Gold Coast and Northern Nigeria, the sort of problems 
which have bedevilled the systems in Southern Ghana could have been avoided.
There is no doubt that the recognition of inter tribal boundaries 
between the traditional states sh»« the basis of boundary disputes. If 
these boundaries are eliminated, the beneficial enjoyment of rights in 
land can be premised on Ghanaian citizenship instead of individual community 
membership, and one of the main sources of litigation will be removed.
In order to advance and buttress the views expressed here further, 
attention will be focussed in the next chapter on land administration 
in the Northern Territories in the past and the present. The way in 
which the principles of the abortive Public Lands Bill of Sir William 
Maxwell has been applied in the North with a relative degree of success 
will be highlighted.
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CHAPTER VIII
The Experiments with Sir William Maxwell's Land Policy 
in the Northern Territories
A. Introductory
As the understanding by the colonial government of the land problems 
of the Gold Coast grew with the years, so did the appreciation of the 
wisdom in Sir William Maxwell's measures to deal with them. While it 
was thought to be too late to return to his policy in its entirety in 
the Colony and Ashanti, it was considered expedient to apply it in the 
Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. This decision was taken not 
only because the government became convinced that it was the right policy 
to pursue, but because it did not anticipate the sort of active opposition 
which such measures had engendered in the past in the Colony, and to some 
extent in Ashanti.
The introduction of certain ordinances to implement the principles 
inherent in the abortive Land Bills of 1894 and 1897 had some important 
and lasting effects on land tenure and administration in this part of 
the country. Firstly, it led to the creation of a dual system of land 
administration in the country. In the Northern Territories, membership 
of a family o r a  particular tribe or community ceased to be the basis 
for the enjoyment of rights in land. The enjoyment of such rights became 
dependent on membership of the Gold Coast Colony and the Protectorates; 
so that in terms of acquisition or enjoyment of rights in land in the 
Northern Territories, no one living in the Gold Coast was regarded as 
a stranger.
Secondly, this policy led, in principle, to the abolition in these 
parts of the country of the tribal or territorial boundaries which had 
been the major source of inter-tribal and inter-territorial boundary 
disputes. As we have seen already, this was one of the main causes of 
uncertainty of title and costly litigation which had caused the impoverish­
ment of many families, stools and individuals in the rest of the country 
where such boundaries were recognised and allowed to remain. Thirdly, 
the pursuit of this policy resulted in the take-over by the government 
and its agencies, such as the Lands, Survey,and Town and Country Planning 
Departments, of the control function of the traditional land authorities.
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Finally, the overall result of this policy in the Northern Territories 
was the restriction to the barest minimum of the twin problems of uncer­
tainty of title and costly litigation and speculation in land, problems 
which have bedevilled the land administration systems of the rest of 
the country since the introduction of mining on a large scale and the 
cultivation of the land on a permanent basis.
However, as we shall see presently, for lack of understanding of 
the background to the introduction of this policy and the way in which 
the scheme has worked in practice with beneficial effects, this laudable 
system is currently in danger of being abolished and in its place trans­
planted systems, similar to those in the rest of the country with its 
incidental- problems of uncertainty of title and maladministration by 
chiefs and traditional elders. It will be a tragedy if, for political 
and emotional reasons, this is allowed to happen. In order to appreciate 
the wisdom of the introduction of this scheme of land administration 
and the way in which it has worked in practice with a relative degree 
of success, it is necessary to outline the background to the introduction 
of the laws governing land administration. This discussion will disclose 
beneficial effects of this system in these parts of the country in compari­
son with those areas where such policies had been abandoned in the past 
because of native and European merchant protests.
B . Background to Land Legislation in the Northern Territories
With the general response to German and French competition during 
the scramble for territories in the Gold Coast in the 1890s, the colonial 
administration signed treaties of friendship and trade with leaders of 
tribal communities in the Northern Territories. As was the case with 
many of such treaties, the sovereign rights of the traditional authorities 
were not ceded to the Queen. Similarly, the terms of the treaties did 
not cover land matters. In one such treaty with the people of Trugu and 
Bole, for example, Article II provided that:
"There shall be friendship and freedom of trade between the king, 
chiefs, princes, principal headmen, and people of Trugu and Bole 
and the subjects of Her most Gracious Majesty and Queen Empress 
and it is hereby understood and agreed betwieen'. the contracting 
parties to this Treaty that British subjects shall have free access 
to all parts of the country of Trugu and Bole . . . and they shall 
have full liberty to carry on trade or manufacture -and should any 
difference or dispute arise with regard to any trading transactions 
or other matters between the subjects of Her Majesty residing in 
Trugu and Bole and the People of that country the same shall be 
decided by the proper local authorities according to the customs
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and laws existing in that country".
The basis of the relationship between Britain and the Northern Terri­
tories hinged on similar treaties throughout the region. However, they 
paved the way for the future appointment of Provincial Commissioners 
with the responsibility of protecting British commercial interests there. 
British jurisdiction in the Northern Territories was regarded as a matter 
of expediency and Governor F. Hodgson who, it will be recalled, had held 
office between 1898 and 1901, was thus inclined to the view that, until 
the means of communication with these parts of the country were improved 
and the "civilising influence of a settled form of administration has 
made its mark on the country", it should be on the whole best to exclude 
them by amending the definition of the word "colony" and limiting its
meaning to Her Majesty’s possessions in the Gold Coast, exclusive of
519
the Northern Territories.
The Chief Justice, Sir William Brandford Griffith, disagreed with 
this view. He believed that the redefinition of the word "colony" to 
exclude some other territories which might be regarded as protectorates
520
and outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, would be inconvenient.
This argument did not convince the Governor, who proceeded with an Order
in Council under section 20(a) of the Supreme Court Ordinance to exclude
521
the Northern Territories, from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
However, the replacement of Sir F. Hodgson as Governor by M. Nathan 
saw an end to this policy. Chamberlain, who supported Griffith's view 
on the matter, informed the new Governor that in view of the difficulty, 
if not the impossibility, of determining precisely the limits of the 
territories which had already been annexed to the dominions of the Crown, 
and of the practical difficulties which Griffith had pointed out in his 
memorandum of August 1899 would arise if the territories which had been 
treated as forming part of the Colony were to be declared a protectorate, 
he had come to the conclusion that the necessary steps should be taken
to effect a formal annexation of the protected territories, as they existed
522
on the 29th day of December 1887, to Her Majesty's dominions. The 
Secretary of State's intention was that the natives of the Northern
518
519
520
521
Treaty of 1 June, 1892, CO 879/113. It is interesting to observe 
how the terms of the Treaty assumed that there were kings, chiefs 
and princes in the acephalous societies of the North.
Hodgson to Chamberlain, 14 September, 1899, CO 879/57.
See Griffith's memorandum on Ashanti Jurisdiction, 9 August, 1899, 
CO 96/432.
Order in Council, 23 February, 1900.
Chamberlain to M. Nathan, 5 February, 1901, CO 879/67, No. 649.
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Territories should thereby become British subjects and therefore subject
523
to the provisions of the Acts of the Imperial Parliament.
Although Sir Frederick Hodgson still believed that it was good policy
to exclude the North from the Colony, while he was in London in the autumn
of 1900 he assured the Secretary of State that the natives of the region
were ready for annexation and that no trouble need be expected if the
state of affairs which the natives regarded as already existing de facto
524
were then established de jure. Certainly, the way in which the natives
regarded the treaties of trade and friendship signed with the Queen was
a very important factor in the establishment of British jurisdiction
over the Northern Territories and the determination of land policy towards
it. The truth of the matter was that, unlike the Colony and to some
extent Ashanti, where theoretical and legal arguments were employed by
opponents of the colonial government to challenge British jurisdiction,
sovereign rights and its land policy, the people of the Northern Territories
regarded the treaties of trade and friendship signed with the Queen as
having taken away their sovereign rights.
Thus the Provincial Commissioner for Wa reported in 1914 that:
"When Treaties were made here in Dagarti and Issala the chiefs,
with the consent of the people were unanimous in believing that 
in accepting the protection of the Government when signing the 
Treaties, they surrendered to the Government all rights over land, 
and the powers to deal with them, as formerly were vested in the 
chiefs. In the Treaties the terms 'friendship' and 'trade' were 
insignificant compared to 'protection' which they intensely desired 
and for this they were ready to surrender^^e rights of the chiefs 
to the officers appointed by the Crown".
Similarly, in the Colony and Ashanti, the people attached great
importance to land rights and were beginning to treat them as an article
of commerce. Any policy which appeared to them as likely to violate
land rights met with vehement protests. In the Northern Territories,
however, attitudes to land rights were completely different. Land was
conceived of, not as an estate or a possession of any particular value,
but as part of the universe, just as the sun, the moon and the stars,
and "no question of monetary interest in land existed any more than in
527
the constellations".
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Ibid.
Ibid.
Report of 5 December, 1914, National Archives of Ghana, ADM/56/1/105. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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In the Provincial Commissioner's Report, it was noted that lands
«
occupied by the Walas, Dagartis and probably the Grunssi, were not recog-
523
nised as being owned by the tribe, chief, village or individuals.
There were no boundaries between the villages, and uncultivated land
between them was considered as common ground for the collection of natural
fruits and hunting. The Dagombas, for example, were reported to have
held land on condition that such land could not be sold. No money could
be taken for leasing it, and it could be granted or rights to it given
up, only by the consent of the chief.
A report of the Provincial Commissioner for Navrongo gave similar
accounts of native conceptions of land in the North and the land tenure
systems generally. The report stated that in Lobi^Dagarti, Issala and
529
Grunshie, lands were "commonly owned". A religious leader called
the Tindana administered the lands in "trust" for the community. He
was not the owner of the land. His role was mainly concerned with the
performance of religious rites which were considered necessary to appease
the spirits to ensure plentiful harvest. Tribute, if paid at all, was
530
voluntary, and was nominally paid to the Fetish Priest.
In South Mamprusi, the idea of selling land,"or making a man live 
without it, could not be understood". For purposes of land occupation 
and use a stranger was one who came from a far country, and who stayed 
in the community for less than three years. If he stayed there for three 
years, he had as much right to the land as the native inhabitants living 
there. In Bawku, a large town in which many strangers could be found, 
no one was regarded as a stranger having lesser rights to the land.
"It was entirely and absolutely against the native law to pay any money
531
or its equivalent as purchase money, taxes or rents for the use of land.
It is significant to note that even in modern Ghana, chiefs in the 
Dagomba traditional area of the North do not accept monetary consideration 
for the grant of land rights. I was told by every traditional Elder 
I spoke to that they would prefer to accept cola nuts and any amount 
of produce which the grantee might offer as presents. Such presents
532
have no bearing on the size of land occupied by the grantee or the harvest.
The over all picture portrayed by these early accounts of the land tenure
systems is that no economic value as such attached to land. Land was
528
529
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This statement would seem to be of doubtful validity. It probably 
meant no more than that the idea of the land belonging to groups 
or communities as it is understood today was not highly developed.
This was due to the nomadic life of these tribes.
Report of 12 November, 1924, National Archives of Ghana, ADM/56/1/113. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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abundant, demand for it was negligible, and it thus had no market value.
Hence claims of right to or over it did not feature prominently in the
land tenure systems of the Northern Territories.
During the time when the Concessions Ordinance was being considered
the colonial administration did not have at its disposal the reports
discussed above. But it had'a fair idea about the general attitude of
the natives in the North to land matters. The government had a fair
idea about the differences in the land tenure systems of Ashanti and
most of the native communities in the Colony on the one hand, and the
tenure systems of the tribes in the Northern Territories on the other.
In Ashanti and most areas of the Colony, the system for the administra™
tion and enjoyment of rights in land was fundamental to the structure
of government. The appreciation of land values due to the development
of the mining and timber industries was increasing the economic and political
power of chiefs and community leaders who exercised rights of control
over lands. Apart from these developments, there was a great deal of
sentimental attachment to land in Ashanti and the Colony. These were
the main reasons why any land policy which would have the effect of reducing
533
the power of chiefs usually met with strong protests.
In the Northern Territories, however, there was no concrete evidence
of such sentimental attachment to land. Land control functions did not
necessarily devolve on those exercising political power in the community.
The political and economic power associated with the control of land
in Ashanti and the Colony were thus absent in the Northern Territories.
For these reasons, the government was aware that no serious opposition
to its authority was likely even if it introduced laws affecting land,
land by
having regard to the general notion of/the people in that Region, which
may be summed up in the words of a Gonja chief of Pombe, who in reply
to a question as to whom, in native opinion, the land belonged to, replied:
"As the people belong to the Government, how much more then does 
not the land they live on?" 534
This statement by the chief might well have stemmed from fear and
despair and might not have been a genuine reflection of the wishes of
the chief and his people. Nevertheless, it showed that they would not
The nature, extent and the form of such protests are discussed in 
Chapter IV above.
Report of the Provincial Commissioner, Havrongo, op. cit.
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oppose the government for any land reform programme or policy that might 
be designed for them.
Under these conditions the government, having witnessed the problems 
arising from the land tenure systems of the Colony and Ashanti, where 
chiefs and heads of families were allowed freedom of dealing in land, 
decided to pursue a different policy towards the North. A policy similar 
to those of Sir William Maxwell was thus adopted as a basis for land 
legislation for the Northern Territories,. In line with this policy,
Governor Nathan in July 1901, made a draft proclamation laying down the 
conditions and procedures by which land rights might be granted in the 
Northern Territories. In forwarding the draft proclamation and instructions 
thereon to the Commandant of the Northern Territories, Nathan drew the 
attention of the former to the fact that the procedure involved in land 
grants differed considerably from that adopted for Ashanti and the Colony 
under the Concessions Ordinance.
The procedure for concession grants, as contained in the draft proclama­
tion, were as follows:
"A person applies for, and is granted for 6 months, an exclusive 
licence to prospect over an area of which the limits are approximately 
defined and pays for that licence on the basis of the area it covers. 
During the term of the licence its holder can apply and be granted 
rights of option over the whole or part of the area included in 
it, the area for such rights being somewhat more definitely defined 
in the description, and on the ground? The rights are to last 
one, two, or three years, and each year a payment is to be made 
to the Government on the basis of the area, and if in the opinion 
of the Chief Commissioner . . . native chiefs should receive payment 
on account of the rights given over their lands a further sum also 
calculated on the basis of area is to be paid to Government for 
distribution to chiefs. During the term of the rights of option 
their holder can apply for and be granted a lease over the whole 
or part of the area over which those rights extended, the area 
included in the lease being accurately defined by description and 
survey, and marked on the ground by boundary pillars. The lease 
will be a valid title for a period not exceeding 90 years, and each 
year a payment will be made for it to the Government on the basis 
of area as well as payment for disbursement to native chiefs . . .
It will be observed from this procedure that the Government assumed 
complete administrative control over the lands, treating them as if they 
were Crown Lands, although there was no legal basis for doing so. The 
draft proclamation also provided for payment to the Government of a duty
535
Governor Nathan to the Commandant, Northern Territories, 1 July, 
1901, CO 879/67, No. 652.
536 tk •Ibid.
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of five per cent on net mining profits. It embodied clauses empowering
the Chief Commissioner to make rules and settle disputes as to areas,
restricting the use of lands granted f°r defined purposes and preserving
the existing rights of natives. Rules could also be made empowering the
Governor to exercise certain powers over lands leased, preventing their
being assigned or underlet without the Governor's consent, providing
for the determination of leases if the conditions were not fulfilled,
537
and laying down penalties for offences.
It will be observed that the main area in which these procedures 
differed substantially from the machinery provided under the Concessions 
Ordinance for the Colony and Ashanti was that, in the case of the Northern 
Territories, the grant was to be made directly by the government and not 
by any native authority, while in the case of the Colony and Ashanti, 
such grants were made by traditional authorities and subsequently declared 
as valid or invalid by a Concessions Court. Another interesting point 
of difference was that while there were prescribed limits on the size 
of concessions that could be acquired in the South, no such restrictions 
were placed on the area for which a lease may be granted to one individual 
in the North.
Making a case for not extending the Concessions Ordinance to the
Northern Territories, Nathan wrote:
"Large tracts of the Northern Territories appear to be uninhabited 
or sparsely populated by nude savages without recognized headchiefs 
or central forms of government, and the Gold Coast system would 
be quite incapable of: such tracts". 538
It seems, however, that the plausible rationale for the policy was 
his later statement which seemed to echo Sir William Maxwell's views, 
saying:
"Further, it seems right that the main part of the rental for u n ­
occupied lands should go to the paramount power which, by a very 
large expenditure on administration, has made it possible to utilize 
those lands. At the same time where native chiefs have rights by 
native custom over minerals and produce got from the soil, they 
should derive some advantage from the work of European companies 
in this direction, and also the existing rights of individual natives 
must be preserved to them". ^3^
In order to provide a sound legal basis for the exercise of the 
powers implied by the scheme of land administration devised for the North, 
and in line with the Secretaryof State's wish that no distinction should
5 3 7  T K  •Ibid.
538 T V i  • ^Ibid.
539 Ibid.
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be drawn between the Northern Territories and the rest of the country,
540
an Order in Council of 1901 annexed the latter to the Gold Coast.
This was followed by another Ordinance, the purpose of which was to provide
for the general administration of the Northern Territories. This latter
541
Ordinance, the Administration (Northern Territories) Ordinance of 1902, 
although it was not an enactment dealing with land as such, contained 
two provisions which are relevant for our purposes. They were sections 
5 and 7. These provisions were intended to provide a legal basis for 
the performance of some of the functions prescribed under the draft procla­
mation of July 1901, as discussed above.
Section 5 of the Ordinance conferred powers on the Chief Commissioner, 
or anyone appointed by him, to enter upon any land required for the public 
service, and to appropriate and take so much of such land as shall be 
required for the said service. Where such land was taken for such service, 
no compensation shall be paid except for growing crops, or in respect
of, or interference with, any buildings, works or improvement on or near 
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the land taken. Section 7(a) declared ownership in all lands, premises
and buildings, which were on the 31st day of December 1901, held and
occupied as government property absolutely vested in Her Majesty the 
Queen, free from all encumbrances, titles, interests, liens, charge 
and claim of whatsoever nature.
It can be seen that the extent to which land rights might be affected 
under these provisions did not go farther than what prevailed under the 
Public Lands Ordinance, under which lands could be acquired for the public 
service in the Colony and Ashanti. In spite of this, no further legis­
lation affecting land was introduced in the Northern Territories until 
1927. This meant that the draft proclamation of July 1901 remained the 
only basis for the exercise of administrative rights over lands by 'the 
government. As pointed out already, this was mainly due to the fact 
that the government did not anticipate that anyone would seriously question 
the basis of its actions there. Also, because there was relatively no 
large-scale foreign ilnvolvement in land exploitation there, it was thought 
that no legislation defining with particulars of detail, the conditions 
under which land should be held was required. Moreover, the successors 
of Governor Nathan, particularly Sir Hugh Clifford, pursued vigorously 
the policy of indirect rule, which was incompatible with the principles 
inherent in the draft proclamation of July 1901. Hence, no law was enacted
540
Order in Council of 1 January, 1902.
541 Cap.Ill, (1951) Rev.
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to embody its principles into legally enforceable rules.
By the 1920s, however, maladministration of stool lands by chiefs
in the South and the general disapprobation of the anomalies of the land
tenure systems of the Colony and Ashanti saw the beginning of a change
in policy. For fear that the evils of the systems in the South might
spill over to the North, it was decided to crystallise the procedures
and rules being followed in the Northern Territories into legally binding
rules. Thus, in 1927, an ordinance was introduced with the declared
543
purpose of vesting all lands in the North in the government.
The relevant provision stated that the whole of the land of the 
Protectorate, whether occupied or unoccupied at the commencement of the 
Ordinance, were thereby declared public lands. Exception was made in 
respect of prior existing rights, provided that such rights could be 
proved. Section 17(2) provided that at the end of every three months, 
or such other periods as the Governor may direct, half the rent received 
during such period in respect of leases shall be paid to the town or 
new town and shall be expended from time to time in such manner as the 
Governor might consider to be for the benefit of the town or new town.
These provisions would have had the effect of vesting all the lands 
in the Crown, but it was not brought into force. Its provisions were 
similar to those proposed by Sir William Brandford Griffith in 1894 by 
which all vacant lands in the Gold Coast would have been vested in the 
Crown. In this case, the only exception being that even occupied lands 
would have been affected by the Ordinance. Section 17(2) of the 1927 
Ordinance, like the abortive Crown Lands Ordinance, took into account 
the communal principles of the land tenure systems. Hence revenue accruing 
therefrom was to be applied for the benefit of the community at large.
The Ordinance was, however, not brought into force because some 
government officials, particularly those in the Northern Territories, 
were not favourably disposed towards the introduction of an Ordinance, 
the purpose of which would be to confirm what the natives assumed to 
be true, but which in fact was not. The Chief Commissioner of the Northern 
Territories, for instance, had argued earlier in protest against such 
a measure by pointing out that since it was generally assumed by the 
natives that all unoccupied lands belonged to the Government, and could 
be utilised as it saw fit, it was unnecessary for the Government to vest 
them in the Crown. He argued that unlike Northern Nigeria, which was
Land and Native Rights Ordinance No. 1 of 1927, which was not brought 
into force.
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arguably a conquered territory and therefore Crown land by right of conquest,
544
the same argument could not hold for the Northern Territories.
However, four years later, a similar Act, based on the principles
of Sir William Maxwell's Public Lands Bill of 1897, was enacted to govern
the administration of lands in the region. It was this ordinance which 
introduced a dual system of land administration in the country providing 
a basis for comparative analysis of how either system works, both in 
theory and in practice. Having discussed at length already the working
of the system in the South, we shall have a close look at the provisions
of this Ordinance and discuss how it is working currently. This discussion 
would enable us to come to a conclusion as to whether or not it was a 
right decision to withdraw the Public Lands Ordinance of 1897.
C . The , Land and Native Rights Ordinance of 1931
545
With slight variations, the Land and Native Rights Ordinance 
could be seen as a replica of the 1927 Act which was never brought into 
force. The objects of the Ordinance were declared in its long preamble.
It stated that it was necessary to protect and preserve existing customary 
rights of the natives to use and enjoy the land and the natural fruits 
thereof in sufficient quantity to enable them to provide for the sustenance 
of themselves and their families. It was also stated that it was expedient 
to preserve the customary law with regard to the use and occupation of 
the land as far as possible, and that it was necessary to define by law 
the rights and obligations of the government in regard to the whole of 
the land within the region. The rights and obligations of cultivators,
and other persons claiming to have an interest in any such land should
be defined.
For our purposes, the most important provisions were Sections 4,
5, 7, 8, 10 and 17. Section 4 of the Ordinance replaced Section 3 of 
the 1927 Act which was kept in abeyance. Unlike Section 3 of the latter 
Act, which sought to declare all lands within the Protectorate public 
lands, the 1931 provision, Section 4, provided that:
"All native lands and all rights in and over the same shall as from
the commencement of this Ordinance be under the control and subject
544
Letter of 3 August, 1914, National Archives of Ghana, ADM/56/1/113
545 Cap. 147, 1951 Rev.
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to the disposition of the Governor, and shall be held and administered 
for the use and common benefit direct or indirect of the natives; 
and subject to the particular reservations set forth in Section 
3, no title to the occupation and use of any such lands shall be 
valid without the consent of the Governor'1.
Parts of the reservations under Section 3 referred to above related 
to prior existing rights antedating the commencement of the Act. Such 
titles if lawfully acquired, were to have the same effect and validity 
in all respects as they had before the date of commencement. However, 
in the case of non-natives, the validity of any such title was made 
subject to their proof to the satisfaction of the Governor in a manner 
as he may prescribe or direct in five years from the said date.
The effect of this section is far-reaching. Although the lands 
were not absolutely vested in the Crown as was attempted in 1927, their 
management, control and administration were vested in the Governor. While 
it declared that the lands should be held and administered for the use 
and common benefit direct or indirect of the natives, the right of the 
latter to occupy land without reference to any person had been taken 
away. This was the logical import of the provision that no title to 
the occupation and use of any lands would be valid without the consent 
of the Governor. Yet another important aspect of the provision was the 
recognition of the communal principle in the land tenure system by enjoining 
the Governor to hold and administer the lands "for the use and common 
benefit" of the natives. This underlined the sort of obligation towards 
the people which Sir William Maxwell envisaged under his abortive Public 
Lands Bill. The emphasis was on the public and not on particular indi­
viduals .
Section 5 of the Ordinance enjoined the Governor, in exercise of 
the powers conferred on him, to have due regard to the native customary 
law existing in the locality in which any land was situated. Section 
6 made it lawful for the Governor to:
a. grant rights of occupancy to natives and non-natives;
b. exact a rent in respect of rights of occupancy so granted; and
c. revise rent exacted or due under this section by increasing 
or reducing the same, and in the case of building purposes, 
at intervals of not less than twenty years; and in the case
of other rights of occupancy, at intervals of not less than
three years.
A remarkable feature of the above provision is that while it 
enjoined the Governor to have due regard to the existing customary law, 
Section 6(b) provided, quite contrary to the indigenous notions, belief
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and practice, that the Governor should exact rent in respect of rights
of occupancy. The exercise of this right would necessarily make serious
inroads into the generally accepted view and practice among the people
in the Northern Territories that no monetary consideration was exigible 
vV
on the use <&€ the transfer of an interest in land. Another significant 
aspect of Section 6 was the power conferred on the Governor to grant 
land to both natives and non-natives. The right of occupancy no longer 
depended necessarily on membership of a land holding group, such as the 
family or a clan. It now depended on the disposition of the Governor.
Here, it is important to note that the Act did not prescribe differing 
terms for strangers and Northerners.
As we shall see presently, one of the far-reaching effects of this 
provision is that up till now, the Lands Department, upon whom the respon­
sibility of managing lands in the Northern and Upper Regions devolves, 
does not draw any distinction between the people of the North and other 
Ghanaians in matters relating to land acquisition, a policy which was 
to have been the cornerstone of Maxwell's land policy. The cumulative 
effect of Sections 4, 5 and 6 was that the natives of the Northern Territories 
could no longer in principle exercise their inherent rights as members 
of a landholding community validly to establish rights to land through 
effective occupation unless by the sanction of the Governor. What this 
means in effect is that the majority of local people are today in illegal 
occupation of lands acquired through development without reference to 
the Lands Commission, which now stands in place of the Governor.
Section 10(3) took away mineral rights from people in occupation
of any land in which such minerals were to be found, The right of natives
to alienate any estate right or interest in, or with respect to any land
lying within the North to a non-native without the consent of the Governor
was taken away by Section 17 of the Ordinance. Any conveyance, grant,
mortgage, transfer of possession, lease, request or other instrument
of transaction (whether in writing or not) which purported to effect
an alienation of an interest in land without the consent of the Governor
was declared void and with no effect under Section 17(2). Perhaps, in
order to demonstrate in concrete terms the Government's intention to
exercise full control over the natural resources of that part of the
country, the Government proceeded to vest all minerals in the Province
546
in the Crown. By Section 3 of the Mineral Oil Ordinance of 1936,
546
Cap. 155, (1951) Rev.
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the entire property and control of all minerals, in, under or upon any 
land in the Protectorate was absolutely vested in the Crown.
By means of these legislative measures, a dual system of land admini­
stration was established in the country. In the Northern Territories 
the traditional land control functions of traditional authorities were 
assumed by the Government and its agencies, while in the rest of the 
country such traditional authorities were allowed to continue in the 
exercise of their traditional roles subject to any statutory controls 
that might be imposed from time to time. It should be pointed out 
that the role of the State and its agencies in land matters in the North 
is that of an administrator. The lands are not vested in the State by 
any of the laws described above. It is important not to confuse this 
fact of administration with nationalisation. Although the way in which 
all Ghanaians are treated equally in the matter of land acquisition in 
the North would seem to create the impression that the lands are State 
lands, as far as the law is concerned, this is far from the truth. This 
fact must continually be borne in mind in the discussion of the merits 
and demerits of the system in the North.
Interestingly enough, although the native inhabitants had criticised
this type of policy in the past, these laws were not abolished after
independence. Instead of their abolition they were rather consolidated
under other statutes. The obvious reason for this attutide of the independent
government of Ghana is mainly because it recognised the benefits of
such a system. An additional reason why it was not thought necessary
to change the system at independence was because the people of the North
did not complain about the system imposed on them during the colonial
period. Today, however, as a reaction to the power and profit gained
by traditional elders, through their land control functions, particularly
in Akan communities of the country, the people of the North are now
547
calling for the abolition of the system established for them. Other
calls for the abolition of the system by those who now regard the system
as the vestiges of colonialism are based on ignorance of the way in which
548
the system works in practice. In order to explain the benefits of
the system and how it works in practice, we shall discuss the way in 
which the independent government retained the system after independence
See Resolution of a Joint Representative Committee of the Northern 
and Upper Regional Houses of Chiefs, 28 November,'1975, Ministry 
of Lands and Mineral Resources, Accra, Ghana.
See para. 280 of the Constitutional Proposals of the Constitutional 
Commission, 1978.
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because of its beneficial effects. Since the way in which the system 
works at present is basically the same as it did in the past, it is deemed 
unnecessary to discuss its working in practice during Colonial times and 
then repeat the same story for the present. Accordingly, we shall proceed 
to discuss the way in which the system works in practice in the North 
today.
D... The Continuation of the System after Independence
After more than two decades of independence, land policy in Ghana 
basically remains what was inherited from the colonial era. The govern­
ment having no new policy of its own, various statutes were introduced 
to re-enact or add to what was previously existing before independence.
One such statute which has a bearing on the continuation of the system
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established in the North is the State Property and Contracts Act, 1960.
The main objective of this statute was to bring the statute laws of Ghana
into conformity with the Republican status., of the State. Section 2
of the Act thus provided:
"Where in any Act, provision is made that property shall be controlled 
or conveyed or surrendered to and become vested absolutely or otherwise 
vested in and held by the Crown, that property shall vest in the 
President in trust for the public service of the Republic of Ghana, 
and accordingly, in any such Act, references to 'Her Majesty the 
Queen', 'Her Majesty the Queen in trust for the public service of 
Ghana', 'Crown ownership' and 'the Governor General' . . . shall 
be construed as a reference to the President in trust for the public 
service of the Republic or the public ownership as the case may 
be".
This provision had the effect of vesting in the President, the admini­
stration of all the lands referred to in Section 4 of the Land and Native 
Rights Ordinance of 1931, by which all such lands were made subject to 
the control of the Governor.
The State Property and Contracts Act was followed by the Administration 
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of Lands Act, 1962. This Act lays down the conditions under which
stool lands might be administered. The provisions which are relevant
for our purposes are Sections 7 and 8. Section 7 provides:
"7(i) Where it appears to the President that it is in the public 
interest so to do he may, by executive instrument, declare any stool 
land to be vested in him in trust and accordingly it shall be lawful 
for the President, on publication of the instrument to execute any 
deed or do any act as as trustee in respect of the land specified 
in the instrument".
549 C.A.6.
550 Act 123.
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It will be observed that the above section confers power of compul­
sory acquisition by the State of stool lands to be administered in 
the interest of the public at large, and not for the benefit of the 
particular stool to which the land belongs. Under the system prevailing 
in the North, the President could exercise similar powers without 
having recourse to the powers conferred on him under Section 77.
Similarly, Section 8(1) of the Act provides:
"Any disposal of any land which involves the payment of any valuable 
consideration, or which would, by reason of it being to a person 
not entitled by customary law to the free use of land, involve 
the payment of any such consideration and which is made:
a. by a stool
b. by any person who, by reason of his being so entitled under 
customary law, has acquired possession of such land either 
without payment of any consideration, shall be subject to the 
concurrence of the Minister and shall be of no effect unless 
such concurrence is granted".
Here again, it should be remarked that there is no distinction
between the above provisions and Section 17 of the Land and Native Rights
Ordinance of 1931 which by reason of the State Property and Contracts
Act, remained in force in the country. Thus it would appear that no
action under Sections 7 and 8 of the Administration of Lands Acts was
551
necessary in respect of the Northern and Upper Regions.
However, without any reference to the previous law, certain executive
instruments were enacted to vest the administration of all lands within
the two Regions in the President. By Executive Instrument No. 87 of 
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1963, it was provided:
"Whereas it appears to the President that it is in the public interest 
to declare the stool lands hereinafter described to be vested in 
him in trust.
Here therefore in exercise of the powers conferred on the President 
by Section 7 of the Administration of Lands Act 1962, Act 123, 
this Instrument is made this 11th day of July 1963. The stool 
lands within the areas of authority of councils specified in the 
Schedule hereto are hereby declared to be vested in the President".
The local councils specified under the Schedule were those in Bawku, 
Bolgatanga, Navrongo, Lawra and Wa. It should be noted that the areas 
of authority of the above-mentioned councils covered the whole area 
of the Upper Region. A similar Executive Instrument specified Tamale 
Urban Council area, Savelugu, Yendi, Bimbilla, Salaga, Damango, Bola 
and Walewale Local Council areas, all of which covered the whole surface 
area of the Northern Region, as being vested in the President in the
After independence, the Northern Territories were divided into 
two administrative regions named Northern and Upper Regions. 
Stool Lands (Northern Region) Instrument.
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same manner as the Upper Region lands.
It is thus clear that these Instruments were employed to confirm
the land administration system established in the two Regions under
the Land and Native Rights Ordinance of 1931 during the colonial era.
It should however, be observed that the way in which the Executive Instru
ments were formulated discloses gross ignorance about the indigenous
land tenure systems of the Northern Regions. The underlying assumption
of the Executive Instruments giving effect to this policy is that all
the Local Council areas specified under the Schedules were stool lands.
In the Dagomba traditional area of the Northern Region where the Dagomba
conquerors established their hegemony over the original settlers, such
assumptions might be valid to some extent where skin lands might be
regarded as the counterpart of the Akan-type stool lands. But this
can certainly not be true of the generally acephalous societies of the 
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Upper Region. Despite the fact that the underlying assumptions
of these Executive Instruments might arguably be mistaken, they have
been generally regarded as having vested the administration of all lands
in the two Regions in the President.
It is clearly not possible for the President to manage these lands
personally. The 1969 Constitution of Ghana therefore set out proposals
for the creation of a Land Commission to assume the responsibilities
555
of the President. Acting under the provisions of the Constitution,
556
the Lands Commission Act 1971 was enacted. The Act created a Land
Commission, the responsibilities of which are defined under Section
1 of its provisions. It provides:
"1(6) The Commission shall hold and manage, to the exclusion of 
any other person or authority, any land or minerals vested in the 
President by the Constitution or any other law, or acquired by 
the Government, and shall have such other functions in relation 
thereto as may be conferred, or imposed by this Act, or by any 
other enactment.
5 5 3
Stool Lands (Upper Region) Instrument, No. 109, 1963.
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Under Section 31 of the Administration of Lands Act, 1963(Act 123), 
stool land is defined to include "all land in the Upper and Northern 
Regions other than land vested in the President and accordingly 
'stool' means the person exercising control". This definition 
is unhelpful as it fails to define stool lands in terms ofadministra 
tive controls characteristically exercised over it and by which 
it is identifiable under the customary law. In any case, this 
type of land is uncommon in the North, particularly in the Upper 
Region.
555
See Article 164.
556 (Act 362).
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(7) The provisions of sub-section (6) of this Section shall be 
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution and any 
other law to the compulsory acquisition, or taking possession of 
any land, or mines, minerals, forests or National Parks or reserves, 
or the tenure, use or management of land.
2(i) Any assurance of stool land to any person shall not operate 
to pass any interest in or right over any stool land unless it 
is executed with the consent and concurrence of the Commission".
These provisions remained substantially unaltered by the Lands
557
Commission Decree of 1972. The relevant provision for our purposes
is Section 4 which provides that any reference to the President in the
Lands Commission Act 1971 (Act 362) shall be construed as a reference
to the National Redemption Council. Later, further additions were
made to the main provisions by the Lands Commission (Amendment) Decree 
558
of 1972. It provides for the appointment of a regional subcommittee
of the Land Commission for each region consisting of such number of
559
persons as the NRC may think fit. Such regional subcommittees shall
560
discharge any functions which may be referred to it by the Commission. 
Subject to the directions in writing of the Commission, the regional 
subcommittee may, in the exercise of its functions, regulate ita own 
affairs.
These additions made by the Decrees were intended to decentralise 
the administration system so as to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy, and 
to encourage the formulation of .policy with regard to local circumstances 
of each region and community. Therefore, in principle, the responsibility 
for the general administration of lands affected by these laws devolves 
on the Lands Commission. An examination of how the system works in 
practice will, however, disclose that the institutions operating the 
system since the colonial era are still in effective control and the 
Lands Commission’s role is, in theory, that of supervision. This conclusion 
leads us to the^diseussion "of ..the ^role of the Lands ' "Department as the main 
administrator.:'of:.~.lands ~in the* regions in question on behalf of the Lands 
Commission. 88^
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559 Ibid., S.3(1).
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For convenience, in this discussion any reference to "the North" 
includes both Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana. At independence, 
the Northern Territories were divided into two Administrative Regions 
called the Northern and Upper Regions with Tamale and Bolgatanga 
as their respective regional capitals.
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iv. The Lands Department
Within the meaning of Section 1(6) of the Lands Commission Act 
(Act 362), the. Lands Commission is responsible for granting leases, 
collection of ground rents, the valuation of landed*property, the registra­
tion of instruments affecting land and all matters relating to the disposi­
tion of interest in land in the Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana.
These functions, it must be noted, were performed by the Lands Department 
in the past. The creation of the Lands Commission did not, however, 
result in the establishment of a new body to asume these responsibilities. 
As before, the Lands Department in Tamale and Bolgatanga continued to 
discharge the responsibilities entailed by State management and control 
of lands in the two Regions. As can be observed from the discussion 
of the various statutes regulating the administration of lands in these 
Regions, their cumulative effect is that any acquisition of interest 
in land in the area affected by their provisions is rendered invalid 
and of no effect unless the appropriate State institution with the power 
to grant interests in such lands has approved or sanctioned such acquisi­
tion.
The main functions of the Lands Department in Tamale and Bolgatanga
are therefore land allocation, their valuation and the registration
of instruments affecting them. Thus anyone wishing to acquire land
in the North must apply to the Lands Commission through the Lands Deparment
at either Tamale or Bolgatanga, depending on whether the land in question
is in Northern or Upper Region. When the application is received, the
applicant, is advised to engage his own surveyor to carry out a survey
of the area concerned. The area when surveyed is called a site plan
and must be signed either by a licensed or a government surveyor in
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order for it to be acceptable. Three copies of the site plain so 
certified are required from the applicant by the Lands Department.
From the topographical maps supplied to it by the Survey Department,
the technical officers of the Lands Department check the accuracy of 
the site plans. If in doubt, it will be referred to the Survey Department 
for further verification. If their accuracy is determined, the application 
with all other documents relating to the land would be put before the 
regional subcommittee of the Lands Commission. This committee consists of:
This condition is required to meet the requirements of Section 
6 of the Survey Act, 1962 (Act 127).
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1. The Regional Commissioner as chairman;
2. The Regional Lands Officer as a member secretary;
3. The District'Chief Executive;'
4. The Lands Commission's Regional Representative
5. The Regional Town Planning Officer, and
6 . The Regional Surveyor who is a co-opted member.
This subcommittee is required to meet once every month to consider 
applications presented to it by the Lands Department. The Committee 
provisionally approves and recommends formal approval to the Lands Commission 
in Accra, the chairman of which is the Commissioner for Lands and Mineral 
Resources. When the recommendation of the subcommittee with the accompany™
51
ing documents get to Accra, it is normally approved by the Lands Commission,
If approved, the Lands Department at Tamale or Bolgatanga, whichever
is the case, is informed. At this stage, the senior State Attorney
at Tamale, who is also the Registrar of instruments affecting lands
in both regions, prepares the lease. The lease is granted on various
terms, depending on the purpose for which the land is required. If
it is for residential purposes, it is usually granted for a term of
99 years at the current rent of 40 cedis per acre per year, or nine
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cedis for one building plot per year. If the land is required for
industrial use, it is normally granted for a 50 year term, currently 
at 100 cedis per acre per year. For farm lands, the lease is often 
of shorter duration and of cheaper terms. Presently, such leases are 
of 10 years duration at a current rent of 50 pesewas per acre per year.
This means in effect, that one can obtain a hundred acre farm at a ground 
rent of 25 cedis per year.
When the Senior State Attorney has completed the preparation of 
the lease with all the terms clearly spelt out, the Lands Department's 
technical officers make a final scrutiny of the documents. If they are 
•found to be in order, they are sent back to Accra for the signature 
of the Commissioner for Lands. If the latter's consent is obtained 
by means of his signature, the triplicate copy of the site plan and 
a copy of the lease are retained in the Lands Department in Accra for 
record purposes. The original and duplicate copies are returned to
Since its establishment, I was informed by the Lands Departments 
of Tamale and Bolgatanga, that no recommendation of the regional 
subcommittee on land grants has ever been disapproved by the Lands 
Commission in Accra. In fact, the 'Commissioner for Lands' signature 
is only a rubber stamp.
Currently, one pound sterling is equal to about 5.60 cedis.
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the
/North where the Lands Department informs the applicant to come forward
and sign the lease. But where the applicant's place of residence is
far from the regional capitals, the documents are normally posted to
him for his signature. The lease is executed by the representative
of the government, that is the Commissioner of Lands on the one hand,
and the leseei on the other.
Although the document is ready at this stage, this is not the end
of the transaction. The lessee is required to pay at least one year's
lease in full before the documents can be released to him. Upon the
fulfilment of this obligation the documents relating to the grant are
released to him. But this does not mean he has as yet acquired an effective
565
interest under the lease. He is required by law to stamp the document.
The stamp duty to be paid depends on the consideration paid for the
interest acquired, in this case such consideration being the rent.
The transferee of the interest will be able to enforce his rights under
the lease at the regular courts only if the requirements of stamping
are met. Finally, the lessee may wish to fortify his rights under the
lease by making sure that his interest is certain, valid and unassailable
by getting his instruments registered. As will be seen later in the
of the
discussion of land titles registration, registration/instruments is
necessary for the transaction to be effective within the meaning of
^00 00»^ 
the Land Registry ACt, 1962, the Conveyancing Decree of 1973 ,
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and the High Court decision of Asare v. Brobbey. But before the
lessee can be allowed to register his interest, he must fulfil another 
condition. He is required to bring along his tax clearance certificate, 
a document which is a proof that the lessee has fulfilled all his tax 
obligations to the State from which he is to acquire the interest.
Upon presentation of this certificate, his instrument is registered.
This effectively concludes the transaction which becomes legally enforce­
able, even against the Lands Commission.
It should be borne in mind that in terms of beneficial enjoyment 
of rights in land, the Lands Department does not draw any distinction 
between the tribes of the Northern Territories. In the same way, people 
from other parts of the country are accorded the same rights as those 
from the North in matters relating to land acquisition. In effect,
See the Stamp Act, 1965, Act 311. 
Act 122, S.24.
NRCD 175, Sections 1-7 inclusive. 
350. /~197l7 2GyL:iR331.
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lands in the North are virtually administered and controlled in the 
same manner as lands acquired by the State under compulsory acquisition 
statutes. In doing so, the Lands Department is only continuing a land 
policy established by the colonial government for the North over the 
years. Like Sir William Maxwell's abortive Land Bill, which was based 
on the principle that all lands in the country were to be regarded as 
a common asset and resource, and therefore, public lands, successive 
enactments concerning lands in the North were based on similar ideas.
Neither the Administration (Northern Territories) Ordinance of 
1902, nor the Lands and Native Rights Ordinance of 1931 drew any distinc­
tion between natives of the North and natives of other parts of the 
Gold Coast. Post-independence legislation on lands in the North, as 
we have seen, proceeded on the basis of similar policies. The cumulative 
effects of these laws and their underlying policies have been the aboli­
tion of inter-territorial boundaries between one tribal community and 
another, at least in terms of beneficial enjoyment of rights in land.
This led inevitably to the harmonisation of the land administration 
system throughout the North and the elimination of disputes concerning 
land titles. The total absence of litigation over land titles at the 
regular Courts in the North can be seen as one of the most important 
and self-evident beneficial results achieved through the pursuit of 
this policy.
In this regard, the originators of the policy should be commended 
for their foresight and initiative. Evidently, the principles governing 
land administration in the North today are practically those originated 
by Sir William Brandford Griffith in his Crown Lands Ordinance of 1894, 
reformulated and clearly articulated by Sir William Maxwell in his 
abortive Public Lands Bill of 1897 and in his memoranda and speeches 
thereon. Although many of their critics did not appreciate the wisdom 
of their policy then, with time they grew to understand the good sense 
of it and thus introduced it in the North. The results achieved today 
can thus be seen as a clear indication of the vision and foresight of 
Maxwell. It must not, however, be overlooked, that the pursuit of this 
policy is attended with certain difficulties. These problems notwithstand 
ing, the present system of land administration in the North is by far 
a more equitable and beneficial system than those prevailing in the 
rest of the country. We shall consider next the nature of the problems 
and how they may be minimised or resolved altogether.
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v. Problems arising from the Administration System
Within the meaning of the laws regulating the administration of 
lands in the North, any acquisition of an interest in land without the 
approval of the Lands Commission is illegal and will have no effect 
of conferring title on the acquirer. Similarly, any disposition of 
an interest in land without the Lands Commission's sanction will be 
of no legal effect. However, members of the general public are inade­
quately informed about the true legal position on these matters. As 
a result, some of the traditional authorities operate under the mistaken 
belief that they have legal rights to dispose of interests in land in 
their areas of authority. Today, the majority of the local population 
are, in principle, in illegal occupation of lands in their possession 
with the acquiescence of the Lands Commission. This lack of public 
education has led to unnecessary conflict between officials of the Lands 
Department and its lessees on the one hand, and some traditional authorities 
and their subjects on the other.
Allc these problems need not arise if the role of the Lands Department 
in land matters is properly explained to the latter. For an examination 
of the Lands Department's land allocation policy will reveal that the 
principles upon which it operates are not: significantly different from 
the indigenous principles. For instance, under Dagomba customary land 
law, land is not regarded as an article of commerce. The sale of land 
is regarded as an abomination punishable by the gods of the land. It 
is also a sin against the gods to deny a man the use of it. As we have 
seen earlier, it is not only the indigenous people to whom the use of 
land ought not to be denied but strangers as well. These ideas generally 
permeate traditional land tenure systems of the North.
Thus a stranger requiring land in the North, on approaching the 
chief or the Tindana, whichever is the appropriate authority in the 
community concerned, is required to present a gift of Kola nuts. The 
Kola nut is only a present. It is not a consideration for the grant, 
but is of political and religious significance. It serves as a recogni­
tion of the grantor's authority in the area and is at the same time 
used for prayers to the gods, the givers of rain and sunshine which 
are necessary for plentiful harvest. The grantee is warned that the 
right conceded is for surface use only, and if the land is abandoned 
the right reverts to the community. The only obligation on the land 
user is that at the end of each harvest he must present a portion of
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his harvest to the grantor. The quantum of his present has no relation 
to the amount of harvest on the area of land cultivated. Such a present 
is only a token gift in recognition of the grantor’s authority over 
the land.
An examination of what the Lands Department does on behalf of the 
Lands Commission will disclose that the principles upon which leases 
are granted to people largely conform to the traditional norms. What 
the Lands Department has done is actually to assume the role of the 
traditional authorities and to perform their land control functions 
for them. As outlined above, the Lands Department does not make an 
outright grant of lands. It grants leases on clearly defined terms.
The duration of the lease depends on the purpose for which the 
grant is required. Included in the terms of the grant is always a term 
to the effect that if the land remains undeveloped in the manner stated 
within a specified period the lease will lapse. This is consistent 
with the indigenous law under which the land reverts to the community 
upon abandonment. The way in which land grants by the Lands Department 
differ from the traditional methods is that it requires the payment 
of monetary consideration for the grant.
However, this is not something against which the local people should 
complain in modern times, and there is no evidence that the practice 
is objected to. Indeed, the payment of money for land grants is one 
of the ways in which state administration confers benefit on the communi­
ties of the North. As noted earlier, although the lands are managed 
and controlled like State land, it is recognised that they were once 
held by the indigenous inhabitants of the North. Therefore rents accruing 
from land grants are employed for the development of the communities 
from which they are due. Thus, where such monies are received, the 
Lands Department retains 10 per cent of it to meet its administrative 
expenses, such as the cost of surveys, site inspection and the processing 
of documents. Into the local council treasury is paid 45 per cent of 
the amount as a contribution to its development project's funds. The 
traditional authorities of the area receive the remaining 45 per cent 
of the amount.
It will be seen that in this way, communities of the North benefit 
from the competent administrative skills of government officials in 
land administration, while the ordinary citizen benefits from community 
resources through the social services which the monies paid into local 
council treasuries might help to provide. An additional advantage
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for individuals of State control of lands in the North is certainty 
concerning titles thus saving people from the problem of costly litigation 
which has so much helped to enrich lawyers, land surveyors and valuers 
while rendering stools, families and individuals impoverished in many 
parts of the country.
In spite of these advantages, as a result of lack of public education 
on the beneficial effects of State land administration in the North, 
many people are ignorant about how the system works in practice. This 
lack of knowledge about the nature of the Lands Department's role has 
created some few problems and misunderstandings between the Department 
and some local chiefs. During the colonial period, the people of the 
North were prepared to allow the government the freedom to exercise 
control over lands, erroneously believing that the Treaties of Friendship 
and Trade entered into with the Queen took away their land control rights. 
They did not attach any great importance to land as an article of commerce. 
This was largely due to the fact that the slave trade had virtually 
depopulated the area. Furthermore, although there were rumous about 
gold and lime deposits in the area and its potential for cotton growing 
was recognised, no large-scale demand for concessions on the scale witnessed 
in the Colony and Ashanti occurred in the Northern Territories. The 
traditional attitude to land was therefore rather casual.
After independence, however, communication with the South improved 
considerably, and the region's potential as the future granary of the 
country became recognised. The recent rice boom in the region during 
the "Operation Feed Yourself Campaign" is a pointer to this fact. Apart 
from these factors, the population is increasing, particularly in the 
Upper Region. Before independence, not many educated classes of elites 
existed in the North as a rallying point for protest against what they 
might consider as an unfair land policy towards their region. Today, 
there are many persons who belong to the educated elite and nascent 
middle class in the North. These factors have all combined to create 
new problems for the Lands Department in the exericse of its administrative 
responsibilities.
Unhappily, without any critical examination of its advantages in 
comparison with the systems prevailing in other areas of the country,
See pp, 362-364.
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where chiefs and traditional elders still exercise administrative control
over lands deriving substantial revenue from it, the people of the North
are now calling for the abolition of the present system as being unfair.
Resentment against the present system of land administration in the
North is caused by what they see as a discriminatory policy towards
them. Dissatisfaction concerning the present system is reflected in
a resolution of a joint representative Committee of the Northern and
570
Upper Regional Houses of Chiefs in 1975. In that resolution, the
chiefs of the North acknowledge the right of the government to acquire 
compulsorily land in the two regions for development purposes, and ex­
pressed their willingness to co-operate in such matters.
Calling for the abolition of the present system they resolved:
M3. That in view of the fact that persons wishing to acquire land 
for development purposes can secure safe and quick titles from 
the chiefs we propose that all disposals of skin lands in the two 
Regions be executed by the chiefs concerned as prevails in other 
parts of the country subject to concurrence of the lands Commission.
4. That in order to obtain uniformity in the management and admini­
stration of all lands in the Northern and Upper Regions as in the 
other parts of the country we consider that Executive Instruments 
El.87 and El.109 of 1963 and others which vest almost all skin 
lands in the Northern and Upper Regions in the President/Head of 
State be revoked and the lands in the two regions re-vested in 
the chiefs and people".
A remarkable thing about this resolution is that neither in its 
long preamble nor in any of its six paragraphs was mention made of any 
grievances concerning the present system. No advantage which the systems 
in other parts of the country have over the system prevailing in the 
North was cited as being the reason why the change was being called 
for. The main reason for desiring the change would seem to be what 
they regard as lack of "Uniformity in the management and administration 
of all lands in the Northern and Upper Regions as in the other parts 
of the country . . . "
With respect, this aspect of the resolution is misconceived. In 
fact, instead of th? uniformity they seek to achieve, the opposite 
result will be the consequences of the change they are calling for.
If the system is abolished, inter-tribal boundaries would have to be 
redefined and the terms on which land would be acquired would vary accord­
ing to the customary rules prevailing in each tribe or community. Certain
Resolution of Northern and Upper Region Houses of Chief, 28 November, 
1975.
280
general principles are common to all the systems, but they differ in 
particulars of detail. Having regard to these facts, it is difficult 
to see how the abolition of the present system will have the effect 
of harmonising land tenure and administration in the North.
The resolution is based on the assumption that there is uniformity
in the land tenure systems of the rest of the country. This is far
from the truth. In fact, it is rather the adoption of the kind of policy
towards the North for the whole country that may be able to unify the
systems in the South and, therefore, in the whole of the country. Indeed,
none of the people I have spoken to in the North has denied that the
present system is the ideal one for their Regions. What they object
to is the way in which the two Regions have been differently treated
from the rest of the country in land matters. They cannot see why,
if land policy towards the North is a sound one, it should not be made
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to apply throughout the country.
There is some justification for the present attitude of people 
of the North in expressing dissatisfaction about the lack of a uniform 
policy on lands for the whole country. It must be noted that any Ghanaian, 
whether he be an Ewe, a Fante or an Ashanti from the South, can obtain 
land in the North from the Lands Department on the same terms as a Dagomba 
or a Sissala of the North, but no person from the North can enjoy similar 
rights in other parts of the country. This is one way in which people 
of the North can justifiably regard the present land administration 
system as being discriminatory, although the original policy behind 
its introduction was not intended to be so.
The problem for the Lands Department at present, particularly in 
the Dagomba traditional area, is that during this period of rice boom 
in the Region, certain local chiefs have taken the law into their own 
hands by conceding land rights to strangers without reference to the 
Lands Commission. During the colonial period, although land acquisition 
by the local natives without the consent of the Governor was illegal 
in terms of the Ordinance, such acquisitions through the cultivation 
of farms or building houses were acquiesced in by the government. This 
practice was continued after independnce, mainly because the law was 
originally passed to protect the natives against strangers and not to 
prevent them from exercising their inherent rights of land occupation.
A prominent Tamale lawyer at one time the Northern Regional Representa­
tive of the Northern Regional Subcommittee of the Lands Commission 
told me he believed many people objected to the present system 
mainly because it was regarded as discriminatory.
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Thus much of the land allocated by the Lands Department is in favour 
of strangers, from other parts of the country.
At present, some local chiefs are increasingly asserting their 
right to make land grants to strangers. Some stranger farmers, being 
ignorant of the legal consequences of obtaining grants from local chiefs 
without the consent of the Lands Commission, encourage the chiefs in 
the assertion of their traditional land rights. Even some prospective 
grantees of land in the North who have some fair idea about the legal 
stuatus of land in the North, normally prefer the acquisition of land 
from the local chief to acquisitons from the Lands Department. One 
important reason for this is that it is quicker and cheaper to obtain 
land from the former without reference to the latter. Land developers 
do not like the long bureaucratic processes of getting the necessary 
consents of the Lands Commission, the preparation of site plans, stamping 
the document, the presentation of tax clearance certificates and the 
registration of the instruments. All these cost money and cause delays.
While the Lands Department would insist on the payment of monetary considera­
tion for the grant, the local chief would accept initially only some 
cola nuts as presents, and during harvest-time a proportion of the crops 
which the grantee might present as a gift to the chief. All these can 
tempt prospective grantees of interest in land to prefer dealing with 
the chief rather than with the Lands Department. This temptation can 
become strong where the grantee has no definite idea about the legal 
effect of such transactions.
These irregular transactions have caused problems for such stranger 
grantees and the Lands Department. The first problem for the grantee 
is that he will be unable to enforce his rights at the regular Courts 
should the transaction fall into difficulties. Secondly, as a result 
of the illegality of such transactions, the continued occupation of 
the land by the grantee depends entirely on the goodwill of the local 
chief and his people. Thirdly, the grantee runs the risk of his grant 
being in conflict with grants made by the Lands Department. As we have 
seen earlier, grants made by the Lands Department are normally covered 
by an accurate plan of the area to which the interest relates. Copies 
of such plans are kept in the records of the Lands Department. The 
way in which the Lands Department avoids overlapping grants is by reference 
to the topographical maps supplied to it by the Survey Department and 
the site plains of the areas of land already subject to grants.
Acquisitions of interest in land from local chiefs, however, are
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not covered by records and are not reflected by any records of the Lands 
Department. Therefore, although a man might have acquired land from 
the local chief, as far as the records of the Lands Department can deter­
mine it, the area of land concerned is vacant for allocation. This 
has in fact happened on certain occasions where lands already granted 
by the Lands Department were granted to strangers by local chiefs.
A classic example of this sort of conflicting grant is provided by the 
case in which a retired Regional Commissioner of the Northern Region,
Colonel Adjekum, obtained large tracts of land from a local chief in 
1976 without reference to the Lands Commission. The Colonel quickly 
brought tractors on to the land and began development. Unknown to him, 
a large part of the area in his possession had already been granted 
to another person by the Lands Department and had been duly registered.
The lessee of the Lands Department produced his papers and threatened 
to sue for trespass and declaration of title. The Colonel insisted 
that he had lawfully acquired the land from the local chief. The latter 
admitted the former's claims and justified his right to make the grants 
by reference to his customary rights. Although the legal position is 
clear enough, the Colonel could not realise the futility of his claims,
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and the grantee of the Lands Department sued in the High Court at Tamale.
The lesson provided by this case is very important. It shows that
if a person of Colonel Adjekum's standing could be so ignorant about
the legal status of lands in the North, then we can expect most ordinary
people to be even more ignorant about the land administration system
5 7 3
prevailing there. As pointed out already, it is due to lack of
public education concerning the legal status of lands in the North that 
land administration functions of the Lands Department have had very 
little impact on the indigenous people themselves. The real effect 
of the laws governing land administration in the North is now beginning 
to be felt because of the increasing demand for land by strangers through 
the Lands Department.
This suit was pending at the High Court in 1977 when I left Ghana.
I was informed that the case was withdrawn before it could be decided 
upon. But there is no doubt of the invalidity of the grant,made 
by the local chief.
By virtue of his position as the Regional Commissioner for the 
Northern Region*until his retirement, he was a member and chairman 
of the Northern Region subcommittee of the Lands Commission and 
should therefore have been in a position to know better.
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As a result of conflicting grants and growing resentment against 
the role of the Lands Department, the latter has evolved a system whereby 
the local chiefs are involved in the land acquisition process. By this 
process the Lands Department advises an applicant to consult the local 
chief of the area from which he wants to obtain the land. If the chief 
agrees to the grant, the applicant will obtain from the chief what is 
called "a consent note ". On presentation of the note, the Lands Department 
makes the grant to the applicant by going through all its laid-down 
procedures. When the transcation is completed, the local chief is not 
made a party to the grant. This is a clear indication that there is 
no legal basis for the degree of participation allowed the local chief.
The Lands Department believes that participation by local chiefs 
in the land acquisition process will foster cordial relations between 
itself and the chiefs, and at the same time promote the goodwill of 
the chief and the local people towards the stranger-lessee who is going 
to develop the land within the local community. The Lands Department 
has made this concession to the local chiefs because it has learnt from 
experience that the lack of goodwill towards lessees of land from the 
Department has on certain occasions resulted in the destruction of the 
crops of such grantees by bushfire.
It must be pointed out, however, that this cannot be an effective
and lasting solution to the problem. It must be borne in mind that
before the chief gives the prospective grantee the consent note, the
latter should have gone through all the customary procedures for land
grants with the chief. Under such circumstances, as far as the chief
or the Tindana is concerned, the grant has been made by him. For this
reason, the traditional land authority expects the lessee to continue
paying the usual annual homage to him by presenting him with a portion
of the annual harvest. Such a present is not regarded under the customary
law as a consideration for the grant, but a practice has grown recently
whereby between 10-25 bags of paddy rice are annually presented to the
grantor chief. This figure has no relation to the size of land granted
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or the amount of rice harvested.
The problem here is that the terms of the grant are prescribed 
by the document by which the Lands Department has granted the interest 
to the lessee. The latter can therefore insist that there is no agreement 
between him and the local chief. This has led to a number of incidents
See Kenneth E. Obeng, "Customary Land Holding and Uses in Ghana", 
1975, Ghana Law Reform Commission, Working Paper No. 17/75, 6.
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in the "rice belt" between farmers who insist on their strict legal
575rights and some chiefs who want to assert their traditional rights.
A case was reported in which a chief went to a farm with a truck to
demand some 300 bags of rise, being 10 per cent of what the farmer obtained
from his 300 acre farm. The latter refused to hand over the goods,
arguing that there was no contractual agreement between them, pointing
out that his obligations under the lease was the payment of an annual
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rent of 0175.00 to the Lands Department.
Other sources of conflict relate to the exercise of certain customary 
rights by the indigenous people. In most societies of the North, the local 
people have some common and concurrent right to collect dawadawa, firewood, 
mango and other fruits growing naturally on the land. Hence, as far 
as the local people are concerned, the lessee's rights are subject to 
the exercise by them of these customary rights. It is, however, evident 
that the lessee from the Lands Deaprtment is entitled to regard any 
unpermitted intrusion on his land as trespass, which he can sue for 
or lawfully resist. In certain cases where the lessee insists on his 
rights, his farms are found to be "accidentally" desroyed by bush fires.
Apart from these problems, there is a burning issue of the assessment 
of compensation paidi' by the Lands Department for lands acquired in 
the North under compulsory acquisition statutes. It is clear from the 
provisions vesting the control and administration of lands in the North 
that such lands have not been compulsorily acquired as State lands.
The payment of the rents accruing from land grants by the Lands Department 
into the treasuries of local councils in the North is an evidence supporting 
this fact. But whenever the state acquires land in the North under 
any one of the compulsory acquisition statutes, such as the Administration 
of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123) or the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125), 
problems arise as to the basis for the calculation of any compensation 
that might be due to those whose interests might be injuriously affected.
It is clear from the provisions of the above mentioned statutes 
that whenever the State acquires land for the public service or in the 
national interest, those whose interests may be affected should be com­
pensated. Under the State Lands Act of 1962, compensation may be calculated 
on the basis of the cost replacement value of the land, the cost of distur­
bance or any other damage resulting from the acquisition may be assessed
575
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and paid for. Similarly, where the President authorises the occupation
of any land under the Administration of Lands Actt 1962, an annual 
sum may be paid as compensation for the land from the national treasury, 
account being taken of the value of the land on the one hand, and on 
the other, the benefits to be derived by the people of the area where
the land is situated from the use to which the acquired land is to be
. 578put.
It is clear from these provisions that there is a clear departure
frtrm the principles underlying the compensation system established under
the Public Lands Ordinance of 1876, under which compensation was payable
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for wealth created on the land only and not for the land itself.
However, the post-independence compulsory acquisition statutes are normally 
employed to acquire lands the administration of which is not already 
vested in the State but usually in stools and families. In the North, 
however, the administration of the lands is already vested in the State.
A common complaint in the North is that acquisition of land by the State 
in the Region is not adequately compensated for. The problem has often 
been whether compensation should be paid for crops and economic trees 
growing on the land, including the land itself. It is clearly accepted 
that economic trees growing on the land, such as mangoes, dawadawa and 
sheabutter should be compensated for. What is in doubt is whether value 
must be placed on the land itself and compensated for.
Part of this problem has its roots in the colonial period. During 
the colonial era, Sir William Maxwell's principles, by which all the 
lands were to be regarded as public lands, were applied in the North. 
Compensation was therefore paid for wealth created on the land only 
and not for the land itself regarded as belonging to the community.
Where laws were introduced after independence to enable the laws establish­
ing.:: the present system to continue, no provisions relating to the assess­
ment of compensation in respect of lands in the North was made. It 
would appear that the Lands Department has continued the practice of 
paying compensation for wealth created on the land and not for the land 
affected by the acquisition. I was told by those I intereviewed that 
even in those cases in which compensation was paid for economic trees, 
the value placed on them was often so low as to make the system of valuation 
a mockery.
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Act 123, S.10(l).
579 See No. 8 of 1876, S.7(1).
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The Lands Department does not deny all these allegations. Its officials
claim that the reason for the seemingly low prices paid for economic
trees is that values placed on them were fixed by statutory regulations
many years ago, and although present price indices make such values
out of date, no new law has been passed placing new values on them.
The Department does not admit, however, that compensation paid in the 
'is
North/ in general inadequate. The fact is that throughout the country, 
values placed on economic trees are now outmoded. Compensation for 
one cocoa tree, for instance, is ten pesewas, although a cocoa tree 
might be valued at more than 050 today. The problem is therefore not 
one peculiar to the North.*
On matters relating to paying compensation for the land itself,. 
the problem is that whenever the chiefs are informed that land is to 
be acquired by the Government in their areas for certain development 
projects, as it is their desire that the project, if located in the 
locality, should provide job opportunities for their people, the chiefs 
normally write to the Government expressing their willingness to release 
the land to the Government at no cost. In cases like this, compensation 
is not paid for the land except for development on it. But where no 
such willingness to release the land is expressed, compensation is paid 
for the land, if taken according to the provisions of the statute under 
which it is acquired. Compensation paid for the value of land in the 
North may be comparatively low, having regard to the large amounts paid 
in respect of lands in the southern part of the country. The reason 
assigned by the Lands Department for this disparity in the amounts paid 
in other parts of the country, is that the market value of lands in 
terms of supply and demand has, until recent times, been comparatively 
low in the North.
It is submitted that the major source of all the problems outlined 
above is lack of public education. Taking the problem concerning the 
conflicts arising from the unofficial role of the chiefs in land acquisi­
tion, for example, there seems no reason why the true legal position 
on the question of capactiy to grant lands ought not to be explained 
to the traditional authorities. It will be a better policy to make 
the situation clear to them while making certain arrangements which 
may officially involve them in the land acquisition process than the 
present arrangement by which the chiefs are given the false impression 
that they have the legal capacity to dispose of interests in land. 
Relations could be strained if the chief realised in the end that the
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transaction which he had conducted could be superseded by those of the 
Lands Department when he originally thought the latter was simply confirming 
what he had done initially.
Turning to the question of payment of compensation, the misunder­
standing concerning it is also due largely to lack of public education.
It ought to be explained to the chiefs from the beginning that where 
they release land to the Government for development projects in their 
localities, compensation will not be paid for the land itself. Taking 
advantage of their own realisation the benefits which the community 
would derive from the use of the land by the Government, it should not 
be difficult to impress upon the local authorities the desirability 
of establishing the principle that compensation shall not be paid for 
land acquired for the provision of services which will benefit the community 
at large. In our opinion, such a policy is not only one which should 
be adopted for the North, but for the whole country. The amount of 
compensation which would be paid to the traditional authorities, who 
as we have seen, do not often use such monies to the best advantage 
of their people could be channeled into the project for which the land 
has been acquired for its speedy execution.
Similarly, although the Government has acquiesced in the occupation 
and acquisition of rights in land by the indigenous people without the 
prior consent of the Government over the years, it is not a good policy 
not to explain the legal status of the lands in the Region to the local 
population and the country at large. This lack of candour and public 
education has left both the local population and the traditional authorities 
confused about their rights and responsibilities. Lack of knowledge 
about the proper procedures for valid acquisition of land in the North 
has misled strangers in avoiding the Lands Department and to enter into 
illegal transactions with the local chiefs. Ironically, because the 
Government has acquiesced in land acquisition by the indigenous people 
without reference to the Lands Department, strangers are generally much 
better informed on the legal status of lands and the procedures for 
valid acquisition of interest therein than the local population itself.
It should be pointed out too, that one reason why people tend to 
avoid land acquisition through the Lands Department is the result of 
the unnecessarily long and cumbersome bureaucratic processes involved 
in land acquisition through it. As we have seen already, the consent 
of the Minister in Accra is a necessary condition for the valid alienation 
of interests in land. The creation of the Regional Subcommittees of
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the Land Commission was intended to decentralise the system of land 
administration. This decentralisation is possible only when the Regional 
Subcommittees are allowed effectively to sanction grants made by the 
Lands Department on its behalf. The fact that the. Minister has never 
disapproved of any recommendation made to him by the Subcommittee of 
the Northern Region since its inception in 1972 is a clear indication 
that the signature of the Minister is only a rubber stamp.
It can be seen that the Subcommittee of the Lands Commission consists 
of competent authorities on land matters in the Region. The Regional 
Lands Officer, the Regional Surveyor and the Regional Town Planning 
Officer are the most competent officials dealing with land matters in 
the Region. The Regional Commissioner and the District Chief Executives 
are the chief representatives of government in the Region, and are therefore 
supposed to be aware of and conversant with government land policy in 
the Regions. Moreover, all these officials are more conversant with 
local conditions and circumstances than the Minister who may not necessarily 
be a specialist in these matters. Decisions taken by these officers 
in land allocation should therefore ordinarily be regarded as well founded. 
It is for reasons like these that the Minister normally rubberstamps 
their recommendations on land grants. Hence, there seem no good reason 
why real meaning should not be given to the decentralisation policy 
by giving powers to the Regional Subcommittees to give effective consent 
to land grants on behalf of the Minister. In such a case, a limited 
period within which an aggrieved person may appeal to the Minister might 
be the right procedure. These suggestions, if adoped, would cut down 
the delays caused by the bureaucratic processes.
The pursuit of present policies has had far-reaching beneficial 
consequences for the administration system and the community at large. 
Firstly, the non-recognition of inter-tribal boundaries between the 
various ethnic groups of the North has harmonised the system of land 
administration. The elimination of such boundaries means there no longer 
exists any basis for disputes concerning inter-tribal boundaries. The 
boundaries which exist are those carved by the Government for political 
administrative purposes. Questions relating to boundaries are therefore 
politically determined and settled by government officials with the 
result that it has become unnecessary for the Courts to determine the 
issue between contesting parties of different communities.
Secondly, the establishment of the Lands Department as an independent 
and recognised government body with legal capacity to dispose of interest
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in lands which are mainly group-held property has reduced to the barest 
minimum the difficulty faced by strangers in identifying persons within 
the traditional systems with the legal capacity to deal with property.
The overall effect of the policies and land administration system estab­
lished in the North is certainty of title and lack of any litigation 
concerning titles whatsoever. So certain and secure are titles that 
there is to be found hardly in our Law Reports any reported case of 
land litigation in the North.
One direct beneficial result of title security in the North is
that while the banks and financial institutions would insist on accepting
only registered titles as security for loans to farmers in southern
Ghana, some of the banks are willing to grant loans to farmers in the
North provided there are visible signs that the farmer has begun development
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in a way that will prove profitable. Insecurity of title, regarded
as one of the key obstacles to the acquisition of agricultural credit 
by the farmer, has thus been removed in the North.
Finally, it is submitted that the most important beneficial effect of 
land policy in the North is that the enjoyment of rights in land is 
now based on Ghanaian citizenship. Entitlement of an individual to 
rights in land no longer depends on membership of a particular community 
or family. Provided that one is a Ghanaian and willing to develop land, 
one can approach the Lands Department at Tamale or Bolgatanga and acquire 
it on predetermined conditions laid down by law. These terms apply 
equally to all citizens, including those of the North.
This was the cornerstone of Sir William Maxwell's policy regarding 
all ’lands in the country as public lands. He recognised in the traditional 
systems of tenure a communal principle by whch land was regarded as 
a community asset and resource to which no individual should be permitted 
to lay exclusive claims. He had wanted to widen the scope of this principle 
to embrace the whole country through his abortive Land Bill of 1897.
The results achieved in the North today are a vindication of the wisdom 
of his policy. The fact that the post-indepndent government found it 
unnecessary to abolish the system, but consolidated it with.laws, may 
be seen as a recognition of the advantages of the system. Today, the 
majority of those closely connected with land problems in the country
Standard Bank of West Africa Ltd., Barclays and the Agricultural 
Development Banks are some of the financial institutions presently 
pursuing such policies on agricultural credit in the North.
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are agreed that nothing short of the introduction of of a system of
land administration similar to that in the North throughout the country
581
can effectively deal with Ghana's land problems.
It may be argued that insecurity of title was no problem in the
North because there was no great demand for land in those areas during
colonial times. An answer to such an argument is that the question
is not whether there was large-scale acquisition of land. What should
be considered is whether the conditions which give rise to insecurity
have been removed. The elimination of the inherent problems associated
with insecurity is the more important thing to consider. In any case,
the recent rice boom that accompanied the "Operation Feed Yourself"
campaign of 1972, and which has led to a scramble for land in the "rice
belt", has not given rise to problems of uncertainty and its associated
costly litigation. In fact, in those cases where grants were made by
the Lands Department in conflict with the traditional authorities, the
matter was easily resolved administratively.
There is ample evidence in the North and other parts of Africa
suggesting that state agency administration of lands can lead to greater
certainty. In northern Nigeria where, by legislation similar to that
of the North of Ghana, lands in that region were vested in the colonial
government, a policy continued by the post-independence government of
Nigeria, titles have remained certain and secure. In comparison with
southern Nigeria, where, like southern Ghana, land administration was
left in the hands of tribal authorities, there seems to be a high degree
582
of title uncertainty and costly litigation.
Today, the Nigerian government has recognised the wisdom of such
land policies towards its Northern areas and has introduced a similar
583
law to apply throughout Nigeria. The objectives of the Decree are
contained in its preamble which is self-explanatory. It states:
581
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In interviews with the Regional Lands Officers of Northern, Ashanti 
and Volta Regions, the Regional Surveyors of Ashanti, Northern and 
Volta, the Town and Country Planning Officers of the same Regions and 
people in similar positions in Accra, there was a general agreement that 
the answer to Ghana's land problems lies in State administration. It
may be thought and rightly too, that the views of these men were in­
fluenced by their natural desire to protect their jobs. But there is no 
evidence to suggest that the continuation of the present system poses 
any real threat to their positions or to the jobs of their Staff under 
the Civil Service.
See the Land and Native Rights (Northern Provinces) Ordinance, No. 1 of 
1901 as amended by No. 23 of 1926. There is a striking similarity bet­
ween the Gold Coast Ordinance, Land and Native Rights (Northern Terri­
tories) Ordinance of 1931, Cap. 147, 1951 Rev., and the Nigerian Statute,
The Land Use Decree, No. 6 of 1978.
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"WHEREAS it is in the public interest that the rights of all Nigerians 
to the land of Nigeria be asserted and preserved by law: AND WHEREAS 
it is also in the public interest that the rights of all Nigerians 
to use and enjoy land in Nigeria and the natural fruits thereof in 
sufficient quantity to enable them to provide for the sustenance 
of themselves and their families should be assured, protected and 
preserved: NOW THEREFORE, THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT hereby 
decrees as follows: . . ."
Section 1 of the above Decree proceeded on the lines of the above 
declared policy objectives to vest the administration of all lands in 
Nigeria in the State. The lands are declared to be held in trust "for 
the use and common benefit of all Nigerians" in accordance with the provision 
of the Decree.
This Decree will certainly have the effect of harmonising the land 
tenure systems of Nigeria if the terms of its provisions are complied 
with. The logical import of this Decree is that like the northern regions 
of Ghana, tribal, community or family membership basis of the enjoyment 
of rights in land has been replaced by the concept of Nigerian citizenship
as entitling the citizen to enjoy land and the fruits thereof for the
sustenance of himself and his family. It is submitted that this is a 
progressive and a healthy policy, albeit a colonial heritage.
If we look beyond Africa south of the Sahara, we can see in East
Africa a further example of beneficial effects of the abolition of tribal 
and traditional authority administration. In Tanganyike, now Tanzania, 
where the German colonial administration abolished tribal tenure before 
the British took over the country as a mandated territory, the latter 
did not encounter the sort of land problems with which they became so 
preoccupied in the neighbouring territories of Uganda and Kenya. This 
German policy paved the way for the adoption of the present national land 
policies of Tanzania without any serious opposition from traditional leaders.
The trend in the formulation of national land policies indicates 
a tendency towards a return to certain aspects of colonial land policies 
of the past. In northern Nigeria and northern Ghana, there is no doubt 
that such policies have had their beneficial effects. It should therefore, 
be not only as a matter of regret but of great concern for what would 
appear to be a call on the part of the 1978 Constitutional Commission 
of Ghana for the abolition of the present land administration system in 
the North of the country by reason only that the system was established 
during colonial times. In its proposals for a constitution for the establish­
ment of a transitional (interim) National Government for Ghana, the 
Commission made the following recommendations:
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"Our attention was drawn to the present lack of uniformity in the 
regime regarding stool and skin lands. Under the present system, 
certain skin lands in the Northern and Upper Regions are deemed 
to be 'public lands' and, as such, are vested in the Government 
of Ghana, whereas stool lands in other regions of Ghana are considered 
as being vested in the’stools concerned. We recognise that this 
arrangement has been carried over from the colonial era and from 
previous constitutions and laws. We, however, consider that this 
system is unjustifiable, inequitable and anachronistic. We therefore 
recommend that it be abolished. . ." ^84
This recommendation was accepted and embodied in Article 183 of
the Constitution which provides:
"(3) For the avoidance of doubts it is hereby declared that skin 
lands in the Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana which immediately 
before coming into force of this Constitution were vested in the 
Government of Ghana are not public lands within the meaning or 
provisions of clauses (1) and (2) of this article.;
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, all skin lands 
referred to in clause (3) of this article shall vest in the approp­
riate skin, without further assurance than this clause".
In making this recommendation which has been thus enshrined in 
the Constitution, the Commission provided no evidence the examination 
and analysis of which has led it to its conclusions on the land administra­
tion system in the North. Taking a decision concerning a matter involving 
the socio-economic development, not only of the North but the whole 
country, it is not enough for the Commission to declare that the present 
system of land administration in the North is unjustifiable, inequitable 
Sind anachronistic without indicating the respects in which the system 
falls short of justic, equity an modern requirements. The Commission 
seems to have based its conclusion on the erroneous assumption that 
any arrangement carried over from colonial times is necessarily out 
of date, unjust and inequitable.
The Commission seems to be saying that because stool lands are 
vested in stools in other regions of Ghana while skin lands in the North 
are vested in the Government, the system is unjust and inequitable.
Does this means that the operation of two different systems of land 
administration in one country necessarily leads to inequity and injustice? 
There would seem to be no logical nexus between the inequity of operating 
different land administration systems in the same country. The injustice 
or inequity of the differing systems can only be objectively determined 
by the examination and analysis of the varying systems on a comparative
584 See the Constitutional Proposals, op.cit., .para. 280.
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basis. This comparative analysis, the Commission has not done.
It is submitted that the Commission could only have performed its 
task creditably and come to the right conclusion by a thorough investigation 
and examination of the policy considerations actuating the introduction 
of the system in the beginning. In the course of doing so it would 
have to examine the ways in which the system has worked in the past 
sind how it is working in practice at present. It is through this kind 
of investigation that it can discover the respects in which the circum­
stances actuating the introduction of such policies are still relevant 
or irrelevant, having regard to the circumstances of modern requirements.
If the Commission had carried out an investigation on the lines 
suggested above, it would have discovered the beneficial effects of 
the present system and would prbably have reached a different conclusion 
about the justice of the land administration system in the North. It 
may well be that it would have come to the conclusion that the system 
established in the North would be the best for the whole country. What 
the Commission has done at present is in effect to plunge the land tenure 
and administration in the North into the chaos associated with the tenure 
systems of the Southv
It is respectfully submitted that the Constitutional Commission's 
recommendations being ill-considered, the provisions of the Constitution 
based on it should be amended so as to retain the present system of 
land administration in the North. Instead of abolishing it, it is suggested 
that the system should be extended to the whole country.
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CHAPTER IX 
FOREST LAW AND POLICY
A. Introductory
The forests of a tropical country like Ghana are important for the 
maintenance of climatic conditions necessary for agricultural productivity. 
Most tropical crops such as cocoa, coffee, the oil palm and other perennial 
plaits grow best on forest lands. In addition to their suitability for 
mqst tropical crops, the forests help in checking soil erosion and seasonal 
bushfires, which could destroy farms, animals and much of the vegetation 
during the Harmattan period.
Adequate water supplies and the production of timber for fuel and 
furniture, building and for other domestic uses depend largely on the 
tropical rain forest. Moreover, the growth of the forests can, and 
do determine the general climatic conditions of the whole country.
Apart from human needs, wild life also dpeneds, in many ways, on the 
forests. There are, therefore, strong reasons why the forests of the 
country should be treated as a common asset and resource which ought 
to be efficiently administered for the benefit'of the nation at large.
Colonial policy concerning forest administration did not, however, 
proceed on the basis of a national land or forest policy. Forest policy 
was governed by the same principles upon which land policy was based.
The forests being part of the general lands of the polities within the 
protectorates, their administration was left in the hands of traditional 
authorities, subject to such controls as might be imposed by laws and 
regulations. But mainly as a result of their ignorance and illiteracy, 
they were not adequately equipped with the necessary expertise to meet 
the responsibilities attendant upon forest management and administration 
during the time of the mining boom and the growing timber trade within 
the first decade of the twentieth century.
Despite this, when the colonial government introduced an Ordinance 
to make provisions for the creation of forest reserves to be administered 
by trained and qualified personnel of a Lands Department which was to be 
established under the Ordinance, there was organised opposition to the 
measure in the same manner as the Crown Lands Bill, 1894 and the Public 
Lands Bill, 189^ were opposed. So strong was such opposition from British 
businessmen and trade associations and the natives, that the Ordinance,
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although it came on the Statute books, was never brought into force
585
until it was replaced by another Forest Ordinance in 1927. It is
a matter of regret that although the colonial government realised that 
the traditional authorities and the greater majority of the native popula 
tion could not appreciate the problems concerning forest administration 
at the time, it failed to be firm and resolute in pursuit of its policies
B. Background to Forest Legislation
i . Problems of the Timber Industry
Before mining and timber firms began their operations on a large
scale, the need for legislation to conserve forests and regulate their
exploitation was not felt. The first enactment having anything to do
with forests was the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, 1883 under which
Traditional Councils were empowered to make by-laws for the protection
585
of water courses and conserving forests. The native authorities
did not, however, see the need for the creation of any such reserves,
and thus did not exercise the powers conferred on them.
Despite this inaction on the part of Traditional Councils, the
colonial government did nothing by way of forest legislation until
the Report of the Commission on Agricultural Potential of the Gold Coast
587
was published in 1889. This Report provided the basis for the
formulation of policy on forest management and administration. The 
Report, while drawing the attention of the British business community 
to the opportunities that the forests of the Gold Coast offered for 
investment, warned of the dangers associated with an indiscriminate 
and uncontrolled exploitation of the forests, described as an "untouched 
mine' of wealth". The Report warned that while it was desirable to 
encourage the felling of timber, not only as a source of wealth but 
as throwing open to cultivation new tracts of land, the concomitant 
dangers ought not to be overlooked. It noted that there were too many 
examples of countries where such excessive destruction of forests had
Ordinance No. 6 of 1927, repealed by No. 30 of 1935.
586 No. 5 of 1883, S.11
587
See the Report of a Commission appointed to Investigate the Economic 
and Agricultural Potential of the Gold Coast, 8 September, 1889; 
Accounts and Papers Relating to HM Colonial Possessions, 1890,
No. 110, ZH&1/5239.
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resulted in droughts, inadequate supplies of water, barren soil caused 
by soil erosion, and uncultivable land.
The Commission recommended the introduction of regulations providing 
for the replacement of destroyed forests. In any such regulation, provision 
should be made for preventing forest exploitation along rivers so as 
to ensure their continued flow. Government policy would seem to have 
been guided by the views expressed in this Report. Henceforth, its 
policy was directed towards the maintenance of sufficient land under 
forest to meet the needs of agriculture, to ensure adequate water supplies 
and to sustain the production of timber, fuel-wood and other forest 
products in sufficient quantity for export and local consumption.
Within four years of the publication of the Report on the Economic
and Agricultural Potential of the Gold Coast, the operations of timber
and mining concessionaires increased considerably, with the accompanying
583
increase in the cutting of timber. Notwithstanding this, the government
did not introduce any law for regulating forest exploitation and the 
protection of its products. The reason for this lack of action on the 
part of government was due to the way in which it sought to deal with 
land problems generally. It seemed that both Governors Sir Brandford 
Griffith and Sir William Maxwell thought that if their respective Crown 
sind the Public Lands Bills were going to bring the whole of the lands, 
including forests, in the Colony under government control, then special 
legislation on forests would be unnecessary.
However, when both Bills were withdrawn on account of the objections 
raised by European firms and the natives, the need for a special legis­
lation for the regulation of forest exploitation was realised. Thus, 
as soon as Sir Frederick Hodgson assumed the governship as successor 
to Sir William Maxwell in 1898, he introduced an Ordinance to deal with 
forestry problems. It was obvious from the nature of the provisions 
of the Bill that due to past objections to legislation affecting lands, 
it did not go far enough in conferring general powers on the government
to create or constitute forest reserves. Although it was entitled "Forest
589
Reservation and Water Courses (Protection) Ordinance", its provisions
looked more like a revenue collection device rather than a forest protection 
and reservation statute.
Between 1890 and 1894 a total of 23,300 tons of timber was exported 
to Hamburg, Liverpool and London.
The Ordinance was introduced on 6 October, 1899, but it was never 
brought into force. It met with objections from timber firms and 
the natives. See Dispatch form Sir F. Hodgson to Chamberlain,
No. 108 of 12 March, 1900, C.0. 879/65.
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The preamble of the Bill declared that it was designed to make 
provision for the conservation of woods and forests and the protection 
of water courses of the colony. However, in a memorandum to the Bill, 
it was stated that there had sprung up in the colony a class of middle­
men land brokers establishing themselves as pricnipal controllers of 
the rubber industry; that they purchased rubber at cheap rates and resold 
it at higher prices to exporters, thereby absorbing much of the profit 
which ought to have gone to the producer or the exporter. To prevent 
this from continuing, one of the principal provisions of the Bill, dealt 
with the question of issuing licences for cutting timber, the collection 
of fubber and cola nuts. The provision introducing licences was apparently 
aimed at middle-men and brokers.
Clause 6 of the Bill thus provided that after the passage of the 
Ordinance on a date to be notified by means of a Proclamation by the 
Governor, it would become unlawful for any one to cut down timber, collect 
rubber or any substance of a like nature, or cola nuts, without first 
being licensed in the manner prescribed by the Ordinance. For any breach 
of this provision, a penalty of a fine of not less than £5 and not more 
than a fine of £50 was attached. The power to issue such licences at 
a fixed cost of £6 was conferred on the Governor under Clause. 7 .
There were no provisions placing any significant restrictions on 
licensees' rights to cut timber. Clause 9 provided that where a person 
cut down, sold, bought or disposed of any timber, the girth of which 
was less than nine feet and measured ten feet from the ground, he should 
be guilty of an r-’ offence and liable to a fine not exceeding £50, and 
the timber so cut should be forfeited to the government. As noted earlier, 
the Bill did not confer power on the Governor to constitute reserves 
.directly. Under Clause 11, it was provided that the Governor "may with 
the approbation of the Head Chief of a District", constitute any land 
in such District, a reserved forest or reserve any land for agricultural 
or other purpose.
It was in respect of such reserves if constituted, that some degree 
of restriction on the way in which their resources might be exploited 
was imposed. Clause.:'. 14 provides:
"Any person, who in a reserved forest:
a. causes any damage by negligence in felling any tree or cutting 
or dragging any timber, or wilfully strips off the bark or 
leaves from or otherwise damages any tree, shall be guilty 
of an offence and on conviction shall be liable to a fine not 
exceeding twenty pounds".
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The making or burning of fire, felling, girdling, tapping or burning 
of a tree in a reserved forest were prohibited under Clause 15 of 
the Bill. But it must be noted that these restrictiosn applied to reserved 
forests only. It can therefore be seen that apart from restrictions 
on the cutting of timber, the girth of which was less than nine feet 
measuring less than ten feet from the ground, licensees were free to 
do all the things prohibited in forest reserves without necessarily 
breaking the law, provided they were done outside such reserves. Hence 
the provisions of the Bill would have been inadequate to deal with the 
problems concerning indiscriminate explotiation of the forest resources 
even if they had come into force.
To supplement its provisions, Regulations were made pursuant to 
Clausen 23 of the Bill in order to provide for the replacement of destroyed 
timber, and to prescribe rules for the tapping of rubber. Rule 3 of 
the Regulations provided that whenever a tree was cut down, another 
tree of a similar kind should be planted in its stead within seven days 
near to the place where such tree had been cut down. This was the only 
provision dealing directly with matters relating to forest preservation 
under the Regulations. Most of the rules were devoted to prescribing 
rules to be followed in the tapping of rubber, its sale and the keeping 
of account books in respect of the rubber industry.
Not only were the Bill and the rules made thereunder not inadequate 
enough to meet the problems arising out of the rapidly developing timber 
industry, but they were not brought into force. The provisions of the 
Concessions Ordinance under which timber concessions were acquired, 
were also not adequate to cope with the problems. The rate of growth 
of the timber industry was reflected in the volume of export of timber 
to Europe within the first five vears of the twentieth century. For
2, 228,618 feet of timber, valued at an export price of £21,896. In
1903, exports more than trebled, amounting to 7,382,684 feet, valued
at £48,853. This figure increased in the following year to 16,012,560
feet, the export value of which was £34,294. This trend continued in
1905, where the export value was £84,429. In 1906, the export of the
year, excluding the month of January, was valued at £75,939, making
the total export of the five years ended 31 December, 1906, excepting
590
the month of January,1906, 41,419,930 feet at a value of £285,411.
See The Memorandum of the West African Branch of the Liverpool Chamber 
of Mines on the Subject of Timber Rights Reserved to Holders of Mining 
Concessios, 27 May, 1907, C.0. 879/65.
instance, Colony no less than
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These figures speak plainly for themselves, showing the extent 
to which the country was being denuded of timber. What was more, at 
the same time as the timber industry was flourishing, the mining industry 
was booming. This was accompanied by the increasing use of logs ob­
tained from the forests around the mining centres. A considerable quantity 
of timber was required for props in the underground working of the mines. 
Apart from using logs for props in their mining operations, miners used 
a lot of timber as fuel. It was cheaper to burn readily available wood 
for fuel than to buy imported coal. For both fuel and props, miners 
preferred a particular species called "Kaku" or "fillacopsis KakuM due 
to its strength and durability. Mining firms gave the supply of this 
species to independent contractors who cut down the largest of the trees
to be found. As these got exhausted, they cut down under-sized trees
591
near to the firewood tramways in order to save costs on transport.
All these opened the forests to serious risks and which might endanger 
adequate water supplies and injuriously affect the climatic conditions 
of the colony.
There were difficulties about the exercise of control over the
way in which forest resources might be exploited. Timber concessions
were acquired under the provisions of the Concessions Ordinance.
Yet the Ordinance did not contain provisions making operations of timber
concessionaires subject to effective governmental control.
The statutory definition of the word "Concession" under Section
2 of the Concessions Ordinance was "any writing whereby any right,
interest, or property over land with respect to . . . timber . . .
purports to be either directly or indirectly granted by a native . . . "
As we have seen earlier, any person claiming to be entitled to
the benefit of any such concession was required under Section 9 of
the Ordinance to file notices thereof within six months of the date
592
of the acquisition. He was also to file the documents relied
upon in support of his claim. Under Section 9(2) of the Ordinance, 
a penalty of a fine not exceeding £5 for every day during which default 
in compliance with this section continued was imposed. By Sections 
27 and 28, a concession holder was burdened with a duty of preparing 
and delivering to the Treasurer, a statement of profits made by him 
from the concessions during every 12 months. Under Section 31 of
591
Dispatch from Governor F. Rodger to Secretary of State, 17 June,
1908, C.O. 879/99.
592 See the discussion of this at p.131-192.
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the Act, a penalty of £50 and treble the amount of duty payable were
imposed on persons neglecting to deliver such statements.
Despite these provisions of the Ordinance, it would appear that
the government was not keen to enforce the law against timber concession
holders * This led the West African Chamber of Mines to complain that
timber concessions had been overlooked in the anxiety to enforce the
593
law against the holders of mining concessions. Mr. Giles Hunt, writing
on behalf of the West African Chamber of Mines, drew the attention of 
the Colonial Office to the way in which timber firms were allowed to 
operate in breach of the provisions of the Ordinance with impunity.
He wrote:
"Now sic / of all the 183 certificates of validity that have been 
published in the Gazette up to the 7th of March in this year, only 
two, viz., Nos. 169, Apani Timber, and 170, Bogosu Timber, are in 
respect of timber concessions. So far as I know, no proceedings 
have ever been instituted by the Government to enforce compliance 
by timber concessions holders with the Sections of the Ordinance 
which I have referred to above or to recover penalties for non- 
compliance therewith". ^94
Under the provisions of the Concessions Ordinance, mining in the
colony was made unlawful unless a concession was obtained from a native
having the right to make the grant or unless a mining licence in the
manner prescribed by law was obtained from the Governor, and the necessary
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stamp duty was paid. It was competent for the Governor to prevent 
mining promiscuously, not only on the part of the concession holder by 
civil process, but also through the imposition of penalties. However, 
as Mr. Hunt had pointed out in his Memorandum, timber concessionaires 
were left free to operate in the forests as if they were not subject 
to these laws.
Some timber firms employed "Contractors" to deliver quantities of 
timber on the tramways. These contractors felled timber at random, and 
went wherever they chose. On occasions, they might be stopped by a chief 
if the timber cutting was not by his authority. In those cases where 
the chief protested and sued for trespass, it had no effect on the culprits 
because they were often men of straw against whom it was not worth proceeding 
It often happened that some firms employed gangs of "Kroo boys" who were 
sent out as contractors to cut timber. On some occasions, the cutting 
was done under what was termed a "licence" from a local chief. The effect
The Memorandum of 27 May, 1907, op.cit. 
Ibid.
S.25.
Loc.cit.
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of such a licence was that the latter allowed the licensee to cut timber
at will, paying a royalty for each tree cut and not limiting the licence
to a particular area or excepting other concessions from its scope.
Some of the difficulties attending the operations of such timber
'’contractors" were that although the licences under which they carried
out their operations could be regarded as concessions within the meaning
of the Concessions Ordinance, they were neither forwarded for stamping
by the Commissioner of Stamps, nor were they submitted to the Concessions
Courts for their validity to be certified. The result was that apart
from the loss of revenue to government, timber was cut in the forests
without regard to already existing concession rights. It was impossible
for concession holders to police their areas of operation unless an army
of men was employed to keep continuous watch and ward over the whole
area to prevent the marauding expeditions carried out by the so-called 
597
contractors.
What made these state of affairs serious for forest preservation 
was that timber cutters did not follow any rules of procedure. Rules 
concerning the scientific cutting of the trees of the forest so as not 
to endanger their destruction were not observed. As was remarked in 
the Hunt Memorandum on behalf of the West African Chamber of Commerce, 
timber cutters never confined themselves to trees of full growth, fit 
to be cut. They seemed to benefit merely by obtaining so many thousand 
feet of the timber. Both at Axim and Sekondi, one often saw logs of
I
not more than 14 or 15 inches square, and at times of even less dimensions.
This meant that the trees, which if the forests were conserved,
would constitute the future prosperity of the timber industry and would
be a great asset to the Colony, were being "ruthlessley destroyed in
their infancy, the assets of the Colony being anticipated by thoughtless
599
and irresponsible parties for their immediate gain". Commenting on 
the consequences of such state of affairs, Mr. Hunt gave the following 
warnings:
" . . .  the devastation that is being carried into the forest, and 
the rapid destruction of a most valuable asset to the Colony that 
must inevitably occur if matters are allowed to continue as at present 
can only be prevented if something is done by way of legislation".
597
Loc.cit.
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Loc.cit.
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Apart from his caution that irreparable damage to the forest would 
affect rainfall as it had already done in certain parts of the Colony, 
he made some specific suggestions as the lines on which legislation might 
proceed to deal with the problems. He suggested that legislation should 
be passed prescribing:
a. the land area within which timber may be cut in any one year;
b. the number of years which should elapse before an area should
be cut over a second time;
c. the number of trees to be left on each specified area of land;
d. the minimum girth of trees which may be felled; and
e. making regulations for the reservation of selected trees for
seedling purposes and reafforestation.
He also suggested the immediate introduction of laws prohibiting 
the export of small logs. The establishment of a forestry department 
to be responsible for a scheme of forestry administration in the Colony, 
was one of the main suggestions. Some of the most important duties of 
the forestry department, if established, should be the enforcement of 
rules and regulations concerning forest protection and reservation.
The suggestion was also made that chiefs1 rights in regard to timber 
should be limited. Although they might be "owners", they should also 
be made to hold a licence if they wished to cut timber. Such a licence 
should prescribe the area in which the timber was to be felled, and it 
should be published in the Gazette and persons claiming through the chief 
should also be made subject to such rules, and their rights should be 
registered under the Registration Ordinance. As an immediate step to 
meet some of the pressing problems, Mr. Hunt recommended the amendment 
of the Concessions Ordinance in order to place timber concessions and 
timber cutters, who had hitherto not been required to take out any licence, 
on the same footing as holders of mining concessions in respect of which 
a licence fee of £30had to be paid.^^ In lieu of the ordinary royalty 
of per cent on the net profits of timber concessions, there should 
be an export duty on timber concessions.
These suggestions were favourably received by the Acting Governor 
and the Chief Justice. The former thus instructed the latter to draft 
a Bill for the amendment of the Concessions Ordinance in accordance with 
the views expressed by Mr. Hunt on behalf of the West African Chamber
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of Commerce. The changes which the amendment sought to bring about were 
that:
a. notice of concession which was the first legal step in an appli­
cation for a certificate of validity should not be filed until 
the Registrar was satisfied that a stamp duty in respect thereof 
had been paid;
b. no person should for the purpose of a sale, barter exchange,
or export, cut or fell any of the trees including mahogany 
which were to be specified under the Schedules to the Amended 
Ordinance without holding a written Concession from a native 
having the legal capacity to concede such a concession, and 
unless he had obtained a timber cutting licence costing £30 
from the Governor;
c. none of the specified trees under the Schedule should be felled 
without the written consent of a District Commissioner if the 
girth of the specified tree be less than six feet at the height 
of six feet from the ground:
d. nobody should collect uncultivated rubber without being the 
holder of a written concession from the native having the power
to grant the right _ and unles he obtained a rubber collect­
ing licence costing £30 from the Governor.
The operation of these laws, if they were introduced, were to be 
strictly confined to the Gold Coast Colony, and native holders of land 
upon which timber or rubber was growing, and in respect of which no conces­
sions were conceded, were to be exempted from the restrictions imposed
under (b) and (d). These changes were to be introduced immediately,
60X
pending a forestry legislation which was under consideration.
When the draft on the lines outlined above was presenWto the Legis­
lative Council, it met with strong opposition from timber merchants a n d N 
the native authorities. Although the amendment sought was virtually 
based on the recommendations of the West African Chamber of Commerce, 
certain aspects of it did not please them. They took exception to the 
inclusion of the species "Kaku" or "fillacopsis Kaku" in the protected 
trees under the Schedule to the Amending Ordinance. They alleged that 
the use of such trees as fuel and as props in the underground works of 
the mine was indispensable in their mining operations.
Following these protests, an informal meeting between Governor Rodger 
and unofficial members of the Legislative Council was arranged. As a- 
result of the meeting, the Governor decided not to proceed with the amend­
ment of the Ordinance. Action on it should be delayed pending the Report
From Governor to the Secretary of State, 31 August, 1907, C.0.879/99.
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of a Commission to be set up to investigate the problems arising out
0Q2
of the timber industry. In spite of the fact that Governor Rodger
was not enthusiastic about an immediate legislation to deal with these
problems, the Acting Governor who deputised for him during his absence
on leave in England, was favourably disposed towards immediate legislation.
He thought it was no longer desirable to delay action on preventing the
cutting of immature timber. For this reason, in place of amending the
Concessions Ordinance, he proposed a short legislation, the Timber Protection
603
Bill, 1907, for the regulation of certain aspects of the timber trade.
The objective of the Ordinance was expressed in its draft memorandum
as being to prevent the "wanton destruction of immature trees which possess
economic value". The most important of its five provisions was
Section 3. It provided:
"3(1) No person shall without the permission in writing of a District 
Commissioner cut or fell any growing timber the girth of which is 
smaller than the following dimensions:
a. in the case of timber trees in Part I of the Schedule to this 
Ordinance, a girth of nine feet at a point one foot above the 
convergence of the buttress roots, if any, or at the base where 
there are no such roots;
b. in the case of timber trees in Part II of the Schedule to this
Ordinance a girth of four feet six inches, at a point one foot
above the convergence of the buttress roots, if any, or at the 
base where there are no such roots;
c. in the case of timber trees in Part III of the Schedule to this
Ordinance a girth of three feet at a point one foot above the
base".
Section 3(2) imposed a penalty of a fine not exceeding £50 for the 
contravention of any of the above provisions, and on the second or subsequent 
conviction for any breach, to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
six months.
These provisions imposed the same restrictions to which timber merchants 
and mining companies took exception under the proposed amendments to 
the Concessions Ordinance. It was therefore, not surprising that similar 
objections were raised again. The inclusion of the species "fillacopsis 
Kaku" in the protected trees to which miners had raised objection was 
once again included in the Protected Species. As in the past, the West 
African Chamber of Commerce argued that if miners were prevented from
602
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cutting this particular tree, for use as props in the underground workings,
the mines could become exceedingly dangerous underground, owing to the
SOS
lack of support in the slopes and other workings.
The natives on the other hand, as on previous occasions, attacked 
the Ordinance on several grounds. Mensah Sarbah, a member of the Legisla­
tive Council strongly opposed the Bill. He argued that the Bill should 
deal only with the timber trade which was principally responsible for 
the cutting of immature trees. He pointed out that the use of immature 
trees which natives considered suitable for erecting houses, making furniture 
and for other purposes, did not constitute a "wanton destruction", and
the fact that any of the trees specified under the law had been cut for
000
any such purposes ought not to be made an offence. In as much as
a parent did not teach or guide his child to do what was right by convicting 
him of an offence, Sarbah pleaded, even so ought not the government, 
which was to a large extent standing "in loco parentis" to the native 
chiefs and their people, make convicts of them through this sort of legis­
lation. He questioned the soundness of a law which made a land "owner" 
a criminal by reason only that he made use of what was his own. He argued 
that the Bill in that form would have the effect of restricting native
enterprise by imposing limitations on the people's right to cut wood
« 607
for various uses.
Sarbah's arguments boiled down to the proposition that where immature
trees were cut by a native for domestic and other uses, this.should not
be made unlawful. If, on the other hand, such trees were cut for export,
then such an act could be made unlawful. The problem, as the Acting
Governor Bryan had rightly pointed out was that, it was impracticable
to distinguish between immature timber felled for export and that felled
008
for local use. In either case, a valuable asset was destroyed.
Stressing the need for such a law, Bryan said:
" . . .this Ordinance has been passed with the object of dealing 
with the most urgent of the many questions connected with forestry 
in this colony. It is an endeavour to protect the chiefs against 
their ignorance and cupidity which prompt them to hand over the 
exploitation of their tribal land - generally through the medium 
of a native lawyer - to unscrupulous contractors and middle men.
I question whether a 'land owner' of any importance in the sense 
in which Mr. Sarbah uses the word . . . is to be found in the Colony;. . 
The chiefs and councillors are merely trustees for tribal lands, and 
if they neglect or abuse their trust to the detriment of their succes­
sors and people, I consider that their responsibilities should be
605
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brought home to them as provided in the Ordinance by a fine and 
on subsequent, offence, by imprisonment".
The interesting point to be observed about Bryan's arguments was 
that they echoed and reflected the views and policies of Sir William 
Maxwell on the control function of chiefs in the land tenure systems.
The difficulties associated with this kind of legislation had an irony 
that while the government had consistently proceeded by making laws which 
it believed would be in the best interest of the natives and British 
trade and industry, one often found both natives and British industrialists 
on the same side opposing such measures, although their grounds for object- 
ion might differ. Not infrequently, the declared objectives of the law 
had been the protection of the native against the sharp practices of 
certain European firms and native merchants and lawyers. The truth of 
the matter, as pointed out already, was that although the latter were 
natives and theoretically represented native opinion, their economic 
and commercial interests coincided with those of the former. This fact 
affords explanation for the main reason why the native capitalist and 
the European industrialists often found themselves on the same side on 
issues concerning enactments on lands.
The Colonial Government often found itself in this sort of difficulty 
because it seemed unable to recognise the fact that those who needed 
protection were not necessarily the traditional authorities, but the 
ordinary citizen. To protect them adequately, their support was needed. 
This support could be obtained if they were enlightened through public 
education so as to prepare their minds for the changes sought to be intro­
duced!. Even if government officials made statements implying the recogni­
tion of this fact, no practical steps were taken to devise the means 
by which this sort of education could be undertaken. Under these circum­
stances, when measures which would have afforded some measure of protection 
to the ordinary man were opposed by the native middle class whose economic
interests might be injuriously affected by those measures, the ordinary
the
man, who looked up to/former for leadership and protection, being ignorant 
supported them.
As on previous occasions, the objections raised to the Ordinance 
led to its provisions not being implemented. On account of the protests 
Governor Rodger, who was away in England before the Ordinance was enacted, 
regretted that it was passed without awaiting either the Report of Mr.
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Thompson or the Report of the Timber Commission appointed by the acting 
Governor Bryan. He was thus in favour of its amendment or repeal
altogether so that its general provisions could be incorporated in a 
Forest Ordinance. On the basis of these recommendations to the Secretary 
of State, the application of the Forest Protection Ordinance was suspended, 
pending the Reports of the Timber Commission and H. N. Thompson's investi­
gations.
The Reports referred to above provided the guidelines for the future 
legislation on forests on the Gold Coast. As will become clear from 
this discussion, a close look at these Reports would reveal that the 
nature of the responsibilities involved in a scheme of forest administration 
considered necessary for the Gold Coast at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, was far too sophisticated for the chiefs and traditional elders 
to discharge efficiently. The performance of the functions involved 
would require competent personnel of surveyors, foresters and an educated 
clerical staff. For this reason, it would be unrealistic to entrust 
traditional authorities and chiefs with that responsibility. In order 
to appreciate the duties which the scheme would entail and the reasons 
why in our opinion, the function of forest administration should have 
been left in the hands of state agencies, we shall take a close look 
at Thompson's .Report on the subject of forestry administration in the 
Gold Coast and his guidlines which were based on the Southern Nigerian 
experience.
ii. The Thompson Report
As a result of the problems arising out of the timber industry discussed
above, Mr. H. N. Thompson, Conservator of Forests for Southern Nigeria, 
t>V)
was invited the Gold Coast Government in 1904 and charged with the 
task of investigating and reporting on forestry matters on the Gold Coast
and to rrecammoid the lines on which a forest leigslation should proceed.
At the same time, the Acting Governor Bryan had also appointed a Commission
to investigate and report on the subject of forest legislation and the
timber industry. Thompson's task was rendered easier by the fact that 
conditions prevailing in Southern Nigeria were similar to those in the
Dispatch from Rodgers to Secretary of State, 17 June, 1908, C.O. 
879/99. Mr. H. N. Thompson was the Conservator of Rorests for 
Southern Nigeria who was required to investigate and report on 
forestry matters in the Gold Coast.
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Gold Coast.
In addition to submitting to the government his written observations
on what he had found fro'm his inquiry in the Gold Coast Colony, he supplied
to the latter the guidelines for the organisation of forest administration
610
in Southern Nigeria for which he was responsible. The guidelines
prescribed the duties and responsibilities of the senior and junior staff.
It laid down rules for the supervision, examination and collection of 
information on plants of the forest, their analysis and reports thereon.
The result of such information would determine policy on conservation, 
the selection of particular species for protection and questions relating 
to afforestation.
According to the Southern Nigerian guidelines, forest administration 
was the responsibility of a senior and a subordinate staff. The main 
duties of the senior staff consisted of supervision, the analysis of 
data and information, and the submission of reports. There were Assistant 
Conservators of Forest of the first and second grades, having the responsi­
bility of examining forests situated in the areas within their charge during
the dry season. It was their duty to submit proposals for the reservation
611
of the most important of such forest land under their care. Thus
if the Gold Coast was to adopt the same scheme of forest administration 
and management, then the qualified staff would have to be found to discharge 
these responsibilities.
In examining the forest with a view to making proposals for forest 
reservation, the guidelines required special attention to be paid to 
areas covered with a growth of high forest that did not appear to have 
been previously felled by the natives for farming purposes. Out of such 
places, the areas to be selected for reservation should be seen to contain 
a fair proportion of any or all of certain specified species numbering 
nine plants. Also important was the identification of specimens of flowers, 
fruits and leaves of plants. All such plants as could be of economic 
value were required to be identified and variously labelled as follows:
a. the date of collection;
b. the locality oh District name of the forest or the nearest 
village, whether growing in a dense forest or open forest, on 
hills or in valleys; and
c. the colour of the flower and its native name.
All specimens so collected would have to be serially numbered and
610
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the flowers and leaves procured from the same treee should all bear 
the same number. All collections of plants, fruits, seeds and other 
articles of minor forest produce were to be handed over to the District 
Commissioner with a written request that they should be forwarded 
to the Director of the Botanical Gardens, Kew, in London.
According to the guidelines provided by Thompson, one of the import­
ant duties which a forest officer would have to perform was the investiga­
tion of the sylvicultural requirements of the most important species 
of plants growing in the forest under his charge, paying special attention 
to some specified species of plants. Information concerning their rate 
of growth, whether they were evergreen or belonged to the class of deciduous 
trees that shed their leaves annually, was to be collected. Storing 
information on these matters was regarded as the most important aspect 
of the organisation of forest administration because the formulation 
of policy and decision making about the way in which forest resources 
should be exploited, protected and preserved depended on the accuracy 
and scientific analysis of such data.
With regard to ascertaining the rate of growth of plants, the Thompson
guidelines required that certain procedures should be followed. The
main thing to ascertain was ..Whether the concentric rings found in the
wood concerned were annual or biennial. The Thompson Report noted that
deciduous trees generally showed well-marked annual period of rapid growth
in the form of rings in their woods. Although evergreen trees often
did the same, there was normally no means of ascertaining whether the
rings formed annually or not. The safe procedure for finding out, the
guidelines said, was to compare a number of rings in the wood of every
young tree with the age of trees estimated from other known evidence,
such as the number of years that might have elapsed since t;he area on
which the young plants were growing was last cleared, and the time that
612
had elapsed since it was abandoned.
Similarly, the correspondence between the ring and the age could be dis­
covered from planted trees, the age of which were known. If the average 
number of rings and the age could be found out from this evidence, it 
might be learnt that the consecutive number of rings were put on during 
each year. In such a case, the data might be sufficient to ascertain 
the age of trees of the same species from an enumeration of the rings
6 1 2  T K ' AIbid.
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alone. The correspondence between the rings and the age having been 
established, the age of any particular plant of the same species could 
be discovered by counting the number of rings along two or three selected 
radii of a log of stump and taking the average. The rate of growth could 
then be established by counting the number of rings occurring along each 
inch of radius. The same method could be used to find out the rate of 
growth of the different species and the life of the tree. The Report 
warned that for data of this kind to be of scientific value, they should 
be procured from the average of a large number of observations and the 
peculiarities of each species in that respect would have to be ascertained 
separately.
The purpose of the exercise outlined above was to ascertain the 
condition of the gradation of the age classes with reference to any par­
ticular species. As pointed out by Thompson, in a well-stocked tropical 
forest, the girth of the trees may, with a fair degree of approximation 
be taken as directly proportional to the age of the tree; therefore, 
if the girth of the various sizes are equally spaced out between the 
plants of the smallest size and the average size of the mature tree, 
a convenient workable scale could be arrived at. The classification 
of the ages into young, middle-aged, mature and subsequent determination 
of the proportion existing among the number of plants found to fall into 
each of these classes would be quite sufficient to indicate whether or
S13
not the age gradations greatly depart from the normal type.
The value of this classification into age groups of plants was that 
it enabled the forest officer to offer sound advice to government through 
the Conservator of Forests, on forest reservation. For instance, by 
this classification, if the number of plants in the youngest and middle- 
age classes were found to be less than that in the mature class, then 
the forest, so far as any particular species under discussion was concerned, 
was over-mature and great care would have to be taken in its exploitation. 
If, on the other hand, the number of plants found in the youngest class 
was very much in excess of that in the middle-age class and the number 
in the latter class was in turn in excess of that found in the mature 
class, then the age gradations should be regarded as approaching closely 
to the normal type. In such a case a large number of mature trees would 
be available for exploitation without running the risk of encroaching 
upon the growing stock.
Loc.cit.
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These classifications and the identification of growth rate and 
age of plants were thus of vital importance in the selection of forests 
for reservation and the formulation of rules for regulating the cutting 
of plants in the forest.. In selecting forest for reservation, secondary 
growth which had been left untouched for such long periods that it had 
had time to grow up again into high trees very nearly as good as the 
original ones that were not felled, should be preferred to young secondary 
growth. Thompson recommended that apart from selecting forests for reserva­
tion on the basis of the classification outlined above, forests growing
within reasonable distance of streams capable of floating timber should
•ftv
also be chosen in preference to those inaccessible exploitation.
The rationale for this recommendation was obviously to prevent many roads 
from being constructed through the forests and thus destroying forests 
in the process.
Among the factors which Thompson recommended should be taken into 
account in selecting forests for reservation were the system of shifting 
cultivation practised under the traditional system and the requirements 
of the local population. When the Forest Officer was submitting proposals 
for forest reservation, he was duty-bound to ascertain and make sure 
that sufficient forest land would still be available to the natives for 
their agricultural operations. He would have to make enquiries regarding 
the size of villages in the area proposed for reservation, the approximate 
area required by each village in each year for cultivation, the length 
of the farming rotation, that meant the ascertainment of the number of 
crops raised on newly-developed farms before they were again abandoned 
to forest growth.
Apart from submitting reports to the Conservator of Forest on all 
relevant information concerning the forest as outlined above, the Forest 
Officer was to have other important functions. He was to exercise adequate 
supervision over the workings of timber concessions in their respective 
areas. He was to check as often as possible, work done by his subordinate 
forest rangers. In this regard, he ought to make frequent tours. He 
would have to keep watch on rubber nurseries and young plantation, and 
make adequate provisions for their annual extension and preservation.
He was to be responsible for reporting to the Conservator of Forest the 
infringement of minimum girth rules and any cases of undersized felling 
of timber by concessionaires. He would have to bring to the attention 
of any guilty concessionaire carelessness in felling causing injury to 
young growth. It was his duty to check wasteful logging and to inspect
312
plantations made by concessionaires to replace trees felled by them.
He would have to ensure that the species planted were really the same
type as-those felled and that they were properly spaced. To be sure that
trees felled were replaced, the Forest Officer would be required to inspect
the books of concessionaires so as to check the number of trees and logs
shown with the numbers actually found on the stumps in the forest.
In addition to his guidelines, Thompson made certain observations
on the controversial Timber Protection Ordinance. On the basis of the
information received from the principal mining stations he visited, Thompson
came to the conclusion that some of the criticisms levelled at the Timber
614
Protection Ordinance were well founded. He was of the view that
the number of species protected under the Ordinance was far too ambitious.
He observed that they included practically one-third of the arboreal
vegetation of the forest in the western province and Southern Ashanti.
As far as native farms were concerned, he observed, the protection accorded
to trees would result in so many of them being left on the farms as to
render the cultivation of crops under them a precarious matter on account
615
of the amount of shade to which they would be exposed.
He noted, however, that the Bill did not go far enough to protect
the forest as it omitted certain species the protection of which was
imperative. Thompson described past attempts at forest legislation in
the Gold Coast as crude, but well-intentioned efforts to solve problems
of forest conservancy. He pointed out that long experience in the tropics
had shown that it was far better to adopt intensive protection in certain
selected areas as reserves, and to introduce only the slightest restriction
616
to the bulk of the remaining forest. He thus recommended the reduction
of protected species from 14 to six. He would not advise restriction 
on mining firms to cut wood for fuel or timber for mine props. In his 
opinion, such restrictions could only be justified if it was shown that 
such cutting was causing the destruction of the forest, and bringing 
about denudation of hillsides or causing diminution of water supply.
His written observations, suggestions and recommendations including 
the guidelines for the organisation of forest administration, were submitted 
to the Gold Coast Government to form a basis for a comprehensive forest 
legislation.
The treatment of Thompson's guidelines in such detail is meant not 
only to illuminate the nature of the work and responsibilities which
Dispatch of Governor Rodger to Secretary of State, 17 June, 1908,
_ C.0.879/99, Enclosure No. 3-
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forest administration would involve, but also to demonstrate that the 
scheme of forest administration envisaged would be far too sophisticated 
for the illiterate native chief to manage in a meaningful manner. In 
predominantly illiterate societies of the Gold Coast, the chief could 
not be expected to find the necessary qualified staff without which the 
performance of the functions connected with the organisation of forest 
administration described above would be impossible. The case for traditional 
authority administration of forests was made even weaker by the fact 
that the chiefs were generally ignorant and had shown themselves averse 
to concerning themselves with matters relating to forest protection, 
preservation and conservancy. Their unwillingness and inability as we 
have seen, to exercise the powers conferred on them under the Native 
Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883 to make bye-laws for the preservation 
of forests and protection of water-courses were reflective of their general 
attitude to forest conservation.
The success of a scheme of forest administration on the lines suggested 
by Thompson would therefore appear to depend on considerable governmental 
participation. It was only the government who could obtain and maintain 
the qualified staff of clerks, surveyors, forest officers, foresters 
and forest rangers which were essential for the efficient organisation 
and administration of the scheme. The Colonial Government began to shift 
from policies by which chiefs were left to make decisions concerning 
forest reservation and the protection of its resources.
The development of a new policy towards greater governmental control
was reflected in the amendments which were proposed to the Concessions
Ordinance and the introduction of the Forest Protection Bill. The speech
on the Forest Bill by the Acting Governor Bryan in the Legislative
about
Council, reflected and echoed Sir William Maxwell's views •"/ policy on 
617
such matters. The former was so keen on basing the proposed forest
legislation on sound policies that he set up a Commission to enquire
613
into the timber trade. The Commission's Report was intended to be
a supplement to that of H. M. Thompson. As we shall see presently, its 
Report and recommendations were reflective of the growing realisation 
that greater governmental controls would be necessary if the objectives 
of land and forest policies were to be achieved.
See Dispatch from Rodger to Secretary of State, 17 June, 1908. C.O. 
879/99.
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iii. The Pennington Report on the Timber Industry
The Commission's terms of reference were that it should enquire
as to whether any of the provisions of the Concessions Ordinance 1900,
and the Ordinances amending the same, had a tendency to place holders
of timber concessions at a disadvantage in competition with other persons
in the timber trade. It was to find out what system of registration
of timber cutters was desirable and feasible. The Commission was required
to recommend what type of legislation, if any, was required to correct
619
abuses and hardship which might be brought to its attention.
The Commission sat at Axim and Secondi, the two principal timber- 
cutting centres of the time. Its terms of reference were circulated among 
timber cutters and all known timber merchants. In response to this, 
memoranda were received from various trade associations and individuals 
interested in the question. From the perusal of these memoranda and 
oral evidence of those appearing before it, the Commission found that 
the prevailing laws governing timber concessions were generally disregarded. 
The Commission found that the provisions of the Concessions Ordinance 
and its amendments were deliberately and systematically avoided by the 
majority of persons engaged in the timber industry. As a result, the
Government lost substantial sums which tould have accrued to it as revenue
020
under the Stamp Ordinance of 1889.
Among other findings of the Commission was the discovery that there 
were many timber cutters having no licence under the Concessions Ordinance, 
and that the majority of people in the timber trade were under no control 
as to the way in which timber should be felled. This resulted in indis­
criminate devastation of the forest, which might prove very dangerous 
to the climatic conditions and water resources of the country in the 
future. The three members of the Commission were agreed that one way 
of dealing with the problem was the registration and licensing of persons 
dealing in timber, and that trade marks should be assigned to each in 
their several branches. But they were unable to agree on the form and 
scope of the proposed timber cutter's licence.
Mr. Hunt, a representative of the West African Branch of the Liverpool 
Chamber of Commerce, and a member of the Commission, took the view that 
no cutter's licence should be issued to any person unless he held a concession
Ibid., Enclosure No. 5
Ibid., Ordinance, No. 12 of 1899.
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duly registered and stamped under the Concessions Ordinance. He thought
this would prevent to a large extent, trespassers cutting on other people’s
possessions, and would also make the working of any future forestry depart-
rnent, especially with regard to reafforestation, very much more simple.
It would also make it possible for large tracts of land hitherto unsurveyed,
to be surveyed and tied on to government datum points.
Strongly advising that the Government would have to assume full
control over the forests, he warned:
’’The forests are assets to the Colony which could no longer be neg­
lected or allowed to be wasted. Unless the government is prepared 
to take, at once, such steps as are necessary to acquire and> create 
large forest reserves, in order to preserve at least some part of 
the valuable timber in the Colony, I see no alternative to the estab­
lishment of the scheme I have advocated". 621
H. M. Thompson whose views were sought on the form and scope of the proposed 
timber licence agreed with Mr. Hunt that every timber cutter should be 
licensed, even where he was the owner of the land on which the timber
to be cut was growing. It was his opinion that if exceptions were made,
622
the enforcement of any laws on the subject would prove difficult.
The Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Justice Pennington and Mr. Coghiil, 
on the other hand were of the opinion that if the views of Mr. Hunt and 
Mr. Thompson were adopted, it would have the effect of practically exclud­
ing the natives from cutting timber for sale or export. They noted that 
under the prevailing law, natives had the right to mine and cut timber 
with or without a licence. If all persons, including natives, were required 
to take out a licence, it would amount to the reversal of the policy 
of protecting the natives in their admitted rights of property in the
land, as requiring them to take out a licence might compel them to work
623
their timber through concessionaires. They noted that a great deal
of timber cutting for export was in the hands of small cutters, and had
been so for the past 12 or 15 years, and there was no evidence to show
that such small cutters carried out their business in a dishonest manner.
For these reasons, they believed that nothing should be done to throw
the timber business into the hands of European companies who would probably
take large tracts of land without any immediate intention of working
624
them, as had been the case with mining concessions.
621 TK’.Ibid.
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In accepting the Report, the Governor, John Rodger, agreed with
g
the majority view of Mr. Justice Pennington and Mr. Cc^iill. Disagreeing
with Mr. Hunt nd Mr. Thompson's views on the matter, the Governor argued
that having regard -to the proprietary rights of the natives which had
been formally recognised, the views taken by the former were more consonant
625
with justice than those of the latter.
It should, however, be remarked that for the law to require all 
persons to take out a licence before cutting timber would not necessarily 
mean that ownership of the land was being challenged. A man may own land 
andbe entitled to do as he pleases with his own; but his exercise of 
rights thereof can always be made subject to the general laws of the 
society in which he is owner of the land. Thus, if in the Gold Coast 
Colony, it was found that the way in which timber was being cut would 
prove injurious to the interest of the society at large, it was competent 
for the government of the day to make laws to control the way in which 
timber might be cut. If taking out licences was found to be one of the 
ways in which abuses in the system might be checked and a general law 
to bring this into effect was passed, this would not necessarily be incon­
sistent with rights of ownership.
Perhaps, the problem which might be associated with the introduction 
of such a measure would be the difficulty which the predominantly illiterate 
natives would face in going through the bureaucratic procedures and satis-
626
fying the conditions which would enable them obtain the prescribed licences. 
This difficulty might lead to the results which the Governor, Mr. Coghill 
and Mr. Justice Pennington feared. But this would not necessarily mean 
that the law was challenging the ownership rights of the natives. Most 
probably, it was the problem which would accompany the introduction of 
the measure that the Governor and the majority in the Commission had 
in contemplation when advancing their arguments, although this was not 
brought out clearly. Whatever might be the merits or demerits of the 
opposing views on the issue, this Commission's Report, the guidelines 
and the observations of H.M. Thompson, convinced the government that 
a large measure of governmental control over the forests was essential 
for its efficient administration. The need for the establishment of 
a forest department with the responsibility of organising forest administra-
625 Ibid.
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tion became patently obvious. The duties which forest administration on 
the scale provided by Thompson's guidelines entailed made it imperative 
that government officials with the training and know-how be employed 
to perform the functions implied by the scheme. As will be seen in the 
discussion of the Forest Bill below, the recognition that increasing 
governmental control over the forests was a necessity made the basic 
principles upon which the new Forest Bill was premised, bear many of 
the features of Sir William Maxwell's Public Lands Bill of 1897.
C . The Forest Ordinance of 1911
The Ordinance reproduced what Sir Hugh Clifford referred to as "many
627
of the objectionable features of the Public Lands Bill of 1897".
Its preamble declared that the Ordinance was to make provision for the
establishment of forest reserves and their conservation and management,
and to regulate dealing with forest produce. It stated its objectives
as being to make provision for the beneficial working of the undeveloped
lands of the colony and for the preservation of forest resources.
It was provided under Section 4(1) of the Ordinance that it should
be lawful for the Governor to declare by an Order in Council, any land
which appeared to be unoccupied shubject to forest reservation from the
date specified in such Order. As long as any such Order was in force,
it should m o t  be lawful for any person without the consent of a Reserve
Settlement Officer to be appointed by the Governor, to take timber,
collect rubber, or make any new clearing within the areas specified in 
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the Order. Any person contravening this provision was to be made
liable to a fine not exceeding twenty-five pounds, or to imprisonment
not exceeding three months, and any timber collected in contravention
62§
of this Section should be forfeited.
i. The Constitution of Forest Reserves and Restrictions as to Use
The Ordinance conferred power on the Governor in Council, by an
Order, to constitute any land which was unoccupied from a date specified
630
in the Order, a forest reserve. Section 11(2) of the Ordinance carefully
provided that:
"The ownership of any such forest reserve shall not be altered by 
its constitution as a forest reserve".
It provided that every such forest reserve shall be managed by either:
627
Secret Dispatch from Sir Hugh Clifford to the Secretary of State on
_OQ the Land Question, 26 December, 1917, C.O. 96/583.
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a. the owner or owners under the direction of the Forest Department;
b. the government for the benefit of the owner or owners; or
031
c. the government under lease from the owner or owners.
In the case of b. two-fifths of the gross receipts should be paid
to the owners thereof. The Ordinance left at the option of the owner
or owners, the method by which a forest reserve should be managed. But
if within six months of the creation of the reserve the owner or owners
did not opt for any particular method, then the Government could select
632
any of the methods described above.
The forest reserves when created under the Ordinance, were to be 
made subject to certain restrictions as to use. The Section imposing 
such restrictions provided:
”13(1) The Governor in Council may, by Order, prohibit the follow­
ing acts, namely:
a. the clearing for cultivation of any land in any forest
reserve which was not in cultivation or cleared for culti­
vation at the constitution of such reserve;
b. the taking and collecting of any forest produce specified 
in the Order in any forest reserve;
c. the sale, offering for sale, purchase, possession and 
export of any forest produce specified in the Order from 
any forest reserve;
d. the sale, purchase, possession and export of any forest 
produce specified in the Order, taken, collected, or 
prepared in contravention of this Ordinance or any rule 
or order thereunder;
e. the sale, offering for sale, purchase and export of any 
forest produce specified in the Order, taken, collected, 
prepared, possessed, sold or purchased in Ashanti or 
the Northern Territories in contravention of the law 
for the time being in force therein respectively".
Any person violating any of these provisions should be liable on
conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds, and in default, to imprison-
633
ment for a term not exceeding six months. In what would appear to
be a restriction on the rights of traditional authorities to concede 
timber concessions in reserved areas, the Ordinance provided that no 
concession should be granted and no lease should be made with respect
631
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to any forest reserve without the consent of the Governor.
634
Similarly,
no licence to take forest produce from a reserve should be granted except
635
in accordance with the rules made under the Ordinance.
It will be observed that some of the main features of the Ordinance
had a lot in common with Sir William Maxwell's 1897 abortive Public Lands
Bill. Like the latter Bill, the present Ordinance revived what Sir Hugh
Clifford would call "the old heresy" of recognising the existence of
unoccupied lands in the Gold Coast and declaring them to be lands which
636
were not used for permanent cultivation. The restrictions imposed
under Sections 11, 13 and 14 to the effect that natives were not to exercise 
their inherent rights of collecting forest produce in forest reserves 
without the consent of the Settlement Officer, and that the land authorities 
were not to exercise their dispositive rights in respect of such.reserves 
except by the permission of the Governor, reopened the old arguments 
about the rights of the Government to legislate on lands. As will become 
clear from this discussion, the so-called "objectionable features" of 
the Ordinance formed the basis for native opposition to the Bill. European 
firms and merchants who also feared that governmental controls on the 
felling of timber might affect their profit margin, as was the normal 
practice on such occasions, joined the native lawyers and traditional 
authorities in opposing the Bill,
ii. Opposition to the Bill
Even before the Bill had been published, it attracted criticism 
from several quarters. When the draft was made, its features reflected 
the changing attitude of the Government towards greater controls over 
land and its resources. It did not, for example, make provision for 
the possible participation by chiefs in the organisation of forest admini­
stration. By the time the draft was ready, William Brandford Griffith, 
Junior, had returned from Jamaica as Chief Justice of the Gold Coast.
Upon seeing the draft, he addresed a letter to the Government criticising
63
the measure in such strong terms that the draft was immediately withdrawn.
Clifford's- Statement on the Land Question, op.cit. See Section 2(iv) of 
the Ordinance under which "unoccupied land" was defined as land which 
was not used for permanent habitation, or had not been cultivated for 
ten years.
Sir Hugh Clifford's Statement on the Land Question, op.cit. The Chief 
Justice was obviously influenced by the unexpected objections in the past 
to the Crown Lands Ordinance, in which he had a hand, and Sir William 
Maxwell's Public Lands Bill.
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This was just a prelude to the serious objections which were to be raised 
later against the Bill.
The final draft which was brought before the Legislative Council 
in 1911 did not contain some of the original features about which Chief 
Justice Brandford Griffith had complained. For instance, as we have 
seen, the 1911 Ordinance carefully provided that the constitution of 
a forest into a reserve did not affect ownership rights and gave chiefs 
the option of choosing the method by which the forest reserves should 
be managed. These concessions did not satisfy the opponents of the Ordin­
ance. The Forest Ordinance thus reopened the whole question about the 
Government's right to legislate over lands in the colony.
An article in the 14th October, 1904, edition of the West African 
Mail, foreshadowed European merchants' objections to the Ordinance.
In fact, before the Forest Bill of the Gold Coast had been passed, H. N. 
Thompson was preparing a working plan for a proposed Forestry Department for 
British West Africa. This plan was to follow a scheme of supervision 
planned for Southern Nigeria in order to enforce regulations concerning 
the exploitation of forest resources. In an address to the Liverpool 
Chamber of Commerce in London in 1904, Thompson explained the objectives
of the plan and outlined the sort of rules which might be introduced
638
so as to protect the West African forests. The measures outlined
by Thompson were similar to his guidelines and recommendations to the
Gold Coast Government, the main principles of which were embodied in
the Gold Coast Ordinance.
Mr. Hazzledine, as a representative of the African Section of the
Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, criticised the plan in the above mentioned
paper. Objecting to the plan, Hazzeldine accused Thompson of having,
like most Indian servicemen, made the palpable mistake of applying Indian
conditions to those of West Africa, which were quite dissimilar. Hazzledine
argued that what Thompson saw as the dangers of denudation, the perils
of the encroaching desert and desert fires, while sound in Upper Burma,
"may be quite wrongly applied to the conditions prevailing in the dense
tropical West African forest belt, which is gifted with the proverbial
639
thousand and one differences, mostly unascertained".
European merchants' view of the matter was what Mr. Hazzledine expressed
Address delivered to Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, 19 September, 
1904. See a lengthy discussion of this by J. E. Casely Hayford 
in his book, The Truth about the West African Land Question, 
London, 1917, 43-48.
The West African Mail, 14 October, 1904.
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in the paper that it was not the duty of the government to look so far 
ahead. No human foresight was strong enough to "pierce the veil of years 
like that". The duty of the government as regarding existing timber 
rights, he said, was to assist the natives and the traders by every possible 
means in converting into national wealth whatever timber existed. For 
the natives, this meant civilisation, for the traders, it meant prosperity, 
and as a consequence of both, it meant revenue for the Government.
Mr. Hazzledine's reaction to the proposed measures for the control 
and preservation of forests in British West Africa was reflective of 
European merchants' attitude to business enterprise in the Gold Coast.
As Governor Sir William Brandford Griffith had pointed out, European 
and British subjects regarded the Gold Coast as a country "to make money 
in, and to escape from as soon as their object is accomplished".
With such an attitude, their primary objective in the Gold Coast was 
profit maximisation. To them, what happened in the forests in the future 
did not seem to matter much.
Unlike the Colonial Government European entrepreneurs were not account­
able to anyone. But the former, while it was undoubtedly in the colony 
to protect British economic interests, was playing socio-economic and 
political roles. This imposed an obligation on it to protect and preserve 
the economic resources of the colony, and therefore the long-term political 
and economic interests of the Imperial Government. It was for such reasons 
that the Government ought to, and in fact did look so far ahead in project­
ing forest policy into the future. As Mr. E. D. Morel, the editor of 
the West African Mail, had urged the Government in the paper when making 
a case for the introduction of the Forest Ordinance:
"The duty of the British overlord is an obvious one. From the highest
standpoint, he is bound to protect those over whom he exercises 
trusteeship from the consequences of European speculation on the 
one hand and native folly on the other".
Leaders of the native community did not, however, appreciate the 
distinction between objectives of the government and those of European 
entrepreneurs in the colony. They thus supported the views of the latter
See Brandford Griffith to Ripon, 31 October, 1892, C.O. 879/39,
No. 453.
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See the 14 October, 1910, edition of the paper quoted by J. E. Casely
Hayford in his book, Gold Coast Land Tenure and the Forest Bill,
A Review of the Situation, London, 1911, 12.
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and opposed the introduction of the Forest Ordinance. J. E. Casely Hayford 
who had succeeded J. M. Surbah as the President of the A.R.P.S., lent 
his support to the view of Hazzledine on what forest policy in West Africa 
ought to be. In his objections to the introduction of the Forest Ordinance, 
he agreed with the views expressed by the latter that it was not the 
duty of the government "to look so far ahead", and that there was no
need for forest reservation and the protection of some species of plants
• 4- a* • 642in West Africa.
Casely Hayford argued that for many years, a good trade in forest
produce in the colony had been induced by and depended on the energetic
co-operation of the indigenous people. It was therefore a questionable
policy for the Government to place restrictions and burdens upon their
6 *^ 3
use by the creation of forest reserves. It may well be that Casely
Hayford was genuinely suspicious about the Government's intentions in 
assuming some measure of controls over land and forest management. He 
could not understand why the Government should adopt policies which would 
"prevent the possibility of a landlord class, black or white ever arising 
in a Crown Colony" like the Gold Coast while the concept of landlord 
and tenant relationship was firmly established in the British system 
of tenure.
He expressed his concern about Government's land policy in the following 
words:
"A three-fold danger would seem for the moment to threaten the people 
of the Gold Coast in the enjoyment of their immemorial rights to 
their lands. There is the speculator, fresh from the goldfields 
of South Africa, who, used to a different system of land tenure, 
and impatient of the long-established rights of the people based 
upon their recognised laws and customs, is eager to see such rights 
swept away with a stroke of the pen, and urges the Government to 
declare Gold Coast lands, Crown Lands. There is also the philanthro­
pist, who, as the heaven-born guardian of native interests, would 
restrict the poeple from directly and freely dealing with their 
lands by placing all business negotiations under government control 
or management. There is again, the native landowner who, it is 
alleged, has given cause for government interference, by recklessly 
dealing with interests in his lands. Between these diverging senti­
ments and interests it is possible that_the ultimate result to the 
proprietary rights of the aboriginals / sic / may be overlooked, 
and trouble unintentionally caused". 644
It should be pointed out that there were three other dangers which
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J. E. Casely Hayford, The Truth about the West African Land Question, 
op.cit., 45.
Ibid.
J. E. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Land Tenure and the Forest Billi--A 
Review of the Situation, op..cit., 1.
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Casely Hayford overlooked. The fourth danger was the selfish financial
and economic interests of most of the native middle class of lawyers,
merchants and elite which motivated them to ally themselves with European
entrepreneurs to oppose measures devised to cure some of the ills of
the land tenure system. The fifth danger was the ignorance and cupidity
of the traditional authorities which led them to alienate communal lands
on unreasonable terms. The sixth was the illiteracy and ignorance of
the ordinary citizen, disabilities which prevented them from challenging
the activities of their leaders in the community.
The fifth and sixth dangers were illustrated by an article in a
local paper, The Gold Coast Leader, part of which reads:
"With their present reckless bartering away of their rights in their
ancestral lands by the alluring offers of fat options, the natives 
do not seem to realise when and where to put a stop to the dangers 
they are unconcsciously courting for their prosperity. What provision 
have they made to reserve lands for their own working and profit, 
or those of their children's children, whose civilisation may be 
far ahead of our own some day and who may be disposed to shift for 
themselves in mining and agricultural development and improvements?
Are we going to suffer ourselves to be reduced to the miserable 
status of the proletarian for exploitation purposes by foreign set­
tlers to enrich themselves and make us landless people in the land 
of our own birth? . . . Let us not preach only the gospel of develop­
ment, but let us also practise the lessons of combination and co­
operation that we be not lost in the struggle for existence. We 
do not by the foregoing remarks imply that we are opposed to the 
development of our country by the foreign capitalists. Far from (
it. What we desire is protection from exploitation and confiscation".
The kind of protection called for by the paper could only be accorded
to the natives by the Government, even if not to the extent that one
would have liked. For the native leaders of the community, the middle
class and the traditional authorities as a result of their ignorance
646
and selfish interests as we have pointed out, could not afford such 
protection which would have been inconsistent with their financial and 
economic interests. If Casely Hayford was genuinely seeking the interest 
of the native population, then he made the serious error of overlooking 
the last three dangers mentioned above and which must be regarded as 
the most serious threat to the enjoyment by the natives of their land 
rights.
645 Ibid. My emphasis, pp.9-10, quoted by Casely Hayford.
646 See pp. 85-89 and 120.
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Casely Hayford and his A.R.P.S.' role in the campaign against the 
Forest Bill could thus be seen as due to either:
a. the desire to protect the vested interests of the native middle
class and the traditional authorities;
b. inability to identify the dangers posed by the activities of
the latter; or
c. inability to appreciate the essential dichotomy between the
objectives of the Colonial Government and those of private European 
industrialists and entrepreneurs.
Whichever was the case, the A.R.P.S. and the chiefs mounted a campaign 
against the Forest Ordinance. To discuss the nature and content of the 
protests would mean repeating much of the arguments advanced against 
the Crown and the Public Lands Bills of the 1890s. The same theoretical, 
historical, traditional, political and legal arguments against the previous 
Ordinances were reopened. It would be sufficient for our purposes to 
summarise the main arguments and the reasons given for objecting to the 
introduction of the measure. The protest which began in 1911, culminated 
in a meeting between the A.R.P.S. and the chiefs of Central and Western 
Provinces at the beginning of January 1912.
After sending several petitions similar to those sent against the
1897 Public Land Bill to the Imperial Government, Casely Hayford was
despatched to London in January i912, in order to engage the services
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of solicitors and to lobby the support of some Parliamentarians.
The gist of what was contained in the petitions of protest was the familiar 
assertion that from time immemorial, the control and management of the 
lands had been vested in the people themselves, that the Ordinance was 
in effect an endeavour to attain the same object as was attempted by 
the Lands Bill of 1897. It was contended that there was no deterioration 
of forest land, and under the conditions prevailing at the time, no advantage 
to be derived from forest land administration by an official department 
could justify the Government in assuming an authority which belonged 
to the natives alone.
Casely Hayford engaged the solicitors Messrs. Ashurst, Morris, Crisp 
and Co., and lobbied the support of Mr. Tim Healey, K.C., M.P.
See Casely Hasyford, The Truth about the West African Land Question, 
op.cit., 71.
See Sir H. Conway Belfield, Report on the Legislation Governing 
the Alienation of Native Lands in the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti
with some Observations on the Forest Ordinance, London, 1912, 38.
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It was further argued that if the Ordinance became law, the Government
might assume possession of their lands on the pleas of establishing a
system of forest conservancy and then put them to other uses, such as
alienating the lands to third parties for commercial purposes and thus
arrogating to itself the right and privileges of ownership which were
649
vested only in the tribe. Making a case for entrusting the protection
and reservation of forests to traditional authorities, it was argued 
that:
"The principle of conserving forests is not unknown to the people 
of this country* The chiefs now and again set certain parts of the 
forest for the preservation of game, the collection of forest produce, 
and as sacred groves. This had been done from time immemorial to 
the present day, so that apart from the timber industry and the 
extensive dealings / sic / made by the mining companies for fuel 
and timbering their mines, the forest of the country would be in 
a state of good preservation". 650
It will be observed that this assertion was inconsistent with the
claim that there was no need for forest reservation and the protection
of species in the country. The truth of the matter was that the native
chiefs just could not appreciate the importance of forest preservation
and the risk to the forests, and therefore to the climate of the country.
As Belfield has pointed out in his Report:
"No one of all the persons who gave evidence before me could be
induced to show the smallest interest in the preservation of forests,
or to admit, when the system was explained to him, that the country 
would be any better for its introduction".
Under these circumstances where the native chiefs had no interest 
in forest reservation and without the know-how and adequate staff, which 
we have already argued would be necessary for any meaningful scientific 
organisation of forest administration, it would have been proper for 
the Imperial Government to take a firm stand on the issue. However, 
it did not. Instead, it avoided the issue conveniently by sending Conway 
Belfield to the Gold Coast to enquire into the system of land tenure 
prevailing in the colony and to look into the question of the Forest 
Ordinance, the wording of which had caused fears in the minds of the 
community lest action on the level taken against the Land Bill of 1897 
was taken again.
649 TVi * /-}Ibid.
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From his enquiry, Belfield discovered that objection was taken to
the wording of Sections 2 and 4 of the Ordinance, which referred to "unoccupied
land". This, it was argued, implied the existence of land over which
no right of ownership was claimed or practised. It was claimed that
the use of the term was inconsistent with the fact that there was no
land without an owner in the Gold Coast. These were familiar objections
which Belfield regarded as not of much value, but suggested that in order
652
to allay the fears of the natives, the term should be changed. He 
also found that the chiefs objected to Section 11(3)(c) of the Ordinance 
under which it was provided that if the Government administered a forest 
reserve for the benefit of a native community, two-fifths of the gross 
receipts should be paid to the owner or owners. The natives could not 
see why.three-fifths of the amount should go to the credit of the government. 
The cause of the misunderstanding here was that the Ordinance 
did not specify the use to which the remaining three-fifths of the gross 
receipts were to be put. It was obvious that such monies were to be 
used to meet administration costs.
However, as Belfield has pointed out, it was unwise to specify the
proportion of receipts which should go to the administration or the natives
653
before costs and expenses were determined. He thus recommended the
introduction of a clause which would make it possible to pay the net 
annual revenue, after deduction of administrative costs, to those entitled. 
Referring to Sections 14, 15 and 16 under which various powers were conferred 
on the government to grant leases, licences for timber cutting and to 
make regulations concerning the collection, exploitation and enjoyment 
of forest resources and produce, Belfield noted that while laws should 
be enacted upon lines which would empower the Government to effect the 
conservation of forest land by rules and methods similar to those which 
were being successfully employed elsewhere, it was necessary that attention 
should be paid to the extreme jealousy with which the natives would view 
any provisions which might bear the constructi~on or interference with 
their ancestral rights. He thus recommended that the Forest Ordinance 
should be so altered as to limit its scope to the selection, demarcation, 
constitution and mainenance of reserves, and no terms should be incorporated
652 Ibid., p. 39.
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in its provisions which by expression or implication would confer upon
the Government the power of dealing with reserved areas in a manner not
654
essential to the formation of an effective system of conservancy.
14, 15 and 16 and the abrogation of the power of the Government to grant 
concessions or licences in reserved areas, Belfield recognised the fact 
that the natives had neither the desire nor the know-how to create reserves 
or administer them if created. For this reason, his recommendations 
fell short of suggesting that the Government should leave the matter 
of forest reserves and their administration to the natives as was demanded 
by them. What was noteworthy of Belfield's recommendations and observations 
was that he recognised the fact that left to themselves, the traditional 
authorities would do nothing by way of creating forest reserves or their 
protection. What he recommended was the assumption by the Government 
of these responsibilities with assurances that the things about which 
the natives had apprehension would not occur.
Action on these recommendations and bringing into force a new law
on these lines became the responsibility of Sir Hugh Clifford, who assumed
the Governorship of the Gold Coast in 1912. But as we have seen earlier,
655
the new Governor was committed to a policy of indirect rule. He
was thus strongly opposed to any policy which might antagonise traditional 
authorities, through whom he wished to rule. Therefore, instead of finding 
a way of convincing the people that such measures as forest conservation 
were necessary in their best interest, he put his weight behind the critics 
of the Forest Bill and did nothing to bring it into force, even in an 
amended form. In his 84-page apologia in defence of the stand taken 
by A.R.P.S. and traditional authorities on the land question, he strongly 
criticised what he regarded as the mistaken assumptions upon which the
656
Forest Ordinance and Ordinances of similar nature were based in the past.
He contended that the Forest Bill was introduced because the Legis­
lators fell into the old error of regarding the Gold Coast as a single 
political entity. It ignored alike the individuality of the mutually 
independent political fragments of which the colony was composed. He 
accused the framers of the law of having failed to assess accurately,
It should be noted that although
654 . ,
Ibid., p . 39.
655 See pp. 221-223.
656 See Sir Hugh Clifford, The Land Question, op.cit.
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the extent to which the peculiar and immediate interest of each of the
small native states transcended in importance, in the eyes of the people,
any collective interest which they might also have as inhabitants of
one and the same British possession. Forest administration, he argued,
might be regarded by the Government as essentially necessary in the interest
of the Colony as a whole, but this general interest should not be allowed
to overshadow the fact that the "sacrifices" which conservation would
entail, would have to be made, not by the general population of the Gold
Coast, but by members of certain individual tribes, whose "immemorial
rights of use, as aginst all the rest of the world, will forthwith be
657
taken from them or curtailed".
It will be noted that Clifford's reasoning was in sharp contrast 
to Sir William Maxwell's views on the relationship of the government 
in respect to lands of the colony, lands which the latter regarded as 
common community assets and resources, and therefore public lands. While 
Brandford Griffith and particularly Maxwell, recognised the communal 
principles in native tenure as a common factor which might be used, not 
only to harmonise the systems of tenure, but to unite the people under 
the paramount power to share in the community resources as a common asset, 
Clifford was keen to stress the factors and differences that divided 
the people.
What could be deduced from the views expressed by him was that minerals 
such as gold and diamonds in one native community or tribe belonged to 
it, and therefore revenue derived from it should go to the benefit of 
that particular state. To apply its revenue to the development of the 
whole territory under British rule would amount to "sacrifices" on the 
part of the people of the native community in question. Arguing that 
such a situation would be unjust, he wrote:
"The injustice of devoting monies derived from the sale and lease 
of lands in Wassaw, for example, to the development of Accra or 
of the Central Province, should none the less, I think, have been 
patent to him".
It should be pointed out that Sir Hugh Clifford's policy was divisive 
and had little to commend it. In the first place, it should have been
Ibid. Clifford was referring here to Brandford Griffith, Junior, 
who had advised his father in 1894 on the Crown Lands Bill arguing 
that revenue from "waste lands" would be used for the general advantage 
of the colony as a whole. See pp. 106-108.
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patent to him that despite the differences which he sought to emphasise, 
he was not a Governor over "Negro republics", as he called the tribes 
individually, but Governor of the Gold Coast in which the Imperial Govern­
ment had brought those native polities under its political authority.
As Sir H. S. Read commenting on Clifford's views has pointed out, after
1901 the native authorities no longer possessed exclusive jurisdiction
659
within the territory occupied by them. Their people and chiefs were
all amenable to His Majesty's Supreme Court. They had no legislative 
bodies except such as had been created for them by His Majesty's Legis- 
lature. 660
Sir H. S. Read pointed out that Native Councils were empowered 
under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance to make bye-laws and the territory 
occupied by them was a British colony. Under these circumstances the 
claim to sovereign rights of natives states, as was implied in Clifford's 
thesis, was unfounded. Sir H. S. Read argued, and in our opinion rightly, 
that if such claims of sovereignty were negated, then much of Clifford's 
argument would crumble and the position would be that all the rights 
of natives of the Gold Coast had as to land and minerals would flow, 
not from sovereignty but either from their native law and custom so far 
as they had been recognised by and continued by the Gold Coast Legislature 
or else from laws passed by the Legislature directly dealing with tribal 
lands or minerals.
These arguments did not seem to have convinced the Governor, Sir 
Hugh Clifford, who proceeded to lay down certain policy guidelines as 
the basis upon which any future Forest Bill or any legislation affecting 
lands should be framed. In doing so, he failed to give serious thoughts 
to the policies of Maxwell and the Belfield recommendations concerning 
these matters. Outlining the considerations which must guide future 
legislation on the question, he made the following propositions, namely 
that:
a. it was neither reasonable nor equitable to expect the natives 
of any one native state in the Gold Coast to submit without 
compensation, to substantial sacrifices alike of a practical 
and of a sentimental character, because such an act of tribal 
altruism will prove to be of advantage to the Gold Coast as a 
whole;
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b. the government should formally and publicly renounce any right 
arbitrarily to deal with the forest and "unoccupied land" lying 
within the boundaries of any native state and indeed that the 
terms "unoccupied" land or "waste" lands could not be accurately 
applied to any land in the Gold Coast and should once and for 
all be discarded as inapplicable to local conditions;
c. if it became necessary in the interest of the colony as a whole 
to declare an area as reserves, the loss which the native will 
incur as a result should be recognised frankly and generously;
d. as forest reserves would serve the general interest of the colony, 
compensation should be paid to the tribes affected from the 
general revenue of the colony to which all classes of its population 
contributed, so as to compensate for the sacrifices demanded
of them;
e. the settlement of these issues on the lines stated above, should 
be accomplished through negotiation with the tribal authorities 
concerned and possibly by reference to a court which may determine 
the granting of compensation;
f. any costs involved in referring the matter to the court for 
settlement should be borne by the court from the general revenue 
of the colony; and
g. if an area declared as a reserve be so large as to deprive the 
tribe of arable land, then the Government as a precondition 
for such declaration must by negotiation, obtain allocation
of land from an adjoining tribal authority for the use of those
to be deprived, compensation being paid to the latter.®^1
In what Clifford regarded as a precedent for the last suggestion 
above, he referred to an action taken by Alfred Maloney in 1882 when 
he was Administrator of the Gold Coast. An examination of the action 
referred to would, however, disclose some inconsistency in Clifford’s 
views about the sharing of resources in the Gold Coast. The action referred 
to was a case of 1882 where land for New Jaubeng Settlements, of which 
KofCffidua is now the centre, was obtained from native chiefs of Akim Abuakwa 
to settle a portion of the Juabeng tribe which had broken off from the
rest of Juabeng in Ashanti and had migrated to settle in the Gold Coast
Colony. Difficulties arose as a result of ill-defined boundaries between 
the Juabengs and the Krobos. Additional areas were acquired from Akim 
Abuakwa to compensate the Juabengs for the loss of land subsequent upon 
the adjustment of the boundary. For these additional areas the Government 
paid a sum of £400 to and received a deed of conveyance from the chiefs
661 Loc.cit.
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Akiwi
and elders of the section of Akkm Abuakwa, to which the land in question 
belonged.
It would be noted that if, as Clifford had insisted all along, one 
tribe should not be made to submit without compensation to sacrifices 
by reason only that such sacrifices would prove to be advantageous to 
the Gold Coast Colony as a whole, then the payment of compensation by the 
Government, out of public funds to which all the various tribes contributed, 
to pay for land acquired for the use of one particular tribe which on 
its own volition migrated from one area to another, would contradict the 
very principle which Clifford sought to establish as the basis upon which 
the land and its resources should be treated in the colony.
In the precedent referred to, there was no obvious direct benefit 
to the Gold Coast as a whole as a result of migration by that portion 
of the Juabeng tribe from Ashanti to the colony. Within the context 
of Clifford's arguments therefore, there was even little justification 
for the payment out of public funds a sum of £400 to pay for land to 
be utilised by one particular tribe with which many other tribes had 
nothing in common, except that they were all natives of the Gold Coast.
It should be pointed out that the difficulties and the inconsistencies 
demonstrably attending Clifford's proffered example, was an indication 
that it would not be a wise policy to employ the divisive elements in 
a complex heterogenous society like the Gold Coast as the basis of policy 
formulation on such important matters as land and its resources. The 
Governor fell into the serious error of not recognising the effect of 
British rule on the soveriegn rights of the native polities within His 
Majesty's possessions. He ignored the fact, as Sir H. S. Read had pointed out 
that as a result of British rule, the "conglomeration of small Negro 
Republica" had lost their sovereign rights and no longer had exclusive 
jurisdiction over the territories occupied by them, and were now under 
British sovereignty in one country, the Gold Coast, of which he was Governor.
His views were not only founded on mistaken premises, but were rather 
insular and did nothing to promote national unity. His policy would 
do nothing to solve land tenure problems of the colony, but would rather 
exacerbate them. If the Governor and those who thought like him had 
given serious consideration to past policies of Sir William Brandford 
Griffith and Sir William Maxwell, which they so often attacked, it would 
have become evident to them that the basic policy of the Public Lands 
Bill of 1897 which sought to harmonise the land tenure systems of the 
colony by establishing land enjoyment rights on the basis of Gold Coast
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nativity, as opposed to tribal community membership, would not only have
had the effect of removing many of the troublesome questions about title
security, but could have been one of the ways in which the various ethnic
groups comprised in the Gold Coast could be welded together.
Failing to recognise the advantage of this kind of policy, Clifford
concluded his policy statement on the Forest Bill by stating emphatically that
"If forest reserves are to be made,justice demands that compensation 
for sacrifices which they must inevitably entail should be paid to 
the communities from which in the interest of the colony as a whole 
they are demanded; and further, the claim of Government to exercise 
any sovereign rights over lands situated in any of the Native States 
of the Gold Coast cannot be maintained on any grounds of equity, 
justice or even policy."
No one would deny the fact that in creating reserves in the interest 
of the whole Colony, account ought to be taken of the needs of communities 
which might be affected. But to insist that the Imperial Government had 
no power to exercise sovereign rights over lands in the Colony, was to 
dispute the very basis of British rule in the country. Questionable though 
his policies might be, Clifford was one of the best-loved Governors of 
the native authorities and the native middle class. This was probably 
the reason why, unlike previous governors, he remained long enough in the
Gold Coast to prevent the passage of the Forest Ordinance, and it was
063
not until 1927 that the first legislation on forests was passed.
Unhappily, Clifford had during his long governorship established
land and forest policies on these lines which almost became a blueprint
for successive administrators, until after the Second World War when there
was a change in direction of policy towards more governmental control
664
of land and its resources. The Forest Ordinance which came into force
in 1927 reflected much of Clifford's idea and policies.
The principles of "unoccupied", "waste" or "public land" disappeared 
in the literature of land law legislation, and with it the idea of all lands 
of the colony being "public" or common assets and resources of the Gold 
Coast as a whole. Section 4 of the Forest Ordinance 1927, empowered the 
Governor to constitute reserves, but the Ordinance as a whole did not provide 
for the kind of elaborate and scientific organisation and administration 
of forests by government officials, as was envisaged by the Thompson 
Scheme. Even after more than two decades of independence,
Loc.cit.
Ordinance No. 13 of 1927.
See Circular Dispatch from the Secretary of State, Mr. A. Creech 
Jones, 17 October, 1946, Colonial office, P. & S. file (12). See 
the discussion of this at PP • UH-
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land and forest policy has never changed much, with the result that no 
national land policy, the framework within which land administration 
and development can be organised, has as yet emerged.
It is submitted that a national land policy framed on the basis 
of those pursued in the north of Ghana, would be able to take care of the 
major land problems including forest conservation and the twin problems 
of uncertainty of title and costly litigation.
P A R T  I I I
LAND TITLES REGISTRATION IN GHANA
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CHAPTER I
THE HISTORY OF LAND TITLES REGISTRATION 
IN GHANA 1880-1960
A. Introductory
The history of land titles registration in Ghana may be seen as an
account of governmental attempts over the years to find a solution to the
intractable problems of title insecurity and its incidental costly litigation.
Beginning from 1883, various legislative measures were adopted with a view
to establishing a machinery for the storage of information concerning land 
665
titles. The introduction of such a scheme on the lines of the system
666
established in Australia on the basis of Sir Robert Torrens’ Bill was
667
considered to be the best way of dealing with these problems.
As will be shown in this discussion, however, the system introduced 
by means of legislation for recording titles to or rights in land fell 
short of inaugurating a system of title registration, properly so called.
An arrangement for recording rights in land, if it should succeed as a 
means of making titles secure and certain, requires, as a prerequisite 
for its success, an accurate survey of the land areas subject to recording 
or registration. Boundaries have to be clearly demarcated and defined 
by means of accurate surveys. During the process of such demarcation and 
definition of boundaries, a competent adjudication tribunal, created for 
that purpose, ought to determine and settle conclusively titles to or rights 
in land. Such conclusions, if recorded in the register, should be guaranteed 
by the State as indefeasible.
An examination of the enactments establishing the system of recording 
land titles in the past and at present discloses that the foundations neces-
The first attempt to establish a system of land registration in the 
Gold Coast was made in 1883, with the passage of the Registration 
Ordinance, No. 8 of 1883.
666
Sir Robert Torrens introduced a Private Member's Bill in the South 
Australian Parliament on 2 June, 1857, the object of which was to 
"simplify the laws relating to the transfer and encumbrance of freehold 
and other interests in land". The passage of the Bill led to the 
establishment of a system of land registration knwon as the "Torrens 
system of title registration". See E. A. Francis, The Law and Practice 
Relating to Torrens Title in Australia, Vol. 1, Sydney, 1972, 5.
See Dispatch from Marquess of Ripon to Sir W. B. Griffith, 10 October, 
1894, CO 879/46.
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sary for a successful working and operation of the scheme were neither 
laid as a preliminary to their passage, nor provided for as part of the 
measure. There were conspicuously absent from their provisions, the establish­
ment of a competent adjudication tribunal for the settlement of titles, 
and including a guarantee by the government ^ -. the indefeasibility of 
registered interests.. In societies where the concept of land ownership 
as understood in Anglo-American law was so nebulous, one would have expected 
that provision for the definition of rights subject to registration would 
have been made, but this was not done. What was more, surveyors were not 
appoihted specifically for the purpose of surveying the areas subject to 
registration. In a country where the overwhelming majority of the people 
were illiterate and ignorant in such matters, the success of a scheme of 
this kind would necessarily require some arrangements for public education 
on the subject. However, none of these things were provided for in the 
ordinances creating the system of recording land titles in the Gold Coast.
As matters turned, the laws that were enacted proved defective in 
many respects and ineffectual to deal with the problems that they were 
designed to solve. The colonial government, throughout the period, appeared 
to be so obsessed with the idea that a system of title registration provided 
the only panacea for the problem of insecurity of title that it overlooked 
the obvious alternative solution, vi>z., governmental control and administr­
ation of lands. Not even the relative certainty concerning those lands 
held under Crown grants and those areas administered in the Northern Territories
drew its attention to this alternative measure. This attitude was greatly
668
influenced by the erroneous belief, as we have argued, that the creation
of freehold titles in the Colony was a necessary condition for the acquisition
of agricultural credit from financial institutions,easy alienability and
maximum productive use of land* The independent governments of Ghana and
669
land law reform bodies also hold similar views at present.
The objective of this part of our discussion is to examine the way 
in which the schemes of land registration had worked in the past, and to 
demonstrate the respects in which the provisions of the Acts establishing 
such systems were defective. In the process, the objectives which we con­
sider should guide those concerned with policy formulation and decision­
making in regard to lands, their management and administration in Ghana 
will be outline and discussed. To suggest ways in which the systems might 
be improved does not necessarily mean acceptance of the view that the intro­
duction of a system of title registration provides the only solution for
See the discussion of this point at pp.7^-?^
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See the Law Reform Commission Report on the Reform of Land Law, November, 
1973, p. 2 and pp. 13-16.
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land problems in Ghana. The intended final aim of the thesis is to demon­
strate that a system of land titles registration need not be introduced 
in modern Ghana at all, and that a better alternative is provided by the 
introduction of the principle of administration by governmental bodies 
of all lands in Ghana.
B. Title Registration and its Objectives
For a proper insight into the history of land titles registration in 
Ghana, it is deemed necessary to describe in broad terms the essential 
features of the system and the ends which it is normally designed to attain. 
The first preliminary point to be made is a rather obvious one, that land 
is a vital asset to man, since it supports many of his basic needs, such 
as shelter, food, industry and raw materials. It is hard to visualise 
any economic venture which does not require the use of land or an interest 
in land. The ownership, possession or the acquisition of an interest in 
land is thus an essential prerequisite for any economic activity or venture. 
For this reason, the demand for titles to, interests in, and rights over 
land frequently occurs in society. The more complex and economically active 
the Society, the greater these demands will be. A potential transferee 
of an interest in land would thus wish to be sure that no one else can 
claim any rights adverse to his own during the subsistence of his title.
The indigenous schemes of tenure had their own inbuilt systems of 
title security. The way in which exclusive rights were established over 
land was by effective occupation and development of the land. In close 
communities where economic activity was basically subsistence agriculture, 
everydody knew which farm belonged to which person or family. On inter­
tribal levels, physical features, such as rivers, valleys, rocks or large 
trees were used for identification and determination of boundaries between 
adjoining polities. Since land was abundant claims of rights over boundaries 
were not keenly contested. Problems of title insecurity thus did not con­
stitute an important feature of the traditional systems" of tenure.
However, as we have seen earlier,^^£ke introduction of permanent agri­
culture and the concession boom that accompanied the development of the 
mining and timber industries during the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century changed people’s attitude to land. Land values appreciated consider-
See pp. 68^4.
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ably and rights to them were keenly contested. The acquisition of land 
by strangers on a large scale made serious inroads into the inbuilt tradi­
tional systems of title security. Effective occupation and development 
of land were no longer the only means by which exclusive individual rights 
could be established over land. Acquisition of land on speculative basis 
implied that although a land might be unoccupied and undeveloped, it might 
not necessarily be free for occupation by the subject. Exclusive individual 
rights might have been established over it by a purchaser of an interest 
in it.
The acquisition of rights in this way over large tracts of land, cutting 
across natural and physical featues which were traditionally employed to 
define and distinguish boundaries made the indigenous methods of boundary 
identification no longer adequate within the context of the new developments.
It became necessary to replace such traditional modes of boundary identifi­
cation with modern systems of survey and land demarcation if insecurity 
of title and disputed claims over land rights were to be avoided. The 
introduction of a system of land titles registration in the Gold Coast 
was thus in response to the need for accommodating the new developments 
in the land tenure system with a more reliable and sophisticated mode of 
securing land titles. The primary objective for introducing the system 
was to ensure certainty and security concerning land titles and to provide 
the means by which interested persons can ascertain with reasonable certainty 
the title situaiton with regard to any given piece or parcel of land.
This is in fact, the main objective of any land titles registration system, 
although its consequences may produce other effects, such as individualisa­
tion of interests and the concentration of land in the hands of the wealthy.
The registration of title to land simply means an entry or entries 
into the record books, established for that purpose, or various interests 
in land to which a person may be entitled or hold. In this sense, the 
use of the term may be misleading, for by reference to the records one 
does not necessarily ascertain title itself as of fact, but only some evidence 
thereof. When employed in terms of what has become known as the "Torrens 
system" of title registration, however, it imports the recording of conclusions 
reached by a competent body or tribunal set up for the purpose of determining 
conclusively titles to land. The registration of such conclusions becomes 
state oj? government guaranteed as valid and unassailable. Dowson and Sheppard, 
for instance, describe the system as "an authoritative record kept in a 
public office of the rights to units of land as vested in some particular 
person(s) or body for the time being and of limitation of such right.
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It is more comprehensively called registration of rights to land or even
671
briefly, land registration".
In this sense, title registration must be distinguished from deeds
registration. In the case of the latter, any document by means of which
an interest in land is transferred or any instrument affecting land is
recorded in a public register established for that purpose. The basic
principle in its simplest form, as S. R. Simpson points out, is that registered
672
deeds take priority over unregistered deeds, or deeds registered subsequently.
Furthermore, under a system of deeds registration, the recording in the
public register of an instrument affecting land does not necessarily affect
the validity of the land transaction of which such instrument constitutes
written evidence. Under this scheme, what registration does generally
is to determine, as between competing instruments, priority by reference
to the date of registration and not the date of execution.
This last proposition may, however, be subject to the qualification
that the courts may take the view that a latter instrument can, by registration,
acquire priority over an earlier one if it is obtained without fraud and
673
without notice of the earlier unregistered instrument. It will be seen, 
therefore, that in absence of any competing instrument, deeds registration 
confers no special advantage in so far as the validity of the transaction 
which is the subject matter of registration is concerned. It is in this 
respect that a system of title registration differs substantially from 
deeds registration.
Under a system of title registration, as Simpson points out, with 
certain unavoidable exceptions such as "overriding interests", all material 
particulars affecting title to land are fully revealed simply by perusal 
of the register which is maintained and warranted by the State. The register, 
as he points out, is at all times the final authority and the State accepts 
responsibility for the validity of transactions, which are effected by 
making an entry in the register, and only by this means. The guarantee 
by the State of the indefeasibility of registered titles or interests can 
thus be seen as sin essential element in title registration that distinguishes 
it from deeds registration.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that a system of deeds registration
671
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Ernest Dowson and V. L. 0. Sheppard, Registration of Title with Special 
Reference to its Introduction on the Gold Coast, London, 1946, Part 
1, 2.
S. R. Simpson, Land Law and Registration, Cambridge, 1976, 15.
See Souhail Crayem v. Consolidated African Selection Trust (1949).
12 W.A.C.A. 443, and Anyidoho v. Markham (1905), 1 Renner, 592.
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can be so arranged that it may approximate to a system of title registration 
in the sense that the register can be relied upon as giving accurate informa­
tion concerning titles and giving the same kind of certainty and security 
that a system of title registration can provide. This is possible if an 
efficient system of survey that can guarantee the accuracy of maps or plans 
which must be attached to instruments subject to registration can be provided 
as part of the scheme. When the accuracy of the plans defining the land 
areas to which interests relate is assured, and the law makes the validity 
of instruments conditional upon registration with a provision that the 
courts shall not receive unregistered instruments as evidence of title, 
then the system may well achieve the objectives of certainty and security 
as would title registration, albeit a deed registration system. But this 
will depend largely on the efficiency of personnel and the elimination 
of human errors to the barest minimum.
The essential features of title registration and the ways in which 
it differs from deeds registration has been outlined because the appreciation 
of the nature of the schemes devised under the Statutes for the recording 
of land titles and rights to land would depend to a large extent on the 
understanding of the distinctions outlined above. An examination of the 
ordinances and statues establishing the system in the Gold Coast and modern 
Ghana would disclose that what we had in the past was a deeds registration 
system, and the current statutes have not as yet changed the system to 
that of title registration, as described above. In one legislation after 
the other, attempts were made to improve upon the previous laws so as to 
make more efficient the working of the system.
As can be gathered from the discussion so far, although title registra­
tion may differ from deeds registration in form, both systems seek to achieve 
similar objectives which are primarily, certainty and security of titles.
Sir Robert Torrens defined the objective of his pioneering South Australian
Act to be the creation of "independent titles by cutting off the necessity
674 675
for retrospective investigation of titles". In Gibbs v. Messer,
the Privy Council, per Lord Watson, described the objectives in the following
words:
"The object is to save persons dealing with registered proprietors 
from the trouble and expense of going behind the register in order 
to investigate the history of their author's title, and to satisfy
Quoted by Dowson and Sheppard, op.cit., p.3.
675 — —
/ 1891 / A.C.248 at p. 254.
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themselves of its validity. That end is accomplished by providing 
that everyone who purchases, bona fide and for value, from a registered 
proprietor, and enters his deed of transfer or mortgage on the register, 
shall thereby acquire an indefeasible right, notwithstanding the infirmity 
of his author's title".
This means in effect that the system, if efficiently administered,
does away with the repeated, imperfect and costly examination of bona fide
mistakes as to the past titles or existing burdens affecting the land;
and removes the ever-present possibility of fraud by duplication or supression 
S70
of deeds. If it is a system of title registration rather than deeds 
registration, it gives additional state guarantee safety and positive security 
against claims which a system of conveyancing by deeds can never give.
0'
In order to attain these objectives, a system of land titles registration
must be designed to ensure the following:
a. the positive identification of the physical boundaries of the 
lands to which the interests, the subject matter of registration 
relate, both on the ground and on the map;
b. adjudication and the settlement of competing claims in respect 
of positively identified plots of land;
c. the registration of the adjudged interests, and
d. the guarantee by the State or government that such recorded interests
shall be indefeasible.
An attempt will be made through this discussion an . examination 
of the extent to which the Ordinances passed during the period under considera­
tion had . made provision for these essentail elements outlined above, 
and the extent to which the objectives of title security and certainty 
had been achieved through such legislation.
C. Background to Land Titles Registration Legislation in the Gold Coast
It has already been pointed out that, until the last two decades of 
the nineteenth century, there was no large-scale exploitation of land and 
its resources in the Gold Coast. The end of the Ashanti War of 1874 saw 
the beginning of direct involvement of Europeans in mining activities in
Dowson and Sheppard, loc.cit.
The term "Land Titles Registration" is employed throughout in this 
work to refer to the recordings into an official register or registers 
provided for storing information concerning titles generally. Thus 
the term can be used to refer to both deeds or registration under 
any arrangement whereby land titles are registered, unless it becomes 
necessary to refer to a particular system of registration specifically, 
in which case the appropriate terms will be used.
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the early 1880s, which led to acquisition of concessions on a large scale.
The story of these events need not be repeated here; it suffices to recall 
that the acquisition of land on such a large scale in communities whose 
boundaries were undefined and undemarcated led to overlapping and conflicting 
grants, causing considerable uncertainty of titles and the ensuing costly 
litigation.
Thus as early as 1876, the need to make arrangements for the registra­
tion of certain instruments affecting land was already recognised by the
colonial administration. Thus Appendix B of the Rules of Court of the
679
Supreme Court Ordinance, made in 1876, provided for certain charges 
in connection with certifying signatures for which a fee of four shillings 
was paid. In this way, a judge could certify an instrument affecting land 
as valid or properly executed. When this was done, there was greater confidence 
about the authenticity of the document so certified. This device was employed 
for voluntary registration of any instrument by which any right or interest 
in land was acquired at a charge of five shillings. This scheme was devised 
under the Supreme Court Ordinance to meet the ordinary requirements of
4-v,  ^ 680the day.
But with the mushrooming of mining companies at the beginning of the 
last two decades of the nineteenth century in the Western and Central Provinces 
of the Colony, problems of title insecurity mounted. Early reports about 
conflicting grants of concessions brought home to the colonial government 
the need to adopt some legislative measures to deal with the problem.
As early as 1897, Lieutenant-Governor Maloney sent a dispatch from Lagos 
to the Gold Coast Colony noting that there was a need for compulsory registra­
tion in the Colony; and he gave instructions to the Gold Coast administration
681
that an early enactment on the subject should be considered.
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See pp.
Ordinance No. 8 of 1876. See para. 4 of Appendix B of Rules of Court. 
This seems to be an attempt to introduce notarisation into the judicial 
and legal system of the Gold Coast. This is a system whereby a notary 
Public, an official duly appointed, whose public office it is, amongst 
others to draw, or certify, usually under his official seal, deeds 
and other documents including conveyances of real and personal property 
and powers of attorney relating to real and personal property situate 
in England. See 28 Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd ed. vol. 28, 114- 
115. C.F. authentication of documents by Justices of the Peace in 
England.
Enclosure No. 8 of 2 January, 1879, C.O. 96/140.
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Another early warning of the problems caused by title insecurity in
the mining centres came from Mr. Higgins, Commissioner for the Tarkwa District 
682
in 1882. Mr. Higgins m  his Report pointed out that there was a great
need to arrange for an orderly control and management of the mines. He 
believed that one of the first steps towards this end would be the introduction 
of a system of registration of concessions.. He noted that 
this requirement was so urgent that if it were not met, "confusion and probably
0Q3
disturbances would be the result". The Queen's Advocate on his arrival
at the Colony in September 1882, was required to take such steps as were
necessary to put into effect Maloney's instructions of 1879 in respect
of preparing an ordinance for the compulsory registration of instruments
684
affecting "real estate or judicial declaration of title to land".
Hardly had the Queen's Advocate begun his work than Lieutenant Governor
Maloney sent another dispatch to the Gold Coast Colony urging the introduction
of a scale of registration charges proportionate to such large and valuable
685
concessions as were being acquired in the .Colony. It was the Lieutenant
Governor's opinion that the introduction of such charges, yielding extra 
revenue to government, would not be felt locally, as this would fall legiti­
mately on speculators who could well afford to pay from their "profitable 
gamble". He believed the payment of such registration charges was justifiable, 
having regard to the fact that mining companies bringing machinery into 
the Colony were exempt from the payment of custom duties. Stressing the 
need for an early legislation for the establishment of a system of land 
titles registration, he observed:
"Boundaries of concessions are often, generally I may say, of the vaguest 
description and advantage is no doubt taken of the indifference of 
the Government and of the ignorance of the people."686
Maloney's dispatch shows that, in addition to wishing to secure titles, 
he had in contemplation the establishment of a system of registration as 
a means of ascertaining the extent of land acquisitions and making sure 
that revenue was collected as a form of property tax on landed interest,
Higgins to Governor, 6 June, 1882, C.O. 96/114.
6 8 3  T V >  ■ AIbid.
See Winfield, Minutes of 14 October, 1882, C.O. 96/144
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Maloney to Sir Samuel Rowe, 2 November, 1882, No. 511, C.O. 96/144.
686 TV,’.Ibid.
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as some of the objectives of any legislative measure which might be considered. 
It was at the background of the events outlined above and the obejctives 
sought to be achieved that the Queen's Advocate was required to draft a
Bill for introducing a land titles registration system for the Gold Coast
p i 687Colony.
D. The Registration Ordinance of 1883
i. General Provisions
The Queen's Advocate had as a guide, a draft Bill based on a Sierra 
Leonean Ordinance of 1872. He considered these provisions inadequate or 
too imperfect to be of any use as a precedent. He recommended instead, 
certain Ontario Acts, copies of which were sent to him to be used as a 
guide. Under Section 2 of the Ordinance, the registration of instruments 
affecting lands was provided for. The term "instrument" was defined as 
"any instrument in writing affecting land in the Gold Coast Colony including 
a will and including the power of an attorney under which any instrument 
affecting land may be executed". This would seem to be an inclusive defini­
tion which does not always prove useful. By including the term sought 
to be defined in the definition itself, its meaning could be obscured.
What could be deduced from this definition was that an "instrument" 
was generally any writing, memorandum, document or deed evidencing an interest 
in land or by which an interest in land was conveyed or transferred. All 
these types of documents were "instruments" affecting land which may be 
registered under the Ordinance. Among other documents which could be registered 
under the Ordinance, but which might not necessarily be instruments affecting
land, were wills including a codicil with will annexed and any judgment
688
including any Decree or Order of a Court of Justice.
Section 1 of the Ordinance provided for the establishment of registries
at Accra, Cape Coast and Lagos and such other place or places as the Governor
689
might from time to time appoint in the Colony for the registration exercise. 
Grants from the Crown executed after the coming into force of the Ordinance 
were declared void unless registered within 30 days from the date of their 
execution. Every instrument executed after the coming into force of
687
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This idea would seem to have been influenced by the Indian experience 
where property tax was one major source of Imperial revenue.
S.2.
Lagos was then the administrative headquarters of Sierra Leone and 
the Gold Coast.
S.4
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the Ordinance, except a will, so far as it affected any lands, took effect
as against other instruments affecting the same land from the date of its
registration, provided it was registered:
i . in the case of an instrument executed at the place where it was 
registered, the period of ten days from its date of execution;
ii. in the case of an instrument executed elsewhere in the Gold Coast 
Colony, the period of 60 days from its date of execution; and
iii. in the case of an instrument executed out of the Colony of the^^ 
Gold Coast., the period of one year from its date of execution.
In what would appear to be prescribing registration as a condition
for the validity of land transactions, Section 7 of the Ordinance provided
that every private ordinance, judgment and inquisition enacted, pronounced
or held after the coming into effect of the Ordinance should become void
so far as regards any land to be affected thereby, "unless a memorial thereof
692
shall be registered within ten days from the enactment or date thereof".
As a condition for registration, Section 15 of the Ordinance provided that:
No instrument other than a will, and no memorial of an Ordinance, 
Judgment or Inquisition shall be registered unless it shall have on 
the margin or back, a plan of the land affected by such instrument, 
Ordinance, Judgment or Inquisition, and either in the body of the 
instrument, or in the margin or back thereof, a description of such 
land.
Apart from the above provision no other section of the Ordinance 
dealt with questions relating to surveys, definition and demarcation of 
of boundaries or the preparation of site plans which might be attached 
to registrable instruments. It will be observed that the Ordinance provided 
for the registration of deeds and not of titles. No provision was made 
for settlement and adjudication of title. Nowhere in its provisions was 
it provided that registration guaranteed titles. These were obvious defects 
in the Ordinance which were to render the administration of the scheme 
established under it difficult.
ii. Problems of Administration
The immediate problem faced by the government after the coming into
691
Sections 5(1), (2) and (3).
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It will be observed that this provision did not take into account 
parol grants which were also valid modes of acquisition of interests 
in land under the customary law. For the discussion of this point 
see pp. 402-407.
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force of the Ordinance, was how to get qualified personnel to administer 
the scheme. As we have indicated earlier, for a scheme of land titles 
registration of this kind to succeed, it would be of paramount importantancet
the appointment of qualified surveyors with a supporting staff of 
cartographers,Technical officers of various grades capable of reading and 
understanding maps and plans drawn to standard scales. A clerical staff 
with the responsibility of filing, recording and arranging documents would 
also be needed. But in 1883, the colonial administration did not have such 
qualified personnel. No one could be found with the experience in such 
matters, and who might train local staff to get the scheme off the ground.
Hence, the government was forced to entrust court registrars with
the responsibility of registering instruments   under ''the provisions
of the Ordinance. But this was inconsistent with Section 1 of the Ordinance
which required the establishment of registries at various places arid the
appointment by the Governor of registrars- to administer the scheme. Mr.
Turton, who had had some years of experience in the Lagos land registry,
did not think it was a wise policy to make court registrars, undertake this
responsibility. He pointed out that deeds registration was technically
693
different in form from court registry work. The Governor agreed in 
this view and thought it might be better if the District Commissioners 
were asked to perform this duty. The Governor suggested that in Cape Coast, 
for example, where the District Commissioner was inundated with magisterial 
work, an assistant District Commissioner could be appointed to be solely 
in charge of deeds registration.
There were many advantages in requiring District Commissioners to 
perform the functions of registrations. It was part of their duties to 
make tours and travel on visits to all parts of the District within their 
spheres of jurisdiction. They were therefore expected to-be well acquainted 
with the peculiar problems of their localities. As men on the spot they 
could be in a better position than would a court registrar to check inaccura­
cies in site plans which might be attached to registrable instruments, 
both on the ground and on the plan or map.
What the government should have done therefore would have been to 
establish registries in or near the District Commissioners’ offices, and 
provide the necessary staff for the work of the registries. But it seemed
cqq
See Minutes by B. W. Winfield, 14 October, I 1’", C.O. 96/144.
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the government did not consider the long-term benefits of the scheme as 
so important as to merit an undertaking which would involve it in expend­
iture. It was thus finally decided that the registration exercise should 
be combined with court registry work under the administration of court regi­
strars. The Plan to bring the administration of the scheme under the office 
of the District Commissioner was accordingly abandoned.
One of the first court registrars involved in the administration of 
the scheme was Mr. Blankson, who was also the interpreter at the Cape Coast 
Court. The work of the registry was impeded not only because there was
a lot of court duties to be combined with those of registration, but the
695
registrars appeared to be "incompetent and indulgent". Work piled up
at the registry and many applications for registration remained unanswered.
Files and records were never properly kept and searches were rendered
696
cumbersome and difficult. As a result, the Chief Justice informed the
Governor that having regrd to the volume of work involved in court work
and deeds registration under the Registration Ordinance, it was imperative
that a more competent person be appointed to perform those functions.
The Chief Justice informed the Governor that despite his efforts to
make Mr. Blankson execute his duties expeditiously, arrears continued to
pile up largely due to the self-indulgence and incompetence of the latter.
He therefore recommended not only the suspension of the Registrar, but also
the repeal of the Registration Ordinance unless better provisions could
697
be made for carrying into effect its provisions. Following the Chief
Justice's recommendations, the former was suspended. Finding a suitable
person to replace the Registrar was not so easy as his suspension. In the 
search for a replacement, the lot fell on Mr. A. W. Thompson, the acting 
Post Master of Cape Coast. It should be noted here that his choice was 
based, not so much on any special knowledge about land registration, but 
upon the fact that he was literate. There was no evidence that he was in 
a position to understand, read and interpret maps and plans drawn to scale 
so as to be able to locate and identify land areas to which such plans relate 
both on the maps and on the ground; knowledge which was necessary if conflict- 
registrations were to be avoided. As we shall see later, this lack of qualifi< 
personnel largely accounted for inefficient administration of the scheme 
and its failures.
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See Letter from Chief Justice to Governor, 24 April, 1884, C.O. 96/161.
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Related to the administrative problems were the lack of transport 
and communication. The Ordinance enjoined the Governor to establish registries 
at specified places and such other places as he might deem fit, and had 
power to diminish, merge or expand such registries. This provision was 
meant to make it possible for registry offices to be located near those 
areas where land transactions took place on such scales as would make their 
establishment necessary. None of these offices was ever established.
This meant that instruments could only be registered at those places where 
Court registries could be found. Consequently, persons desiring to have 
their instruments registered in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance, 
would have to travel long distances to Cape Coast and Accra, and some few 
places where court registries were to be found in the Colony. Since the 
basic means of transport was by foot, it meant many days of travel, if 
not weeks in some cases. Under these conditions it would have required 
a great deal of public education and some compelling reasons for a man 
to embark upon the arduous task of getting his instrument registered out 
of his own volition.
Faced with these problems concerning the registration of instruments 
affecting land, the Secretary of State, the Marquess of Ripon, suggested 
that Clause 17 of the proposed Crown Lands Bill of 1894 under which con­
cessionaires were required to register their grants within six months from 
the date of their acquisition, should be changed. He expressed the view 
that it would be better for the government to have such grants registered
before the issue of certificates of validity. In such a case a moderate
698
fee to cover the expenses of the registry could be charged Mad valorem11.
This suggestion was obviously meant to compel those concessionaires who 
by reason of the difficulties involved in the registration exercise had 
refrained from doing so, to comply with the provisions of the Ordinance..
The Secretary of State believed that if it were proposed to introduce a 
system of title registration similar to those in the Australian colonies 
in which registration, except in cases of fraud, was complete proof of 
title, then his proposal might be required as part of such a general scheme.
In this regard he considered the 1883 Registration Ordinance as inadequate.
It was under these circumstances that eleven years after its operation,
Dispatch from Ripon to Sir W . B. Griffith, 10 October, 1894, C.O. 
879/46.
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the latter Ordinance was repealed and replaced by the Land Registry Ordinance 
699
of 1895, which we shall consider in due course.
E . The Land Registry Ordinance of 1895
i . General Provisions
The preamble stated that the new Ordinance was to make better provisions 
for the registration of instruments affecting land. A cursory glance at 
its provisions would, however, show that they were basically similar to 
the 1883 Ordinance with minor alterations and additions. Section 3(1) 
reproduced Section 1 of the latter Ordinance under which the Governor was 
empowered’ to establish registries with the minor alteration being that 
Lagos was no longer one of the places where such registry offices might 
be established. Section 3(2) provided that instruments affecting land 
in' Ashanti should be registered only at Cape Coast and such other places 
as the Governor might direct.7^
Section 6 of the new Ordinance replaced Section 15 of the 1883 Statute. 
Unlike the latter, which provided that for an instrument to be registered, 
it should have a plan describing the land attached to it, the former only 
provided that except a will or a probate, no instrument could be registered 
unless it contained a Statement describing the boundaries, extent and situa­
tion of the land affected. The question it would be necessary to answer 
was whether or not this meant that such a description could be made within 
the meaning of the Ordinance without reference to a plan. What appeared
to be new in the present enactment was elaborate provisions which it contained
701
on proof of documents. These provisions were probably meant to ensure
the authenticity of the instrument which would be subject to registration, 
but as we shall argue in due course, these would only make the registration 
procedure cumbersome without serving any useful purpose.
Sections 14, 15 and 16 dealt with the mode of registration. The nature 
of the records to be kept, how they should be kept and maintained, were 
all treated under the three provisions mentioned above, the rest of its 
provisions dealt with consequences of registration which did not differ
No. 1 of 1895.
As amended by Ordinance No. 8 of 1902. The Registry office at Accra 
appointed a registry office for registering instruments affecting 
land in Ashanti as from 1 January, 1909. See Order in Council, 7 
October, 1908.
See Sections 7-11 inclusive.
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substantially from the sections of the 1883 Ordinance dealing with the
question. It treated priorities between competing instruments in a similar
manner. The only significant difference was the provision under Section
20 of the new Ordinance that:
Registration shall not cure any defect in any instrument registered, 
or confer upon it any effect or validity which it would not otherwise 
have had.
This provision which obviously implied that registration did not guarantee 
title, was a clear indication that the system of registration established 
under the Ordinance was that of deeds and not title registration.
ii. Inherent Defects of the Ordinance
a. Among the essential freatures of a lands title registration system 
which we have pointed out were necessary for its successful operation, 
was positive identification of the physical boundaries of the lands to 
which interests subject to registration relate. The most efficient way 
in which this can be done is the definition of lands subject to registration 
by reference to accurate plains or maps drawn on the basis of nationailly 
agreed scales or national grid co-ordinates. In this way, such lands can 
be identified both on the map and on the ground. Such plans, if attached 
to instruments by which rights affecting land are transferred, assigned 
or evidenced, can then be recorded in the official books or register as 
a source of information in respect of land titles. Such accurate surveys 
form the basis of any : meaningful land titles registration system. Without 
them, the operation of the scheme would just be an exercise in futility.
For if the instruments to be registered are unaccompanied by accurate site 
plans, recordings into the books of the land registry other material parti­
culars of the interest or the land itself would simply amount to evidence 
of title without the proper means by which interested persons can identify 
the things about which such particulars sire recorded. Under such conditions, 
registration of conflicting interests, duplication and conflicting transactions 
in respect of the same land cannot be avoided. This means that rather 
than solve problems of uncertainty, the registration system will complicate 
the issues and increase insecurity.
As Dowson and Sheppard pointed out, it is the primary function of 
cadastral surveys to lay the foundation and satisfy the initial requirements 
of the title register by defining the parcels of land which constitute
r7fm)0
the objects and units of the record. The two authors stressed the fact
Op.cit., p. 10.
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that by means of such methodical surveys within the setting of the appropriate
administrative and economic subdivision of the territory concerned, it
would provide the orderly and comprehensive basis which was necessary if
the construction and conduct of the register was to be^economically effected
throughout the country within a reasonable period. This means that:
It is the basic necessity in the construction of and making of any 
dependable land record that the units of land to which entries relate 
should be defined so that they can be located readily, surely, unam­
biguously at any time on the ground. 703
The definition of such land units is that which has been referred
to as cadastral surveys, a survey relating to boundaries and subdivision
of land. It entails the survey of land depicting boundaries with accuracy
and showing the exact measurements by which boundaries may be demarcated.
In the Gold Coast, the law required that plans or maps made on the basis
of such surveys and which might be attached to registrable instruments,
should be carried out by an Official Surveyor and should be approved by
the Director of Surveys or any competent person appointed by him for that 
704
purpose.
Mr. Higgins, who was Commissioner for Tarquah in 1882, recognised 
the important role which this kind of survey should play as a necessary 
component of the land registration system which was being contemplated.
While recommending the introduction of a scheme for the registration of 
concessions and other rights to land in the Tarquah District therefore,
705
he stressed the necessity for a survey of the area as part of the measure.
He drew attention to the fact that various mining companies had some plans 
giving general ideas about their acquisitions, but those maps or plans 
were nothing near perfection in accuracy. He thus suggested the appointment 
of surveyors for the specific task of mapping out the areas which might 
be subjet to registration, noting that the Survey Division of the Public 
Works Department was so understaffed that they could not be depended upon 
for such an undertaking.
It would appear, however, that no great importance was attached to 
the essential role which this sort of survey should play in the scheme 
of registration contemplated under the registration ordinances. Throughout
703 Ibid.
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See the Survey Ordinance, 1922 (Cap. 132) 1951 Rev.S.2. See also 
The Survey Act, 1962, Act. 127.
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Higgins Report of 6 June, 1882, C.0. 96/144.
706 TK•^Ibid.
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the correspondence preceding the 1883 and 1895 Ordinances, the question
of surveys as part of the scheme was never seriously discussed or considered.
Hence, Higgin'^ advice was ignored and no provisions were made for the general
survey of the Colony as part of the scheme, or at least of the mining areas
where the introduction of the scheme was considered to be urgently required.
The first indications as to the serious defects in the administration
of the scheme of land titles registration established under the Registration
Ordinance of 1883 and the Land Registry Ordinance of 1895, emerged in 1909.
The Registrar of Instruments at Cape Coast was required to prepare a report
on the extent of land alienations in the Colony since 1800. The Registrar
replied that this information*could not be supplied on the basis of recorded
707
evidence available in the registry. The only information the Registrar
was able to give was that between 1889 and 1909, over 4,500 instruments
affecting lands were registered in the Colony. He admitted that it would
entail a great deal of work to determine accurately, on the basis of the
number of registered instruments, the extent of land area involved, because
708
surveys and plans attached to such documents, if any, were inaccurate.
This was an express admission on the part of the Registrar that plans attached 
to registered instruments could not be relied upon for the determination, 
location or identification of the land areas to which registered instruments 
related. But if this was the truth, then evidently the whole purpose of 
the scheme would be defeated and the objects of certainty and security 
could never be assured.
Although Section 15 of the 1883 Ordinance provided that for an instrument 
to be registered, it should have on the margin or back a plan describing 
the land affected by such instrument, Section 6 of the new 1895 Ordinance 
provided that no instrument, except a will or probate should be registered 
unless it contained a description which should include a statement of the 
boundaries, extent and situation of the land affected by it.
It will be observed that unlike its predecessors, the new proifvison 
did not require that such a description of the land should be made by_ 
reference to a plan. The question was whether it would be consistent with 
this provision to accept instruments for registration although unaccompanied 
with plans describing the land to which they related. Obviously, within
707
Minutes of 6 January, 1909, 0.0. 879/109.
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the meaning of Section 6 of the Ordinance, a prospective grantee could 
describe in his document the boundaries and situation of the land by 
reference to physical features such as trees, rocks, rivers or anthills, 
without necessarily being in breach of the Section. Although such 
a description would not be by reference to a plan prepared on the basis 
of a scientifically agreed standard, it would nevertheless be a description. 
This was a serious defect in the law that its provisions were not formu­
lated on the basis of the important role which accurate surveys and 
plans should play in the administration of the scheifle.
The seriousness of this defect in the law could be appreciated
if we turn to the successive returns wjiich the Cold Coast Government
709
furnished the West African Lands Committee in response to requests
made by the latter in the course of its inquiries between 1913 and 1915.
The Committee wanted to know from the government the character and
extent of land alienations under the Concessions Ordinance between
the period 1900 and 1913. Concerning the nature of the information
which the Committee received from the government^the Draft Report
of 1916 contained certain observations which reflected vividly on the
serious defects from which the registration system suffered due to
inaccurate surveys. It is apposite to quote the relevant paragraphs
which were as follows:
. . . from 1900 to 1910, the native authorities of the Gold Coast 
alienated, according to notifications in the Gq£ette, 23,606 square 
miles of land (23,151 square miles for mining purposes and 455 
square miles for agricultural and aboricultural purposes). Within 
the same period the Courts struck out concessions aggregating 
8,673 square miles. From the end of 1910 to the end of 1913, 
a further 1,502 square miles have been alienated, a feature of 
these more recent alienations being that they are for the most 
part alienations of surface rights. It will thus be observed 
that of their own volition, and acting in ignorance t we must 
assume - of the character and extent of the public rights with 
which they were parting, in the vast majority of cases of one 
year only short of a century, the chiefs of the Gold Coast have 
in the past thirteen years alienated sin area which actually exceed 
the total area of the Colony itself. This does not take into 
account the alienations to which they have consented in the last 
two or three years, and which have not been notified in the Government 
Gazettes . . . *710
This Committee was appointed in 1912 to investigate the land tenure 
systems of British West Africa. It sat until 1914 and its Draft 
Report was ready in 1916, but was never published.
Draft Report of the West African Lands Committee, 1916, Para.
157. Emphasis supplied.
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The position at the close of 1913 was thus summed up by the Committee 
as follows:
’’Total area of the Gold Coast 24,335 square miles
Total alienation of land by native 
authorities of the Gold Coast which 
have been notified in the Government 
Gazette from 1900 to 31st December 1913
(Telegram 22nd April 1914) 25,108 square miles
Total area of alienation struck out by 
the Courts from 1900 to the end of 1913
(Telegram 22nd April 1914) 10,279 square miles
Total area (being part of the last- 
mentioned area) whosq alienaticn has 
been validated by the Courts up to 
31st December 1913 (Despatch 6th 1914)
(sic) 1,084 square miles.
As the Committee observed, from the above figures the total area of 
land alienated, on the basis of the evidence contained in instruments 
affecting lands, amounted to some 36,000 square miles, thus exceeding 
the estimated total area of the Colony of 24,335 square miles by 12,136 
square miles. It should be borne in mind that this calculation did 
not take into account large areas of land which would certainly have 
been affected by oral grants which were not officially recorded. These 
figures speak for themselves as showing that the instruments registered 
under the scheme were not accompanied by accurate plans depicting the 
land areas to which the interests described in the instrument related.
It is also patently obvious that there was no proper system of checking 
the accuracy of site plans (on those occasions when they were attached 
to the documents) before accepting the instruments for registration.
If there were an efficient system of checking the accuracy of plans 
against base maps drawn to nationally recognised scales or national 
grid co-ordinantes, such inaccuracies and mistakes would have been 
discovered in the land registry, preventing the absurd results which 
we have seen in the returns furnished to the Committee.
It was in these respects that the inherent defects of the Land 
Registry Ordinance were reflected. It should be remembered that before 
a concession was notified in the Gazette, it would first have been 
registered under the Ordinance. For section 15(1) of the Concessions 
Ordinance required that before the publication of a concession in the
711 Ibid.
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Gazette, the registrar of the court should register it at the expense
712
of the person entitled to benefit from the concession grant. As a
condition for the issue of a certificate of validity, the law required
that the certificate should state the boundaries, extent and situation
713
of the land in respect of which the certificate was given. It was
required that the certificate shoud also briefly specify the nature
714
of the concessions; and should contain a complete statement of
715
any limitations, modifications and conditions imposed by the court.
Like Section 6 of the Land Registry Ordinance, the weakness in these 
provisions was that they did not go far enough in prescribing as a 
condition for registration, an accurate description of the land area 
subject to registration by reference to a plan drawn on the basis of e* 
national accepted scales. The root cause of the problem of overlapping 
grants, conflicting registration and double dealings in land which 
the figures above suggested, was the lack of accurate surveys without 
which the objectives of title security and certainty could not be 
achieved under the registration system.
71G
In Concession Inquiry No. 1016 of 1911, for example, the
question for the determination of the court turned on the priorities
between instruments containing two leases of the same land by the same
grantor to two different persons. The second lessee took his grant
for value and without notice of the first grant and registered his
interest before the first grantee did. The case of Arkaah v. the Tarquah
717
Mining Exploration Co. Ltd., also dealt with a similar issue of
priority between two instruments of which the second in date was registered
718
before the first. The case of Hockman v. Arkhurst dealt with a 
similar problem of conflicting registration in which both parties 
were purchasers for value. The subsequent purchaser had no notice 
of the first grant and registered his interest prior in time to the 
first purchaser. All these cases need not have reached the courts
712
Ordinance No. 14 of 1900.
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at all if the system of accurate surveys were made a basis of land
transactions and for registration of instruments based on such transactions
Some writers on the subject of land registration in Ghana in the past
and present have concentrated their attention on the conditions or
the considerations which influence the courts in determining priority ’
between conflicting instruments. They deal with questions relating
to the operative effect of such doctrines as nemo dat quod non habet
on such transactions; and the effect which fraud or notice, actual
719
or constructive, have or should have on such transactions. But
while such treatment of the subject helps to illuminate the legal problems 
concerning the determination of priorities generally, they do not touch 
upon what we regard as lying at the root of all such problems, i.e. 
inaccurate surveys.
It is therefore not our primary concern here to deal with such 
problems in any detail. The reason for drawing attention to the cases 
referred to above is to show that the pith and marrow of the problems 
giving_rise to the issues to be resolved in them lay in inaccurate 
survey of the land areas subject to registration. We are intent on 
demonstrating that such problems need not arise at all under a land 
registration system if, firstly, an accurate system of surveys which 
could be relied upon for locating and identifying positively the physical 
confines of the land area to which registered instruments related were 
available, and secondly, if an efficient and well-equipped staff capable 
of checking the accuracy of plans attached to registrable instruments 
against base maps prepared on the basis of a nationally agreed scale 
were maintained.
It cannot be denied the fact that the absurd figures on the charac­
ter and extent of land alienations under the Concessions Ordinance 
within twelve years of its operation could be largely blamed on the 
failure to lay a solid foundation for the survey of all lands, or at 
least of the centres where land transactions were prevalent, as part 
of the scheme. The major lesson to be learnt from the failures of 
the scheme of land registration established under the 1895 Ordinance 
is that it will not be enough to make laws for the solution of social 
and economic problems in society if the means by which such laws can
See Bentsi-Enchill G.L.L., London, 1964, 318-30. See also G. 
Woodman, "The Registration of Instruments Affecting Land", (1975), 
7 R.G.L. 53
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be implemented are not to be made available. In this respect, it should 
be regretted that the attention which the matter of land surveys should 
have received as -part of the scheme of land registration was not forth­
coming. This attitude of the government could be explained in terms 
of the state of land surveys in the Gold Coast generally; and that is 
what we should consider next in relation to its effect on land registra­
tion.
F. Surveys and Mapping in the Gold Coast
Until the l^)20s, when the Survey Department was established,
no serious attempts at mapping were made in the Gold Coast. Between
1900 and 1923, the Royal Air Force Engineers under the leadership of
Mr. Watherstand, carried out some surveys in the Gold Coast. But these
surveys were confined to mining and timber working areas and were carried
720
out on individual bases only. Indeed, the first map of the Gold
Coast was produced as recently as 1911. Thus, although Section 6 of
the Land Registry Ordinance of 1895 substantially reproduced Section
15 of the Registration Ordinance of 1883 which required that for an
instrument to be registered, it should contain a description of the
boundaries and the situation of the land affected, prior to 1911 most
of the plans attached to instruments affecting lands contained only
sketches or diagrams with the names of adjoining occupiers written
on them. They described only the physical features such as rocks,
trees or rivers on the boundaries without being drawn to scale or located
721
on a proper plan.
The establishment of the Survey Department in the early 1920s,
however, saw the beginning of serious attempts to encourage surveying
in the country. It was during this time that compass surveys and cadastral
plans were begun and plans could be drawn showing direction of property
boundaries in degrees, minutes and seconds in relation to true North
722
by applying magnetic variation/ Between 1921 and 1939, extensive
mapping of the Colony was undertaken by the Royal Air Force Engineers 
under the guidance of Major-General Sir Gordon Guggisburg. During 
this period cadastral plans of large towns such as Keta, Ada, Cape 
Coast, Accra, Elmina and Axim were prepared.
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After the Second World War map making /An the Gold Coast progressed
steadily, and the first air survey maps of Accra were published in 
723
1954. Such aerial surveys became great assets to the map-maker
and the conveyancer because the revised maps showed contours, wood 
areas, and in some cases it was possible to identify traditional bound­
ary marks such as trees and rivers, which were located by stereoscope 
and taken by the camera. Such air photographs enabled the positions 
of such natural boundary marks to be located and plotted on maps.
It was during this period of improved map making and land survey methods 
that the inherent defects in the land titles registration system establish 
ed under the Land Registry Ordinance of 1895 became patently obvious.
After the Second World War, particularly during the 1950s, the 
government embarked upon elaborate infrastructural development programmes 
of road construction, housing and other social services. This made 
it necessary for government to acquire lands compulsorily. Such acquisi­
tions were followed by many claims for compensation. It thus became 
necessary to determine the extent to which individuals' interests were 
affected so as to compensate them. The responsibility for determining 
land areas affected and the value to be placed on such claims devolved 
on the Valuation Branch of the Lands Department. During the course 
of checking documents, some of which were registered or upon which 
judgment had been declared, against the revised base maps, it was dis­
covered that the plots of land described in some of the instruments..
724
were as much as 2,000 or 3,000 feet out of their true positions.
Referring to such inconsistencies, Dey wrote:
It is our experience that a particular site which has been developed 
with a house may have been transferred by A to B and the same 
site might have been transferred in another instrument by X to 
Y and similarly by C to Z but there may not be any conflict on 
the ground. ^25
For instance, in a case referred to by Dey in his paper, as Re-Abeka 
726
and Mukose Lands, In its review, the Privy Council referred to 900
723 . , _ 724 „  . . _ 725 ,
Ibid., p. 6 . Ibid., p. 7. Ibid.
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Ibid. The case was described as Asere and N^koi Olai Family Suite 
No. 60/70, Tesano Concession Certificate of validity No. 814.
The case was probably unreported.
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acres as being the extent of land involved, but based its judgment on 
the "area edged green" (Exhibit No. 1). On the basis of the plan "edged
727
green", however, the areas of land involved would have been 1,781 acres.
Cases of this nature should be a cause of concern to the admini­
strators of the land registration system, because it had been erroneously 
assumed that instruments affecting land in respect of which final judg­
ment was pronounced accurately rtflected what existed on the ground.
It was thus provided under Section 9 of the 1895 Land Registry Ordinance 
that: "A probate of a Judge's certificate may be registered without proof 
upon production thereof to the registrar". In the light of the concrete 
evidence produced by the Valuation Branch of the Lands Department as 
to the unreliability of such documents, however, it would not be unsafe 
to conclude that the land registry records between 1883 and 1954 could 
not be relied upon as a source of information concerning ,land titles.
We have tried to show the discrepancy between the land areas indicated 
on plans which were attached to registrable instruments .and what they 
actually were on the ground in order to demonstrate that inaccurate plans 
or surveys lay at the root of the problems that beset the administration 
of the scheme of land titles registration in the Gold Coast, and to stress 
the point that inaccurate surveys constituted one of the most formidable 
obstacles to the accomplishment of the objectives of title certainty 
and security for which the system was designed.
G. Proof of Instruments
It would appear that the colonial government, having failed to provide
the machinery for the survey of the land areas subject to registration,
found a substitute in elaborate provisions on proof of instruments.
Under Section 7(1) of the 1895 Ordinance, it was provided that:
Every instrument presented for registration (except a will or an 
instrument which may be registered without proof under the provisions 
hereinafter contained), must be proved by the oath of the grantor 
or one of the grantors, or of the grantee or one of the grantees, 
or of one of the subscribing witnesses, to have been duly executed 
by the grantor.
727 Ibid., p.9.
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An original will presented for registration was also required to
be proved by the oath of one of the subscribing witnesses in the manner
728
provided by the Ordinance. Under Section 7(3) such oath was required
to state whether the grantor or testator could read and write, and if
he could not read and write, it should state (except in case of a will
where the deponent was not present at its execution) that the instrument 
was read over and interpreted to him at the time of its execution by 
him and that he appeared to understand its provisions.
The proof required was to be made in the following manner:
a. If the instrument was executed in the Colony, before the registrar 
at the office where it was presented for registration, or before
a Judge, District Commissioner, or a registrar of a Divisional 
Court;
b. if the instrument was executed in any other part of Her Majesty's 
dominions, before any Judge of any court of law, or the mayor
or chief magistrate of any city, or any police magistrate, or 
the person administering the government of any colony; and
c. if the instrument was executed in any foreign country, before 
any British Consul or othej^|ccredited British representative 
resident in such country.
In respect of instruments affecting lands in Ashanti, it was provided
that they might be proved before a District Commissioner of or the Chief
Commissioner of Ashanti or before the registrar of Deeds, his deputy
730
or a District Commissioner of the Colony.
Unless all these conditions were fulfilled by way of proving the
instrument, it would not be accepted for registration. The Ordinance,
however, excluded from the requirements of proof by oath as as condition
731
for registration, a probate or a Judge's certificate. The will of
a person who died before the date on which the Ordinance came into force
in 1883, and any other instrument executed before that date were also
excluded from the duty of proving instruments in the manner provided
732
under the Statute.
It is difficult to see the need for these elaborate provisions concern­
ing proof of instruments by oath. It would seem unlikely that the part 
which such proofs could play in fostering certainty of title which was 
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S.8(2), as amended by Ordinance No. 1, of 1902, S.10.
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S.11. The date on which the Ordinance came into force was 24 March, 
1883.
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the main objective of the Ordinance would be so significant as to merit 
the emphasis which the legislator seemed to place upon them. It should 
be noted that proof of an instrument under oath that it was executed 
by the grantor would not be sufficient evidence that what was contained 
in the instrument necessarily represented the true state of affairs.
The Ordinance did not provide that the persons before whom the instru­
ments were to be executed should also have been present at the time of 
the transaction, or should depose that the facts contained in the instru­
ment were accurate and true. Such witnesses before whom the grantor 
was required to execute the instruments were not enjoined to guarantee 
the validity of the instruments.
If the above observations are correct, then there is no doubt that 
proof of instruments in the manner provided in the Ordinance was not 
a good substitute for a machinery of land surveys as part of the system 
of land registration under the Ordinance. Yet this is the impression 
one gets from an examination of its provisions. While an instrument 
could not be accepted for registration unless it was proved in the manner 
described above, Section 12 of th Ordinance provided that:
"If an instrument presented for registration has any map or plan 
drawn on it the registrar may require the person presenting it to 
deliver to him an exact copy of the map or plan to be posted or 
bound in the registry book with the copy of the instrument."
It can be seen that this provision presupposed that some instruments 
affecting land could be accepted for registration without plains being 
attached to them. Importance was thus placed on the proof of instruments 
by oath at the expense of provisions which should have made registration 
of instruments conditional upon accurate plans being attached to them.
Ofall its 28 provisions, only Sections 6 and 12 dealt, in a casual manner, 
with the question of surveys and plans. It is submitted that the emphasis 
in this regard was misplaced.
<K. Adjudication and Settlement of Title
Under any system of land registration where the objective is to 
use the scheme as an instrument for securing titles, a provision as part 
of the measure, for the definition of rights or interests in land and 
the determination of the land areas to which such rights or interests 
relate is of vital importance. The exercise under such a provision should 
be accompanied by conclusive determination and the settlement of issues 
relating to the persons, natural or artificial in whose names defined
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rights and interests should be recorded. This implies a scheme for adjudi­
cation and settlement of titles to land.
It should not be erroneously assumed that adjudication and settlement 
of rights to land in the manner described is only necessary under a scheme 
of title registration under which the indefeasibility of registered titles 
are guaranteed by the State. Under a deeds registration system, such 
as the one established under the Land Registry Ordinance, 1895 where 
the objective was title security, the attainment of the ultimate goal 
of certainty of title would be impossible without any arrangements for 
the determination and settlement of rights to land.
It is clear from section 20 of the Ordinance that registration did
not cure defects in title. It follows that the system did not guarantee
absolute security of registered instruments. But this does not mean 
that the Statute permitted or encouragedthe registration of defective
titles. Indeed, elaborate provisions under the Act on proof of instruments
as a condition for registration clearly demonstrates the intentions 
of the legislator that only good titles should be recorded. What is 
the purpose of recording titles, rights to which are not conclusively 
determined? There would seem to be none, in so far as security of title 
is concerned.
But the Ordinance did not make provision for conclusive determination 
of titles to land. It only provided for voluntary and sporadic registra­
tion of instruments affecting lands. Moreover, oral grants by which
interests in land were transferred under the indigenous law were by implica-
733
tion excluded from the provisions of the Ordinance. In Crayem v C.A.S.T. 
the West African Court of Appeal, considering section 17 of the Ordinance 
on priority between competing instruments, came to the conclusion that 
the section was for determining priority only as between written instru­
ments. "Where therefore, the competition is between a written instrument
734
and a parol grant under native custom, the Ordinance does not apply."
This meant that even if adjudication and settlement of titles were 
contemplated, transactions under customary law might be excluded.from 
the exercise. But undoubtedly, an orderly organisation of a system of 
land registration and the attainment of its goals of title security depend 
largely on conclusive and final settlement of rights to land. When this
733
(1949) 12 W.A.C.A.,443
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Ibid., at 446. For a fuller discussion of this point see pp. 402-403. 
below.
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is done through a systematic adjudication of title by a competent tribunal 
set up for that purpose, the registration of the conclusions of such 
a tribunal accompanied by accurate site plans could achieve lasting 
results.
As Dowson and Sheppart pointed out in their recommendation for the 
establishment of a system of title registration in the Gold Coast, the 
essential working features of an effective register of title to land 
is the unambiguous definition of:
a. the parcels, which also form the units of the record;
b. the rights and interests; and
735
c. the persons, individual or corporate, entitled thereto.
Rights to land would thus depend not upon the registration of the
instruments which are only documentary evidence of title or judicial 
declaration of title to such documents, but upon the final and conclusive 
decision by such a tribunal that the evidence contained in the instruments 
reflects the true state of affairs both on the ground and in the instruments. 
Such final conclusions can only be reached, if during the course of such 
settlements, the exercise is accompanied by accurate survey, definition 
and demarcation of the boundaries and units of land to which defined 
interests relate.
When this is done, rights or titles to land would depend on recordings 
into the official register or registers, the ’’durable precisely defined
units of land” affected rather than the "mobile mortal mistakable persons
736
temporarily possessing or claiming rights over portions of the land".
These essential elements are necessary under both deeds and title registra­
tion systems if their objectives of title security are to be achieved.
Evidently, these aspects of the scheme were never seriously considered
737
under the Land Registry Ordinance and were thus unprovided for.
It is submitted that this failure to take account of the important role
that adjudication and settlement of titles should play under the scheme
constituted a serious defect in the Ordinance and was one of the key factors
738
in the failures of the .system.
Impact of Uncertainty of Title and Costly Litigation
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Dowson and Sheppard, op.cit., p.7.
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For a fuller discussion of adjudication see pp. 392-399,
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As we have seen, the principal reason for introducing an Ordinance 
in 1883 for the establishment of a system of land registration in the 
Gold Coast was to make titles secure and to prevent litigation. An examina­
tion of' Official Reports and Commissions of Inquiry on the extent of 
litigation over land titles and its disastrous consequences on peasant 
communities would disclose, however, that during the period of two decades 
short of a century since land titles registration was introduced to Ghana 
the system has had no significant impact on the insecurity of titles 
and its incidental costly litigation. There is no evidence that the 
law and the machinery proivded under it were effective against these 
problems or even minimised them.
For example, 29 years after its introduction, Belfield found during 
the course of his Inquiry that the chiefs who had had the best opportunity 
of raising money through concessions grants were those who plunged their
stools most deeply into debt, and attributed such indebtedness, which
739
he found to be widespread, to litigation over land titles. Ten years
after the Belfield Report was published, the problem of title insecurity
and litigation became so acute that between 1922 and 1927 most of the
dispatches and memoranda on land matters in the Gold Coast were devoted
to the definition of policies designed to remedy the "exasperating uncert-
740
ainty that has long existed in respect of titles in the Gold Coast".
In one of the memoranda to the Commission appointed in 1923 to consider
the question of registration of title to land in the Gold Coast Colony,
Mr. Rowe presented a paper in which he made a strong case for cadastral
741
surveys as a framework for the introduction of the scheme.
These calls for the introduction of a new system and the volume 
of litigation which steadily increased with the years were clear indications 
that the existing law and the system which it supported were proving 
inadequte to solve the problems of title insecurity and the
costly litigation that was associated with it. When we turn to scrutinise
742
the C. R. Havers Report on Indebtedness in the Gold Coast, the magnitude 
of the problems of insecurity and its incidental- costly litigation would fur-
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See Proposed Reforms in Respect of Land Legislation of the Gold 
Coast, Primarily in Order to Promote Security of Title, Vol. I, 
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R. H. Rowe, "Cadastral Survey Framework of the Gold Coast Colony 
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C . R . Havers, K .C ., Report of Commission of Inquiry into Expenses incurred 
by Litigants in the Courts of the Gold Coast and Indebtedness caused 
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nish evidence of the failures of the scheme.
X. Boundary Disputes
A distinctive feature of the Havers Report on Agricultural Indebtedness
was the light which It shed on the extent and magnitude of the problems
relating to boundary disputes. The following quotation from the Report
indicated the main source of such disputes. It said:
It is abundantly clear from the evidence that the majority of states
in the Colony and Ashanti have been, and many still are, in debt.
Though there are other contributing factors, litigation is undoubted­
ly the main cause of the indebtedness. Stool debts caused by liti­
gation generally arise out of litigation over land and particularly 
out of boundary disputes. 743
Some of the evidence upon which the above conclusions were reached 
must now be examined in order to show that, notwithstanding the institu­
tion of a .system of land titles registration in the country for more 
than 60 years, the problems which the laws were introduced to solve have 
persisted and even become worse.
The Havers Report showed that the most expensive cases concerned 
boundary disputes between two paramount chiefs of adjoining polities 
or traditional states. More often than not, other paramount and divisional 
chiefs became involved. In some cases whole communities were pitched 
against one another in litigation over boundaries. Such disputes were 
normally protracted and almost inevitably went through a chain of appellate 
courts to the West African Court of Appeal, and in certain cases, as 
far as the Privy Counci1/London. One of the cases providing the locus 
classicus of such protracted and expensive disputes was that between 
the Paramount Chief of Akim-Abuakwa and the Sub Chief of Asamankese.
Havers found that Oferi Atta representing the Akim-Abuakwa stool spent
744
over £1 0 0 , 0 0 0 apart form other expenses which were not on record.
There was also the series of disputes over the stool lands between 
the Chief of Hieman and the Chief of Mokwa. Hieman was a small village 
of a population, according to the 1931 Census, of 900 people. The dispute 
began as far back as 1872 over a parcel of land and the right to ferry 
over the river Prah. The dispute culminated in litigation in 1894.
The litigation resulted in the whole of the stool lands of Hieman being
743
Ibid., p. 31
7 4 4  -Q1
Ibid. It is believed that the total amount spent -e£ both sides might
well exceed a quarter of a million pounds. See pp. The result of this 
protracted litigation was the passage of the Asamankese Division Regula­
tion Ordinance (Cap.78) in order to protect, control and regulate the pro­
perty, revenues and expenditure of stools in the Asamankese Division.
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sold in execution to purchasers. Later, the purchasers who were related to 
the stool family of Hieman, entered into an agreement with the chief 
of Hieman under which the latter was appointed a bailiff-tenant of the 
stool lands with a right to share in the receipts. A further agreement 
was entered into with the Ohene of Mokwa under which the receipts from 
the ferries were shared. Thereafter, there had been a constant stream 
of actions between the parties to the agreement, or their successors 
in title.
An attempt was made to settle this dispute in 1931 (59 years after
it had started) with the assistance of Sir John Yates, and an agreement
was concluded. On that occasion, the chief of Hieman told Sir John Yates
that he and his people desired to abandon this meaningless litigation
in respect of which they had paid £1 2 , 0 0 0 to one legal practitioner,
745
sind £8,000 to another. When the chief died, however, his successor
challenged the agreement and further litigation ensued, and was only
terminated by a compromise in 1942. At the time of this compromise,
the accounts of the receiver and manager of the land showed that the
total receipts between 1911 and 1942 amounted to £9,264. This amount
included the proceeds of the sale of the land in dispute itself. Having
regard to the amount of expenditure involved, the loss to the stools
and their subjects concerned could be appreciated. Yet at the time of
the Havers Commission in 1945, two actions were still pending between
746
persons claiming to be entitled to thsoe lands. This meant that
over 73 years after the dispute had begun, litigation over title and
right to the land had not been conclusively decided.
Similar evidence of protracted litigation over stool boundaries
was found in Sefwi-Bekwai where the latter stool had borrowed over £2,000
towards the cost of litigation which commenced in 1926. The chief imposed
a levy on his subjects in 1932 in order to liquidate the debt but some
of it was still outstanding in 1945 when the Havers Commission was sitting.
In Edubia there was a protracted boundary dispute between the Edubia
stool and the neighbouring stools of Ochereso and Gydim.. The litigation
which ensued made the Edubia stool fall into debts which notwithstanding
748
substantial payments still amounted to £1,994 in 1945.
745 Ibid.
74 6 Ibid., p. 32.
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Further evidence of boundary disputes in which large sums of money
were spent was provided by the litigation between the poeple at Donyina
and the poeple of Nyamiani. Although this dispute was settled in 1907,
it was reopened in 1935. Donyina eventually won the case in the Privy
Council, but only after it had spent £1,700. In order to pay this amount,
the stool raised a loan at an interest rate of 50 per cent. The village
749
thus gained nothing from the 28 years of dispute. There was also
750
the interesting 1936 case of Nsoatre v. Besekum. The dispute concerned
a piece of land named Kotofa, of about one square mile in area. It was 
virgin land described by the Havers Report as having no minerals of any 
kind or anything of value upon it. The case went through the Asantehen's 
Court and proceeded to the Chief Commissioner's Court before it was amicably 
settled, but not before the parties on each side had spent over £1,500.
In a dispute of similar nature, the Adansi stool spent £8,000, of
751
which £4,150 was spent on lawyers' fees. In cinother case, for more
than half a century, a piece of land called Hini.was claimed and counter­
claimed by the people of Kuntu and Nkusukum on the one hand, and the 
people of ; Suprudu in Ekunfi on the other. About 760 perople were interested
on the one side and about 740 on the other. Hundreds of pounds were
752
spent before the conclusion of the case.
As the Havers Report had shown, a problem hardly less acute was
in repect of boundaries between divisional stools. For example, no boundary
was ever settled between the various stools to whom the Ahafo lands,
a total area of some 720 square miles, were presented by the Asantehene
753
Nana OpokV.ware after the Abimburo War. This failure to demarcate
the boundaries between the divisional chiefs gave rise to disputes between
the chiefs concerned lasting for many years which were not settled until
1939 by the Asantehene Prempeh II. Similar problems existed in the Wenchi
District where the boundaries between several divisions remained uncertain.
For instance, at the time of the Havers Commission in 1945 the boundaries
between Abease, Badu, Banda, Drobo, Mo, Nkoranza, Nswakan, Seketia, Seikwa,
754
Suma Techiman and Wenchi remained undefined and uncertain. This meant
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that the disputes were not limited to traditional state boundaries alone
but involved internal subdivisional stool boundaries as well.
We have highlighted those aspects of the Havers Report which drew
attention to boundary disputes in order to focus attention on three main
points. Firstly, that over half a century after its introduction, except
755
the Kumasi Town lands, the system of land titles registration established
under the Land Registry Ordinances of 1883 and 1895 had proved ineffective 
against uncertainty of title and costly litigation. Secondly, we want 
to focus attention on the fact that most of the disputes concerned unde­
fined, undemarcated and unsettled boundaries. Thirdly, the way in which 
communities and stools were affected by large-scale expenditure having 
serious economic and social consequences on the societies involved.
The magnitude of the problem portrayed in the Havers Report was
a.clear indication that the scheme was a failure. As we have stressed 
throughout this discussion, the main cause of the problem was the lack 
of an adequate machinery of surveys and settlement of boundaries as 
part of the scheme. These views were confirmed and reflected in the 
recommendations of the Commission. The Commission recommended as a solution 
to the problem a plan by which boundaries between native polities could 
be conclusively determined and fixed within the framework of a land titles 
registration system. 7^
It recommended the appointment of a boundary commision which should 
be empowered under an ordinance to determine conclusively and fix boundaries 
in the Colony and Ashanti. Provision should be made under such an Ordinance 
enjoining the boundary commission to record its findings in a "boundary 
book by reference to a plan" prepared or approved by the Survey Department 
as accurate. Boundaries should be fixed on the ground in some permanent 
manner under the direction of the commission.. It concluded its recommenda­
tions by suggesting that the ordinance establishing the boundary commission 
should contain provisions making the decisions of the commission on
boundary settlements final and conclusive, binding and good for all purposes
757
against all persons with no right to appeal.
These recommendations were significant in several respects. They 
touched upon almost all the essential elements which a system of land 
titles registration should consist of in order to achieve its objectives
Those areas of Kumasi township which were taken by govemnEntunc e^r 
the Administration (Ashanti) Ordinance, 1902, (Cap.110) 1951 Rev. 
See pp. 369-373.
756 Ibid., p.34
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of title security and certainty. The role of the boundary commission 
could, for instance, be seen as that of an adjudication committee or 
tribunal, which we have argued,should play an important role in any success- 
ful scheme for the registration of land titles. In a similar way, the 
recording in the boundary book of the conclusions reached by the commission, 
describing such conclusions by reference to a plan drawn by the Survey 
Department or approved by it as accurate, could be seen as taking into 
account the indispensable role which a reliable system of surveys would 
have to play in the administration of the scheme. Similarly, the Commission's 
recommendation that the findings of the boundary commission should be 
conclusive and final indicates a recognition of the need for excluding 
defective and disputed titles from being recorded in the register.
In terms of establishing a land titles registration system, these 
were sound recommendations, but to carry them out would require the expendi­
ture of large sums of money on equipment and qualified personnel. It 
would also involve initial increase in litigation, the evil at which 
the scheme would be directed, with consequential financial losses to 
the communities concerned. Realising that the decision of such a commission 
would be final and conclusive, the people would be prepared more than 
before to spend money to defend their claims to the lands. It may well 
be that in the long term, titles would become certain and secure, but 
the initial economic and social consequences could be devastating. Perhaps 
because of such reasons and the government's disinclinatim towards expenditure 
on projects which would not pay themselves instantly, these recommendations 
were not put into effect and no change in the law ever occurred until 
1962. Lord Hailey, commenting on this attitude of the government, rightly 
observed that:
Whatever may be felt as to the necessity for the introduction of 
a system of registration of titles in some other African territories, 
there can be no question that it is now required in the Gold Coast 
Colony. It is understood that the Government has had under its 
consideration proposals for legislation on the subject, but that 
it has hesitated to adopt them in view of the complicated nature 
of the problems involved, the expenditure which must be incurred, 
and the possibility of political opposition. ?58
Twelve years after the Havers Report was published, the problems 
which gave rise to the setting up of the Commission of Inquiry under
Native Administration in the British African Territories, Part III,
(1951), p. 225.
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the chairmanship of Havers persisted and even increased so much that
another Commission of Inquiry was set up once more to find out the causes 
759
of indebtedness. One would have thought that this Commission of
Inquiry should have been unncessary, having regard to the available evidence 
provided by past Inquiries. As should be expected, the 1957 Committee 
having exhaustively considered the history of past inquiries and the 
new evidence available, reached the conclusion that widespread agricultural 
indebtedness in peasant ocmmunities was attributable to litigation over 
land titles. The cause of such litigation was once again found to be 
uncertainty of boundaries between adjoining stools, communities and familie 
Like previous Commissions of Inquiry, the 1957'Committee of Inquiry recom­
mended the introduction of a system of land titles registration as a 
lasting solution for these problems. What stands out clearlyfrom these 
accounts of the history of land titles registration in Ghana is that 
since its establishment in 1883, until the Land Registry Ordinance of 
1895 was repealed in 19.'62, the system of deeds registration has not had 
the effect of reducing significantly, the problems which it was devised 
to solve. In contrast, a relatively successful system of deeds registra­
tion was operated under the Kumasi Lands Ordinance of 1943 which we 
must now consider.
K . Land Registration under the Kumasi Lands Ordinance
At the time when the Registration Ordinance of 1883 was passed and
re-enacted under the Land Registry Ordinance of 1895, Ashanti was
not part of the Gold Coast Colony. However, following the publication
of the Ashanti Order in Council of 1901 under which Ashanti was annexed
as a conquered territory and formally brought under British jurisdiction,
the provisions of the 1895 Land Registry Ordinance were made operative
throughout Ashanti. This was done under the Administration (Ashanti)
760
Ordinance of 1902. This latter Ordinance declared that all lands,
premises and buildings occupied as government property vested absolutely 
761
in the Crown. The Crown also appropriated an area of land lying
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See the Report of the Committee on Agricultural Indebtedness, Accra,
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760 Cap.110, 1951, Rev. S.22.
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within the limits of the town of Kumasi "free from all encumbrances, 
titles, interests, liens, charges and claims whatsoever alleged to be
i • 762claimed".
The Ordinance enjoined the Chief Commissioner to prepare, with all
convenient despatch, a schedule of all the lands so acquired together
763
with proper plans thereof. The Ordinance imposed a duty, on the Chief
Commissioner to cause the originals of such plains and schedules duly 
certified under his hand and official seal to be deposited at the office 
of the Commissioner for lands in Accra. Any of such plans or documents’ 
was for all purposes and without proof of signature to be deemed to consti­
tute conclusive evidence of the facts as to the Crown’s ownership of
764
which they purported to be a record.
It should be noted that the duties which the proivsions of the Ordinance
imposed on the Chief Commissioner could be seen as the first real attempt
to institute a system of title registration on the basis of cadastral 
surveys in the country. Land registration by this arrangement was, however,
limited to the areas acquired or controlled by the Crown within the Kumasi
area.
When the Gold Coast became independent in 1957, and later a Republic 
in 1960, the Statute laws of Ghana were streamlined so as to conform 
to the Republican status of the State. Hence all lands previously vested
in the Crown or in the Governor-General, were either vested in the state
765
or in the President of the Republic in trust for the people of Ghana.
Though the administration of Kumasi Town Lands had been changing hands
over the years, the Administration (Ashanti) Ordinance of 1902, under
766
which they were originally acquired by the Crown remained unchanged.
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See the State Property and Contracts Act, 1960 (C.A.6).
On 25 September, 1941, in the course of his address at a durbar held in 
Kumasi, His Excellency Sir Arnold Hodson announced the Government's in­
tention to give the freehold of the Kumasi Town Lands to the "Golden 
Stool" "in view of the steadfast loyalty of the Ashanti people and their 
chiefs and theih devotion to the British Crown which has since become 
so manifest . . . "  As a gesture of reconciliation with traditional 
rulers of Ashanti, therefore, these areas of land which were hitherto 
absolutely vested in the Crown were revested in the Asantehene and his 
successors in office in trust for the Golqen Stool. See the Kumasi Lands 
Ordinance (Cap.145) 1951, Rev., S.2. Following the Sarkodi-Addo Commission 
Report, however, the trusteeship of the Kumasi Town Lands was transferred 
from the Asantehene to the Governor-General as a trustee for the Golden 
Stool under the Ashanti Stool Lands Act of 1958 (No. 28). See the 
Sarkodie-Addo Report of a Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of the
Kumasi State Council and the Asanteman Council, i 10 February, 1.958,
Accra.
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Registers were established for land registration purposes under the Kumais
767
Lands Ordinance of 1945.
A remarkable feature of the scheme of land registration established 
in Kumasi since the advent of the Administration (Ashanti) Ordinance,
1902 was that cadastral plans of Kumasi town lands were.prepared. The 
key maps and plans purported to show boundaries of the lands surveyed 
with accuracy in accordance with Section 4(2) of the Ordinance. These 
maps were required to give the exact measurement by which the boundaries 
were to be demarcated on the ground. Such maps or plans were thus made 
in conformity with the result of a survey carried out by official surveyors 
and approved by the Director of Surveys or persons appointed by him for
4-v, *  768that purpose.
The relative accuracy of such key maps and plans accounted for the 
degree of success which attended land titles registration in those areas 
of Kumasi under government administration and control. Titles were free 
of the uncertainties that bedevilled those areas lying just outside govern­
ment-controlled areas and other places under traditional authority admini­
stration in the whole country. Noting the contrast between land registra­
tion under the Land Registration Ordinance, 1895, and the arrangements 
under which rights to lands were registered in Kumasi, the Havers Report 
observed:
An interesting contrast is provided by the lands within the bound­
aries of the Town of Kumasi, which by an historical accident became 
vested in the Crown and are now vested in the Asantehene and his 
successors in office in trust for the Golden Stool and the Kumasi 
Division under the Kumasi Lands Ordinance, 1943. Persons holding 
leases from the Asantehene, which are duly registered in accordance 
with the Ordinance, enjoy security of title, and litigation with 
regard to such land seldom, if ever arises. 788
It is important to note that this degree of certainty was achieved 
although no settlement or adjudication of title or demarcation and settle­
ment of boundaries were undertaken. Several reasons could be found for 
this. In the first place, the question of title was not in dispute.
Section 4(2) of the Ordinance made it clear that any original of the 
plans relating to the acquired lands and the documents thereof should 
for "all purposes and without proof of signature be deemed to constitute 
conclusive evidence of the facts as to the Crown's ownership" of which 
they purported to be a record. This provision removed any doubts as
767 (Cap.145) 1951 Rev. S.23.
768 S.4(2)
769 C. R. Havers, op.cit., p. 37
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to the root of title.
As root of title was certain, the only thing which might give rise 
to uncertainty would be inaccurate survey of the areas to which titles re­
lated. But this was prevented by the maintenance of qualified staff in 
the Survey Department under the supervision of the Director of Surveys.
The fact of government administration and control, which removed doubts 
about root of title and the fact of an adequate system of surveys, were 
thus the two crucial factors in the success of the land registration system 
in Kumasi. The registration or recording in the register of title in 
Kumasi therefore amounted only to a statement of fact as to the existence 
of these states of affairs, namely that a grantee had acquired an interest 
of a certain duration relating to a specific area of the land held 
or controlled by the government.
When these facts are appreciated, then the alternative measure of 
state control of all lands as a means of ensuring certainty without neces­
sarily resorting to the establishment of an elaborate and expensive system
of title registration can be recognised as feasible. As we have pointed 
770
out earlier, the fact of government control which had the effect 
of eliminating boundaries betweeen stools, substools and families and 
establishing a recognisable and easily identifiable body with the legal 
capacity to deal with lands accounted for the degree of certainty of title 
in Kumasi and not necessarily because of the registration system. It 
is our contention that even if there were no system of land registration 
in the Kumasi town lands areas, with accurate surveys, the same degree 
of certainty could still have been achieved.
One fact is certain. In the Northern Territories where the government
was in control, titles were and are still certain. In the whole of the
North, the majority of the people never registered their interests nor
even knew about the existence of the facility at all. In those areas
of the country where government was not in control of lands there was
a high degree of title uncertainty, the existence of a facility of land
771
title registration notwithstanding. These facts lend support to the
view which we seek to urge, namely that the cheaper and quickest alternative 
of state administration of all lands be adopted in place of title registra­
tion.
To conclude these historical accounts of land titles registration, 
it would be appropriate to draw attention to two enactments, the Land
770 See p. 371
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It may well be that lack of knowledge about the existing facilities for 
registration accounted for the degree of uncertainty. But it is a fact tha 
where government is in control the problem of uncertainty does not exist.
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Development (Protection of Purchasers) Act, I960,.and the Farm Lands
773
Protection Act, 1962. These Acts were passed not as land titles regis­
tration statutes, but as reactions to increasing problems of title insecurity 
with which land registration under the Land Registry Ordinance of 1895 
was unable to cope.
L. The Land Development (Protection of Purchasers Act
We have seen from the conclusions of the Havers Report of 1945 and 
the Report of the Commission on Agricultural Indebtednesss of 1957, the 
way in which uncertainty of title and costly litigation over land titles 
had caused social and economic problems for stools and peasant communities.
We have also drawn attention to the post-war infrastructural development 
programmes of the government in the 1950s. These events led to the influx 
of people from the countryside to the urban and city areas in search 
of jobs.
During this time, private individuals saw the economic potential
of investing in housing and estate development. This led to increasing
demands for land for building houses in the urban and city areas. But
insecurity of titles increased correspondingly with such increases in
land transactions attendant upon housing and estate development. This
brought home to the independent government, even.more than before, the
ineffectiveness of the land registration system. The problems were underlined
in a memorandum of a United Nations housing mission to the Gold Coast
in 195)4, which said:
It has long been acknowledged that a serious need exists for clear­
ing titles to land in certain areas of the Gold Coast and for instituting 
a system of land registration. These reforms are essential to record 
the rights of people to land, to secure those who have purchased 
property against eviction and to assure people who build their homes 
that they can do so without fear or uncertainty. It has been iterated 
and reiterated that only when a sound system for buying and selling 
property exists will the fundamental wealth represented by the country's 
land be brought into use for the benefit of the people. All too 
often, though no one may be disputing ownership to land, the imputed 
owner is unable to establish his ownership, cannot borrow money with 
which to develop his land, nor sell it to those able to develop it . . .
The evils and mischiefs of the current situation are known. They 
rise to obstruct important programmes involved with the country's
772
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growth. They loom in the conflicts between stools in some of the 
rural areas and between owners and tenants in the burgeoning uncertainty 
as to their rights. Almost every phase of the housing problem which 
the team of United Nations experts has explored has brought forth 
the uncertainties of land tenure as a primary obstacle. It has been 
emphasised in conferences with architects and builders who have been 
obstructed in their operation; by such folk seeking to build a roof 
over their heads; by Government officials who have the duty of making 
housing loans or carrying out legislative policy; by those concerned 
with advancing the building and loan movement; and by local government 
officials. 774
The provisions of the Land Development (Protection of Purchasers)
Act, 1960, had thus been designed as sin ad hoc measure to deal with pressing 
problems of the kind described in the above memorsindum. The Act is not 
a land titles registration statute, but its objectives ..are, like the 
latter, the security of titles and to make land transactions free of liti­
gation. Accordingly, it may be seen not only as a reaction to the ineffect­
iveness of the registration system under the Land Registry Ordinance of 
1895, but as a supplement to it. The subtitle of the Act makes it clear 
that it is intended to "protect purchasers of land and their successors 
whose titles are found to be defective after a building has been erected 
on the land".
The Act is not of general application in Ghana. It apples only to 
those areas of the country which the Minister of Lands, by legislative 
instrument, has declared as prescribed are%under the provisions of 
the ACt. In the Statutory Development area of Accra, for instance, where 
the Act applies, for a purchaser of land to have protection under the 
Act, the following conditions must be fulfilled:
775
a. the purchaser should have taken a i^gnveyance" of land at 
any time after 31 December, 1944, whether before or after 
the date on which Accra became a prescribed area;
b. the purchaser or a person claiming through him should have erected 
a building on the land in good faith, and
c. proceedings for a possession order against the purchaser or a 
person claiming through him should have been brought before the 
Courts on the grounds that a person other than the purchaser
is entitled to the land.
774
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Memorandum on the Clearing of Clouded and Unmarketable Titles in 
Land in the Gold Coast and for the Institution of a System of Land
Registration, November, 1954. Quoted in Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill in 
his article, "Do African Systems of Land Tenure Require a Special 
Terminology?", (1965) J.A.L. Vol. 9, No. 2, 114, at 335-6.
Conveyance is defined as including a transfer of land by customary 
law, showing that oral grants are also covered by the Act.
S.1(1) (a). The Act takes retrospective effect from 31 December, 
1944.
777 S.1(1) (b). 778 S.1(1) (o).
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If, under these conditions, the Court comes to the conclusion that
but for the provisions of the Act, the conveyance would not operate to
confer title to the land on the purchaser, but to make an order of possession
against him would cause "hardship and injustice" to him, then the Court may
make make an order providing that the conveyance taken by the purchaser
shall be deemed for all purposes to have operated to confer on him title 
779
to the land. But this is not the end of the matter. If the Court
finds on the other handr that its refusal to make sin order for possession 
in favour of the person entitled to the land would in itself cause "hardship" 
and "injustice" to the latter, the Court may make a further order requiring 
the purchaser or a person claiming through him to pay to the former, com­
pensation in a sum not exceeding the aggregate of any sums equal to twice
the value of the land at the date of the purported conveyance to the pur- 
780
chaser.
It should be noted that unlike the Land Registry Ordinance of 1895 
which did not provide for registration of parol dealings in land, the 
present Act, by defining "conveyance" as including a transfer of land 
by customary law, caters for this need. It is in this respect in which 
the Act is in a way, a supplement to the Land Registry Ordinance of 1895, 
although it does not deal directly with land registration as such. As 
we have indicated already, like the Land Registry Ordinance, the main 
purpose of this Act is to ensure certainty of title and to curb litigation 
over land titles which had been increasing with land transactions in the 
1950s.
Bentsi-Enchill is, however, very critical of the present legislative 
measure on several grounds. The most relevant of his criticisms is that 
rather than secure titles, it is possible for the Act to increase insecurity 
and encourage fraud. Expressing these views he comments thus:
It could, perhaps, be urged on behalf of the Act that it was intended 
to make titles more secure and thus to encourage investment in buildings, 
and foreign capital generally. The answer to this appears to be irresi­
stible. In the first place, one does not make titles more secure 
by providing machinery whereby an unscrupulous person can be assisted 
to take land away from its true owner against his will. If the quest 
is for increased security of titles, then it is paradoxical to enable 
defective titles to be validated as against existing good titles.
That way rather lies an increase in the insecurity of titles,.and
779
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S.1(2).
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the encouragement of fraud. The very subtitle of the Act, which 
suggests that it is intended 'to protect purchasers of land and their 
successors whose titles are found to be defective after a building 
has been erected on the land', carries more than a hint of the possibi­
lity that the innocent owner of land whose property is sold through 
the fraudulent act of some third person is being ignored. But he
*701
too needs protection . . .
It may not add anything to the understanding of the main theme of 
our work to enter the debate on the merits or demerits of the Act. The 
main purpose of discussing it and drawing attention to it is to use it 
as a further demonstration that the problems of uncertainty and costly 
litigation persisted even long after land registration was introduced 
in the Gold Coast; and to indicate other legislative measures such as 
the present Act, which were being adopted to solve them. We should, however, 
remark that whatever the merits of Bentsi-Enchill's criticisms, it will 
be difficult to see under what circumstances a person who sits down until 
a building has been erected on his land before beginning an action for 
possession can be described as an "innocent land owner". It would appear 
that the fears expressed by Bentsi-Enchill have been taken care of by 
the provision in the Act that, for a purchaser to benefit under the Act, 
he should have erected his building on the land in "good faith". If the 
bona fide of the purchaser and the person claiming through him is the 
condition for the exercise by the Courts of the powers conferred on them 
then the situations and occasions on which the events which the author 
fears might possibly occur will be rare indeed.
M. The Farm Lands (Protection) Act, 1962
782
The Farm Lands (Protection) Act like the one discussed above, 
is a further legislative measure to deal with the problem of the uncertainty. 
It is,r in fact, an extension of the policy of the Land Development (Protec­
tion of Purchasers) Act. The difference between the two Acts is that 
the former is of wider application than the latter. The Act applies only
to those areas prescribed by the Minister responsible for stool lands
783
under a legislative instrument. The Minister has exercised this power
784
in such a way that it now applies in most farming areas of the country.
K. Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law, London, 1964, 272.
Act 107.
S.4.
The Act now applies in the whole of Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Southern Ghana 
comprising the Western, Central Eastern and Volta Regions. But the city 
and urban areas of Accra, Kumasi, Cape Coast. Sekondi-Takoradi, includ­
ing local council areas of Ada, Anlo North, Anlo South and Tongu, have
been excluded from its provisions. See L.I., 23 March, 1962.
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The objectives of the Act are clearly stated in its memorandum.
It says that:
Several occasions have arisen where a number of farmers have bought 
land from a stool holder, and after cultivating the land for six, 
seven, or eight years have been presented with documents of title 
by another person claiming title to the same piece of land from the 
former stool holder who did not develop the land. This situation 
invariably leads to prolonged litigation, waste of time and money 
and stultifies essential agricultural production. This Bill is thus 
designed, with retrospective effect, to make it possible for the 
second lot of purchasers who have developed the land to obtain good 
title to the land which they have developed. It also provides for 
compensation to be paid, in appropriate cases, where the Court 
considers it equitable.
Within the context of these objectives, it is provided under Section
2(1) of the Act that any farmer who acquires any land within the areas
to which the Act applies, for farming purposes any time after 1940 and 
before the commencement of the Act may have valid title conferred on him 
notwithstanding any defect in his title, if:
a. he has acquired it in good faith;
b. he has begun farming on it within eight years of the date of
acquisition, and
c. no one had farmed on the land for a period of eight years prior
to its acquisition by the farmer.
But any defect in the farmer’s title could not be cured under certain 
conditions. Section 2(2) empowers the Court not to grant a possession 
order against the farmer, but should instead declare his title valid if 
it finds that but for this Act, it would have to do so by reason of defects
in the farmer's title. But this power should be exercised only when the
Court finds that to make a possession order against the farmer will cause 
"hardship” and injustice to him. Under Section 2(3) of the Act, where 
the Court declares valid the defective title of the farmer, thereby effect­
ively extinguishing the valid claims of the person entitled thereto, and 
the Court considers that this would cause hardship and injustice to the 
claimant, then it should make a further order requiring the farmer to 
pay to the former, compensation in an amount not exceeding twice the value 
of the consideration paid at the time of the acquisition.
Undoubtedly, these provisions like those of the Land Development 
(Protection of Purchasers) Act, were designed as an ad hoc measure to 
deal with title insecurity and as a supplement to the Land Registry Ordinance 
and the land registration system established under it. However, like 
the latter Ordinance, the present measures were insufficient to deal with
378
the problems in their totality. The need for a more comprehensive legis­
lation on a new land titles registration system was thought to be overdue. 
The Land Registry Ordinance, 1895 was thus repealed by the Land Registry 
Act, 1962 (Act 22) which replaced it, thus bringing to an end the colonial 
phase of 80 years of land titles registration in Ghana.
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CHAPTER II
THE CURRENT MACHINERY OF LAND TITLES REGISTRATION
A. Introductory
In the discussion of the history of land titles registration in Ghana, 
an attempt was made to dmeonstrate that the enactments under which the 
scheme of land registration was established proved inadequate for the solu­
tion of the problems of title insecurity and litigation. Although a belated 
attempt was made to supplement the provisions of the Land Registry Ordin­
ance, 1895, with the Land Development (Protection of Puchasers) Act, 1960, 
and the Farm Lands Protection Act, 1962, these statutes had no significant 
impact on the effectiveness of the system.
Attention was drawn to the fact that the failures of the system were 
due to:
a. inattention to the crucial role that sin efficient system of surveys 
should play as part of the measure;
b. lack of qualified personnel to administer the scheme;
c. the sporadic nature of the registration programme whereby oral 
grants under the traditional systems were excluded from its purview;
d. the lack of any machinery for the definition, settlement and de­
termination of rights to land and
e. the failure to settle boundaries between traditional states or 
polities.
The main task in this part of the discussion will be an attempt to examine
the changes which have taken place,in the registration system since 1962 when
785
the Land Registry Ordinance, 1895, was repealed.
As will be seen from the analysis of the provisions of the Land Registry 
786
Act, 1962 under which the present system works, most of the pre-colonial
problems still persist. It will be seen that the new Act contains provisions
which are capable of dealing with the problems for which they were designed.
But for unexplained reasons some.of these important provisions have not
787
been brought into force as yet. It will be shown that like the previous
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The Land Registry Act, 1962, (Act 122) repealed Ordinance No. 1 of 
1895. See Section 35(1) of the former Act.
Act 122.
Sections 20(a) and 20(b) of Act 122 from which the power of adjudication 
and settlement of title could be inferred were not brought into force. 
For the discussion of this point, see pp. 392-398.
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enactments the present Act excludes the registration of oral grants from its
purview. What is more, none of the facilities, such as the establishment
of registries and the appointment of a Chief Registrar are provided in
accordance with the provisions of the Act. The present statute like its
predecessors, provides no machinery for the definition of rights in land,
the demarcation and settlement of boundaries and a systematic survey of
the land areas subject to registration. The tedious, cumbersome, complex,
time-consuming and the unnecessarily expensive nature of the procedure
788
for registration will be highlighted.
B. The Land Registry Act of 1962
i . Registry Offices
Having recognised some of the shortcomings of enactments on land
titles registration in the past, the independent government of Ghana found
it necessary to introduce a more comprehensive legislation to provide
for a better arrangement for recording titles and rights to land. R. J.
H. Pogucki, the first Commissioner of lands and the brain behind the Land
Registry Act, was well acquainted with problems associated with instruments
registration under the previous law. He believed that the time was still
not ripe for the inauguration of a real system of title registration.
This belief was founded on the knowlege that administrative and financial
789
constraints would make its introduction unworkable.
Accordingly, as Draftsman of the Act, Pogucki made provisions for 
the establishment and continuation of the deeds registration system of 
the past. The Act repeals the Land Registry Ordinance of 1895. Yet as 
its title suggests, it is an ’’Act to consolidate with amendments the law
788
The discussion of the current arrangements existing for registration 
of instruments affecting land under the Land Registry Act, 1962, 
is based on the data and information obtained from the Lands Departments 
of the Regional capitals of Ashanti, Greater Accra, Northern, Upper 
and Volta. The data and information were obtained between July 1975 
and August 1977 through personal interviews of Regional Lands officers, 
District Chief Executives, Regional representatives of the Sub-Committee 
of the Lands Commission and from the examination of files and records. 
Some legal practioners dealing with land questions and some prominent 
traditional elders were also interviewed. The opinions expressed 
on the facts are my own and my responsibility.
R. J. H. Pogucki, Memorandum to the Committee on Agricultural Indebted­
ness , Accra 1957. See Appndix III A of the Report.
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relating to the registration of instruments affecting land." The Act
thus substantially contains the main provisions of its predecessor, with
some important additions, modifications and alterations.
Part I of the Act provides for the establishment of a land registry
office at.Accra and at such other places as the minister may appoint.
The minister may remove any office from one place to another and may increase
790
or diminish the number of offices. Power is conferred on the President
to appoint a Chief Registrar of lands with the responsibility of supervising
791
registry offices, and a registrar at each office. Remarkably, these
provisions had been on the Statute books since 1883 when the Registration 
Ordinance was passed; and although it might be inconceivable that a scheme 
of land titles registration could be successfully implimented without 
the provision of such basic facilities as offices, equipment and the appoint­
ment of a competent administrative head, none of such facilities were 
ever provided.
Certainly, Pogucki who was the Draftsman of the Act, envisaged and 
had in contemplation, the establishment of registry offices independent 
of the Lands Department. If this had not been the intention of the Draftsman, 
the provisions for their establishment would have been superfluous, since 
the Lands Department was already in existence. The role of the Lands
792
Department, if any, was intended to be one of servicing the land registries.
Yet it would appear that the necessary foundations which should be laid 
for the administration of the scheme through the establishment of well 
equipped independent land registries and the appointment of qualified 
personnel have been neglected. Like past governments since 1883, the 
independent governments of Ghana have not considered it necessary to estab­
lish land registries and appoint registrars with the expertise to supervise 
the implimentation of the programme.
Before Pogucki could begin implimenting the scheme he was replaced 
in 1960. That was two years ahead of the coming into force of the Act 
in 1962. When the Act came into force, contrary to Pogucki's intention
%
and the provisions of the Act, neither were the registries established 
nor the Chief Register or a registrar appointed. Instead, the functions 
of the land registry were absorbed into the main stream of the Lands Depart­
ment’s work. Until 1974, there were no registration facilities in the
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5.1. 
5.2.
I am indebted to Mr. B. T. Acromond, Senior State Attorney and Registrar 
of Lands, Kumasi, for the information on Pogucki's work in the Lands 
Department and his role in the framing of the present Act.
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Brong Ahafo, Northern and Upper Regions of the country. This meant that
any grantee of an interest in land from the two regions who was desirous
of getting his instrument registered would have to travel to the Department
in Kumusi for this purpose. The expense in time and money which such
an exercise involved was enough to prevent even a willing interest holder
to undertake this task. At present,- although Northern, Upper, Volta and
Brong Ahafo Regional Lands Departments have got land registries, they are
793
inadequately equipped for the registration exercise.
At the time of Pogucki's departure, the most senior man in the Lands
Department was a Valuer. He succeeded Pogucki as Chief Lands officer.
Since then, there had been successive Chief Lands officers all of whom
794
were valuers by profession. As the administrative head of the Lands
Department, the Chief Lands Officer combines many functions. They include
795
matters relating to the administration of stool lands, lands compulsorily 
acquired by the state, lands generally controlled by the government and 
all questions concerning valuation of property. The registration of instru­
ments affecting lands thus became just one of the additional functions 
in the main stream of the Lands Department's work.
This failure to establish independent land registries and to appoint 
registrars to administer the scheme in accordance with the provisions 
of the Act underlines the lack of appreciation on the part of past and 
present governments, of the real nature of the scheme, what it involves 
and what it will take to make it work successfully. As will be seen presently, 
this is the starting point of the failures of the present system. We 
shall examine next, the effects of the lack of such registries and registrars, 
on the administration of the scheme.
ii. Problems of Administration.
As has been pointed out already, the government has failed to establish 
land registries and has not appointed a chief Registrar and registrars 
for the administration of the scheme of land titles registrations according 
to the provisions of the Land Registry Ordinance of 1962. This has created
793
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There was for example, as at August, 1977, no embossment machine 
in any of the places mentioned above for the stamping of documents, 
and all instruments had to be sent to Kumas or Accra for that purpose.
I was informed that all three successive Chief Lands Officers were 
replaced because of the inefficient manner in which they administered 
the Lands Department.
Section 8(1) of the Land.Administration Act, 1962, (Act 123).
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certain problems for the registration programme. Although the function 
of land registration has been absorbed into the main stream of the duties 
of the Lands Department, larid registration and its administration came 
to be regarded as a function for trained lawyers. Yet no service conditions 
comparable to what obtains in the Attorney General's Department or other 
comparable institutions exist for lawyers at the Lands Department.
For this reason, there are no permanent legal officer-employees of 
the Lands Department. Instead, the Attorney General's Department is requested 
to second some of its legal staff to the Lands Department. The legal officers, 
when assigned to the latter, remain subject to the service conditions of 
the former. Their promotion, welfare and discipline are the responsibility 
of the Attorney General. They are responsible and answerable to the latter 
and not to the administrative head of the Larlds Department. Such legal 
officers can be called upon by the Attorney General to perform other duties 
apart form those of the Lands Department. At the Lands Department, the 
legal officers perform most of the functions relating to the registration 
of instruments affecting lands.
In the Kumasi office of the Lands Department, for example, there is 
a Senior State Attorney who is the registrar of instruments affecting lands 
and assisted by a state attorney in the performance of his duties. In 
addition to duties pertaining to registration of rights to land, they perform 
other functions relating to the administration of stool and government 
lands and all legal issues incidental thereto, on behalf of the Lands Depart­
ment. As the legal staff is subject to the control of the Attorney General 
and its Department, and not answerable,to the head of the Lands Department, 
the Registrar has no supervisory powers over the clerical and other staff 
of the Lands Department.
Similarly, the registrar has no right to enforce discipline directly 
or initiate policy towards efficiency and improvement in the registration 
procedure. All the clerical and technical staff, including those concerned 
with registration of instruments for which the senior State Attorney or 
the registrar is responsible are under the senior Lands Officer. The land 
registers, documents, files and all other records relating to land registra­
tion belong to the Lands Department. Most records are designed for valuation 
purposes and not for registration of instruments as such. As a result, 
the registrar has no control over entries into the record books. Yet on 
many occasions the legal staff has to be called upon to answer in court, 
questions in respect of certain anomalies arising out of inaccurate entries 
into the record books and reports submitted from the Lands Department of 
which the registrar may be the signatory.
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In all the Lands Departments of those regional capitals investigated, 
the situation seems to be the same. A solution of the problem could be 
found in cooperation between the senior lands officers of the Lands Depart­
ment and the registrars, but this cooperation does not appear to exist.
At least, in the Kumasi office, no evidence of such cooperation was found 
to be existing. The administrative arrangements are in themselves inherently 
fertile for disagreements. The senior lands officer is the administrative 
head of the Lands Department. But the registrar who is a senior State 
Attorney earns much higher salary than the senior lands officer. The 
former, as we have seen, is not answerable to the latter. The registrar 
too has no control over junior and clerical staff although his work with 
regard to registration is supposed to be directly under his control.
These conditions are not conducive to any co-ordinated action between
796
the legal staff and the senior lands officer. In this way, the land 
registry is viewed by most lands officers as an appendage of the Attorney 
General's Department and thus pay no particular attention to the working 
of the system.
In addition to these problems, there is an acute shortage of staff 
in the Lands Department. There is no staff directly responsible for lands 
titles registration. That function is combined with other duties of the 
Lands Department. The number of junior stafff responsible for making 
entries into the record books, checking the accuracy of site plans attached 
to instruments for registration against base maps and other duties is 
too small to cope with the volume of work involved. In the KumasiLands 
Department for instance, the main office in which the duties of land regist­
ration is performed is very small and overcrowded. This small office 
is staffed by a senior Technical Officer, a Technical Officer, a Senior 
Technical Assistant, a Higher Executive Officer, and a typist. These 
officers combine the duties of registration with attending to valuation 
records, court attendance, preparation and keeping of plans and record 
sheets.
The office is so small and so overcrowded with staff, records, documents, 
plans, maps and files that the arrangement and filing of records in the
It should be noted that even in those places where the relationship 
between the registrar and the lands officer responsible for the Depart­
ment may be cordial, the registration functions are so regarded as 
falling within the spheres of the legal officers' administration 
that the latter does not pay any particular attention to the administra­
tion of the scheme. This situation was evident in the Lands Department 
at Tamale in 1977. Most.of the Regional Lands Officers interviewed 
seemed to know very little about the technical details of the registra­
tion, under the provisions of the Land Registry Act, 1962.
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order in which they can be found and respond to searches has become diff- 
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ficult. Under such conditions it is obvious that land registration 
cannot be given the serious attention it actually deserves. These conditions 
are in a large measure responsible for the inefficiency in the working 
of the system. At the Lands Department in Ho, for example, for lack of 
office accommodation, no legal officer was assigned to the Department 
when records were being examined in July, 1977. At Tamale, the senior 
State Attorney who is the registrar of lands for both Northern and Upper 
Regions has no other staff assisting him other than one technical officer 
who combines such functions with other duties of the Lands Department.
It is submitted that if the system of land registration should be 
used as an instrument for securing certainty of title and to bring
to sin end the costly litigation that is associated with it, then the establish­
ment of independent land registries in accordance with the provisions 
of the Land Registry Act 1962 is inevitable. It is only when a Chief 
Land Registrar is appointed as the administrative head of the scheme and
registrars are appointed at each office to supervise the registration
the
that a principle of accountability cam be established for/organisation 
of the scheme. As things stand now, when something goes wrong, it will 
be difficult to aportion,blaime, since neither the lands officer responsible 
for the Lamds Department, nor the Land Registrar who is usually a lawyer 
subject to the rules of the Attorney General's Department, will be ready 
to accept responsibility for any mistake.
At present, registration facilities exist in the Lands Departments 
of the regional capitals only. This meains that people have to travel 
long distances from the country side at great expense to get their instru­
ments registered. Needless to say,it will require a great deal of urgency
and necessity for the ordinary man to embark upon this task, particularly
798
when this means years of delay. If the government believes that the
At Kumasi, one can often see people hovering around this office; people 
from far beyond the city. These are people wishing to enquire about 
delayed actions on their applications for the registration of leases, 
timber and charcoal concessions and other rights to land. There was 
evidence that some people went to the extent of complaining to the 
Regional Commissioner about delays in processing their documents 
and the latter would send a note requesting quick action on the docu­
ment concerned. Such conditions create room for redtapism, corruption 
and favouritism.
Evidence of applications for registration which had been pending for 
more than two years without being answered were found at Kumasi. These 
were those applications which had not been followed up by the applicants 
or got mixed up in the filing system. For delays in registration 
procedure see pp.432-431 below.
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only way by which it can solve problems of uncertainty is by registration 
of instruments affecting land, then the system should be brought near 
to the people by establishing registries in every district of the country.
The financial resources should have to be made available for staff recruit­
ment and the purchase of equipment necessary for a successful operation 
and organisation of the system.
iii. Surveys and Registration of Instruments
Modern techniques of survey introduced during and after the Second 
World War carried with it considerable improvement in survey works in 
the country. By the time the Land Registry Act came into force in 1962, 
the country had many more qualified surveyors, technicians, cartographers 
and draughtsmen than in the past. Since the establishment of the Survey 
Department, facilities were provided for in-service training for draughtsmen, 
technicians and sub-professionsals. Today, some personnel of the Survey 
Department are so well trained that they are capable of doing any type 
of survey work independently or under the supervision of professionals
Apart from government surveyors there are those professionals licensed
^ 800 
under the Survey Act, 19.62.
But this improvement in the system of land surveys has not eliminated
sdibgetherr the problems relating to iinaccurate surveys in the current
land titles registration system. The Land Registry Act, goes further than
previous enactments in providing for accurate description of the land areas
subject to registration by reference to a plan, but not far enough, to
make this requirement obligatory! The relevant provisions are to be found
in Section 4 and 16 of the Act, the former providing that:
"No instrument, except a will or probg^, shall be registered unless 
it contains a description (which may be by reference to a plan) 
which, in the opinion of the registrar, is sufficient to enable the 
location and boundaries of the land to which it relates to be identified 
or a sufficient reference to the date and particulars of registration 
of an instrument affecting the same land and already registered."
word
This provision, but for the unfortunate use of the/"may", would certainly
I am indebted to the Regional Surveyors of Ashanti, Northern and 
Volta for most of the information concerning the Survey Department.
Act 127. See Part II of the Act.
Emphasis supplied.
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have made the description of the land areas subject to registration by 
means of an accurate plan a conditio sine qua non for accepting an instru­
ment for registration. Another obvious defect in this provision is the 
exception from the requirement" of the description of registrable instru­
ments by reference to a plan, a will or probate. The exception made in 
respect of a will and a probate is based on the erroneous assumption that 
instruments affecting lands upon which the courts have declared judgment
are necessarily free of doubts as to the accuracy of the plans attached
802
to them. As we have seen earlier, this is hardly the case.
Like the above provision Section 16 of the Act is so framed that 
it presupposes that some instruments can be accepted for registration 
without plans being attached to them. It provides:
"16. Where a map or plan is comprised in or annexed to an instrument, 
a true copy of the map or plan must accompany the instrument when 
brought for registration, and shall be filed in the register."
Both Sections 4 and 16 of the Act suggest that some instruments may 
be accepted for registration without having plans describing the land 
areas to which they relate.attached to them. But it will be difficult 
to see how the requirements of Section 4 that the description on the land 
area should be sufficient to enable the location and boundaries of the 
land to which the instrument relates to be identified can be met without 
a description by reference to an accurate plan. For this reason, the 
normal practice under the current registration system is that the land 
registry would not accept an instrument for registration unless there 
is attached to it a plan describing the land area in the manner prescribed 
by Section 4 of the Act. This means tht provided there are adequate means 
of checking the accuracy of such plans in the Lands Department, barring 
human errors, the registration of conflicting grants can be eliminated 
in the system altogether. This will have the effect of reducing overlapping 
grants to the b/fearest minimum and thus reduce land litigation considerably.
However, the lands Department does not have qualified surveyors in 
the regional capitals where the registration is carried on to carry out 
or supervise the kind of meticulous checking necessary to avoid mistakes.
The few trained government surveyors are concentrated at the Accra office 
of the Lands Department. The result is that under the present system 
of deeds registration, registrable instruments are accepted for registration 
on some occasions although the plans annexed thereto might be inaccurate.
802 See pp.352-356 above.
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For instance, in 1964 certain lands including Osu stool lands were
803
vested in the President under an Executive Instrument. The stool, 
however, continued disposing of interests in parts of the affected lands 
and were given approval by the Minister of Lands under the provisions 
of the Administration of Lands Act, 1962. Later when the Survey Depart­
ment carried out an accurate survey of the area, it was discovered that
Lon the basis of the plans ,on. which the transaction was concluded, some of 
the purported.grants < fell into the Achimota Forest Reserves. Some of
805
theplots were as much as 400 feet out of their true positions on the ground.
A research in the Lands Department at Kumasi disclosed similar problems
806
in the registration system. A lease in respect of a plot was recommended
for the Minister's concurrence by the Senior Lands Officer in Kumasi after
it had been approved by the latter. On rechecking at the Lands Department
at Accra, it was found to have fallen on another plot in respect of which
807
an earlier lease was filed and registered. What is important about
this case is that the instrument sought to be registered went through 
all the processes of checking at the Kumasi Department. The conflicting 
interest could easily have been registered if the Minister had given his 
concurrence on the faith of the Senior Lands Officer's recommendation 
without further check in the Accra office of the Lands Department. It 
is difficult to determine how often defective instruments of the kind 
go through, but having regard to the lack of qualified surveyors in the 
Department and the frequency by which inaccurate plans are annexed to 
registrable instruments, the system cannot be relied upon as giving the 
true state of title on the face of the records.
There was a similar case involving a plot of land situate at Adankwame, 
four miles from the Kumasi city centre on the Kumasi-Sunyani road. The 
Lands Department being in doubt, referred the plain attached to the instrument 
to the Survey Department for further checking. The officials of the latter 
Department found that upon the basis of the plan annexed to the instruments 
for registration, the plot of land in question was lying aind situate 90 
miles away from Kumasi. Several letters were found on the files of the
No. 108.
Act 123, S. 8(1). As will be seen later, this is one of the last 
Acts in the process of registration. In fact, before the Minister's 
approval the instrument should have gone through all the checks that 
are necessary for registration. See pp.400-401 below.
See J. K. Dey, op.cit., p. 14
No. 1A, Block 'N *, Asukwa Amakom Extension.
The earlier lease was registered and numbered L.S. No. S.462/70
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Land* Department in Kumasi in which queries about conflicting registration
of interests were raised by the head office of the Lands Department in
Accra. It is not easy to determine with precision, the extent of conflicting
registration and the extent to which the lands records can be relied upon
as giving accurate information on the extent of lands under registration.
It is, however, clear that inaccurate surveys still pose a fo rmidable
problem for achieving certainty of title through the.present system of
land registration.
There are several reasons why despite considerable improvements in
techniques of surveys and the availability of more qualified surveyors
that
these problems still persist. Our investigations revea]/ in the majority
of cases, non-professionals do. the work and the professionals, without
actually checking their accuracy authenticate them as accurate while they 
808
may not be so. This practice seems to be widespread in the country.
This is mainly due to the fact that apart from the Survey Department where
there sire relatively a reasonble number of qualified surveyrs, draughtsmen,
and subprofessionals, in the private sector, there sire only a handful
of professional or licensed surveyors. By May 1977, there were not more
than 12 licensed surveyors serving the Kumasi city area. During the same
period, only four licensed surveyors were operating in the whole of the
Volta Region. There was only one in the Northern Region and none at all
was to be found in the Upper Region during the same period.8^
In spite of the scarcity of licensed surveyors in private practice,
the Lands Department would not accept any instrument for registration
unless the plan attached thereto is certified as accurate by a licensed
surveyor. This was one of the measures adopted by the Lands Department
in 1971 in order to prevent the registration of instruments to which inaccurate
plans may be attached so as to enable it to begin the compilation of more
accurate records. In order to introduce this procedural requirement into
the registration process, the Lands Department had to rely, not on the
provisions of the Land Registry Act, but on certain provisions of the 
810
Survey Act, 1962 which deal with the qualification and registration 
of surveyors. The relevant provision of Section 6 prescribes that:
808
Information obtained from Regional Surveyors of Volta, Ashanti, and 
the North. See also J. K. Dey, op.cit. p. 12
8^  Information from the Regional Surveyors as above.
810 Act 127.
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"1. No person other than an official surveyor, a licensed surveyor, 
or any public officer making or preparing any plain in the course 
of his duties as such shall survey any land for the purpose of preparing 
any plain for attchment to an.instrument of conveyance, leaser assign­
ment, charge, or transfer.811
2. No person other than an official surveyor or a licensed surveyor 
shall certify a plan.
3. Any person contravening the provisions of this section shall
be liable to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds or to imprison­
ment for a term not exceeding six months."
The effect of adopting these provisions for land titles registration 
purposes is to make government and licensed surveyors, the only persons 
that cam prepare or certify plans which may be attached to instruments 
for registration. Government policy towairds its civil service employees 
with regard to private occupation has the effect of reducing even further, 
the category of surveyors who may certify or prepare plains for the purposes 
mentioned in the above provisions. Government surveyors of the Lands 
Department are regarded as civil servants and are therefore, not permitted 
to offer their services for sale outside their scope of employment. This 
leaves only the hamdful of licensed surveyors in the country to cope with 
the preparation and certification of the large number of plans to be annexed 
to registrable instruments.
This will certainly go far beyond the capability of such few licensed 
surveyors in the country. In order to comply with the law and at the 
same time to exploit the high demand for their services, many licensed 
surveyors simply employ apprentices to whom they often leave, the work 
of survey and preparation'o'f^plans . When the .work is completed, the licensed 
surveyor invariably certifies it as accurate without necessarily having taken 
the trouble to verify its accuracy. There are also sub-professionals 
and quacks who often take advantage of the scarcity of professional surveyors 
by undertaking survey work and do prepare site plans for conveyancers 
and grantees of interests in land. Obviously the Lands Department does 
not accept work done by such non-professionals and quacks. But where 
they are certified in accordance with the provisions of the Survey Act, 
they become acceptable. Such non-prof essionsfg therefore, present their 
work to the licensed surveyor who certifies them as authentic and accurate, 
although in the majority of cases their accuracy would not have been verified 
against base maps supplied by the Survey Department or agreed scales or
Emphasis supplied.
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co-ordinates.
This state of affairs can obviously not aid efforts to build up reliable 
records on the basis of which interested persons can be assured of the 
certainty of land transactions which may be conducted on the faith of 
the land registry record. This is more so because the normal practice 
in the Lands Department is to accept plans certified by licensed surveyors 
as accurate. Unles there are obvious defects in the face of the work 
which may raise doubts as to its authenticity or accuracy, no further 
checks are conducted. This makes possibility of conflicting registration 
very high indeed.
One of the most effective ways of preventing this from happening 
will be the appointment of competent personnel with the special respon­
sibility of checking the accuracy of every plan which may be attached 
to a registrable instrument, whether it be certified by a licensed surveyor 
or not. Yet at the present, it does not appear that the Lands Department 
is in a position to do this. It is submitted, however, that this problem 
does not appear to be insurmountable. It could be solved by getting the 
Survey Department directly involved in the registration exercise. Whether 
or not independent land registries will be established in the near future, 
such participation by the latter Department in the programme of registration 
would seem to be inevitable, if the problems relating to inaccurate surveys 
in the registration system should be found a lasting solution.
At present, the survey Department, as part of its general responsibilities 
supplies base maps to other Departments such as the Town and Country Planning, 
including the Lands Department. On certain occasions officials of the 
Survey Department may upon request, check the accuracy of plans and maps 
on behalf of the Lands Department. But such duties are not regarded by 
the former as essentially part of its primary functions. It considers 
its main functions as being the making and production of maps. Hence, 
such detail works as the demarcation of boundaries, marking, plotting 
and pegging out land areas on the ground will be undertaken on behalf 
of the Lands Department only upon special requests. As such duties are 
regarded as secondary to its main functions, even though some work required 
of it may be urgently needed, the main duties of the Survey Department 
may be given priority over those of the former. In such situations the 
expeditious execution of such "secondary" duties will depend largely on 
the good will and the degree of corporation between the administrative 
heads of either Department. If the relationship between the senior staffs 
of the two Departments is not good enough, there could be unnecessary 
dalays in the execution of such work.
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For reasons such as these, it becomes imperative that the Survey 
Department, or at least a branch of it, should become formally and directly 
involved in the scheme of land titles registration. It is the Survey 
Department which has the men with the necessary expertise adequate for 
the ground work required for theimplementation of an effective and efficient 
system of land registration. We have it on competent^ advice from the 
Director of Surveys and senior officials of the Survey Department that 
much of the field work involved in land surveys, such as the demarcation 
of boundaries, plotting, marking and pegging out land areas on the ground, 
do not require// a .large number of professional surveyors. With only one 
or two professional surveyors assisted by few semi-skilled and a good 
number of unskilled workers, a lot of work can be done in a reasonable 
time. This means that by getting the trained personnel of the Survey 
Department involved in the scheme, much of the staffing problems affecting 
the registration programme can be reduced if not eliminated completely.
Physical examination and identification of plots to which instruments 
subject to registration relate can be undertaken where doubts exist and 
qualified personnel will be at hand to offer competent advice. If the 
government still believes that the best way of solving the problems of 
title insecurity is the institution of an effective system of land titles 
registration and is keen on supporting such a programme, then the suggested 
involvement of the Survey Department or at least a section of it would 
seem to be imperative. Such a step would become even more desirable if 
a programme of compulsory and systematic registration should become neces­
sary in the programme. In such a case, the adjudication and settlement 
of title will become an inescapable part of the programme where qualified 
and official surveyors would be expected to play a key role. In this 
regard it will be apposite to consider next, the extent to which the 
present law, the Land Registry Act^makes provision for the adjudication 
sind settlement of title under the present system of land registration.
iv. Adjudication and Settlement of Title
It is one. of the defects of the present system of land titles registra­
tion that the Act under which it operates does not make positive provisions 
for the adjudication and settlement of titles to land. For the current 
system to achieve its primary objective of security of title, a machinery, 
for the settlement of claims to land as part of the scheme would seem 
to be necessary. Under the present Act there is no comparable provision 
of section 20 of the 1895 1janc* Registry Ordinance to the effect that registration
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does not cure defects in title. But the former does not guarantee the
unassailability of registered instruments. What the present Act does
is to make land transactions ineffective until registered in the manner
812
prescribed by the Statute. This does not imply that defective titles 
will be cured of their defects by reason only that they are registered.
The most obvious way in which the present registration system cam 
be employed to achieve title security is to make it a condition for registra­
tion that only lands in respect of which titles have been conclusively 
and finally determined should be accepted for registration. But this 
can only be done through a machinery for the adjudication and settlement 
of titles as part of the programme. Although the Act does not make positive 
provisions for the establishment of an adjudication committee or tribunal 
for the settlement of titles to land, the power to perform such functions 
can be inferred from the powers conferred on the Chief Registrar under 
Part IV of the Act.
Under Section:~20of the Act, it is provided that:
"A registrar may, subject to the provisions of this part of the Act, 
refuse to register an insitrument affecting any particular lamd if:
a. he is satisfied that the instrument deals with the lamd or part
of it in a manner inconsistent with an instrument previously
executed whether by the same grantor or some predecessor in title 
or by any other person; or
b. on the face of the records the grantor does not appear to him
to be entitled to deal with the land as the instrument purports
to do; or
c. the instrument is made in contravention of, or is null and void 
by virtue of, any enactment; or
d. it contains any interlineation, blank, erasure or alteration
not verified by the signatures or initials of the persons executing 
the instrument."
In refusing to accept an instrument for registration on any of the
grounds stated above, the Act imposes a legal obligation on the registrar
to notify the prospective grantee of his opinion and the grounds thereof
giving him three months within which he is to reply arid to satisfy the
Chief Registrar as to the grantor's title or legal capacity to deal with
813
the land in the manner proposed by the instruments. Where the grantor
is unable to satisfy the Chief Registrar as to his title or right to execute
812 See Section 24.
813 S.21
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the document within the three months prescribed by the Act, the latter
may extend the period, not longer than three months as he may for good
cause allow, within which time the former should prove his title or withdraw
814
the application for registration. If at the expiration of such extended
period, the grantor is unable to prove his title and the grantee has not
withdrawn his application, the Chief Registrar is enjoined to serve on
the grantor and the grantee and upon every person whose interest in the
land appears to him to be affected by the instrument, notice of the time
and place at which he will proceed to hear and determine the question
815
whether registration of the instrument should be refused. In that
event, he is enjoined-to publish notice of the hearing in the Gazette 
and in some newspaper circulating in the area in which the land is situated
and may cause notice thereof to be published in such other manner as he
.. . . ... 816 
thinks fit.
The duty imposed on the Chief Registrar to publish the hearing and 
the time and place where it is to take place is intended to make all persons 
whose interests might be affected by the transaction to become aware of 
it and thus make their claims before the Chierf Registrar. Such publication 
of the hearing is important in Ghanaian communities where the communal 
holding and beneficial enjoyment of property is the predominant feature 
of the land tenure systems. After the necessary publication of the impending 
enquiry into the case, the Chief Registrar is empowered to proceed to 
hear and determine the question at the time and place appointed or at 
any other time or place to which he may adjourn the hearing. In doing
so, he is bound to hear every person claiming to be entitled to an interest
,, . 817
in the land.
After the determination of the issues relating to the claims of the
parties, the Chief Registrar is enjoined to communicate his decision in
writing to the grantor and to every person represented at the hearing,
and shall publish it in the same manner as the publication of the hearing 
818
notice. The right of appeal from the decision of the Chief Registrar
is available to the grantor, the grantee and any other person represented 
at the hearing under Section 22(5) of the Act. Under this provision,
814 S.22(1).
815 S.22(2).
816 Ibid.
817 S.22(3).
818 S.22(4).
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any other person who may not be a party to the hearing can also, by leave 
of the court, appeal to the High Court from the decision of the Chief 
Registrar. The rules governing appeals from a Circuit Court to the High 
Court in civil matters applies to all such appeals, subject to the rules 
of Court.
It can be observed that the power conferred on the registrar to refuse 
registration under certain conditions, and the duty imposed on the Chief 
Registrar to resolve doubts as to the validity of land transactions and 
title thereto imply adjudication.and settlement of titles as part of the 
registration exercise. It is clear that the underlying assumptions of 
section 20(a) of the Act which empowers the registrar to refuse registration 
where he is in doubt about the validity of the transaction is that, before 
the registration of every instrument, a check on the accuracy, of the 
site plan annexed to it should have to be made.
It is clear that the Chief Registrar cannot perform the duties of 
adjudication and settlement of title imposed on him under the Act without 
the services of qualified surveyors. The only way he will be able to 
discover^ that an instrument presented for registration is inconsistent 
with an already registered instrument is by checking the site plans of 
the land to which the instrument relates against base maps of the area 
where the land concerned is located. Similarly,.the settlement of competing 
claims in respect of a given piece of land will also involve the demarca­
tion of boundaries, pegging out the areas and the preparatipn of site 
plans. All these functions will require the skill and ypxeiIthe of surveyors, 
draughtsmen and cartographers.
Surely for these functions to be efficiently performed, it would 
require many more staff and qualified personnel than sire available at 
the Lands Department at present. When the independent land registries 
required to be set up under the Act is established, it is the sort of 
personnel mentioned earlier that the registry will have to depend upon 
for its function. It is probably due to the lack of such qualified personnel 
to administer this aspect of the scheme that sections 20(a) and 20(b) 
of the Act have not been brought into force.
It is suggested that the already existing machinery at the Survey 
Department for survey works is adequte enough to cope with the tasks involved
819 S.22(b)
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in the adjudication and settlement of title under the provisions in question. 
The duties of adjudication and settlement of title can be performed by 
the Chief Registrar expeditiously if the human and material resources 
of the Survey Department can be called in aid of the programme. The co­
operation of the personnel of the Survey Department can be obtained by 
involving officialy and formally the latter Department in the works of 
the land registry.. This will be the best ,way for the land registry to 
obtain fast, efficient and cheap services of qualified personnel which 
it lacks at present.
Bentsi-Enchill does not share the views expressed above. He takes
the view that the function of adjudication is precisely the type for which
820
the regular courts are best suited. Commenting on the arrangements
for adjudication under section.2 2 of the Act, Bentsi-Enchill suggests that
if this side of the functions of registration is left for the courts to
821
handle, they will be operating in familiar territory. Criticising
section 22 of the Act under which the Chief Registrar is required to exercise
the powers of adjudication, he writes:
MBut while the principles behind the new arrangement are commendable, 
the wisdom of constituting the Chief Registrar as a solitary new 
court of first instance for this purpose is open to question. The 
work of adjudication can conveniently remain with the courts of which 
there are many all over the country. . . The Chief Registrar should 
be enable to cause disputed issues, after they crystalise, to be 
resolved through the Lands Division of the High Court of the approp­
riate region . . . The work that they have been doing for decades
under the concessions legislation is closely analogous." 822
Several considerations seem to influence the learned author to adopt
this view. He thinks that adjudication by the Chief Registrar, by contrast
with the courts, the former will either have to travel all over the country
for the purpose of deciding on disputed issues concerning titles; or parties
will have to appear before him at Accra£ from all corners of the different
regions of the country. Either way, he argues, such an exercise appears
unnecessary when account is taken of the present distribution of judicial
823
machinery and personnel. It is open to question whether the views
expressed by Bentsi-Enchill can be supported by the available evidence.
In terms of distribution of the judicial machinery and personnel,
820
K. Bentsi(,'-Enchi 11, Ghana Land Law, London, 1964, 332.
821 TK^Ibid.
822
Ibid. pp. 331-332.
822
Ibid. p. 332
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it should be pointed out that the Land Division of the High Court which 
he suggests must be called upon to handle matters concerning adjudication 
may be found at the regional capitals only. It will thus create a wrong 
impression to suggest that the distribution of such judicial ...machinery 
is so widespread across the length and breadth of the country so as to 
bring justice closer to the people through judicial determination of issues 
concerning adjudication and settlement of title. Concerning the case 
of the Chief Registrar travelling to the regions to perform adjudicative 
functions, it should be noted that the judges of the Land Court would, 
like the Chief Registrar, have to travel to all the regional capitals 
of the country in order to decide land cases. I.n fact, the Land Division 
of the High Court is not a separate institution from the High Court itself. 
What it means is that certain judges will become specialised in the adjudi­
cation of such matters, and the judges will have to travel'to the High 
Courts where resolution of issues concerning lands is to be undertaken.
Thus in terms of savings in time and costs, there will be no special 
advantage in leaving the functions of adjudication for the regular.courts 
to handle.
The most serious objection to Bentsi-EntchilVs.suggestion is that
it does not take into account the delays An the regular judicial processes
of the courts. One need only recall and reflect on the evidence produced
by the C. R. Havers Report on agricultural indebtedness in 1945 in order
to appreciate the expensive and protracted nature of land litigation through
824
the ordinary processes of the courts. If land litigation can last
for half a century and still not be conclusively, decided through the judicial
processes, and many cases can be found where on the average, such litigation
825
can last for five or ten years, then one cannot see how a meaningful 
system of land registraiton can rely upon such a judicial system for adjudi­
cation and settlement of titles to lands subject to registration.
It seems that the learned author is misled by certain provisions
826
of the Concessions Ordinance, 1939 under which to obtain a certificate 
of validity one had to file in the appropriate court, a natice giving 
particulars of the concession including boundaries, situation, and extent 
of the land concerned, together with a plan and copies of documents support­
ing the grantee's claim to the concession. He relied on these provisions 
to conclude erroneously that "the work that the courts have been doing
82/^ See pp. 364—369.
825 Ibid.
Cap. 136. See sections 8(5) and 13.
398
for decades under the Concessions Ordinance is closely analogous” to the 
sort of adjudication contemplated under the Ladn Registry Act. The fact 
which Bentsi-Enchill seems to overlook is that similar provisions have been 
on the statute books since the introduction of the Concessions Ordinance 
in 1900, yet enquiries into the validity of concessions and the issue 
of certificates of validity thereof by the courts hafcfc-not brought about 
the certainty of title as the learned author would suggest irb ha&£. Despite 
the fact that the issue of certificates of validity preceded the registration 
of concessions, it was later discovered that the findings of the courts
could not be relied upon as reflecting accurately, the true state of affairs.
The wide discrepancy found to exist between the extent of the land area
affected by concession grants between 1900 and 1913, whereupon the total
land area alienated exceeded by far, the total area of the Gold coast
itself underlines the shortcomings of the procedures under the concessions 
827
Ordinance.
In the light of these facts it is open to doubt if Bentsi-Enchill's
claims that ” / a_/ certificate of validity obtained from the court in
accordance with the procedure laid down confers on the grantee of a concession
a security of title which is unassailable on any ground save that of fraud
828
to which the grantee is proved to be a party” can be sustained. What 
must be borne in mind when considering the adjudication and settlement 
of title for the purpose of land registration by the ordinary courts, 
against the assumption of such functions by a Chief Registrar is that, 
the former do not have the personnel of surveyors, draughtsmen and techni­
cians without which such functions cannot be thoroughly performed.
The failures of the system under the concessions courts sire due to the 
lack of such personnel.
It is submitted that a progrsimme of adjudication and settlement of 
title within the context of a scheme of land registration must be designed 
to make final and conclusive determination of titles within reasonable 
time as speedily and as cheaply as possible. Land is immovable. The 
determination of titles thereto will involve the physical examination 
of the boundaries of the land which will require bringing members of an
See pp.352-4. The recent survey work of the valuation branch of the 
Lands Department in which it was discovered wide discrepancies in ■ 
the Court's decisions in respect of instruments affecting.lands .and 
what exist in fact on the ground.3 constitutes further proof of this 
point. Seep. 356.
QOQ
Op.cit. p. 336.
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adjudicating committee to the loco situo. It seems that an adjudication 
committee consisting of surveyors, the Chief Registrar and possibly, indi­
viduals and local community leaders with special knowledge of local condi­
tions will be better suited for such functions than the regular courts.
The establishment of land registries and the appointment of a Chief Registrar, 
registrars, and qualified personnel of surveyors are therefore called 
for. Failing this, the involvement of the personnel of the Survey Department 
formally and officially must be considered without delay. .If this is done 
the need for the regular courts to perform the functions of adjudication 
will not arise. What the courts may do, however, is the determination 
of issues relating to questions of law which may arise from the finding 
of facts by the adjudication committee and which the Chief Registrar may 
consider the courts best suited for resolution.
In view of the fact that adjudication and settlement of title is 
essential for the attainment of the objectives of security of title and 
preventing, land litigation, it is unfortunate that sections 20(a) and 
20(b), two of the most important provisions upon which the
Chief Registrar should stand and put into operation the machinery of
829
adjudication have still not been brought into force. It is suggested
that if it is intended that the present registration machinery should 
be employed to solve problems of uncertainty, then they should be brought 
into force without further delay.
v. Registrable Instruments
Like past enactments on land titles registration in Ghana, the present
Land Registry Act, 1962, provides for the registration of any instrument
830
subject to the conditions imposed by its provisions. An instrument
is defined in the usual manner as any writing affecting lamd situate in 
Ghana including a judge's certificate and a memorandum of deposit of title 
deeds. A judge's certificate is defined as a certificate of purchase
In exercise of the powers conferred on the Minister by Legislative Instru­
ment to bring the Act into force on such a day as he may appoint, the 
Minister brought into force the whole Act by the Land Registry Act,
1962, (Commencement) Instrument (L.I.124) except Part IV. The Lands 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1963, (Act 161) S.4 confirmed the 
authority of the Minister to bring only part of the Act into force. Thus 
when the Land Registry (Commencement) Instrument, 1965, (L.I.45) brought 
into force Part IV of the Act on 1 May, 1965, sections 20(a) and 20(b) 
were excluded.
S.3.
829
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of land sold in execution signed by a judge or a District Magistrate, 
and a certificate of title signed by a judge under the State Property
Q O I
and Contracts Act, 1960 (C.A.6.)
It may be observed from this definition that apart from other conditions
prescribed by the Act, only land transactions evidenced in writing can
be registered. It is also assumed that a certificate of purchase of land
sold in execution signed by a Judge or a District Magistrate and a Certificate
of Title signed by a Judge will necessarily be free of doubts as to their
832
validity and thus qualify for automatic registration. The most import-”
ant effect of the way in which an instrument is defined is that it excludes 
from registration under the Act oral transactions by which valid dispostion 
of an interest in land is conducted under the customary law. This will 
in itself render any systematic adjudication and settlement of title difficult 
and registration can only be sporadic and unsystematic.
Bentsi-Enchill in a justifiable criticism of the provisions of the 
Act writes:
"This machinery has, among other weaknesses, the serious defect 
that, in a country whose indigenous law requires no writing for valid 
transactions concerning interests in land, it makes, and perhaps 
can make, no provision for the recording of parol dealings in land 
carried out in accordance with the requirements of the indigenous 
law."
It should be pointed out, however, that whatever adverse., effect this
omission to include oral grants may have on the registration programme
have been minimised by certain provisions of the Land Administration Act,
834
1962, and completely eliminated by Part I of the Conveyancing Decree,
1973. 835
Under Section 8(1) of the Land Administration Act, it is provided
that:
"Any disposal of any land which involves the payment of any valuable 
consideration or which would, by reason of it being to a person not 
entitled by costomary law to the free use of land, involve the pay­
ment of any such consideration, and which is made,
a. by a stool;
b. by any person who, by reason of his being so entitled under customary 
law, has acquired possession of such land either without payment
S.36.
See Section 7 under which it is porvided that a probate or a judge’s 
certificate may be registered without proof upon production thereof 
to the registrar.
K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit., p. 310.
Act 123, S. 8(1).
N.R.C.D. 175.
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of any consideration or in exchange for a nominal! consideration, 
shall be subject to the concurrence of the Minister and shall
be of no effect unless such concurrence is granted."
The effect of these provisions is that a large proportion of parol 
dealings in land in communities where lands are held by stools should 
have to be reduced into writing in order to fulfil the requirements of 
the Act.
It will be impossible to inform the Minister orally that a land trans­
action has been concluded / under the indigenous law and that he should
give his concurrence without producing any evidence of the transaction
in writing. The normal practice which has developed in compliance with 
these provisions is that a grantee of an interest in land from the stool 
attaches a site plan of the land in question to documents of transfer 
prepared in English conveyancing forms before sending them, to the Lands 
Department for the Minister's approval. In this way, although the transaction 
may be oral from the beginning, it ends up by satisfying the conditions 
of writing required for registration under the Land Registry Act, 1962.
In a similar way, all lands under state control and administration 
cannot be acquired without any evidence of the transaction in writing, 
for the Minister or the Lands Commission's concurrence is required for 
the validity of the acquisition in all cases. This means that land trans­
actions in the whole of the Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana, transsactions
836
affecting lands acquired under the Land Administration Act, 1962 and
837
the State Lands Act, 1962 can all be subject to registration under 
the Land Registry Act, and no problems of the lack of writing should in 
principle be experienced in these areas.,
Thus apart from some patrilineal communities such as the Ewe or 
the Ga-Adangbe where the paramount title in land is held by families, 
land transactions under the customary law are invariably evidenced in 
writing in most parts of the country. Even in such communities where 
the law does not compel one to reduce his parol dealings in land under 
the customary law into writing, the tendency nowadays is to prefer some 
evidence of the transactions to be in writing. Thus any.limitations which 
the definition of "instrument" under the Act may place on the range of 
land transactions which can be registered pales into insignificance.
But any such limitations as-.maytstill exist" on'- theiregistration of land 
transaction because of the omission to include oral grants in the programme
Act 123, Sections 7 and 10.
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of registration has been eliminated by the Conveyancing Decree, 1973, 
which will be the next subject of discussion.
C. The Conveyancing Decree, 1973.
The Conveyancing Decree, 1973, does not deal with land titles regis­
tration as such. But it contains certain provisions which can fill some 
of the gaps left in the Land Registry Act, 1962. The objectives of the 
Decree are clearly set out in its memorandum. The first paragraph of 
the memorandum states that for land transactions such as "buying, selling 
and leasing, a need exists to develop methods and machinery which are 
reliable, simple, cheap, speedy and suited to the present-day needs of 
our country".
It can be discerned from the above statements that the Decree which
follows the recommendations of the Ghana Law Reform Commission seeks as
its main goals, the bringing up to date of the law relating^ conveyancing
and the simplification of coveyancing forms. However, Bentsi- Enchill,
an avid advocate of a system of title registration, seized the opportunity,
as the draftsman of the Decree, to include provisions which may have the
effect of making for some of the defects in the current system of land
registration under the relevant enactments. Part I of the Decree thus
deals with the recording of land transactions concluded orally under the
traditional law, the omission to include in the registration, system which
338
Bentsi-Enchill is justifiably critical.
In the memorandum to the Decree, it is observed that such parol
dealings in land do not at present, have to be in writing although the
practice of customary transfers being reduced into writing is now very
widespread. In order to supplement the provisions of the Land Registry
Act, provisions are made for the recording of customary grants under a
schemes to be administered by court registrars. The reasons and objectives
of the provisions are set out in the memorandum as follows:
"In response to the national need for methods of transfer that are 
reliable, simple, cheap, speedy and suited to the circumstances of 
our country, provision is made for an imaginative development of 
the registries of our court system to handle the recording of customary 
transfers of interests in land. The intention is to require a recording 
in the Register of a District Court of transfers of interests in 
land, smd to make such a recording a condition for validity in the 
same way as the tradtional qustha was essential."
K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit., p. 310
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An examination of the relevant provisions which are designed to attain 
the stated goals outlined above will disclose that they have the i 
effect of rendering invalid parol dealings in land unless they are evidenced 
in writing and recorded in the manner prescribed by the relevant provisions 
of the Decree. Under Part I of the Decree, it is provided that a transfer
of an interest in land shall be by a writing signed by the person making
the . transfer or by his agent duly authorised in writing, unless the trans­
action falls within the class of exceptions specified under Section 3 
839
of the Decree. It- is made impossible for a transfer of an interest
in land made in a manner other than as provided under this part of the
Decree to operate and confer any title on the transferee. This in
effect, means that the requirement of writing is now a condition without
841
which no land transaction can be valid in the country.
Section 2 of the Decree contains similar provisions in respect of 
a contract for the transfer of any interest in land and renders it unenforceable 
unless it is evidenced in writing by the person against whom the contract 
is to be proved or by a person who was authorised to sign on behalf of 
such a person or relieved against the need for such a writing by the provi­
sions of section 3. The memorandum to the Decree states that the end
to which the requirement of writing is directed is the making of fraudulent 
difficult.
conveyances/ But it has created the inconvenient situation of rendering
oral grants invalid unless the requirement of writing is met in largely
illiterate communities while not providing for any accompanying programme
of public education on the effect of the new provisions.
Section 3 of the Decree purports to exclude parol dealings in land
842
under the traditional law from the requirement of writing, But as 
will be shown presently, construed in conjunction with the operative 
effect of sections 4, 5 and 7, it becomes patently obvious that such trans­
actions under the indigenous law cannot be said to fall within the class 
of exceptions mentioned under this provision.
i . Registration of Oral Grants Under the Decree
Sections 4 and 5 make provisions for the recording of land transactions
839
840
841
S. 1(1).
S.1(2).
See similar provisions in the Statutes of Frauds 1776, S.4 (29 cha. 
2, C.3), now section 40 of L.P.&., 1925 which is applicable in Ghana 
by virtue of section 111 (2) of the Courts Act, 1971, Act 372). 
Section 40 of the L.P.A. makes the transaction unenforceable, the 
present Decree makes it invalid.
842 S.3 (1) (h).
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conducted under the customary law. The Land Reform Commission deems it
important that comprehensive records of such’ transfers be kept. This
will.be Ma significant step in developing permanent records of transfers
843
of interest in land while preserving the customary mode of transfer."
Under Section 4, such customary transfers are to be recorded in the form
contained in the First Schedule designed for the purposes of this _ particular
844 i
section. It is required to be recorded in the Schedule, the essential_
features of the transaction, whether it be a pledge, a sale, a gift, lease,
an assignment, "abusa", "abunu", sowing tenure or any other. The names
of persons whose consent is required and who have given their consent,
the consideration given for the trasnsfer, whether it be monetary or in
kind such as drinks, must all be specified and recorded in the manner
designed under the First Schedule.
Also required to be specified and recorded in a like manner, is the
extent of the land area to which the transfer relates and such land should
845
be clearly described so that it can be readily identified. Such questions
as the duration of the interest, whether it be permanent or a term of
years and any other matter relating to the transaction must be indicated
846
in writing and recorded in a like manner. In conclusion, the parties 
to the transaction must append their signatures and if a party is illiterate, 
must affix his mark after the document has been explained to him in such 
a way that he can understand the substance and effect of what he has done.
It should be noted that the procedures laid down to be followed under 
the Schedule to section 4 for the recordings required to be made are the 
sort of things that one usually finds in instruments subject to registration 
under the Land Registry Act, 1962. The procedures laid down for recording 
customary transfers of interest in land ought to be followed in order 
to make an effective disposition of interests in land under the customary 
law. This position is made clear by Section 4 of the Decree itself.
The requirements of writing is mandatory and not permissive. The key 
phrase in the provision is "shall be recorded in the -form contained in 
the first Schedule."
To remove any doubts as to the peremptory nature of these procedural
843
See the Memorandum to the Decree.
844 3.4(1).
845
See the First Schedule to section 4 of the Decree.
8 4 6  TV, • ^Ibid.
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requirements and to ensure the recording of customary transfers under 
the Decree, it is provided under Section 7(1) that:
"An oral grant made under customary law shall be of no effect until 
it is recorded under Section 4".
In view of the mandatory requirements of recording customary grants
in the manner provided by the Decree as a condition for their validity,
it will be difficult to see how they can really be proved to be excluded
from the requirements of writing by Section 3(1) (h ) of the Decree.
It will be impossible to comply with the provisions of the Decree without
having to reduce the transaction into writing which may be regarded
as an instrument affecting land. Thus like section 8(1) of the Land
848
Administration Act, 1962', the requirement of writing has been imposed
on land transactions under the customary law through the back door.
The importance of this provision dealing with customary transfer 
of interest in land is that it can fill the gap left by the Land Registry
Act which does not provide for the registration of interests orally
transferred under the traditional law. If these provisions are incorporated 
into the Land Registry Act, it will be an improvement in enactments 
relating to land titles registration in Ghana. Another important contribu­
tion which Part I of the Decree seems to have made to the scheme of 
land registration is the recognition of the crucial role that qualified 
surveyors will have to play in any system of land registration. The
mandatory duty imposed on the chief justice to appoint an official surveyor
for each District Court and such other staff as the business of such 
courts will require for the administration of the scheme underscores
the importance attached to the role of such skilled personnel in the
849
registration exercise. In addition to appointing official surveyors,
it is provided that an adequate plan to which the transfer of an interest
relates, if available, should be incorporated in the record referred
850
to under sub section 1 of section 4.
Unhappily, the wording of section 4(2) seems to weaken the force 
of the requirement that an adequate plan be attached to the land subject 
to registration. Making compliance with the provision contingent upon 
the availability of such an adequate plan creates the impression that 
some customary grants can be recorded in the manner described by the 
law without necessarily attaching plans to them. It is hoped however, 
that should the scheme ever be implemented, the procedure followed under
847 _i . . . . ,
Emphasis supplied.
Ill Act123-
“J? See S.6(3)
850 S.4(2)
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the Land Registry Act, whereby no instrument is accepted for registration 
unles a plan describing the situation and extent of the land is annexed, 
will be adopted.
Another significant aspect of the Decree is what may be regarded
as a provision for the adjudication and settlement of title. A duty
is imposed on the registrar to refer to a magistrate for determination
852
any doubt concerning issues arising under the recording exercise.
No elaborate rules of procedure for settlement and adjudication of title 
have been provided for under the Decree. But this is understandable 
if account is taken of the fact that the draftsman of the Decree, Bentsi- 
Enchill does not consider as necessary, the establishment of an independent 
adjudication committee or a tribunal for such purposes. It is his opinion 
that such disputed issues of title are best suited for the regular 
courts to resolve.
It is for this reason that the Decree provides for the administration
of the scheme of recording customary transfers by District Court registrars
Although the Chief Justice has power under section 6(2) of the Decree
to appoint any person to be a registrar of customary transfers, and
has power to specify the area within which such registrar shall exercise
his functions, the reoords of the districts courts will constitute the
registers into which recordings will have to be made. We have already
pointed out the reasons why it may not be advisable to burden the regular
courts with the sort of adjudication and settlement of title associated
854
with land titles registration. The failures of the concessions courts 
provide striking examples already.
The appointment of official surveyors to the district courts may 
help to reduce the ineffectiveness of the courts in the administration 
of such schemes. Yet such courts cannot be better substitutes for independ­
ent land registries or the already existing machinery available at the 
Lands Department, if the survey department can be formally involved 
in the scheme as already suggested. It will be a better policy to concen­
trate resources at the Lands Department by making the already existing 
machinery efficient and effective. The resources which may be provided 
for the district courts for this purpose can be applied to improve the 
present registration system so as to make it possible for it to absorb
A comparable provision is S.16 of the Land Registry Act, 1962, 
from which it can be implied that some instruments cam be registered 
without plans being attached to them.
S.4(2).
K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit., p. 332 
See pp. 349-358.
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the functions which the Decree sets out for the registration of customary 
grantsi To this end, it is suggested that the relevant provisions of 
the Decree should be incorporated into the Land Registry Act, 19 62.
D . Consequences of Registration
The Land Registry Act, 1962, bears many of the features of its 
predecessor, the Land Registry Ordinance of 1895. But the former differs 
from the latter in some significant ’respects, one of the most important 
of which is the effect of registration or lack of it on land transactions 
in Ghana. Part V of the Act dealing with the question has assumed even 
greater importance because of the requirements of writing which the 
Conveyancing Decree, 1973, as we have seen, virtually imposes as a sine
qua non for the validity of land trainsactions, including those conducted
that
under the customary law. It will be seen presently/the Land Registry 
Act makes registration a prerequisite requirement for the validity of 
instruments affecting land. The requirements of writing which will 
compel land trainsactions under the customary law to be evidenced in 
writing means that they must also be registered in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act in order to be valid.
Section 24(1) of the Act provides:
"subject to subsection (2), of this section an instrument other 
than,
a. a will, or
b. a judge's certificate,
■ first executed after the commencement of this Act shall be of no 
effect until it is registered". 855
It seems clear from the above provisions that for the purposes
of the Act, no instrument relating to an interest in land shall be effective
or valid to confer any legal rights on the person for whose benefit 
unless it is registered 
the instrument is prepared/. This means that no legal consequences can
flow from a non-registered instrument.
However, there is at present certain Appeal Court decisions rendering
uncertain what the relevant phrase "shall be of no effect" means. In
856
the Court of Appeal case of Odoi v Hammond a case involving conflict­
ing instruments made by the same grantor to two different transferees,
Azu Crabbe J. A ., in his judgment said, and in our opinion rightly,
8 5 5  I T ! , . .Emphasis supplied.
856 /”"1971 7 1 G.L.R. 375
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that "section 24 of the Act makes registration a sine qua non for the
857validity of an instrument other than a will or a judge's certificate".
The learned judge proceeded to declare that the first instrument was
858
"void and of no effect" for lack of registration. But the question
of the effect of registration was not seriously argued and exhaustively 
discussed in the present case and the observations of Azu Crabbe did 
not necessarily form the basis of the decision. His statements can 
thus be regarded as constituting dicta only although they must be given 
great weight.
859
In the Court of Appeal case of Asare v Brobbey the question
was seriously considered and argued. This case concerned a mortgage 
deed in which the mortgagor obtained a loan from.the mortgagee on the 
security of a house with, a power vested in the latter to sell the house 
in the event of default in payment of the loan. The mortgagor defaulted. 
The mortgagee exercised his power of sale under the mortgage deed by 
.authorising an auctioneer to sell the property. It was at such an 
auction sale that a third part bought the house in dispute.
The mortgagor sued to set aside the sale on several grounds without 
success. But the issue of non-registration was raised belatedly on 
behalf of the mortgagor to the effect that since the morgagee did not 
register the mortgage deed in accordance with section 24 of the Land 
Registry Act, 1962, the deed was ineffective to confer the power of 
sale on the mortgagee. The Court of Appeal accepted the view that the 
fact of non-registration was sufficient to render the mortgage deed 
ineffective to confer the power exercised by the mortgagee. The Court 
said that:
" . . .  when section 24(1) of the Land Registry Act, 1962, provides 
that a document shall be of no effect until it is registered, it 
means that the document and its contents cannot have any legal 
effect until it is registered, it means the document and its contents 
cannot have any effect until registration has been completed.
This also means that the document is not valid for all purposes 
because the formality of registration is necessary to complete 
its validity . . .  In the present appeal, the mortgage deed was 
not registered at the time the power of sale was exercised and 
therefore the document itself was ineffective and invalid to confer 
the rights and to impose the obligations stipulated in the mortgage 
deed". 860
If these propositions were left to rest here, the above judicial 
pronouncements would have tallied with those of Azu Crabbe in Odio v Hammond
858 Ibid-» at P' 33a*
oirr> Ibid. Emphasis supplied.
ofin 7T ^ 71J  2 G-L-R * 331
Ibid., at p. 337, Per Archer J. A.
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and would have confirmed the effect of Section 24 of the Act as rendering
unregistered instruments void. But this was not to be. The court of
appeal proceeded to qualify its statements that an unregistered instrument
was not rendered void for want of registration. What it did was to
861
render such an instrument ineffective until it was registered.
This is a bizzare conclusion to reach, having regard to the fact 
that the court had itself made it clear in its judgement that an unregistered 
instrument was invalid for all purposes. Will it be realistic to distinguish 
between ineffective or invalid and void instruments within the meaning 
of the Act and for its purposes? It is submitted that it will not.
Hamlyn's Encyclopedic World Dictionary makes the meaning of invalid 
clear enough. It defines invalid as "without legal force, or void, 
as a contract". It is obvious from this definition and the cases that 
whether or not one takes the view that sin unregistered instrument is 
void, or ineffective or invalid, non-registration will have the same 
effect that no legal rights can flow from a land transaction to which 
a non-registered instrument relates.
This would seem to be the view of the court of appeal in Amefinu 
862
v Odametey also. This was a case in which both the appellsint and 
respondent derived their title to the land from the same vendor. The 
appellant claimed that the lstnd was conveyed to her on 5 May, 1967 
smd that although she presented her deed of conveyance to the land registry 
for registration in Accra, it had not been completed when she withdrew 
it for the purpose of the present action. The respondent on the other 
hand claimed that he acquired his grant on 25 March, 1968. He claimed 
that before executing the deed, he carried out a search of the land 
registry which search confirmed that the vendor was the owner of the 
property and that no other transaction affecting the land in question 
was disclosed on the face of the register. After the execution of the 
deed he proceeded to register his acquisition on 17 April, 1968 in accord­
ance with the requirements of the land Registry Act, 1962.
It was argued on behalf of the appellant that Allotey, the vendor, 
having divested himself of title in May 1967 had no title to convey 
to the respondent in March 1968. The court of appeal rejected this 
argument on the gorunds that it was based on the nemo dat quod non habet 
rule which implied the existence of a prior valid transaction. But
8 6 1  T K •^Ibid.
862
/~1977_7 2.G.L.R. 135. The case was decided in July, 1973 but
was not reported until 1977.
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in the present case the document relied upon was squarely caught by
863
section 24 of the Land Registry Act. The view of the court of appeal
was that the deed not having been registered was ineffective or invalid 
to divest the vendor of title in the land, the subject matter of the 
transaction in 1967.
In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeal quoted with approval 
Azu Crabbe's proposition in Odoi v Hammond that section 24 of the Act 
makes registration a sine qua non for the validity of an instrument 
other than a will or a judge's certificate. But the court did not go 
on to say whether this meant that the transaction itself or the instrument 
was void. It would seem that the court found it unnecessary to consider
the issue, since there would seem to be no obvious dichotomy between
void and invalid instruments in this case.
Another argument raised on behalf of the appellant was that since 
it was no fault of hers that she did not register her instrument, the 
rigours of the law ought not to be made to operate unfavourably against
Q04
her. The court rejected this plea in no uncertain terms making
it clear that the language of the Act was clear. The court pointed 
out that an attempt to register or the presentation of an instrument 
for registration could not be equated with registration. "Either an 
instrument is registered or it is not registered".
The court of appeal referred to Asare v Brobbey also, and quoted,
at length, that portion of Archer's judgment in which he declared the 
unregistered mortgage deed to be invalid and ineffective to confer the 
rights and to impose the obligations stipulated in the mortgage .deed. 
However, the court did not consider the interpretation placed on the 
phrase "until it is registered" by Archer J. A. in Asare v Brobbey in 
which he concluded that the unregistered document was not in itself 
void but only ineffective until registered. Here again, it would appear 
that the court did not regard such a qualification important and as 
its consideration was not germane to the issues before it made no pronounce­
ment on it.
It can thus be deduced from the dictum of Azu Crabbe J. A. in Odoi 
v Hammond, and the decisions in Amefinu v Odametey and Asare v Brobbey 
that the courts take section 24 of the Act to mean that an unregistered
863 . ,
Ibid at p. 143
864 !Ui.
865 . , , .
Ibid., at p. 143
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instrument is invalid and of no legal effect and that no legal consequences 
flow from it. Whether or not it can be said to be void or ineffective 
has, no practical importance on the "results of the cases.
However, in Ussher v Darko-888 and fltem v Ankwandah 88^ the Qourt 
of Appeal would seem to have taken the view that Archer J. A.'s interpre­
tation of the phrase "until it is registered" implied that an unregistered 
instrument was not void. In this view, exceptions can be made in respect 
of some unregistered instruments so that rights could be acquired through 
them under certain circumstances. In Ussher v Darko, the legal title 
in the property, as found by the court, was vested in Matilda on trust 
for Edward, the real purchaser of the property. The latter’let the 
premises to the defendants as tenants. Matilda who held the legal title 
to the land and in whose possession was the title deeds, alienated the 
legal title in the property to the respondents who failed to register 
the deed of conveyance, the respondent sued to eject the appellants 
as his tenants.
The court of appeal held that the deed by which title was conveyed 
to the respondent did not operate to confer title on him because the, 
deed was invalid on account of its non-registration under the Land Registry 
Act. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeal found support 
in Asare v Brobbey and Amefinu v Odametey although Odoi v Hammond was 
not referred to in the case. However, the court said that despite the 
fact that the instrument in question was not registered, under the special 
circumstances of this case, it satisfied the requirements of writing
00Q
under Section 4 of the Statutes of Frand 1677, as preserved by section 
14 of the Contracts Act, I960.889
For this reason, although such conveyance as Matilda executed in 
favour of the respondent did not validly convey legal title, it was 
one in respect of which specific performance could be granted at the
suit of the respondent. "It therefore operated to confer an equitable
870
title in the property to him"  ^ So that in this case, but for the
operative effect of the qui prior est tempore, prior est jure rule which 
gave Edward's equitable interest priority over the respondent's, the 
latter would have acquired an equitable interest under the transaction
866 1977J  1 G.L.R. 476
867 0 97Z/ 2 G.L.R. 452
868 29 Cha. 2, C., 3.
869 Act 25
07Q _ _
Ussher v Darko / 1977 / 1 G.L.R. 476 at p. 489. Per Apaloo J. A.
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although it was not registered in accordance with the provisions of
the Land Registry Act, 1962.
The logical import of this decision is that an unregistered instrument
may under certain circumstances be effective to confer legal title on
w
a person in whose favour it is prepared notithstanding the fact that 
it is not registered. In support of this decision, the court of appeal 
said:
"The decision in Asare v Brobbey (Supra) implied that there is
nothing intrinsically wrong about an unregistered instrument, section
24(1) of the Land Registry Act, 1962, does no.more than deny it legal
871
efficacy until it has been registered." As will be argued below,
this interpretation of the decision in Asare v Brobbey is inconsistent,
not only with the decision in the Asare case itself, the dictum of Azu
Crabbe in Odoi v Hammond and the decision in Amefinu v Odametey upon
which the court of appeal relied, but with its own declaration that
"such conveyance as Matilda executed in favour of the plaintiff did
872
not validly convey the legal title" to him. A thing is what it is.
It cannot be otherwise. It is a contradiction in terms to say that 
a document is invalid and in the same breadth to say that it confers 
some right, legal or equitable on some person.
It is not only the logical inconsistency in the reasoning that 
is worrying, but the effect which this decision will have on the system 
of land titles registration in Ghana. Before demonstrating the respects 
in which such a decision can undermine the registration system, it will
873
be necessary to consider the Appeal C.ourt decision of Ntem v Ankwandah 
in which the reasoning of the court was based on the assumption that 
the Land Registry Act makes provision in certain circumstances for 
unregistered instruments to be effective and to confer rights.
In the present case under consideration, the respondent bought 
a piece of land from a stool. The alienation was concurred in by the 
stool occupant who was not then gazetted. The respondent stamped the 
instrument and presented it for registration. The registrar refused to 
accept it for registration on the grounds that Nii Ayikai III, the chief 
who executed the document with a number of his councillors was not gazetted. 
This would appear to be the purported exercise of the powers conferred
871 Ibid. at p. 493
872
Ibid. at p. 489.
oyo   _
/ 1977 / 2 G.L.R. 452
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on the registrar under section 20 (a) and (b) of the Land Registry Act 
to refuse registration where on the face of the record it appears to 
him that the person executing the instrument has no power to do so.
It was argued unsuccessfully at the court below that the document 
was void for want of registration. The Court of Appeal considering 
the issue said that in refusing to accept the isntrument for registration, 
the registrar was wrongfully exercising supposed powers under sections 
20(a) and 20(b) of the Land Registry Act, 1962 which had not been brought 
into force. The court observed that if the respondent had taken a writ 
of Mandamus to compel the registrar to perform his public duty, i.e., 
the registration of the instrument presented to him, the former would 
have succeeded in such an action. For this reason, it was no fault 
of the respondent that she did not register her instrument.
In its judgment the court said:
"Registration of a deed under Act 122 does not constitute a state 
guaranteed title. As the deed was stamped, it was admissible in 
evidence in proof of title and that title was adjudged, registration 
aside, to be good. I think the only way in which justice can be 
done as between the parties, is to hold that the plaintiff's title 
was constructively registered. Equity regards as done, that which 
ought to have been done. True, the records of the registrar may 
speak a different language. But if the land registrar had carried 
out his public duty, the record and what I hold to be deemed to 
have been done would have harmonised".
The court of appeal proceeded to state further that the view expressed 
by Azu Crabbe J. A., in Odoi v Hammond that an unregistered instrument 
was void, was by necessary implication rejected in Asare v Brobbey which 
was followed in Amefinu v Odametey and Ussher v Dattko. The court concluded 
that the better judicial view would seem to be that failure to register 
an instrument did not render it void. This implied that exceptions 
could be made in favour of some unregistered instruments as the Court 
of Appeal actually did in both Ntem v Ankwandah and Ussher v Darko.
It should, however, be pointed out that the two latter cases are 
directly in conflict with the Amefinu case and arguably, with Asare 
v Brobbey which the court of appeal purported to have relied upon for 
its decision. In fact in Amefinu v Odametey, the underlying assumptions 
upon which the court based its decision not to apply the nemo det quod 
non habet rule in favour of the appellant was that the first instrument 
by which the latter purported to acquire his interest was void or invalid
Ibid., at p. 459, per Apaloo C. J. Emphasis supplied.
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for want of registration. As pointed out earlier, there is no practical 
significance in the distinction between a void and an invalid instrument.
If the instrument is void, invalid or ineffective, then no legal conseq­
uences can flow from it. This is what Asare v Brobe, Odoi v Hammond 
and Amefinu v Odametey have decided on the basis of section 24 of the 
Land Registry Act, 1962.
The decisions in Ussher v Darko and Ntem v Amkwandah’are very dif­
ficult to justify in the face of previous case law and the provisions 
and purposes of the Lan^ Registry Act, 1962. The decisions in Ussher 
v Darko and Ntem v Ankwandah might have worked justice between the parties 
but via judicial legislation which can have serious implications for 
land titles registration in the country. Justice might have been done 
but on a principle which is likely to defeat the whole purpose of the 
establishment of the scheme for land registration. It is the discussion 
of the consequences of the two decisions that attention will now be 
directed.
i . Implications of "Constructive Registration"
Driven by the desire to do justice, the court of appeal interpreted 
section 24(1) of the Land Registry Act in Ussher v Darko and Ntem v 
Ankwandah in such a way as to weaken, if not destroy the credibility 
of the land registry as a source of information concerning land titles.
The reasons why the Court of Appeal held that despite non-registration 
of the instrument by the plaintiff in the former case,.the document operated 
to confer an equitable interest on the latter were that.:
a. the instrument satisfied the requirements of writing under 
the existing laws and
b. it was an instrument in respect of which specific performance 
could be granted at the plaintiff's suit.
But these cannot be sufficient reason for coming to that conclusion
As Woodman points out, this decision is clearly contrary to section
24 of the Act. The statute says that an unregistered instrument shall
be of no effect. "To hold that an unregistered instrument passes an
interest in the land, even if only an equitable interest is to give 
875
it an effect." This decision
Gordon Woodman, "The Land Registry Act Bites (Somewhat)", to be 
published in 1979  ^ Review of Ghana Law.
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by the Court of Appeal implies that under section 24(1) of the Act,
an unregistered instrument can operate to confer an equitable interest
on a. person provided the requirements of writing have been met under
the existing laws, the instrument has been stamped under the Stamp Act.
and where circumstances exist to warrant a decree for specific performance.
If this is the case, then no compelling reasons might exist any longer
for persons to get their instruments registered. This would be the
case where some people might prefer to accept equitable interests rather
than take the trouble to go through the tedious, complex, time-consuming
and the expensive procedures to get their instruments registered.
The more serious objection to the decision is that prospective
grantees of interest in lamd will no longer be sure, even after a proper
search at the land registry whether or not an unregistered equitable
interest still affects the lamd he wishes to buy. This is because although
on the face of the records no encumbrances may be seen to affect the
land in question, a person may still hold an unregistered equitable
interest in it. As Woodman points out:
"If Ussher v Darko is followed in this respect, the grantee claiming 
an unregistered instrument who finds that S.24 has locked the front 
door against him, will frequently be able to slip in through the 
equitable back door". 876
The decision in Ntem v Aqkwandah leaves the equitable back door open 
wider. It ,says that under those circumstances where a person
r
can rely on the equitable rule which says that equity regards as done 
that which ought to have been done in order to acquire rights under 
a grant, notwithstanding the clear provisions of secion 24(1) of the 
Act to the contrary, an unregistered instrument acquired by that person 
cam operate to confer an equitable rights on him, provided the instrument 
has been acquired for value and in good faith.
Thus Apaloo C . J.7 said:
"As the deed was stamped, it was admissible in evidence in proof 
of title and that title was adjudged, registration aside, to be 
good. I(' think the only way in which justice can be done as between 
the parties, is to hold that the plaintiff's title was constructively 
registered. I share the view of the trial judge that on the special 
facts of this case, the plaintiff's title was enforceable at law 
. as if it had been registered". ^77
It should be borne in mind that in Amefinu v Odametey, a case 
to which the court of appeal referred in Ntem v Ankwandah, a similar
876
Loc.cit.
pnn_____________________
Ntem v Ankwandah / 1977 7 2 G.L.R. 452 at p. 459. Emphasis supplied.
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view was urged on the court but was rejected on the grounds that "either
a document is registered or it is not registered and the Act does not
878
take cognisance of an incomplete process of registration". This
statement was made in reply to a plea on behalf of the appellant that
"in absence of any default on her part to account for the non-registration,
898
the rigours of the Act ought not in fairness to be applied to her case."
The Court of Appeal is thus saying in the Amefinu case that the 
requirement of registration under the Land Registry Act, 1962 is manda­
tory. There is no half-way measure about it. The basis for the development 
of the doctrine of constructive registration in opposition to this judicial 
view and the clear provisions of the Act seems to be the need, as Woodman 
points out, to avoid injustice to the plaintiff. She had made the effort 
to register and had been frustrated for no fault of her own. But there 
sire several considerations for urging a different view. One such considera­
tion, which was indicated in Amefinu v Odametey is that the Act does
880
not provide for any situation other than registration or non-registration.
Woodman setting out what may be regarded as one of the strongest objections
to the development of this doctrine writes:
"A further objection might be that the doctrine could operate unfairly 
against a party who took a grant in good faith after inspecting 
the register, sind was subsequently held bound by a constructively 
registered instrument. Thus the doctrine may damage the system 
of registration by introducing another category of enforceable 
but unregistered grants. 88^
It should be added that apart from working against the interest 
of the sort of persons referred to by Woodman, constructive registration 
runs counter to the fundamental objectives of the Land Registry Act 
itself. The success of the registration system as a means of securing 
titles depends upon the reliability of the register as a source of informa­
tion concerning land titles. It cannot be over emphasised the fact 
that one of the main objectives of a system of land titles registration
is to create "independent titles by cutting off the necessity for retros-
882
pective investigation of past titles." The reason for doing so
is to save persons dealing with those who have registered their interests 
affecting land, the trouble and expense of going behind the register 
in order to investigate the history of the.interest holder's title and
878 Amefinu v Odametey / 1977 / 2 G.L.R. 135 at p. 143.
8 7 9  tVn * AIbid.
880 „ „ ,
G. Woodman, Loc.cit.
8 8 1  t k •^Ibid.
882 See Dowson and Sheppard, op.cit., p.2.
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in order to satisfy themselves of its validity.
This end can only be accomplished if it is:.provided that anyone 
who, after a search at the land registry, acquired an interest in land 
bona fide and for value from a person who registered his interest and 
acquired his right on the basis of what the records say and proceeded
to register his interest in accordance with the statute should acquire
883
an indefeasible right. If the doctrine of constructive registration
is allowed to remain good law, then grantees of interests in land can
no longer be sure if their title is secure. For despite the fact that the
records may disclose no encumbrances on the land, an adverse right affecting
the land which the courts may hold to be constructively registered can
still make his title insecure. This is a situation which the Land Registry
Act neither contemplates nor provides for. It is submitted that in
order to prevent the credibility of the deeds register as a source of
information on land titles being destroyed and with it, the present
system of land titles registration under the Land Registry Act, 1962,
the principles of Ussher v Darko and Ntem v Ankwandah should be reconsidered.
Woodman suggests that objections to the development of constructive
registration might be met by restricting the doctrine to cases where
the conflicting grantee takes with notice, or to cases where he is not
884
a bona fide purchaser of a legal estate for value without notice.
It may be said in answer to such a suggestion that the Act does not
seem to contemplate any concession in respect of such category of grantees
of interest in land. Section 25(1) of the Act thus provides:
"The registration of any instrument shall be deemed to constitute 
actual notice of the instrument and of the fact of registration 
to all persons and for all purposes, as from the date of registra­
tion, unless otherwise provided in any enactments".
It is clear from the above provision that once an instrument has been 
registered, no one can claim that he is an innocent purchaser of the 
interest to which the instrument relates without notiq.e of the previous 
transaction thereof. To restrict the application of the doctrine to 
the class of cases suggested by Woodman may confine its incidental problems
See Lord Watson in Gibbs v Messer / 1891/ A.C. 248 at p. 254. It 
should be pointed out that this statement is not true of a system of title 
registration properly so-called only. It is valid for the registration sys­
tem like the one under the Land Registry Act too, although indefeasibility of 
title is not guaranteed, |he system is designed for securing titles. That 
security can only be achieved if registration and the information in the 
records form the basis of land transactions. The fact that registration 
under the Act does not constitute state guaranteed title does not mean, as 
Apaloo C. j.^seems to suggest, that rights to land can be acquired without 
formal registration. See Ntem v Amkwandah /1977/ 2G.L.R. 476 at 489.
88^ G. Woodman, op.cit. Emphasis supplied.
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to a limited number of cases but cannot eliminate them altogether. The
suggested solution would only enable grantees claiming under an unregistered
instrument, who finding that section 24 has shut the front door against
886
them, to slip in through the equitable back door.
An alternative solution to deal with the sort of problems which
arose under Ntem v Ankwandah situations is suggested by Woodman. As
of -----  ----------
a result/delays in the registration procedure and administrative bottlenecks
which may affect early registration of instruments, he suggests the
institution of a system of applications for registration. This development
887
he suggests, should be introduced by legislation or administrative action. 
Although it is impossible within the scope of his paper to elaborate 
on how this should be done, it is clear that he has in contemplation 
a sirtuatxon where applications for registration (pending their formal 
registration), will be regarded as registered for the purposes of the 
Act, so that legal consequences may flow from the instruments in respect 
of which such applications are made.
The institution of such a system will, however, be attended with 
certain inherent problems. If applications for registration are to 
be regarded as registered for the purposes of the Act, they will have 
to be filed together with plans and give material particulars of the 
land to which the applications relate in such a way that interested 
members of the public can satisfy themselves about the title situation 
concerning them. Anything short of this will lead to confusion and 
undermine the system as a source of information on land titles. The 
facility provided for ascertaining title at the land registry is what 
land registration is about. But since filing applications for registration 
in the manner described above is what registrations under the Act virtually 
consists of, the measure suggested by Woodman is likely to complicate 
and duplicate the functions of the registry unduly. It will also have 
the additional disadvantage of prolonging the already time-consuming 
procedures further, increase both administrative costs in staff and 
equipment and augment costs to applicants.
Considerations of justice led the courts to make the decisions 
in Ussher v Danko and Ntem v Ankwandah. But as the law stands at the 
moment, it would appear a better policy to allow the law to bite purchasers
This was in fact a criticism of the doctrine by Woodman himself 
G. Woodman, Loc.cit.
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of land in certain individual cases as the price to be paid in the interest 
of certainty of title through the present system of land registration.
The price to be paid for trying to do poetic justice in such isolated 
cases through the development of a doctrine of constructive registration 
will be far too costly.
The case of Ntem v Ankwandah underlines the defects in the present
law where section 20(a) and (b) of the Act has still not been brought
into force. If these provisions had been brought into force, the problems
which arose in the above case would have been avoided. On refusing
to accept the instrument for registration, the registrar would have
proceeded by putting into motion the machinery for setting the uncertainty
concerning the title deeds under section 22 of the Act, as a preliminary
step to the actual registration. There was no evidence in the case
to suggest that because the stool occupant who executed the deed was
not gazetted, he had no legal capacity to deal with the property. But
the registrar refused to accept the instrument for registration because
he believed that failure to gazette the chief was a matter on the face
of the record which made it appear to him that the chief was not entitled
888
to deal with the land as the instrument purported to do.
The court by holding that the registrar had no power to refuse 
to accept the instruments for registration in this particular case and 
that if the plaintiff had taken a writ of mandamus to compel the registrar 
to perform his public duty of registration, she would have succeded 
by reason only that section 20 of the Act had not been brought into 
force, implied that even in those cases where on the face of the records 
an instrument presented for registration appears to be defective, the 
registrar will be compelled to accept it for registration. It is surprising 
that the courts are persuaded to apply liberally,v an Act whose language 
is so clearj^^Y^^^^ccommodate such situations as constructive registration 
for which it does not provide, while applying it strictly to situations 
for which itz provides but not brought into force.
One would have thought that it is rather in the latter situations 
where to restrict the discretionary powers of the registrar: in this 
way will under mine the land registry system as a means of securing 
titles that judicial inventiveness and interstitial legislation are 
called for. To restrict the power of the registrar in the manner suggested 
by the Court of Appeal would, like the doctrine of constructive registra­
tion, undermine the credibility of the land registration system. Should
See section 20(b) of Act 122.
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the registrar for instance, accept an instrument for registration in 
respect of a piece or parcel of land which has already been registered?
What should he do if on the face of the records, the necessary concurrences 
which are necessary under the traditional law for an effective disposition 
of interest in land are not had? Should he accept it for registration 
because section 20 under which he can reject such documents for registra­
tion has: not been brought into force?
Impirical investigation of how the system works in practice reveals 
that despite the fact that section 20 of the Act has not been brought 
into force, the registrar would not accept an instrument for registration 
unless he is sure that title to the land to which it relates is free 
from doubts as to its validity. It stands to reason that this should 
be the condition under which instruments must be accepted for registration. 
It will be absurd to say that because section 20(a) and (b) of the 
Act have not been brought into force, the registrar has all along been 
exercising his power wrongly. Land titles registration is a practical 
measure. Administrative procedures can be devised within the scope 
of the Act so as to achieve its purposes. When the registrar refuses 
to accept an instrument for registration because he honestly believes 
that there is doubt about title, he is not necessarily exercising 
his power under section 20. He may just be following a commonsense 
administrative procedure developed over the years.
It is suggested that the principles of Ussher v Darko and Ntem 
v Ankwandah should be reconsidered in the light of the objections raised, 
Section 20 of the Act should also be brought into force in order to 
forestall the undermining of the land registration system.
E . Priority of Instruments
In a land registration system like the one under the Land Registry 
Act, 1962, priority between conflicting instruments should not feature 
prominently as it is a condition for accepting instruments for registra­
tion that they should be accompanied by accurate plans of the land 
areas to.which they relate. Provided there is an efficient method of 
checking the accuracy of such plans against base maps drawn to nationally 
accepted scales, barring human errors, there should not be any question 
of registering conflicting instruments. Moreover, as we ahall try 
to show below, the Act does not appear to contemplate that priority 
between competing instruments should become an essential feature of 
the registration system as the courts and text writers would seem to
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make it appear at present.
Under the Land Registry Act, 1962, it is provided that a registered 
instrument is to take effect as against, other instruments affecting 
the same land from the date of its execution if it is presented for 
registration within whichever of the following periods is applicable:
a. if executed at the place where it is registered, the period
of fifteen days from its date;
b. if executed elsewhere in Ghana, the period1 of sixty days from
its date;
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c. if executed abroad, the period of three months from its date 
and
d. in any other case,^the instrument should take effect from
the date of its execution when registered.
This means that if an instrument is not presented for registration 
within the times specified, it loses the advantage of being registered 
with retroactive effect from the date of its execution. After the 
expiration of the times specified it remains to be of no effect until 
registered. 89lhe question which readily comes to mind is whether one 
can meaningfully talk of priority between competing instruments in 
the light of the way in which the system of registration is designed 
to work in practice? Considering section 25 of the Act under which 
it is provided that registration constitutes notice to the whole world, 
and its effect on the application of the nemo dat quod non habet rule, 
it would seem that priority between competing instruments is not expected 
to play an important role in the registration system under the Act.
Section 24 of the Act says that an instrument shall remain to 
be of no effect until it is registered. The case of Ussher v Darko, 
and to some extent, the case of Ntem v Ankwandah, have created some 
doubts as to the meaning of section 24'. TTThe two cases create doubts 
as to whether an unregistered instrument is or is not void. If it 
is void, then there will be nothing by way of an instrument to consider.
If on the other hand it is not void, then although it is ineffective, 
the document can operate to confer rights under certain circumstances.
This is what, as we have seen, the two cases seem to be saying.
But one fact on which all sire agreed is that an unregistered instru­
ment is ineffective until registered which means that no legal consequences 
can flow from it. It follows that one can only consider priority between
889 S.26(2)
890 S.26(5)
891 S.24.
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two or more conflicting instruments which have been registered. Such , 
situations may arise where for example, one registered instrument takes 
effect from the date of registration while the other takes effect retro 
actively from the date of execution as a result of the grantee having 
presented his instrument for registration within the specified period.
But is this sort- of situation possible, within the meaning of 
the Act? It would appear that it is not. Section 25 of the Act 
says that the registration of any instrument shall be deemed to constitute 
actual notice of the instrument and of the fact of registration to 
all persons and for all purposes as from the date of registration.
The language of this provision is clear. It means that as from the 
date of registration, no subsequent purchaser of the same interest 
relating to the same land can claim that he is a bona fide purchaser 
of the interest for valuable consideration without notice of the prior 
registration. Moreover by section 24 of the Act, as soon as the instrument 
is registered, it becomes effective to divest the grantor of his interest.
If these arguments are valid, it follows that there can be no
case in which the courts will be called upon to determine priority
between two valid conflicting instruments. For the registration of 
first
the/instrument will have the effect of serving notice to the subsequent 
grantee and at.the same time divest the grantor of his interest. It 
is agreed, as was demonstrated in Amefinu v Odametey that an otherwise 
perfectly binding transaction might be concluded in respect of a piece 
of land, but until it is registered,it would not have the effect of 
divesting the grantor of his interest. This means that the grantor 
could conclude other transactions in respect of the same land with 
subsequent transferees. This shows that there could be one or more 
competing .instruments. But for the purposes of the Act none of these 
is valid until registered. It follows that the question of determining 
priority between them cannot arise.
One of the transferees in such a case may proceed to register his instru­
ment. But as soon as he does so interest vests in him. The others 
will be served with notice, the grantor will be divested of his interest 
and the others will be holding no valid instrument within the meaning 
of the Act so as to compete with the registered instrument.
Moreover, as we have argued earlier, provided plans annexed to 
registrable instruments are accurate and provided that there is an 
efficient system of checking such plans against base maps drawn to 
acceptable scales, barring human errors, the possibility of registering
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two conflicting instruments should be very rare indeed. Even in cases 
where conflicting instruments are registered by error, in principle, 
only the first one can be valid for the purposes of the Act, since 
as we have pointed out earlier, the first registration would have divested 
the grantor of his interest rendering the latter unregistered instruments 
worthless.
It follows that the only way by which two valid competing instruments 
can exist under the Act is where both are registered at the same time.
Since the possibility of such a situation arising is obviously unlikely, 
there would seem to be no justification for the emphasis placed on
892
priority between competing instruments by the courts and text writers.
It seems that it will be a good policy for the courts to ignore unregistered
instruments and treat them as invalid, and therefore as if they do
not exist at all. The courts can then proceed from that position to
consider only registered instruments on their own merits. The pursuit
of such a policy might cause occasional injustice to persons in the
Ussher v Darko and Ntem v Ankwandah situations, but not for long.
Such occasional injustices to individuals will be the price to be paid
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for "giving teeth" to the Act and making titles certain through 
the application of its provisions. When the ultimate goal of general 
security of title has been achieved such unfortunate situations would 
cease to arise.
F. Procedure for Registration
i . Mode of Registration
The procedure for registration is based on provisions contained 
in Part III of the Land Registry Act dealing with the method of registra­
tion. An examination of the records of the Lands Department, as we 
shall see presently, reveals, however, that the Lands Department has 
over the years built up a large number of records and registers far 
beyond the scope of the provisions of the Act. This has become necessary 
as a result of some statutory and administrative requirements other
See Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit., Hanningan, "The Question of Notice 
under the Ghanaian System of Registration of Deeds" (1965) 3 U.G.L.J.,
27. Woodman, "Giving Teeth to the Land Registry Act" (1970) 4 R.G.L. 33CL
Woodman used the phrase in his article, referred to in note 892 
above.
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than registration, which the law demands ought to be satisfied in order
to .acquire a valid interest in land.
Section 11 of the Act provides that subject to the exceptions
made in its provisions, the registrar should keep a Register into which
he should register in the manner prescribed by the Act, all instruments
presented to him. Registration "shall consist in filling a duplicate'
or copy (to be provided by the person presenting the instrument for
895
registration) of the instrument brought for registration." The
registrar, after registering the instrument in the manner provided,
should place upon it a certificate in the form provided under schedules
D or F as the case may be, or as near thereto as may be, specifiying
the year, month, day and hour of the proof or presentation as the case
may be of such instrument. When the instrument is ultimately registered,
a certificate specifying the year, month,, day and hour of registration
must be issued and the times specified in it should be taken as the
896
date and hour at which the instrument was registered.
The above provisions are very imnportant in so far as the time
of registration affects subsequent transactions in respect of the same
land to which the registered instrument relates. Section 12(2) requires
that every duplicate copy of a registered instrument should bear
the certificate required by section 10 of the Act to be placed on the
original instrument and must also include a certificate signed by the
registrar that such duplicate has been compared and verified with the
original. The duplicate or copy of a registered instrument upon which
a certificate in the manner prescribed by section 10 of the Act has
been placed, may be printed, written, typewritten, photographed or
897
copied by any other process. The registrar is enjoined to number
every such duplicate or copy filed consecutively, and shall file duplicates
988
or copies in the order in which they are received by him.
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See for instance, the following Acts. S.75 of the Local Government Ordin­
ance, No. 29 of 1951, (Cap:64) 1951 Rev., Article 164(3) of the 1969 
Constitution of Ghana, and section 8(1) of the Administration of 
Lands Act, 1962, Act 123. All of these enactments in one way or
the other, requires for the validity of acquisition of stool lands that 
the minister should give his consent. See also the Stamp Act, 1965,
Act 311, S.14.
S.12(1).
S. 10.
S - 12(3).
S. 13
423*
Where a map or plan is annexed to an instrument brought forward for
registration, the registrar is enjoined to file in the register a true
899
copy of such a map or plan. Although the wording of the above provision
would seem to suggest that the requirement of annexing a plan to an instru­
ment is permissive and not mandatory it is an administrative procedural 
requirement of the Lands Department that an instrument will never be accepted 
for registration unless it is accompanied by a site plan of the parcel 
of land to which the instrument to be registered relates.
The registrar is enjoined to keep a book in which he should, upon 
registration of any instrument, enter the registered number, the names
of the parties, the date and the nature of the instrument and the date
~ . . . .  900of registration.
It is along the line of these provisions that the procedure for regis­
tration of instrument affecting lands has developed over the years. As 
the demands of land administration in accordance with statutory requirements 
have made it necessary for many more registers to be established, advantage 
is taken of section 17(2) of the Act which gives the registrar discretionary 
power to keep such other books and registers as he may think fit. What 
follows is a description of such registers and records of an imperical 
research and the Memorandum of a working party of a committee created
in September 1976 to investigate the feasibility of introducing a pilot
901
project for establishing a Register of Title to Land in Accra,
ii. Registers of the Lands Department.
It is the primary responsibility of the Technical branch of the Lands 
Department to compile, revise and maintain maps, plans and registers contain­
ing data relating to lands and titles thereof and estate management.
This technical branch could carry out minor surveys, cartographic recordings 
and other functions connected with land and its valuation. In dealing 
with these matters, a distinction is drawn between three main categories 
of land each of which has its own registers. These are classified as follows
899
900
901
S.16.
S.17(1).
See Memorandum to the Government Advisory Committee for Land Administra­
tion Research Centre on the Feasibility of Introducing a Pilot Project 
for Establishing a Register of Title to Land in Accra. January, 1977, 
Lands Department, Accra.
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a. state lands;
b. stool or skin lands, and
c . family or private lands.
Related to this classification of lands and the registration of
instruments affecting them, is the statuory requirements of section 14(5)
902
of the Stamp Act, 1965, by which no instrument can be accepted for 
registration until it is officially stamped. To meet this statutory 
requirement of stamping three registers have been created as follows:
a. the Property Register;
b. the Valuation Register and
c. the Stamp tiuty Assessment Record Book.
On receipt of an instrument for registration at the Lands Department, 
the material particulars of the instrument and the land to which it relates 
are entered into a ledger recording the following:
a. the Land Serial Number or Numbers; (L .S ,.N.)
b. the Deeds Registry Number;
c . the Key Plan Number;
d. the Date of the Instrument;
e. the Nature of the Instrument
f. the names of the parties to the transaction;
g- the description of the situation of the land in question;
h. the purpose for which the land has been acquired;
i. the particulars of the site plan;
j • the duration of the tenure;
k. date of expiry;
1. Plan Reference Number;
m. The means by which grant is terminable, notice or otherwise
n. if renewable;
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0. other related trainsactions, if any;
p. Title Number and 
903
q . Remarks.
Later, when the necessary vetting of the above data is completed, 
these particulars are transferred from the Ledger onto cards maintained 
by a card-index system. These ledgers known as Geographical Registers 
have been maintained since the nineteen twenties. They are maintained 
for geographical location and cross-indexed by plain numbers. A separate 
register, called the Names Index Register is maintained for recording 
the names of the parties to the transaction to be registered. There 
is also the Number Register which is indexed by the Land Serial Numbers.
A record is kept of the plans and maps for each area and these are indexed 
and kept in drawers known as the Plans Register.
Finally, there is what is known as the Valuation Register. It is 
one of the most important of all the registers because it contains all 
the vital information concerning the material particulars of the lands 
to which the instruments relate. It is thus used for answering public 
searches and as it provides comparative information* for valuation purposes, 
it is frequently used by the stamp duty valuers. This register is main­
tained in loose leaf book form. Records like these have been maintained 
904
since 1947.
Each index card contains the following information:
a. Valuation Sheet Numbers
b . ■ P. D. Number (Particulars Delivered Number)
c. Address and stool (if stool land)
d . property number
e. short description
f. date of instrument
g. type of instrument
h. vendor or lessor
1. purchaser or lessee;
.i. consideration or rent
903
904
See the memorandum of the Working Party referred to, note 901 
Ibid.
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k. price per sq. ft.
1. estimated net rental value;
m. area;
n. rateable value;
o. lettings;
P- duration of grant;
q- assessed value of property;
r . special covenants;
s. full description and plan of lay out.
A space is left for.the recording of subsequent information or trans­
action relating to the same land. Records like these are maintained 
for every valid instrument stamped in the Lands Department, the details 
of which will be described below.
iii. Stamp Duty and Registration
The payment of stamp duty has no direct bearing on land titles regis­
tration in Ghana as such. But it would seem that the requirement of
stamping has been used since the colonial era as a means of levying tax
905
indirectly on real property. This ingenius device for collecting
property tax has been conveniently preserved and linked with land registra­
tion. As the Stamp Act makes stamping a condition precedent to accepting 
instruments for registration, it has become one of the many hurdles to 
be overcome in the long procedure for registration.
Thus when an instrument is presented to the Lands Department for 
registration, it is the stamping office attached to the Department that 
receives it first. The former, on receipt of the instruments, refers 
it to the Technical branch of the Lands Department for the purpose of 
checking the accuracy of the site plans annexed to it against base maps 
supplied to the latter by the Survey Department. This then begins the 
long procedure for registration as follows:
See for instance, the Stamp Ordinance, No. 12 of 1889, S.17, under 
which it was provided that "no deed shall be registered in the Registry 
of Instruments affecting land, unless the same shall be duty stamped
it
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a. when the instrument is returned to the stamping office, the land 
transaction to which it relates is recorded into the main register 
of the stamping office and given a "stamping office number" which 
is the sequence of numbers given to any document arriving there.
A form acknowledging receipt of the instrument is issued to the 
applicant. If the instrument refers clearly to a stool land, an 
additional number is attributed to it and a file opened under that 
number at the Lands Department.
b. The stamp office attaches to it a form called "particulars delivered" 
form. This is a form on which the particulars of the land to which 
the instrument relates sire entered. Some of these particulars are
the date on which the instrument was executed, the names of the parties 
to the transaction, the situation of the land, its description, area 
and the type of interest transferred, that is whether it is a lease, 
a gift or otherwise.
c. The documents are checked as to the correct number and type of interest. 
Two copies of the instrument are required, to each of which must be 
attached a a site plan of the land area in question; and a further
two site plains are required to be attached to the "particulars delivered" 
(P.D.) form. This means that an applicant must present for registra­
tion, two copies of the instrument amd four site plans.
d. The documents are sent back to the Lands Department from the stamping 
office where it is forwairded to the technical branch of the Lands 
Department for checking against the list sent from the stamping office.
If in agreement, the list is filed and the documents sent to the 
chief Technical Officer's "plan examination section."
e. The plan examination section records the particulars of the document 
into a register using the number attributed to it by the stamping 
office. The site plans are then scrutinised in order to ascertain 
their accuracy. The Survey of Ghana maps, and base maps supplied
to the Lands Department by the survey department or the Town and 
Country Planning Department are employed in this exercise. Where 
the land in question is in a town, the survey of Ghana "town sheets" 
are used, checking the particular plot against known existing buildings
and control points.
This is a type of form prescribed under section 16 of the Stamp 
Act, 1965, Act 311.
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f. Here/any serious errors are detected during the "office check", field 
checks will then be instigated by the chief technical officer's staff, 
and a report made to the chief technical officer.. If the doubt"
as to the accuracy of the plan is such that the service of the Survey 
Department would be required to resolve it, the assistance of the 
latter will be required and the matter referred to it. If the site 
plan is ultimately rejected on account of its inaccuracy or being 
in conflict with an already registered instrument, the instrument 
is returned to the grantee or the applicant through the stamping 
office without stamp duty being collected. If on the other hand, 
the site plan is acceptable, the instrument is forwarded to the legal 
section of the Lands Department.
g. The legal section of the Deaprtment checks the legal details about 
the instrument, its authenticity, and other statutory requirements 
which ought to be fulfilled before it can be valid. For instance, 
if it is stool land, the legal staff will check to see whether the 
necessary consents and concurrences of the accredited persons have 
been obtained. If the document has not been given a stool land number, 
it will be returned to the stamping office for this to be done, and 
order a file for it to be opened at the Lands Department. Instruments 
affecting lands under state control are, however, not subject to 
such legal checks because the deeds thereof are prepared by the legal 
section of the Department itself. What are subject to search are 
assignment of leases, or subleases and mortgages of state lands in
90'
order to ascertain if the Lands Commission's consent has been obtained.
h. All the documents are sent to the central records room of the Lands 
Department where they are checked against government lands and government 
development programme proposals. If the site falls on any such develop­
ment area which means the grantee cannot use the interest for which
he requires the land, then the latter will be informed and advised 
accordingly.
i. When the relevant checks are completed the instrument and its related 
documents are sent to the Lands Department's Valuation Drawing office 
for plotting, and if necessary, the addition of a Property Number.
The plotting is done on the basis of the large' scale survey of Ghana
See Article 164(3) of the 1969 constitution of Ghana, Section 8(1) 
of the Lands Administration Act, Act 123, and the Lands Commission 
Decree N.R.C.D.24 (1972) as amended by N.R.C.D.112 (97).
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sheets, records of which have been maintained since 1947. Most plots 
in Accra and other regional capitals, particulary those in statutory 
development areas have property numbers in the Valuation Drawing 
office records. Where plots are subsequently sub-divided new "sub­
plot" numbers based on the original plot numbers are ; attributed 
to them.
j . The plot outline and its numbers are recorded including all material
partiuclars of the plot. All this information is recorded and maintained 
on a Valuation Form kept in a comprehensive record, under a Property 
Number and is used for both valuation on comparative basis and for. 
answering searches and enquiries, 
k. At this stage, the instrument is ready to be accepted for registration 
subjpet to any other administrative or statutory requirement that 
may still be required to be fulfilled. From the Valuation Drawing 
office the documents are once again returned to the stamping office 
where the stamp duty is assessed ad valorem by a valuer of the Lands 
Department attached to the stamping office. This concludes the long 
process of stamping which also forms part of the procedure for registra­
tion.
1. The instrument is either returned to the grantee or if. he wants to
complete the process of registration at once, the instrument is returned 
to the legal section of the Lands Department where the actual registration 
takes place.
m. On receipt of the instrument for registration, the oath of proof.„
of due execution is sworn before the Registrar. If such oath has 
not already been sworn before a Judge, a High Court Registrar, or 
a District Magistrate, the oath can be sworn before the Registrar 
by any signatory of the instrument. 
n. A receipt is issued to the applicant in respect of the instruments
deposited and the documents are sent to the Registrar who is always 
a lawyer, for checking personally, the conformity of the instrument 
with existing statutes, decrees, legislative and executive instruments.
If there is no evidence of root of title, the Registrar may require 
a statutory declaration from the grantor,
o. If the instrument and all the related documents are approved as satis­
factory, the applicant is required to submit his tax clearance certi-
See section 10 of the Act.
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taxation or
ficate or prove that he is not subject to / is up-to-date with 
his tax obligations. The registrar would not complete the registra­
tion unless the applicant satisfies this requirement which is a 
governmental directive to all Lands Departments, 
p. When this condition is satisfied, the instrument is accorded a number 
and sent to Accra for the signature of the Commissioner for Lands 
and Mineral Resources who is the Chairman of the Lands Commision 
whose consent is required for the validity of the transaction. This 
is the case where the land affected, falls within the category, of lands in 
respect of which such consents are required, 
q. At Accra, the particulars of the instrument are subject to further
checks, particularly the site plans. If they are found to be in
order, the instrument is placed before the Commissioner of Lands
who normally appends his signature. This is in fact, only a rubber 
stamp.
r. The instrument is returned to the Lands Department from where it
was sent. Here, entries into the Register are indexed alphabetically
and kept in the deeds registry store room. There is an index card
for the surname of both the grantor and the grantee and if there
is more than one grantor or grantee, it is indexed by the person
whose name appears first on the document.
s. After recording the year, month, day and hour at which the instrument
909
is registered, the applicant is issued with a certificate of registra­
tion upon the payment of a registration fee of ten cedis. This concludes 
the registration procedure and the validation of the transaction.
G. Delays
It can be discerned from the long procedure for registration outlined 
above that the system has its own in-built delays. The procedures to 
be gone through at the various stages at different sections of the Lands 
Department, including other departments such as the Survey, Town and 
Country Planning and the Stamping Office constitute a recipe for red- 
tapism and its consequential delays.
The requirements of stamping as a condition for registration .may 
be one of the convenient and effective ways of levying property tax on 
landed-interest holders, but it does not only delay the acquisition of
909 See section 10 of the Act.
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interests in land but the rule operates unfavourably against transferees 
of interests in land. It is normally the grantee anxious to get his 
acquisition validated who pays such tax during the course of getting 
his instrument registered. Since the cost of valuation and the stamp 
duty are not usually taken into account during the course of negotiations 
leading to the conclusion of the transaction, the grantor is often able 
to shift his tax obligations in this regard to the grantee.
Thus what is intended to be a property tax on persons holding an 
interest in land becomes in practice, a tax on prospective grantees of 
interest in land. They are taxed even before the interest becomes vested 
in them. This would seem to be unfair. A solution would seem to lie 
in a general property tax. It is possible that such tax could be added 
to the cost of land rights, but it would at least remove one of the procedural 
requirements in the registration exercise that causes unnecessary delays.
An equally contributory factor in the delays of the system is the 
need to submit a tax clearance certificate to the land registry as a 
condition for instrument registration. Perhaps, the rational for this 
requirement is that those who seek the services of state agencies should 
be up-to:-date with their tax obligations. But it would seem that apart 
from the fact that this requirement is fraught with unnecessary delays, 
it constitutes a formidable obstacle in the way of the majority of illiter­
ate farmers and peasants of the rural communities who might wish to acquire 
lands in accordance with the requirements of the law.
Farmers are not generally subject to direct taxation in Ghana.
This means that they should be exempt from the fulfilment of of this 
condition. But not infrequently, the problem has been how to determine 
who a farmer is. Is he the absentee farmer who is also a civil servant?
Is the business man who has a small farm-yard behind his estate a farmer 
for this purpose? To avoid this problem, the registrar requires those 
who claim not to be subject to taxation to bring along a certificate 
of examption from the Commissioner for Income Tax in lieu of a tax clearance 
certificate.
Members of the rural community are often bemused by such obstacles 
in the way of land acquisition. Ignorant about the bureaucratic processes 
involved in fulfilling such requirements, resort is had to the aid of 
literate members of the community or legal practioners at great expense 
to obtain the relevant documents. There would seem to be no sound basis 
for linking matters relatiang to general taxation to.land registration.
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The agencies responsible for tax collection should be made more efficient 
and other ways of making the public meet their tax obligations should 
be devised instead of clogging unnecessarily the process of land acquisition 
and registration with such unnecessary conditions.
Apart form such statutory and administrative requirements, the fulfil­
ment of which is fraught with delays, the failure to establish land registries 
in the manner prescribed under Part 1 of the Land Registry Act, 1962, 
also accounts for much of the delays that occur within the system. Within 
the meaning of the Act, a Chief Registrar would have been appointed as
the administrative head of the > scheme in such a manner as would concentrate
910
human and material resources at one place and under one administration.
The concentration of trained personnel and equipment at one place under 
a single management would certainly avoid duplication of functions and 
would assist in reducing costs in time and money.
In a well equipped and properly staffed land registry, the functions 
of valuation for the purposes of assessing stamp duty could be performed 
by a valuation officer attached to the registry. There should be no need 
for this to be done in a place outside the registry such as the stamp 
office. This will not only have the effect of cutting down delays consider­
ably, but will reduce the number of registers which the land registry 
and other departments would have to maintain at present. Searches can 
be made easier as all available information can be kept in one place.
It is for reasons like these that the need for establishing independent 
land registers must be seriously considered now if the system should work 
efficiently.
H. Public Education
There is no doubt that the law relating to land titles registration 
in Ghana has very important consequences for land acquisition and use.
But unhappily, there is no provision for a programme of public education 
and information on the substantive law, its objectives, social, economic
and legal implications. As we have seen earlier, the Land Registry Act, 1962,
912
Section 8(1) of the Administration of Lands Act, 1962, the Land Commissions
910
See sections 1 and 2 of Act 122.
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Act 122, s.14.
912 A ^
Act 123.
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Decree, 1972 the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 and the Stamp Act,
• 915
196 5 all have the effect of making writing, stamping, the consent
of the minister in some cases, and registration, conditions precedent
for the validity of transfer of interests in land.
Since the provisions of the Conveyancing Decree have imposed a general
mandatory requirement of writing on land transactions, it follows that
even land acquisitions under the traditional system ought to be evidenced
in writing. A memorandum or deed of conveyance becomes an instrument
affecting land which must be registered either under the conveyancing 
or
Decree/in accordance with the Land Registry Act in order to be effective.
To be able to do so the bureaucratic processes of stamping and presentation 
of tax clearance certificate will have to be gone through. The question 
which must be considered, however, is how many Ghanaians know about these 
statutory and administrative requirements? Are people complying with 
the law? Certainly they cannot, if they are not aware of the existence 
of the law. In a survey of 80 sample villages conducted by the Land 
Administration Research Centre, U.S.T. between July 1976 and January 
1977, it was discovered that less than four per cent of the people questioned 
in the villages knew about the Land Registry Act and the requirement 
that the consent of the minister is necessary for valid alienation of 
an interest in stool lands.
Surprisingly, over 45% of the people questioned knew about stamping, 
but not in the sense in which the Act requires it. It has been the habit 
of letter-writers to affix postage stamps on agreements reduced into 
writing whether or not the agreement relates to a land transaction.
Even an illiterate grantor or grantee might want a postage stamp of any 
value to be placed on the memorandum. It is regarded much more as a 
symbolic pact concluding insignia or what may be called a seal under 
English law than a form of taxation, the value of which is determined 
by the consideration or value of the land within the meaning of the Stamp 
Act.
Investigations at the Lands and Town and Country Planning Departments 
at Ho, and Kumasi disclosed that in the urban and city statutory development 
areas, the majority of people are unaware of these statutory and administrative
913 M „ _ _ _,
N.R.C.D. 24
914
N.R.C.D. 175 SS 1-7 inclusive.
915
1965, Act 311.
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requirements and the consequences of non-compliance with the law on land 
transactions. Many grantee's of interest in land became aware of these 
requirements for the first time during the course of negotation for the 
grant or where litigation arises out of the grant and the need arises 
to tender the document in evidence to prove title. Frequently, it is 
when the grantee is applying for development permit from the Urban or 
City Council that he is for the first time confronted with the requirements 
of the law
Indeed, in a survey carried out in Kumasi between May 1977 and August
1977 on solicitors dealing with land matters, some of the legal practioners
confessed that they were not aware of the significance of the relevant
provisions of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 dealing with the recording
916
of oral grants. Today, cases such as Asare v Brobbey and Amefinu 
917
v Odametey might have provided bitter lessons from which the few 
persons connected with the litigation might learn about the legal consequences 
of non-registration. But such cases without more, cannot be adequate 
means of educating the public on these important matters.
Surely, ignorance of the law means that there are thousands of illegal 
dealings in land at present, particularly in the rural communities.
Numerous land transactions under the abunu and the abusa system by which 
miany stranger-farmers develop land can be found to be in principle, illegal 
for two reasons. Firstly, the greater majority of such transactions 
are conlcuded by illiterate stranger-farmers with stools without the 
terms being reduced into writing. Secondly, they sire never recorded 
.in the manner provided under the Conveyancing Decree, 1973.
It is not so much because of the need to comply with the law generally
that the need for public education on these matters is being stressed 
here. A programme of land titles registration can have significant effects ' 
on a land tenure system. Title registration normally leads to individualisa­
tion of interests and makes transfers of interests in land easy. The 
individualisation of interest which will accompany the implimentation 
of the scheme can have the effect of changing the communal trappings
of the land tenure systems of the country.
916 /19717 2.G.L.R. 331.
917 _
/1977/ 2 G.L.R. 135.
918 ~
See the Law Reform Commission Report, November, 1975.
437
In fact, since Sir Wiliam Maxwell's principles of the abortive Public 
Land Bill was abandoned in 1897, individualisation of interest has been 
consciously encouraged through the adjudicative processes of the courts, 
the influence of lawyers, text writers and conveyancing forms. The insti­
tution of a system of a deeds registration and the present efforts by 
the government to introduce a system of title registration, properly 
so called, is intended to consolidate this process of individualisation
and to transform community-based prescribed user-rights into freehold 
919
titles.
This kind of policy involves questions relating to social economic 
and political considerations. It is thus of paramount importance that 
the public should be informed about the programme of land titles registration 
Such information should not only include the explanation of the current 
law on the matter but its likely consequences on the land tenure system 
and how it might affect society and the individual. This in itself should 
generate debates on the issue and should give opportunity to the rural 
community to express its view on the matter.
It may well be that from the ensuing debates on the issue, new ideas
and alternative proposals on how the problems for which the system is
designed to solve can be dealt with will emerge. It has already been
pointed out that the acquisition of freehold titles is not a necessary
condition for efficient land use and development. All that one needs
920
is the acquisition of an interest in land or a right to use land.
The development and the success of the cocoa and the mining industries 
in Ghana since the last decade of the nineteenth century which did not 
depend in the past or at present on the acquisition of freehold titles 
have been sited as good examples for this proposition.
It has also been pointed out in the discussion of land administration 
in the North that the primary objective of land registration which is 
title security can be achieved through the already existing machineries 
for the control and administration of all lands by the government. One 
of the main arguments often raised in favour of land titles registration 
is the unwillingness of financial institutions to give agricultural credit 
on the security of landed interests which are insecure. But when titles 
become secure through the control and administration of all lands by
919
See the Memorandum of the Working Party referred to above, note 
901; and the Law Reform Commission Report, November, 1973 and 1975.
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See pp. above.
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government agencies, the banks will no longer insist on the fact of registra­
tion but on the value of the interest to be given as security. The considera­
tion of all these aspects of the issues concerning land titles registration 
in Ghana makes public education and general information on the question 
a matter of public duty and necessity.
C. K. Meek rightly points out the fact that the desire by colonised 
people to acquire freehold titles during the colonial times was much 
influenced by the wish to acquire political equality with Englishmen.
Yet in England and elsewhere many farmers prefer tenancy to ownership,
since capital expended on development is more productive than when sunk
921
in the purchase of land. He stresses the fact that in the case of
small-holders, the purchase of freehold may involve the exhaustion of
capital resources; pointing out that in all the colonies where agricultural
debt became a state problem, the excessive buying of more land than could
922
bedeveloped had been the principal causes of such indebtedness.
Noting some of the dangers of the freehold ideas, Meek writes;
"The ability to borrow money on freehold property has everywhere 
been a curse to the peasant proprietors who had not learned the 
proper use of credit. Freehold opens the door for speculation and 
under-development. A recent Land Commission in Northern Rhodesia 
observed that it was monstrous that 80,000 acres of land, much of 
it more suited for cattle than for tobacco, should be lying idle 
at a time when land was so urgently needed; and they added that, 
since there were mnay other extensive areas held by companies and 
individuals for purposes of speculation, the Government should seriously 
consider a tax on undeveloped land. In Kenya, for the same reason, 
a similar measure is under consideration". 922
These dangers concerning which the learned author writes are very 
real to the situation in Ghana where land law reform bodies and those 
in positions of influence on land policy formulation are pressing for 
excessive, individualisation of interests and the creation of freehold 
titles. Land titles registration is the means by which they seek to 
attain their desired objectives. What has not been done, however, is 
to consider the social and economic implications of such policy in the 
manner that Meek approached his subject. In the light of the views expressed 
above, it is deemed necesssary to examine in the concluding chapter of 
this study, this process of individualisation and its social and economic 
consequences for Ghana.
921
See his Land Law and Custom in the Colonies, Oxford, 1946, 244.
922 TV» * /JIbid.
923 T. ..Ibid.
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PART IV
INDIVIDUALISATION OF INTERESTS UNDER THE TRADITIONAL LAW
A. Introductory
The withdrawal of Sir William Maxwell's Public Lands Bill of 1897 marked 
the beginning of a trend in the evolution of the customary schemes of 
tenure in which the tendency was to regard the interest which an individual 
member of a land holding community acquires through the exercise of his 
inherent community membership right as involving the absolute acquisition 
of the land to which his interest relates.
Today, some students of the indigenous law would go as far as assert­
ing that the customary schemes of interest in land has undergone such 
metamorphosis that the individual interest in land can now be regarded 
as approximating to a freehold title on the same footing as the term 
is understood under English law with its connotations. To those who 
hold this view, the evolution of the customary interest into a freehold
is not necessarily in compatible with the "trusteeship idea" which is essentially
924
an ethical justification of property.
To some of the proponents of this view, the trend towards individua­
lisation is progressive and ought to be encouraged and crystallised under 
a scheme of title registration. This, it is believed holds the key to 
the efficient and effective land use and economic development. Such 
transformation of the traditional interest into a freehold is a necessary 
condition for easy accessibility to agricultural credit since such title
could be used as a collateral for the security of loans from financial 
925
institutions.
Among the factors influencing these trends and attitudes are:
i . the impact on land values of European commerce and the development 
of the mining industry in the late nineteenth century;
ii. the introduction of cash crops based on permanent cultivation; 
and
iii. the reception of Anglo-American ideas of tenure by an emergent 
African middle class and elite consisting of lawyers, judges, 
doctors, merchants and the educated native.
See S. K. B. Asante, Property Law and Social goals in Ghana 1844- 
1966, Accra, 1975, p. 31
See The Report of the Law Reform Commission on Proposals for the 
Reform of Land Law, November 1973, pp. 7 and 13-14.
440
What hag never been seriously considered, however, is the likely
effect which such changes will have on the socio-economic and political
value systems of the traditional schema.
The kind of transformation envisaged by this school of thought raises
serious questions regarding efficient and improved methods of productivity,
the distribution of resources in society and the raising of standards
of living. These are questions transcending the economic and social
sphere into the realms of politics. Even as of now, over 60% of the
working population in Ghana is engaged in the exploitation of landed 
926
resources. The ecological processes of such resource exploitation
normally occur within the family milieu and their distribution is usually 
channelled through the same medium in rural communities where the basic 
tools of production are still the proverbial hoe and the cutlass4 The 
cooperative effort funnelled through the family system would appear to
927
be the best way of developing farms in any appreciable economic sizes.
The question which must be of concern to the land administrator 
and the policy maker on lands generally is whether the family system 
and the community-interest ideas inherent in the traditional property 
systems can be accommodated by the individualisation and private ownership 
being advocated by this school of thought. It would appear that there 
is a false thesis underlying the views of those who advocate individualisa­
tion of interests. It is erroneously assumed that individual ownership 
of land is a necessary condition for effective utilization of land and 
a pre-requisite for acquisition of agricultural credit from financial 
institutions.
B. Reception of European Ideas of Tenure
The nineteenth century laissez-faire doctrines of private enterprise
and individual initiative and competition formed the cornerstone of capitalist
production and commerce throughout the four centuries of European contact
928
with the west coast of Africa. These laissez-faire ideas had a great
attraction for the educated elements of the African community and traders.
The ability to read, write and speak English in an illiterate society
See S. Y. Brenner, Agriculture and Economic Development of Low Income 
Countries, The Hague, 1971, p. 156.
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During the late nineteenth century when the cocoa industry began, migrants 
from the south of the Gold Coast to the East in search of lands had to form
companies which were corporate groups in order to employ the advantages of
i 'pint effort in the development of the industry. See Generally, P. Hill, he Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana, Cambridge, 1963.
The Portuguese landed in the Gold Coast as early as 1471 and began the 
trade in the Gold.
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placed this class of natives in a special privileged position.
As middle men in the trade between the natives and the European 
merchants, they were in a unique position to acquire wealth as well as 
wield considerable influence in society. The tendency was to imitate 
European ways of life and in some cases regard certain European values 
as in many respects superior to those of African traditional values and- 
to regard some aspects of the latter as obstructive to economic develop­
ment.
Thus Casely Hayford, for instance, in his Essays on the Forest Bill
of 1910, complained that in the past, they had been taught to believe
that the ’’noble traditions of the British nation, which governed its
conduct in dealing with weak peoples, still controlled public conscience
. . . and it is because we fervently cling to such belief that we are
persuaded that British public opinion will.not tolerate any plans that
might be formed by the so called friends of the indigene to prevent the
possibility of a landlord class, black or white ever arising in a crown 
929
colony".
Here was a prominent lawyer and a public figure, the successor of 
Mensah Sarbah as the President of theAborigines Rights Protection Society
openly advocating the creation of a landlord class within the traditional
property systems. And this was the "noble traditions of the British 
nation" to which they "fervently cling". It must be remembered that 
the idea of landlord and tenant relationship is an English-tenurial concept 
which is contrary to native ideas of property rights, since land is regarded 
as a community asset and resource. No member of a land-holding group 
could be a tenant of any one since no individual has ownership of the 
land. Such relation could only arise between the group and a stranger 
in which case, whatever rent may accrue from the relationship would be 
receivable by the community as an entity and not by any individual landlord.
However, the influence of the reception of Anglo-American juristic
ideas and the conception of tenure by the native middle class and their 
attitude towards land rights are reflected not only in the above statement 
of Casely Hayford, but in the local press in the late nineteenth century.
In the 15th June, 1897 edition of the "Methodist Times", for example,
J. P. Brown, a critic of the Crown Lands Bill, and a Vice President of 
the A.R.P.S. was described as a "striking example of the public". He
J. E. Casely Hayford, op.cit., p. 42. Emphasis supplied.
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was the son of a Wesleyan Minister, "a cultured member of the aristocracy"
not convicted of any crime, a preacher . . . and "a land owner". It
is interesting to observe how the association of a person with membership
of a cultured aristocracy and land ownership was regarded as an index
of respectability in the Gold Coast Society.
Similarly, throughout the period of opposition to the Lands Bills,
men like Mensah Sarbah and Renner who argued the case on behalf of the
traditional authorities before the Legislative Council used language
suggesting that the lands belonged to the chiefs individually, ,arguments
which were inconsistent with Sarbah's own writings in his book, Fanti
as will be recalled,
Customary Laws. For example,/during the debate he said:
". . . Section 19 of the Supreme Court Ordinance; 1876 particularly 
gives special directions for the enforcement and protection of the 
law of tenure in the protected territories of the Gold Coast; and 
subsequent legislation has taken special care to protect the law 
of tenure in this country. The bill, however, practically alters 
this customary law of tenure under which the land owner is an absolute 
land owner, by declaring that the largest right a native of the 
Gold Coast has in the soil of his country is what is called a settler's 
rights". 930
Statements such as these do not only give a false impression about
the nature of traditional schemes of interest in land, but are influenced
by Anglo-American juristic ideas.
In addition to the influences of the native middle class, the European
merchant class, concession hunters and speculators had some controlling
influence on land transactions. In frieir. negotiations with the traditional
authorities, they were concerned about the security of the interests
they acquired. The African or native lawyers who were the middle men,
employed English conveyancing forms and terminology in the drafting of
the ensu ing concession agreements. This relationship united the European
merchanc class, the mining firms and the native middle class in the pursuit
of their common economic objectives. Thus in 1894, when the idea of
the Crown Lands Bill was introduced, the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce
sent a telegram to the Governor requesting him not to pass the Bill until
they had considered the matter and gave their opinion on the subject,,
They complained that the Bill affected a large section of the community
"especially the more intelligent and educated section, and we know nothing
931
about it until it was-passed. It was passed behind our back."
See the Legislative Assembly Debates, C096 295, p. 477. Compare 
this statement with what he says about individual ownership in his 
book, Fanti Customary Laws, op.cit., p. 61 and pp. 68-69. Emphasis 
supplied.
CO/96, 257, p. 280, at p. 281. Emphasis supplied.
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Thus the western conceptions of tenure and the nineteenth century 
lassaiz-faire ideas of private enterprise premised on competition and 
individualism united the European merchant class and the native middle 
class including the lawyers in opposition to a legislative measure which 
would have gone a long way in preserving the communal character of lands 
which is an inherent ethical principle of traditional land tenure. This 
class of persons took exceptions to the possible check on the process 
of individualisation and the limitation which the law sought to place 
on free negotiability of land sales. Under the influence of these forces, 
the process of individualisation became a feature of larid tenure in the 
city and urban areas where such influences were considerable. However, 
this cannot be said to have changed the basic tenets on which the traditional 
system of tenure is based in the rural communities.
C . The Introduction of Cash Crops and Permanent Cultivation
a
The individual interest in land which a member of/land-holding community
acquires through the exercise of his community membership right by effective
occupation of the community's land is an interest of potentially unlimited 
932
duration. It is inheritable and subsists so long as successors are
933
to be found and the land is not abandoned. However, the durability
of such interest* dependent as it is on continued occupation and resource
exploitation, may be limited in duration where land development patterns
are not based on projects of permanent nature. As such, before permanent
agriculture emerged.the frequency with which land was abandoned did not
usually allow for permanent attachment of the individual to a specific
confine of the commons land for many years.
Land use patterns in the late nineteenth century is well ilustrated
by an 1889 Report on "Economic and Agricultural Potential of the Gold
Coast". Paragraph 4 of the report stated:
"In this tropical country where nature repays every effort of cultiva­
tion by a hundred-fold return, and the wants of men are confined 
almost exclusively to his daily necessary food, there is no incentive 
to exertion, and thus, although agriculture is the main occupation 
of the people, we have no hesitation in stating that probably not 
more than three per cent, certainly not more than five per cent 
of the soil is brought under cultivation in any one year". ®^4
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Bentsi-Enchill op.cit., p. 109 
See Ollennu, op.cit., p. 57.
See Report of a Commission appointed in 1887 to investigate the 
Economic and Agricultural potential of the Gold Coast, Accounts 
and Papers - 1891, No. 110, in ZHC 1/5239, P.R.O.
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Under conditions like these described above, in the Report, the abund­
ance of land made it easy and feasible to abandon lands frequently within 
the framework of shifting cultivation in which for lack of scientific 
means of replenishing the soil with fertilizers or manures, the land 
was left fallow for a number of years until it had sufficiently regained 
its fertility before recultivation. With large areas of unoccupied land 
available, the fallow periods were so long that a previously cultivated 
area might be regarded as having been abandoned. Since the individual 
was not tied down to the cultivation of a particular area of land, rights 
in land were of relatively short duration.
With the introduction of permanent crops such as cocoa, coffee, cotton
and rubber plantationsinto the agriculture of the people however, a new
935
element in land development patterns was introduced. In addition
to this new element in land use patterns there was increased demand for
land which was one of the consequences of the mining industry which began
in earnest in the last quarter of the 19th century.
These events led to a sharp rise in land values, the rights of which
were keenly contested. These were some of the principal factors affecting
the evolution of traditional schemes of interest in land.
It will bear emphasis to remind students of the indigenous law that
in any analytical treatment of the phenomenon of an interest in land under
the traditional schema, it must be borne in mind that no amount of long
possession or un-interrupted occupation based on permanent cultivation
or otherwise may transform the community-based prescribed user right
936
into absolute ownerhsip of the soil.
Between 1837-1840, James Swanzy was already managing a coffee planta­
tion which was later purchased by Rev. T. B. Freeman who developed 
it into an agricultural traininhg centre. A group of cotton growers 
in Cape Coast planted 25,000 bushes of cotton and in 1864 the 
Basel Mission arranged cotton growing in the Trans Volta area.
See David Kimble, Political History of Ghana, 1850-1928, p. 8. 
E^export of cocoa began in 1891 with an experimental shipment of 
80 lbs. See Lord Hailey, Native Adminsitration in the British African 
Territories, Vol. Ill, p. 199.
The authorities in support of this view are abundant. See Sarbah, 
op.cit., pp. 68-69.
See also the cases of Owusu v Manche of Labadi (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 278, 
Manko v Bonso (1933) 3 WACA 62,
Kuma v Kuma (1938) 5 W.A.C.A. 4,
Golightly v Ashrifie (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 676,
Addo v Wusu (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 24,
Accuful v Martey 1882, Sar. F.C.L. p. 156, etc.
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This is the logical consequence of the way in which such interests 
are created. As has already been argued,the interest does not usually 
come into being until the exercise of inherent rights founded on membership 
of the community. A logical nexus is thus established between individual 
enterprise and the establishment of the right. By necessary implication, 
the cessation of land exploitation for.a reasonable time during which 
period it may be said that no wealth of the interest holder's creation 
remains on the land should have the effect of reverting the land which 
can then be regarded as vacant to the community in which the paramount 
title is vested.
Yet there is a school of thought which seeks to establish that 
under the traditional schema*of tenure, the introduction of permanent 
crops which has the effect of tying down the individual to a specific 
confine of the land for many generations transforms the useirright of 
such occupiers into individual ownership of the soil to the exclusion 
of the corporate groups in which such titles are known to be vested from 
time immemorial.
D. The Influence of the Judiciary and the Bar
It is the tradition of the common law for the judges not to articulate 
in their decisions the policy objectives actuating their decisions, yet 
more often than not the court decisions are not inreflective of the socio­
economic trends within the society. The judiciary can therefore through 
the adjudicative processes of the courts influencet the direction of 
policy and changes in the law. This may even be more true of the members 
of the Bar whose daily social intercourse with members of, society through 
client-solicitor relationship has a formative influence on the law.
So it is that both the Bar and the Bench imbued with Anglo-American 
juristic ideas and sometimes Roman-Dutch Law, usually play a considerable 
role in the encouragement and introduction into the indigenous law concepts 
and ideas which tend to encourage individualisation and the creation 
of individual ownership of land. Hence emerged at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, a movement in the courts which sought to encourage 
and promote the creation of freehold titles in the traditional systems . 
of tenure.
The driving force behind this movement was Sir William Brandford 
Griffith C. J., whose views held sway over the superior courts of judicature 
in the Gold Coast at the beginning of the twentieth century. The basic 
idea underlying his decisions was that the new trends in land use patterns 
fashioned by the introduction of perennial crops made it inevitable for
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the individual to occupy land for long periods of time. For this reason, 
the landed interest of the person in such permanent occupation ought 
to be regarded as having evolved into absolute individual ownership of 
the soil or land to which such interest related. This judicial attitude, 
regarded by Asante as an exercise in realism in response to the socio­
economic changes of the times was exemplified in the much discussed case
937
of Lokko v Koklonfi.
In this case, Koklonfi inherited from his father, a subject of the 
Berekusu stool, certain cocoa farms and sugar cane plantations. He built 
a cottage on the farm and continued the farming which his father had 
started in his life time. He obtained a loan on security of the farms 
without prior notice to the stool. Upon default the creditors obtained 
judgement at the courts and sought to attach the land under a writ of 
fi:fa. A claimant interpleaded on behalf of the stool on the grounds 
that the land being stool land could not be seized in satisfaction of 
the private debt of a stool subject interest holder. For this to happen, 
the consent of the stool should have been sought before pledging the 
land.
One of the principal issues which the court had to resolve was whether 
or not the stool subject had acquired such right, title or interest in 
the stool land as could be attached in execution of the judgement debt.
In order to resolve this issue, the Chief Justice, Sir W. Brandford Griffith 
noted that the interest which a stool subject acquired through land exploi­
tation was an attachable interest. He observed:
". . .it is notorious that as long as the stool-subject continues 
to live on or to work land, so long is he entitled to live on and 
to work that land. Furthermore, the evidence shows that Koklonfi 
is entitled to use his village and farms; as long as he likes he 
can live in his village, cut his sugar canes and pluck his cocoa, 
and the stool holder cannot disturb him. He has, therefore, even 
assuming the land to be stool land and not his property, a valuable 
interest in this land. ' I see no reason why this interest or property 
should not be seized and sold in execution".
Certainly, these statements were sufficient to resolve the legal 
issues involved in the case. The finding of fact that the stool subject 
had a "valuable interest" in the land capable of being attached was a 
recognition and restatement of the traditional law which regards wealth 
created on communal or the public land as the exclusive individual property
937
(1907) Ren. 450. See Asante, op.cit., pp. 41-42.
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Ibid., p. pp. 452-453. Emphasis supplied.
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of the creator. There is therefore no reason why it should not be attached
in satisfaction of a private debt.
However, the Chief Justice did not conclude his judgement with these
statements. He proceeded to make certain ex cathedra* pronouncements
suggesting that such an interest could be transformed into an absolute
title independent of the stool. His reasons for the decision were ...set
out in the following statements:
"In the present case there has been continuous occupation for about 
40 years and the occupier has been permitted to build a village 
on the land and to make permanent farms. The present is like thousands 
of similar cases. Stool land has been settled by a father, the 
son has succeded, has built a village and has made a home on the 
land; there has been no expressed alienation by theggjtjool, but there 
has been recognition of the exclusive occupation."
The Chief Justice regarded the 40 year period of uninterrupted occupa­
tion. as the factor which warranted the declaration that the subject’s 
interest had approximated to absolute ownership of the land itself.
To buttress his view on the matter, he posed the following, questions:
"Suppose the Berekusu stool fell into debt. I can quite understand 
that Koklonfi would be expected to share the debt, for he is subject 
of the stool, but if the stool land were to be seized in execution,^ 
can there be a doubt that Koklonfi could successfully interplead?"
The learned Chief Justice answered these questions affirmatively, point­
ing out that once there was enough evidence to support the fact that 
Konklonfi and his family had continuous occupation for 40 years or over, 
and that Koklonfi had permanent cultivation upon the land, the court 
would decide that he had appropriated that portion of the stool land
to himself with the tacit consent of the stool and that it was no longer
941
stool property, but his own property.
It may be observed that the Chief Justice's arguments have run into 
certain logical problems here. But before dealing with the logical defects 
in the argument, it may be pointed out-> for the moment, that he showed 
a basic misconception of the nature of stool property. In terms of the 
administrative controls which the stool land administrators, the manage­
ment committee, normally exercise over unappropriate land, the Chief 
Justice may be right in saying that the land in occupation of Koklonfi 
was no longer stool property. But in terms of the reversionary right
939 * AIbid.
940 Ibid.
941 Ibid., pp. 453-454
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which the stool retains as the paramount title holder, the land in occupation 
of Koklonfi was still stool property, and in this sense the Chief Justice 
was wrong.
As to the logical defects in the argument, it may be seen that the
Chief Justice laid it down that long and uninterrupted occupation of
stool land by the subject creates an absolute title adverse to the stool.
The question which he posed and answered can be restated that because
a subject can successfully interplead in cases where the stool land on
which he has established rights is to be seized in execution to satisfy
stool debt, it follows that the subject acquires an absolute title over
the area to which his interest relates. But this is a non sequitur.
The reason why the subject can successfully interplead against the
levying of execution on stool land over which he has established rights
is not because he has absolute title to the land, but because he has
acquired a valuable interest in the land. An interest which is exclusive
individual property over which the stool has no control. Thus to levy
execution on the stool land on which such valuable interest or individual
wealth has been created would amount to taking what belongs to the individual 
for
to pay/the debt of the stool.
It is true, as the Chief Justice rightly observed, that if the stool
were to be in debt, Koklonfi would be expected to contribute money in
payment of the debt as his civic obligation. But he would not be expected
to pay over and above that which other citizens would be expected to
pay. Hence any levying of execution on the stool land which will involve
the confiscation of the subjept's individual property acquired through
unaided effort of the stoolAcannot be permitted under the customary law.
This is what the customary law frowns upon. It is in order to protect
individual rights in this respect that the customary law provides that
his consenl
the stool has no right to alienate land in possession of the subject,, without/
It is ..indeed for reasons such as those outlined above and the operative
effect of the above rule which will make it possible for the subject
to successfully interplead when stool land encumbered by him is in danger
of being sold in satisfaction of stool debt. It does not necessarily
follow that because the subject has this right to interplead his user
right has evolved into absolute ownership. Basing his conclusions on these
mistaken premises the leanerd Chief Justice continued:
"Whether the stool has impliedly consented to Koklonfi appropriating 
the land as his own, or whether the view be taken that the stool 
is now stopped from putting forward its claim to the land, does 
not matter, but I am of the opinion that the occupation has been
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of such continuance and of such character that the land must now 942
be deemed to be the property of Koklonfi and seizable in .execution."
Some of the reasons given by the Chief Justice to reinforce his
views were that while Koklonfi gave part of the produce of his subsistence
farms to the stool, as was customarily required of a stool subject, he
performed no such services in respect of the land under his permanent
cultivation. He pointed out that the stool had tacitly acknowledged
the validity of the pledge by urging Koklonfi to pay the judgement debt
943
in order to save the land.
With respect, the Chief Justice seems to fall into the common error 
of assuming that the performance of customary services by a stool subject 
is an incident of land tenure which, in fact, it is not. It cannot be 
over emphasised the fact that the right of the subject to beneficially 
enjoy an interest in land inheres as a result of his membership of the 
corporate group in which the absolute title is vested. It is a right 
which is independent of the giving of customary services which may relate 
to political allegiance and tax obligations and not an incident of tenure 
under customary schemes of tenure. It would thus be wrong to suggest 
that because Koklonfi was not performing such services in respect of 
the land developed by him, he had thereby acquired an absolute title 
to the land.
It does not also appear to be logically sound to say that because 
the stool urged Koklonfi to pay the debt in order to save the land, the 
former necessarily acknowledged the absolute title of the latter. Of 
course, because the purchaser may be a stranger, the sale of the farms 
may have the effect of placing the reversionary interest of the stool 
in danger of being lost. For such reason the stool, could urge the subject 
to pay the debt without necessarily implying that the subject had acquired 
a title the sale of which would have the effect of extinguishing altogether 
the title of the stool.
E„ Background to Sir William Brandford Griffith's decision
In Asante's opinion, the Chief Justice reached his conclusions "by
944
sin empirical examination of the new economic order." With due deference
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Ibid., pp. 453-454.
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Ibid., p . 453.
944 S. K. B. Asante, op.cit., p. 42
450
to the learned author, it may be said that anyone acquainted with the
C.J.'s views about the traditional schemes of interest in land would
view the accuracy of that proposition with scepticism. Sir Brandford
Griffith had certain fixed views about the nature of the systems and
what they ought to be, even long before any serious empirical investigation
of the land tenure systems had ever been conducted. What he appeared
to be doing in the Lokko case was an attempt to crystallise these views
into legal rules through the adjudicative processes of the courts.
For, his views in the present case reflect- certain opinions he had
expressed in 1891, sixteen years earlier. It will be recalled that in
1891, the Governor of the Gold Coast, Sir William Brandford Griffith,
father of Sir W. Brandford Griffith, (the Chief Justice in the present
case) asked the then Chief Justice of the Gold Coast, J. H. Hutchinson
to give his opinion on his proposed Crown Lands Ordinance. Sir Joseph
Hutchinson, the Chief Justice in response to such a request, gave it
as his opinion that according to native law, all lands in the protectorate,
whether occupied or unoccupied had an owner. For the crown to vest such
lands in itself would therefore amount to confiscation of private property
945
which would be unjust. The Governor did not seem to be convinced.
He thus sought a second opinion, that of his son, the young Brandford
Griffith who had then been transferred from the Gold Coast to Jamaica.
The latter in response to his father's request then gave an opinion
which is reflected in the present judgement. Writing from Jamaica in
1891, in support of the Crown Lands Bill, he advised that the primary
objective of the Bill should be the creation and the establishment of
freehold titles in the traditional tenure systems. The main reasons
for his advice were set out as follows:
"Take any particular piece of land away from the towns. No doubt 
this land will belong to some natives, but what individual claims 
are will be hard to ascertain. Probably numerous persons would 
each of them possess some indefinite claim to the land. Some of 
the claims will probably conflict, and if any person desired to 
purchase this land he would experience great difficulty in getting 
a secure title owing to this indefinite and conflicting claims.
But not withstanding that such a tenure is inconvenient, debars 
any part owner from making the most^the land, yet the land undoubtedly 
belongs to the natives and may seem unjust policy for the crown 
to dispossess them of their rights".
See the Secret Despatch from Griffith to Ripon, 29 August, 1894, 
CO 879/46.
Ibid., p. 20. In enclosure 2, No. 9. Emphasis supplied.
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These were the learned judge's view of customary tenure in 1891.
He thought rights in land under customary law were indefinite resulting 
in insecurity of ittle. He thought the system was inconvenient and could 
prevent any part owner from effective exploitation of the land. This 
was certainly a serious misconception of the nature of individual rights 
in land, under the customary law. The observation that individual claims 
of right in land were indefinite is not justifiable. Everybody in a 
land-holding community was clear in his mind, even at the time the Chief 
Justice expressed his views, where his farm was. As the way in which 
rights were established over land in the past and at present continues 
to be through land development, it is hard to see how claims to rights 
in this respect could be said to be indefinite.
The Chief Justice was also under the wrong impression that the "communal 
ownership of the land" was obstructive to individual effort in the production 
of wealth. He thus had the mistaken belief that the system was "inconvenient 
and probably debars any part owner from making the most of the land."
There was and, still.is, under the systems, the problem of insecurity of 
title. But adequate research reveals that it is not because "numerous 
persons would each of them possess some indefinite claim to the land."
The basic problem is lack of surveys and the difficulty involved in outsiders 
identifying the accredited persons with legal capacity to deal with land.
In the more general level, it is because of non-demarcation of boundaries 
between the polities comprised in the state of Ghana.
Not having recognised these factors, Sir William Brandford Griffith, 
as will be recalled, advised his father, the Governor of the Gold Coast 
to make titles definite so as to enable taxes to be levied on lands.
He said:
"Land in the Gold Coast, as in almost all other places under civilised 
government must bear its burden of taxation and fair better that 
the present wretched system of land tenure should be got rid of 
as soon as practicable, and before mixed application of English 
law and native law gets things into am inextricable tamgle". ^47
It would appear that as this proffered solution was not achieved 
through the abortive land Bills, the Chief Justice having returned to 
the Bench in the Gold Coast thought the opportunity had come to do away 
with the "wretched system of land tenure" by creating "freehold" titles
Ibid., see the discussion of his letter from Jamaica to his father 
at pp. 105-108.
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through the adjudicative processes of the courts. It is therefore doubtful 
if Asante's claim that the Chief Justice's decision in the Koklonfi case 
was a result of "an impirical examination of the new economic order."
The Chief Justice was certainly aware of the effect of the new economic
order which showed that individuals could acquire interest in land of
potentially unlimited duration through permanent cultivation - a valuable
interest which could be attached in execution of debt. It was capable
of being used as a security for loan. These facts were recognised and
noted in the Lokko case. The Chief Justice in his experiences at the
courts would most probably have been aware of the fact that most of the
concession agreements under which mining operations on such a large scale
were going on did not involve absolute acquisition of the lands encumbered
948
by the concessions. He was therefore aware that whatever new economic
order might have been brought about by these developments were comfortably 
accommodated by the traditional system of tenure.
Thus when he went out of his way to overturn the land tenure system 
by making his far-reaching ex cathedra pronouncements to the effect that 
long and uninterrupted occupation by a stool subject transformed the 
latter's interest into a title adverse to the stool, he was not necessarily 
making a decision based on empirical investigation of a new economic 
order to which he thought the traditional law was obstructive. What 
he seemed to be doing was an attempt to engraft onto the traditional 
schema, legal, expedients and devices proved useful in European industrialised 
systems of law, which he honestly believed were the indices of civiliza­
tion. The Gold Coast being under a civilised government such as Great 
Britain ought to evolve a freehold tenure. These were views which the 
Chief Justice held and expressed sixteen years before the decision in 
Lokko v Koklonfi and which he sought to legalise here.
It must not be overlooked the fact that the Chief Justice was not 
alone in this view. He was only echoeing the predominant views of the 
nascent African middle class and elite, the European firms, merchants 
and the literate town-dwelling natives. These were the sections of the 
community in the forefront of the movement towards individualisation 
of interests. Casely Hayford's views on the creation of a landlord class 
and the views expressed in the Methodist Times to which we have referred
As we have seen, most of the concessions were leases of terms of 
99 years or less. Se pp. 169-189.
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lend support to this view. Even today, these members of the Ghanaian 
society which influence policy formulation on land use, management and 
administration, like Sir Brandford Griffith, still believe that the evolution 
of freehold in the traditional schemes of tenure constitutes an ethical 
justification of property and is a necessary condition for the effective 
and efficient land use. With its emergence, it will facilitate the acquisi­
tion of agricultural credit from financial institutions which could readily
949
accept such a title as a collateral.
Following the doctrines laid down in Lokko v Koklonfi in 1907, certain
950
subsequent cases were decided on its principle. In."Sam v Tham for
instance, Michelin, J., cited with approval the Lokko doctrine as the
authority for the proposition that long and uninterrupted occupation of
stool land by the subject matured into freehold title adverse to the stool'.
Delivering his judgment he said obiter, that:
'•Although this land is stool property, and cannot be said to have 
been given to the claimants as their family property, yet, in view 
of the fact that it has been cultivated by them for the past 20 years, 
they have undoubtedly acquired certain rights over the said property, 
and by reason of that judgment of the full court in Lokko v Koklonfi,
I consider that the claimants are justified in setting up their claim 
to this land when such land is seized in execution under a writ of 
fi: fa." ®51
It will be perceived how the learned Judge fell into the same error
as did the court in Lokko v Koklonfi .by assuming erroneously that the legal
basis of the claimant’s interpleader in this case was the 20 years undisrupted
occupation. But as noted already, the legal basis of their claim here
was not the long possession. The legal and ethical justification of their
claim was what the Judge found to be acquisition of certain valuable rights
through the development of the land for 20 years hence, the individual
wealth created on the land by their unaided, efforts. The ethical reason
is the abhorence by the customary law of unjustifiable confiscation of
individual property by the stool and the legal basis for the claim is
the rule that the stool has no right to alienate land.in possession.of
the subject without his consent! .
On similar wrong assumptions, Dean, C. J., followed the Lokko principle
952
in Kodadja v Tekpo and others. This was a case in which the stool
subject interpleaded against attachment of land he claimed to have occupied
949
See Note 925.
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Ibid., at p. 66.
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for 33 years, alleging that the land was not stool land but private property. 
Following the doctrine of Lokko v Koklonfi, the learned Chief Justice 
said:
"I am of opinion further that even if it was stool land given by 
his father, his possession continued over a period exceeding 30 
years during which he has had the undisturbed and exclusive possession 
of this land and has made it into a valuable cocoa farm, has now 
ripened into ownership of the land". ^53
Similar conclusions in which emphasis was placed on the time element
in occupation as confering absolute title on the stool subject was reached
w 954
in the case of Mensa v Ackonu. Needless to say, these conclusions
are not only founded on mistaken premises but are contrary to any legal 
or ethical principles of the indigenous law.
What would appear to have escaped the minds of the courts in the 
resolution of the issues raised by the cases is that, the traditional 
law is not basically concerned with long possession. What it emphasises 
is the creation of wealth.
Thus a man may by the exercise of his inherent right, within a year
acquire such valuable interest in land in terms of cost and value that 
his interest could be regarded as more valuable than those of another 
who had been on the land for 30 years but whose development on the land 
might be insignificant in terms of value and cost. Will it not be absurd 
and a travesty of justice for the courts to decide in a case like this 
that in the first case, because the acquirer of the interest was in occupa­
tion for only one year while in the other it was for 30 years, the latter 
has acquired an absolute title while the former does not?
Happily, this trend towards individualisation of interest and attempts 
by the judiciary to change the land tenure system through the judicial 
process did not escape unnoticed. Even before this movement in the courts
began, Governor Sir William Maxwell had warned in a speech to the Liverpool
Chamber of Commerce on the Larids Bill in 1895 that "English men who.reason 
about land tenures as if English theories and practice regarding freehold 
and leasehold, mortgages .and conveyances, and disposal of real property 
by will were common to all the world, do not readily enter into native
953 Ibid., at 47.
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(1919) F.C., 31.
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ideas about occupancy founded upon tribal rights".
The courts, however, did not appear to have heeded the Governor's 
warning. No wonder that the West African Lands Committee which, from 
the papers submitted to it and the evidence before it had a better under­
standing of the nature of traditional schem& of interest in land severely 
criticised the principle laid down in Lokko v Koklonfi. The committee 
rightly criticised the C. J., Sir W. Brandford Griffith as having improperly 
applied English principles implying the introduction of prescriptive
rights in the indigenous law. The effect of the decision, the Committee
956
pointed out, would be to convert all stool lands into private land.
No doubt, such criticism had its desired effect and the Privy Council
endorsed Chief Justice Rayner's Report to the West African Land Committee
which spelt out the basic principles underlying land tenure in West Africa.
In the notorious case of Amodu Tijani v Secretary of Southern Nigeria,
the Privy Council per Lord Haldane stressed:
"The next fact which it is important to bear in mind in order to
understand the native land law is that the notion of individual
ownership is quite foreign to native ideas. Land belongs to the 
community, the village or the family, never to the individual."
Although many Ghanaian jurists have criticised this statement as
958
being of no universal validity in respect of land tenure in West Africa,
it would appear that those principles guided the courts in some subsequent
959
decisions. In Owusu v Manche of Labadi for example, where certain
lands were compulsorily acquired in Labadi under the Public Lands Ordinance,939
the Labadi stool claimed compensation in respect of the lands on the
grounds that the lands so acquired were stool property. Certain subjects
of one division of the stool made a counter claim challenging the right
of the stool to receive such compensaiton on the grounds that the lands
in question had become their private property as a result of their undisturbed
and uninterrupted occupation for four generations, thus echoeing the
Lokko doctrine.
In enclosure No. 116, 4 July, 1896, CO 879/46, Africa West, No.
531, 137.
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It was rightly argued on behalf of the stool that such long possession
and use per se did not udder customary law, crystailUse into a title adverse
to the stool. The court upheld this contention on behalf of the stool
and re-affirmed the customary law. The rational for the court's decision
was that compulsory acquisition under the Public Lands Ordinance has the
effect of vesting.: title to the land in the Governor General and operates
to bar and destroy all other "estates, rights, titles, remainders, reversions,
961
limitations, trusts and interests whatsoever of and in the land", and 
as the aboslute title was vested in the stool and not in the subject, 
compensation for the acquisition which had the effect of extinguishing 
such absolute title ought to be received by the stool.
This does not, however’, deny the subject the right to claim compensation 
for disturbance of possession or for any wealth which the subject might 
have by fo'is effort created on the lands affected by the acquisition.
The development on the land being the exclusive property of the subject 
to which the stool has no claim, the proportion of the compensation amounting 
to the cost replacement value of the .subject's property on the land ought 
to be received by him.
Asante is however.of the opinion that this case lacks some of the 
elements in the Lokko case which led Sir Brandford Griffith, C. J., and 
his followers to "propound a robusttheory of private ownership". For, 
as he argues, the subjects in the present case had not established any 
form of a permanent cultivation on the lands in question as had the occupants 
in the previous cases. They had farmed intermittently by shifting cultiva­
tion in circumstances which left the basis of their claim to possession 
963
in some doubt. For this reason, he is of the view that the West African
Court of Appeal decision in Owusu v Manche of Labadi may be regarded by 
the "realists" as regressive in as much as it relegated the subject's 
landed interest to the status of mere rights of beneficial user.
But it is difficult to see how this decision can be said to amount 
to relegation of the subject's interest. Under the traditional law, the 
subject's right was and continues to be that of benefit. The right is 
to benefit from the community resource, the land. Such benefit depends 
on user.entailing individual effort in the exploitation of landed resources.
See sections 3 and 11 of the Act.
See the explanation of the case by Ollenu in Wutoh v Gyebi decided 
by the High Court (Land Division) at Accra on 9 March, 1959, reported 
in Ollenu, op.cit., p. 193.
963 Asante, op.cit., p. 44.
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It is submitted that this decision does not derogate from the basic principle 
on which these rights are founded and one can hardly see how this decision 
adversely affects the subject's rights and interests.
With due deference to the author, his criticism of the present case 
and the principles of native tenure set out in the Tijani case as a set­
back to the "realist" movement in the courts is unjustifiable. The grounds
on which he criticises the latter case are not dissimilar to those on
964
which it was castigated by both Ollenu and Bentsi-Enchill, The concept
of the stool's dominium, he argues, does not foreclose exclusive possession
of an individual, and the Anglo-American idea of unity of possession
is only appllicable to waste lands to which the community resorts for
965
fodder and other domestic items.
Here Asante falls into the same error into which the previous critics 
of Rayner had fallen by regarding the subjects' community-based prescribed 
user right as a species of ownership within the Hohfeldian legal conceptions 
which defines ownership in terms of relations between persons and things, 
in terms which we have argued, is inappropriate for application to the 
customary law interest, since it is likely to create wrong impressions 
about its real nature.
Too, the author points out that Rayner's Report was prepared in 
1898 when individual economic resources were not substantial to sustain 
the type of private enterprise conducive to the creation of "a regime 
of individual ownership or individual usufruct". Furthermore-7 Rayner, 
he argues, did not recognise the emergence of individual ownership even 
in his own time, and he oversimplified the factors contributing to this 
phenomenon by ^attributing it entirely to the reception of English ideas.
The idea which appears to have escaped so many of Rayner's successors, 
he thinks, is the idea that customary law is capable of changing in response 
to new conditions.
The underlying assumption of this argument seems to be that the 
traditional schemas of interest in land, falling as it does short of absolute 
individual titles, was incapable of supporting or accommodating the kind 
of economic development which was taking place in the country at the 
beginning of the twentienth century when the decisions based on the basis
See note 958 at p. 45b.
965 *
Loc cit., p . 46
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of the principles set out in Rayner's Report were being made. With respect, 
this would be a travesty of the true position. The success of the cocoa 
industry based on the abunu and the abusa system under the traditional 
law, which does not involve absolute ownership of land; the cultivation 
of the crop on a large scale by the stool subject on the basis of his 
user and beneficial rights, as we have seen in the Lokko case, which 
the court recognised was a similar case of many thousands; the success 
of the mining industry in which none of the concessions upon which it 
was founded involved absolute ownership of the land, provide an antithesis 
to the underlying assumptions of the learned Asante's arguments.
Although Asante accuses Rayner of over-simplification of the factors 
affecting the growth of indiviual ownership, by attributing the trend
to the intrusion of English ideas, it would appear that his own stand
a k
and views on the issue is considerably influenced, if not controlled,
by Anglo-American juristic ideas of tenure which he has imbibed through
his education and in his profession as a lawyer. His views indicate
that tendency which Lord Haldane, like Governor Maxwell, deplored in
the Tijani case as "operating at times unconsciously to render title
conceptually in terms appropriate only to systems which have grown up
under English law". It was to prevent this tendency of • confusing English
titles with the traditional customary law interest that their Lordships
re-emphasised the point that the customary interest is "qualified by
a right of beneficial user which may not assume definite forms analogous
to estates, or may, where it has assumed these, have derived them from
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the introduction of analogy of English jurisprudence."
Although this will appear to be a fair overview of the title situation
in the country, Asante's quarrel with the attitude of the courts of the
post Brandford era is that they invoked Rayner's formulation as an immutable
postulate and applied it without reference to contemporary social reality.
It became fashionable, he laments, in the upper levels of the judicial
hierachy in West Africa as well as the Privy Council, to promulgate "abstract
principles fashioned a priori".
seemg co
This criticism would /suggest that the laws being applied to issues 
relating to land tenure were no longer real customary law, as practice 
was at variance with the applicable law. For contemporary socio-economic
967 — —
/1921/ 2 A.C. 399 at 403.
459
circumstances had so undergone metamorphosis that the applicable law 
was no longer reflective of customary practices. Yet in none of the 
cases discussed by the learned author was evidence produced to show that 
the practice in land tenure or land use patterns had changed in a manner 
inconsistent with the applicable law. Nor has any evidence been produced 
to demonstrate that the non-recognition of absolute individual titles 
based on permanent cultivation or long uninterrupted occupation in the 
traditional systems was proving obstructive to land exploitation under 
customary schemes’ of tenure.
It is submitted that in so far as the traditional system is capable 
of accommodating contemporary exploitative norms based on modern techniques 
of production, any drastic transformation or radical change in the land 
tenure system based on the traditional ideals of the conception of land 
as a community asset and resource must be supported by cogent reasons 
and empirical evidence to show that the new change sought would prove 
to be a better alternative. Unless such evidence is weighed against 
the social, economic and political consequences for the society, the 
change might produce disastrous results in future.
F. The Role of Conveyancing in the individualisation process
Before the advent of writing in Ghanaian communities, all forms
of transactions were conducted by oral agreements. For record purposes,
ceremonies of various kinds were devised within each community to make
the compact memorable. Although these compact concluding ceremonies
varied.from one community to another, certain features of them were common.
For: instance the transaction had to be made . binding or sealed by a ceremony
accompanied by publicity in which some valuable objects such as drinks
or a sheep is presented to the vendor by the vendee.
Allott's picturesque account of the ceremony associated with land
sales under Akan customary law vividly illustrates the "stamping" or
the sealing of the transaction. He writes:
"Some of the Akan customary laws provide for the sale of land as , 
cutting guaha. After agreement to purchase has been reached, the 
land has been inspected, the price fixed, the boundaries cut and 
marked with special trees (themselves as evidence of the extent 
of land conveyed), the parties return from the forest within doors.
The guaha ceremony then takes place before many witnesses for both 
sides. Vendor and purchaser each provides a representative usually 
a young boy to cut guaha. The vendor provides a piece of fibre 
on which are threaded six cowrie shells. The two persons cutting 
guaha then squat down; each passes his left hand under his right 
leg and grasps one end of the string of cowries, holding the three 
cowries nearest to him. The respective parties keep the cowries
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used in the ceremony for ever, in order that in case of dispute 
between them or others over the sale, the cowries may be produced 
as evidence. In fact the production of the cowries is an essential 
piece of evidence as to the sale. After the ceremony the purchaser 
offers drink and a sheep to the vendor (the stamping or Aseda)".968
As the learned author rightly points out, the effect of this ceremony
is to make the transaction complete and irrevocable. It also provides
tangible evidence of the witnesses present at the ceremony. In order
to prove the sale therefore, evidence as may be taken from the ceremony
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can be made available. Allott identifies several of them:
i. the oral evidence of the witnesses;
ii. the boundaries cut on the land and the boundary trees planted 
on the corners;
iii. the cowries used in the Guaha ceremony;
iv. the hairs of the sheep in possession of the witnesses;
v. the bones of the sheep and. the bottles from which drink was
poured and burried on the land.
Yet the defects in the compact concluding function of the guaha cutting 
ceremony and the evidentiary value of the preservation of physical objects 
used or presented are obvious. Take the case of the witnesses as an
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example. Allott identifies two types of them, partial and impartial.
The latter merely testifies to the fact that the transaction actually
took place. The former .sire themselves interested parties in the subject
matter of the transaction. Their interest is bound by their presence
and acceptance of the aseda which signifies their consent to the trans-
971
action when this is required. This may be likened to their signature.
But the acceptance of the drink and objects has not that kind of 
permanent proof like the signature and a seal on a written document.
The partial witnesses could destroy the objects in their possession if 
they were minded to do so. They can alter boundary marks, uproot bottles 
burried on the grounds and may tell deliberate lies to disprove their
968
See, Readings in African Law, Vol. 1, p. 85, ed. E. Cotran and 
N. N. Ruben. See also A. N. Allott, Essays in African Law, London, 
1960, p. 243.
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consent. Impartial and partial witnesses may die and their oral evidence 
obliterated for ever. They may tell deliberate lies to falsify the evidence. 
Human memory grows dim and may not always be reliable. Some may lose 
the physical objects by mistake or they may be destroyed by fire or through 
some other means.
With these defects in the traditional method of land transactions, 
the Ghanaian business community quickly recognised the advantages of 
the written document when it arrived and welcomed it whole-heartedly.
Its permanent nature and its peculiar characteristic of assembling all 
the relevant facts in a conveniently portable piece of document proved 
attractive to acquirers of interest in land. The modern tendency is 
thus for every prospective acquirer of interest in land to want to secure 
some record of the transaction in a written form. However, associated 
with the increasing use of documents as a means of transferring interests 
in land in a predominantly illiterate society; and the effect which the 
use of conveyancing forms employed by lawyers to transfer customary law 
interests through the use of language fitted into the straight jackets 
of Anglo-American tenurial terminology are certain formidable jurispru­
dential, social and practical problems.
What may be observed about the customary law transaction is that, 
the parties are normally directly and deeply involved in the transaction. 
During the course of the negotiations leading to the compact concluding 
ceremony, the parties are clear in their own minds as to what they are 
doing.
The parties use the vernacular which the interested parties and 
the witnesses alike understand. They have no doubt in their minds as 
to the nature of the transaction, the nature of the interest being trans­
ferred and each party's obligations under the contract.
The normal practice in contemporary transactions relating to the
transfer of an interest in land is that, although the parties may no
longer go through the traditional ceremonies associated with land sales,
they normally agree on the terms before approaching a solicitor with
the sole purposes of reducing their agreement into writing - a legal
972
document, on their behalf. The pertinent questions raised by this
From a survey conducted on solicitors dealing primarily with land 
questions in Kumasi under the auspices of the Land Administration 
Research Centre of the University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, 
between 1976 and 1977, almost all the questionnaire returned showed 
that the parties to land transactions reach agreement prior to consulting 
a solicitor.
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recourse to documents sire:
i. does the ensuing document serve only as a memorandum of what
has been agreed upon by the parties?
ii. do the parties who may be illiterates themselves on whose
behalf the memorandum is prepared understand the content, 
nature and quality of the document?
iii. does the use of English tenurial terminology to describe the
interest which the document purports to convey, actually convey 
such interest although the interest held by the transferor 
falls short of that which the document describes?
The principal difficulty about providing a reasonable answer for
these questibns is that it is not always easy to determine whether or
not when the parties request that the agreement be reduced into writing,
they intend that the ensuing document should be a memorandum whose purpose
it is to record in permanent and easily visible form, matters which
might otherwise be in dispute.
Matters such as the description of the land conveyed, the nature
of the transaction, whether it be an outright sale, a pledge, a mortgage,
a lease, a tenancy agreement, etc. may be disputed.
If the objective of the writing is that the document should be a
memorandum, then it cannot override the oral agreement reached between
the parties subsequent to its preparation. On the other hand, if the
document is to be regarded as am instrument, an operative part of the
agreement between the parties, then if in conflict with the prior oral
agreement it may prevail.
The difficulty is where to draw the line between the two. In order
to determine whether the document has the latter or the former effect,
it is important to bear in mind, as Allott has pointed out, that although
on the face of it a document made by an African may appear to be an instru-
ment, it may be nothing more than a memorandum; and there is the danger
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that a memorandum may be held to operate as an instrument. A native
court decision of New Juaben in 1950 to which the learned author made 
794
reference, in which the court refused to go behind the terms of a
receipt given in respect of a pledge and the case of Hamilton v
973
Ibid., p. 245
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975
Mensah where the court held that a receipt recording a pledge was
a sale and not a pledge illustrate the problem.
976
In Total Oil Products Ltd v Oben and Manu, one of the issues
to be resolved was the interpretation to be placed on the isntrument
which purported to convey a "fee simple". Counsel for the plaintiff 
submitted that by customary law, a stranger forfeits his "usufructuary 
title" to land where he denies the title of the grantor. He contended 
that the recital in the deed of conveyance from the second defendant 
to the first defendant, "And whereas the vendor is seized in fee simple 
free from encumbrances" and also the habendum, "to Have and to Hold . . . 
unto and to the use of the said purchaser his heirs, executors and assigns 
in fee simple" showed that the second defendant claimed to be owner of 
the fee simple and also purported to convey the fee simple in the land 
which the subject of a stool did not have but solely vested in the stool. 
Council submitted that this amounted to the denial of the stool's entitle­
ment and therefore the second defendant had forfeited his right in accord-
977
ance with the customary law.
These submissions of Counsel raised several issues of law and of 
fact which the court had to resolve.
i. Does the fee simple eixst in Ghana?
ii. When the parties entered into the agreement did the transferor 
actually intend to pass an interest greater than he actually 
had?
iii. Was there a valid contract for the transfer of an interest
in land at all; and if so, did the use of English conveyancing 
forms sind terminology change the quality or character of the 
interest into sin English type title?
These were some of the pertinent questions raised by Counsel's submission, 
It would appear however that the court did not address itself to all 
of these questions. In answer to the question as to whether the fee
975
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(1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 224. In the survey on lawyers to which reference
has been made above, all the lawyers were unanimous in stating that 
in the majority of cases, the parties to land transactions had agreed 
on the terms and the only thing required of them was the reduction 
of the agreement into a legal document. They agree that when their 
clients append their signatures to the document or make their marks, 
where they are illiterates, they do not necessarily understand the 
words used but trust that their lawyer has accurately recorded what 
they have agreed upon. The difficulty here is that by using English 
conveyancing forms and terminology, the lawyer may end up by drawing 
agreements which may have an effect unintended by the parties.
/I9627 1 G.L.R. 228 
Ibid., p. 232.
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simple exists under customary law, the court, per Ollenu J.,. said:
"The submission that a fee simple title in land is vested in the 
stool, and that the use of the word fee simple is essential in a 
conveyance of land by the holder of the usufructuary title is mis­
conceived. There is no fee simple in customary land tenure."
That there is no fee simple under the indigenous law is unquestionable„ 
What is doubtful is the effect which the learned Judge said a purported 
transfer of the fee simple in land would have in Ghana. The learned Judge 
said:
" . . .  all the effect that a conveyance which purports to convey 
the fee simple in land in Ghana has is to pass the highest estate 
or interest vested in the transferor; and since the. highest title 
which a subject of a stool can own in the stool land is the usufruc­
tuary or determinable title, the only title which passed under the 
said exhibit C and exhibit E is the usufructuary title which was 
vested in the second defendant." ^79
One would have thought that a preliminary enquiry as to whether 
or not the document as such represented a valid contract between the 
parties should have been made before the consideration of any effect 
which it may have on the passage of interest in the subject matter of 
the transaction. For- if as said the Court, there was no fee simple 
in customary land tenure, then upon the basis of the document before 
it, it is arguable that the parties were contracting on a subject matter 
which they thought was existing at the time of negotiation leading to 
the agreement while in fact it was non-existent. Hence, the purchaser 
may be said to have bought a chance, res speg.
Another side of the argument may be that if the transferee thought 
he was acquiring an interest approximating to the fee simple while the 
grantor intended to pass his beneficial interest in the land, then the 
parties were not ad idem as to the identity of the subject matter of 
the transaction. This may be enough, under certain circumstances to
declare that there was no contract at all. These conclusions may be
reached if the document is regarded as a .memorandum merely setting out 
the prior agreement orally concluded between the parties so that one 
can go behind the document and accept oral evidence to clarify issues
Ibid.
Ibid.
See Couturie v Hastie. (1865) 10 E.R. 1065. "The Contract plainly
imports that there was something which was to be sold at the time
of the contract, and something to be purchased. No such thing existing, I 
think the Court of Exchequer chamber has come to the only reasonable 
conclusion upon it . . ." Per Lord Cranworth, at p. 1069.
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which may be in doubt.
But as in this case, where the language used, was to place the customary 
law interest into the straight jackets of Anglo-American terminology, 
the parties may be said to have intended what appears on the face of 
the document to be their own act. In this view, the document may be 
regarded not merely as a memorandum but an instrument the contents of 
which may not be superseded by oral evidence and the meaning to be atrri- 
buted to the instrument will have to be limited to the "four corners 
of the document".
For,it must be remembered that the transfer of an interest in land 
involves a contractual transaction in which the outward manifestation 
of the parties' intent and not their intent itself which determines the 
existence of a contract. Hence, unless the parties in this case could 
allege mistake, illegality, deceit, fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation 
or some other vitiating factor the document as it stood was what it ought 
to be and not otherwise.
Upon this reasoning it is logically sound to say that upon the basis 
of the deed of conveyance before the court, the parties agreed to convey 
a fee simple. The court found that such title did not exist under customary 
law. A fortiori, no title or interest could pass under a contract, the 
subject matter of which did not exist at the time of its conclusion.
Ex hopothesi, it is impossible for such a transaction to have any effect 
on some other interest or interests which were not affected by the trans­
action.
It is submitted that this is the right conclusion which the court 
should have reached. This conclusion, it is suggested, would have the 
advantage that lawyers and solicitors in Ghana who are in the habit of 
using Anglo-American nomenclature to describe customary law interest 
while preparing documents for the transfer of such interests without 
caring whether or not it clearly represents what their clients actually 
intended would henceforth act with greater caution. The effect of a 
decision on the lines being suggested could draw attention to the pith 
and marrow of the problems associated with the transfer of interests 
in land by means of documents.
More often than not, as in this case, lawyers draw agreements for 
parties the nature and effect of which they either misunderstand or do 
not intend. Our survey of solicitors in Kumasi to which reference has 
already been made reveal that one of the frequent sources of litigation 
is a result of the interpretation which is placed on documents that the 
parties dispute as being not that which one or either of them originally 
intended.
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It must be noted that the principle of nemo dat quod non habet is 
also a recognised doctrine under the customary law. The interest holder 
under the customary law can only transfer that which he actually has.
It is therefore legally wrong for the court to rule, that a document which 
purported to pass an interest which the transferor, at the time the document 
was prepared, did not have, had the effect of passing the interest which 
he actually had but had not contracted to transfer under the existing 
contract.
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In the case of Addai v Bonsu II where the issues were similar
to those in the Total Oil Products case, the court adopted a similar
approach in the solution of the problem. The court dealing with the
appeal on the question of the effect of a document purporting to convey
the fee simple title said:
"We think that the learned judge of the land court mislead himself 
by placing undue reliance on the deed of conveyance, exhibit B, 
because the main issues which the trial court determined was that 
Hamidu Yadiga, the plaintiff's vendor had a usufructuary right which 
he inherited from his late brother Salifu Moshie and that it was 
competent for him to sell that interest. All that was left for 
the learned judge to do was to have defined the real interest which 
the plaintiff had in the disputed cocoa farm and to declare that 
as long as allodial rights of the real owner of the land, that is 
the defendant stool as caretaker for the Hiawu stool were recognised, 
the plaintiff is entitled to remain in possession of the disputed 
farm and has the same protection as if he were in fact the owner 
so long as he pays the yearly tribute." ^82
What the court appears to be saying in effect is that the deed of 
conveyance did not contain the agreement of the parties.
There was no evidence that the court made reference to any prior 
existing oral agreement between the parties and which it preferred to 
the deed of conveyance as expressing the real intention of the parties.
The whole basis of the decision was the interpretation to be placed on 
this document.
But what the court did was in effect to throw the document overboard 
and to make its own agreement for the parties. With respect, this is 
a dangerouq approach to the solution of a serious problem. The effect 
of the court's attitude is to regard all such documents as memoranda 
and therefore prepared to go behind such document so as to ascertain
981 — —
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982 Ibid., at p. 277.
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the real intention of the parties. It would have been a different case 
if the document were some receipt or some record prepared by sin office 
clerk or a professional letter writer. In such a case, it may be said 
that genuine errors arising from lack of skill and technique are likely 
to occur. But even here, the document cannot be set aside entirely.
It will form part of the evidence.
But here, where the document was deliberately prepared by a lawyer
who is supposed to know what he was doing and the parties have appended
their signature and put their seals on the document, it will not be for
the courts to say that the parties intended one thing while the deed
of conveyance expressed another. The danger in such an approach is that
there may be occasions where the parties might actually intend a certain
result but which they may later deny. This can prove damaging to the
doctrine of pacta sunt servancja, a doctrine which is cardinal to the
health and confidence of the business ocmmunity.. For when the courts
begin to go into the minds of parties to a contract although the devil
983
itself knowest not what is in a mein's mind, confidence in the sanctity 
of contract as a basis of business transactions could be undermined.
It is submitted that what the court ought to have done was to declare 
such documents as having no effect at all. Having found that the subject 
matter of the contract did not exist, it would be absurd to say that
it had the effect of passing title in some other property which was not
a subject matter of the transaction at all. A person can only transfer 
what he has to another under a contract of sale because of the operative 
effect of the principle of nemo dat quod no habet.
It would appear that it is for reasons such as these that Allott, 
in his Essays in African Law, made the point that the adoption of English 
forms of transfer of interest in land such as the deed or instrument 
does not necessarily mean that such documents can transfer interests 
which are much more extensive than the transferor actually has. In his 
learned contribution to the question relating to testamentary disposition, 
he argues that the assumption that testamentary disposition in English 
form can effectuate a greater interest than the testator actually has
Brian C. J., said: "It is common knowledge that the thought of man 
shall not be tried, for the devil himself knoweth not the thought 
of man". See Year Book Pasch 17 Edwd. 4, Fol. 2, pi. 2. See also 
Bowen L. J. in Edingington v Fritzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch.D. 483
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"reflects a confusion between determination of capacity to make- a will,
which is contestible, and the complete liberty of disposition through
984
use of a written will, which is open to challenge".
Asante diagrees. According to the latter, Allott's thesis presupposes
a rigid wall between imported forms and the substantive doctrine i'denti-
fied with such forms, which may be logically feasible. This he submits,
"is hopelessly unrealistic". "It cannot be seriously maintained", he
argues "that the introduction of such common law forms like conveyance
and mortgage by deed has merely provided Ghanaians with colourless, if
more efficient, devices for transferring interests subject to customary
985
law, without any impact on the substantive body of customary law."
To buttress his argument, he points out that the.stool's dominium 
has been denuded of its substance "by the practice - plainly recognised 
by the courts of subjects alienating an estate in fee simple out of their 
usufruct." Waving the Union Jack, he says, may not be the most sophisti­
cated form of advocacy, but it graphically demonstrates palpable reality, 
namely, the fact of British rule and the profound influence which the 
British connection had on customary jurisprudence. It is too late, he 
concludes, to deplore the contamination of customary law with English
juristic ideas, for Ghanaians who resort to the Common Law will do so
986
fully conscious of the doctrinal implications of this form.
With due deference to the learned author, he appears to confuse 
two things. The impact of the reception of the Common Law forms of conveyanc­
ing ' ' b y  deed on the evolution of traditional schemes of interest
in land and the mental attitude of those imbibing such ideas on the one 
hand, and the effect which recourse to the use of such forms to transfer 
interests in land can have on transactions on the other. There is a 
world of difference between the two.
On the one hand, while the impact may be to make people desire con­
sciously or unconsciously to acquire interests approximating to English 
type titles, on the other hand, mere recourse to the use of the Common
984
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Ibid., p. 59. His reference to the Union Jack here is in criticism 
of Lingley J., in Andoh v Franklin (1952) D.C. (Land) "52 - "55,
24 where the learned Judge had remarked that Coun§41 could not 
provide any authority to support his case other than waving the 
Union Jack.
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Law forms and terminology in the transfer of an interest in land does 
not, and cannot, by itself have the effect of transforming the interest 
conveyed by this means into an English type title if the transferor does 
not actually have that type of interest. This is an important dichotomy 
which the learned author appears to have overlooked.- For, nemo dat quod 
non habet.
As we understand it, this seems to be the gravamen of Allott's complaint 
about the underlying assumptions of recourse to instruments as a means 
of transferring title or making testamentary dispositions by will which, 
not infrequently, involves the transfer of an interest in land. Furthermore, 
it is not too clear what the learned author means by the stool's dominium 
having been denuded of its substance by the "practice - plainly recognised 
by the courts of subjects alienating an estate in fee simple out of their 
usufruct".
Does this proposition entail, as the court assumed in Lokko v Koklonfi, 
that the denudation of the stool's dominium has transformed the individual 
community based prescribed user right into individual titles approximating 
to the fee simple? If this is the import of the learned author's thesis, 
then with respect, the cases do not support such a conclusion. Undoubtedly, 
the courts have been consistent, as we have seen from cases we have discussed, 
in their decisions in pointing out that there is no such thing as a fee 
simple under the customary systems of tenure. They have persistently 
refused to recognise the fee simple.
It may well be that Ghanaians who resort to the Common Law will 
do so fully aware of the doctrinal implications of the form. Yet, aware­
ness of the implications and the influence of the British connection 
including the waving of the Union Jack have nothing to do with the quality 
of property or an interest which a person may have capacity to dispose 
of by will. If the property is family or stool property, for example, 
neither the British connection, the hoisting of the Union Jack nor the 
use of English nomenclature in a deed of conveyance will invest a family 
member or a stool subject with the legal capacity to dispose of the property 
by will. This is where the right to make a will in an English form and 
the capaqity to exercise that right differ substantially; and this is 
the point which it seems Allott was making and in which we respectfully 
concur.
The learned author's attitude concerning the effect of documents 
on transfers of interests in land under the traditional law, seems to 
confirm Rayner's observation regarding, the influence of foreign ideas
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on individual ownership which Asante argues, the former over simplifies.
The excessive individualisation of interest implied in the learned 
author's thesis including the views of many other Ghanaian jurists who
and economic effect on the Ghanaian society. The real value of the Ghanaian 
traditional systems of tenure is the emphasis placed on the communal 
holding and control of resources. The conception of the land as a-icommung-ty 
asset and resource has the effect of placing everyone within the community 
on the same footing in so far as the distribution of resources is concerned.
No one can be handicapped by the preliminary prohlems of finding 
money to acquire an interest in land. In the same way it gives no one 
an unfair advantage of having to contribute nothing to the production 
of wealth arid yet enjoy wealth by appropriating rent from land which 
he has not brought about by his own effort. What mgy separate the individuals 
then is the individual effort, initiative and drive including talentwhich 
always vary. This could create a healthy atmosphere for healthy competition 
while maintaining the communal spirit and the cooperative effort in the 
development of the land and its resources within the traditional system.
It is submitted that, for this system to be substituted for smother 
through engrafting on to the traditional system legal expedients found 
useful in highly industrialised legal and economic systems of western 
Europe, there must be a concrete and empirical evidence that the latter 
system will be better able to promote our social, economic and political 
objectives.
G. The Legal Definition of the Akan Family
i . Introductory
The family is not only recognised in the traditiopal property systems 
as a legal entity but it is one might argue, the most important social 
institution in Ghana. It constitutes the pivot around which the political 
and socio-economic organisation of society revolves. Membership of a 
family is thus of paramount important to the individual. It determines 
his beneficial enjoyment of riehts in land and may generally affect his
rights of succession to • . j offices in the hierarchy Qf political 
organisation within the traditional system. Morover, the family institution 
provides its own form of social security for its members.
think like him ought to be seriously considered in the light of its social
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Accordingly, the courts in Ghana are often called upon to define 
the legal composition of the family and to determine membership of it 
in order to confirm or confer rights on individuals on the basis of family 
membership. It is a matter of regret that in their attempts to delimit 
the ambit of the term "family" for these purposes, neither the courts 
nor the text-writers are agreed on the composition of the family as a 
legal entity. Some of the judges and text-writers, in their desire to 
promote and encourage individualisation of interests in land, often adopt 
a narrow view of the legal composition of the matrilineal Akan-family.
In their attempts.to define the composition of the Akan-family for 
legal purposes, some of the judges and text-writers often fall into the 
serious error of equating branches of lineages or sub-lineages with a 
maximal lineage of which the former are mere segments. By doing so, 
they attempt to accord legal personality to the so-called immediate 
family. This implies that in those cases where a sub-lineage of a maximal 
lineage is entitled to the imemdiate beneficial enjoyment of property 
succeeded to or belonging to the whole lineage, the former also has 
the legal capacity to alienate such property absolutely without reference 
to the maximal lineage or the "wider family".
The complexities of the problems created by the court decisions
establishing this immediate family view of the matrilineal Akan family
are compounded by the fact that the proponents of this view often tend
to label all kinds of descent and kinship groups together as the family
without any distinction, although in many areas of Ghana, lineages are
organised agnatically or patrilineally while in other areas they are
organised matrilineally. As Allott points out, the dichotomy between
patrilineal and matrilineal descent is more than a mere choice of line
of descent. In the matrilineal case there is the contrapuntal connection
between father and child cutting across the matrilineal one. This tension
he points out, is largely absent from the patrilineal socieities; thus
a matrilineal grouping is a priori likely to function differently in
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the legal sense from a patrilineal one.
As will be seen from the discussion below, the school of thought 
which supports this immediate family view of the Akan familly are not 
only influenced by their desire to promote individualisation of interests
A. N. Allott, "Family Property in West Africa: its Juristic Basis 
Control and Enjoyment", in Family Law in Asia and Africa, London, 
1968, p. 125, ed. J. N. D. Anderson.
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but they also confuse two important issues:
a. the rights of control with the rights of benefit and
b. the right of the maximal lineage to succeed to the instestate 
property of a deceased member with the right of the smallest 
sub-lineage members to benefit from the property thus succeeded 
to by the whole lineage.
The exponents of this limited view of the Akan family also fail
to recognise the fact that the right to succeed to or benefit from an
instetate property cannot be the only factor to be taken into account 
in the attribution of legal personality to the unit legally conceived
of as a family under Akan law. The social and economic implications
of individualisation of interests which the immediate family view exemplifies 
have not been seriously considered.
ii. Problems of Definition
If the "family" is now a term of art with a recognised legal meaning 
in the customary schemes of tenure, then it is imperative that the term 
must be precise enought for intelligible manipulation for legal purposes.
What do we comprehend when we use the term "family" under Akan law?
To attempt a precise definition of the term "family" will not be very 
helpful.
The definition of a thing is not itself the most useful way of identify­
ing the thing sought to be defined. To define a thing is to describe 
it in such terms as would isolate and identify the essential elements 
and qualities that make the.thing what it is, that is to say, to identify 
the elments which distinguish it from all other things. However, it 
is not easy to accomplish this task, since describing the thing involves 
the use of terms which may themselves require to be defined in a similar 
manner as the thing sought to be defined originally.
Similarly, definitions suffer from the defect that words do not 
have an a priori meaning but only that which usage, practice and experience 
give them. Accordingly, changing circumstances mean -^nS
of terms from time to time. It is submitted that in/property relations 
the emphasis shouLdbe on the administrative controls which cam be exercised 
or are exercisable by the representative of the group as a corporate 
juristic entity over property held by it for the benefit of its
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members.
,iii. The Matrilineal Family
It was Sarbah who first attempted the legal definition of the matri­
lineal family nearly a century ago. His proffered definition is, however, 
attended with some difficulties. He writes:
"A Fanti family consists of all the persons lineally descended through 
females from a common ancestress, provided that neither they nor 
those through whom they claim to be the descendants of the common 
ancestress has severed their connection with that root . . . "  989
While this definition does not indicate how far back one should 
trace descent to that original ancestress in order to determine the unit 
which in the contemplation of the customary law constitutes the family, 
our task is made even more difficult by what he later wrote:
"there is no limit to the number of persons of whom a family may 
consist, or to the remoteness of their descent from their common 
stock, and consequently, to the distances of their relationship 
from each other." 990
Now, if indeed, there is no limit to the number of persons of whom 
a family may consist, then the concept of the family is too nebulous
P. C. Lloyd discusses the problems involved in the definition of 
the term "family" in Yoruba law and warns against the risk of anthro­
pologist .using the coim,ionly-used Yoruba term "ebi" and giving it 
a precise definition. The term ebi is used by many literate Yoruba 
today with as little precision as it is used in English. He says 
that the "family" may connote any group of the smallest nuclear 
family consisting of a man, his wife and child, to several thousand 
persons tracing their descent from a common ancestor through many 
generations. The Yoruba term "family"; which the word abi translates 
is even less precise. See his Yoruba Land Law, London, 1962; pp.
31-32; see also A. P. K. Kludze, Ewe Law of Property, London, 1973, 
pp. 32-33, where the learned author discusses the imprecision of 
the English translation of the family as fome in the Ewe language.
Like Lloyd, Kluuze points out the inadequacy of such loose terms 
for legal purposes. He writes: "Among the Northern Ewe-speaking 
people of Ghana, fome properly only means 'relations'. It comprehends 
sin indeterminate circle of persons related by conssmguinity on both 
the maternal sind paternal sides and extends to relations of any 
remove". He lays emphasis on the point that the term "family" when 
used to denote fome is used only in a loose non-technical sense.
The English term family which the Akan word Absua translates, has 
similar wide connotations when commonly used in everyday parlance.
989
Sar. F.C.L.,p.33
990 Ibid.,p . 36.
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for intelligible manipulation as a juristic entity in the determination 
of rights founded on its membership.
Sarbah appears to recognise this imprecision in his definition.
He tried to distinguish between a family as a sociological term, denoted
by common descent, and the family as a corporate juristic entity, denoted
by legal capacity to control and deal with property. "When we speak
of a joint family as constituing a cop sireenary", he writes, "we refer,
not to the entire number of persons who can trace descent from a common
female person, and among whom no cutting of the ekar has ever taken place;
we include only those who, by virtue of relationships, have the right
to enjoy and hold the joint property, to restrain the acts of each other
991
in respect of it, and to burden it with their .debts."
This classification correctly attempts to narrow down the delimitation 
of the ambit of the term "family" as a legal concept to the category 
of persons, who by virtue of such membership are entitled in law, to 
enjoy certain rights in property with certain legal capacities and powers 
concerning it. The introduction of the elements of control and enjoyment 
of rights strips the concept of its anthropological trappings and limits 
it to legal realities.
Yet even this classification still falls short of the kind of precision 
which is required for the identification of the salient featues which 
can enable one to shift from the large number of persons who can trace 
descent from a common ancestress, a., readily identifiable body of persons 
constituting the "coparcenary", properly so called.
In his effort to overcome this difficulty, Sarbah identifies several 
incidents of the family which include:
i. a common clan;
ii. a common penin (an elder or head of the family);
iii. common liability to pay debt;
iv. common funeral rights; and
992
v. a common burial place.
Once it is realised that one or more of these incidents of the family
is or are equally attachable to other persons outside the "coparcenary", 
persons indicated by Sarbah himself to possess inferior rights, but who
may under certain circumstances enter the coparcenary, then the inherent
992 Ibid, p. 36.
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problems of the definition can patently be seen to persist.
Both the courts and some lawyers frequently refer to Sarbah in their
search for the group which constitutes the family in the customary law.
Faced with the difficulty of deducing from Sarbah's proffered definition
the class of persons falling within the group legally recognised as the
family with the legal capacity to control, manage and administer property,
recourse is had to what Sarbah says about the right of succession within
the family as providing a clue to the identification of the unit. However,
in doing so they usually not only fail to draw a distinction between
the matrilineal and patrilineal family, but draw erroneous conclusions
from Sarbah's work.
According to Sarbah, the real successor of a person is his mother.
Tfre proper successors are the uterine brothers and sisters and the issue
of such sisters; but never can the pedigree be traced. out of the female 
993
line.
It is clear law that in Akan customary laws if a person dies intestate,
his self-acquired property devolves on his family. Relying on this legal
proposition, the school of thought which takes.a limited view of the
legal concept of the family erroneously assumes that what Sarbah calls
real and proper successors is that which in the contemplation of the
994
customary law, constitutes the legal composition of the family.
It is submitted with respect, as will become clear from the exegesis 
that presently follows, that not only is the conclusion drawn from Sarbah's 
work founded on mistaken premises, but it is a myopic view to adopt concern­
ing the legal constitution of the Akan matrilineal family, a view which 
if stretched to its logical conclusion would lead to the complete dis­
integration of the Akan family systems.
iv. The Judicial view of the Legal Concept of the Family - The so called 
Immediate Family
In a series of some High Court decisions, there emerged two clear 
views regarding the legal concept of the matrilineal family which has 
become known in Ghanaian legal terminology as the immediate and the wider 
families. The genesis of the immediate family view of the legal composition
993 ibid.
994 See Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit., p. 135.
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of the family appears to be the 1946 case of Araba Busumafie v Hyde Cooper.
The case raised issues concerning the delimitation of the ambit of the
family for legal purposes and the rights of succession to the self-acquired
property of a family member who died intestate.
The facts of this case were as follows: the deceased intestate,
Hanna Appia, bought a house which was accepted by the court to be herself-
acquired property during her life time. She died without having, made
a will. She was survived by a sister. She had neither a child nor
a brother. The defendant who took over the house as successor was therefore
the sole surviving matrilineal descendant of her mother. She sold the
property. The plaintiff appellant sued to set aside the sale on the
grounds that the house became ancestral property on the death intestate
of Hanna Appia. For this reason, her consent was a necessary condition
for the validity of the sale.
The appellant's argument was that one must look back further and
trace ancestry in this case, from the grand mother of Elizabeth Hyde
Cooper and thus include her grandchildren of whom Araba Busumfie- is one,
as being a daughter of Amuaba Berdzie, who was the sister of Araba Berdzie,
the mother of Hanna Appea.
To resolve the issues raised by these argumetns, the court posed
this problem: "Accepting the fact that the property has acquired a character
known as "ancestral", the difficulty has been to determine at what point
996
that acestry starts." To solve the problem, the High Court endorsed
the lower court's view that it commenced from the person who first acquired
the property, the deceased intestate. The court's reasoning was that
if the appellant's argument was sound then there was "no reason why the
ancestor should not be traced back even further, e.g. a great-great-grand
997
mother and thus include in the term "Family" more than one stock of descent."
By this holding the court has delimited the ambit of the family to the 
immediate matrilineal sub-lineage of a person, what the court regards 
as one stock of descent or what Sarbah refers to as "real" and "proper" 
successors, the immediate family.
The effect of this decision is to detach from the maximal lineage 
of which the immediate family is a mere segment and attribute to it legal
995
(1946) D.C. (Land) '38 - '47, p. 245.
996 . _ _ . _ „ ,
Ibid., p. 246. My emphasis
997 T K ' .Ibid.
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personality. The court thus excludes what Sarbah calls "ordinary" and
"extraordinary" successors consisting of persons descended from the
maternal grandmother of a person such as uncles, aunts and the issue
of such aunts including the issue of a house domestic with a male person
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of the "heritable blood, domestics, clan or tribal relative", 
although they can also form part of the maximal lineage.
It must be pointed out at this stage that the court falls into the 
serious error of confusing among other things, two important issues, 
namely the right of the maximal lineage, otherwise known as the wider 
family, to succeed, and the rights of the immediate family members to 
have immediate- beneficial enjoyment of the property. The former relates 
to the power of control importing the legal capacity to deal with the 
property through compliance with certain rules of procedure and the right 
of protecting the reversionary rights of the lineage including spes 
successionis. The latter pertains to the right to benefit and enjoy 
the property with certain inferior rights implying conditional user so 
as not to extinguish or destroy the reversionary rights of the lineage 
of which the present beneficiaries are part.
It is respectfully submitted that the principal source of misunder­
standing in the discussion of the legal concept of the matrilineal family 
is traceable to the failure to draw this vitally important distinction 
between right of control and the right to benefit. Similarly it is suggested 
that it is the confusion of the two issues which clouds the judgment 
of that shcool of thought which mistakenly draws wrong conclusions from 
Sarbah's treatment of the Akan Law of Succession.
Be that as it may, there are a series of High Court decisions based 
on the sarnie mistaken premises and upon which the exponents of the so- 
called immediate family view rely to assert that the immediate sublineage
is a legal entity in itself. Supporting this view of the ambit of the
999
family is the case of Arthur v Ayensu in which the plaintiff sued 
as head of the wider family of a deceased intestate. Adumua-Bossman 
J., upheld the contention that the plaintiff head of the wider family 
had no locus standi, as the property, the subject matter of litigation 
vested in the immediate family alone. '
The relevant points made by the learned Judge was that: " . . .  
the self-acquired property of the late John Ayensu, deceased, does not
See Sarbah, op.cit., p. 102.
999
(1957) 2 W.L.R. 357.
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devolve upon the wider Anona family of which, in his life time, he was 
a member and the head of which the plaintiff claims to be - but upon 
his immediate family as I have said, consisting of Mrs. Faustina Daniels
head of the immediate family applied for letters of administration with 
regard to the deceased intestate’s property. The head of the wider family 
entered a caveat on the grounds that the applicant had been appointed 
as head by the immediate family members only without any consultation 
with the lineage head. The same Judge, Adumusa-Bossman granted the applica­
tion holding that it was the immediate family which was entitled to inherit 
the property and was therefore competent to appoint its own head without 
reeference to the wider family.
As in the previous case, the learned Judge relied on the case of 
Larkai v Amorkor and Tamakloe v Attipoe^ ^  the authorities of which,
it will be submitted, are suspect.
Next in the line of the learned Judge's decisions is the case of 
Daatsin v Amissah where there was an action for a claim of debt
due to the deceased. The court on similar grounds held that the plaintiff 
as head of the wider family had no locus standi arguing that the latter 
had no interest in the property.
Adopting similar views in the case of Ennin v Prah in which he placed 
reliance on Larkai v Amorkor, as in the previous cases, he confirmed 
the limited view of the legal concept of the matrilineal Akan family.
In this case, an action was brought by the wider family head to 
impeach the validity of the sale of cocoa farms by the immediate family 
without the prior consent of the former. The Judge held that the property 
vested in the immediate sublineage absolutely with plenary dispositive 
rights without the necessity of prior consultation with the wider family.
The case went on appeal to the Supreme Court. However, prior to 
the resolution of the issues by the Court, the parties agreed to withdraw 
the case, having reached a compromise. They agreed that the sale was 
invalid. The purchase money was returned to the vendee who agreed not to
and others like her, claiming through females from John Ayensu's mother." 
 Following this case was In re Eburahim, Ansa v ________  . which the
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Ibid at p. 360.
(1958) 3 W.L.R. 317.
(1933) I.W.A.C.A. 323.
Unreported, Civil Appeal No. 38/1952, W.A.C.A., 22 June, 1953. 
(1958) 3 W.L.R. 480.
/1959/ G.L.R. 44. See also the consent judgment of the Supreme 
Court resulting from the Appeal in /l96l/ G.L.R. 59.
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insist on his rights. The Supreme Court.accepted this compromise.
These decisions provoke several comments. First of all, the learned 
judge for his decisions relied on the cases of Larkai v Armorkor and Tamakloe 
v Atippoe. ^007 nowever> as Woodman has demonstrably shown, in the former 
case, the court merely drew a distinction in Ga-Mashie law, between succession 
to an office such as a stool and succession to property rights. The former 
may relate to patrilineal succession while the latter may concern matrilineal 
descent. 1008
The court thus found that although the plaintiff occupied the stool 
which belonged to the Larkai family of which he was a member and head, 
that did not necessarily mean that he was a member of the group, which 
for purposes of Ga-Mashie law , entitled him to succeed to the deceased 
intestate's self-acquired property. The court argued that though the 
plaintiff may belong to his own paternal family, in accordance with Ga- 
Mashie law, in which property descends in the female line, on the death 
intestate of Ahuru, his property devolved, not on the Larkai family, but 
on his own matrilineal family.
On this reasoning therefore it is patently manifest that the court 
in Larkai v Amorkor was not concerned with the delimitation of the ambit 
of the family for legal purposes. Although the decision may have the 
effect of vesting rights to benefit in the so-called immeidate family, 
the court never specifically considered the issue as to whether or not 
the latter was a legal entity in itself. It is therefore submitted that 
the authority of Larki v Amordor is suspect and cannot be relied upon 
as the basis of Adumua-Bossman's decisions expounding the immediate family 
view of the family.
It should be pointed out also that the case of Tamakloe v Attippoe ' 
referred to by the learned judge cannot be a reliable authority. That 
case concerned the law of succession in a Patrilineal Ewe Community which 
operates differently from the Matrilineal one.
It should however, be observed that although the validity of these 
decisions are questionable on the grounds outlined above they laid down 
the legal proposition that an immediate sub-lineage of the Akan maximal 
lineage- constitutes a corporate juristic entity with the legal capacity 
to control in absolute terms, property, and to benefit thereof. This
1006 See (1961) G.L.R. 59.
1007
See notes 10Q2 and 1003.
1008 Gordon Woodman, "Two Problems in Matrilineal Succession", (1969) 
1 R.G.L. p. 6 and p. 8.
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entity, the immediate family, is separate and independent of the maximal 
lineage of which it is a mere segment, and as such, a legal personality 
of the Akan property systems.
The learned Judge and the exponents of this view are misled into 
thinking that the right of immediate beneficial enjoyment of the self­
acquired property of a deceased intestate nearest in blood relation to 
the group which is entitled to such benefit is the sole criterion by 
which the legal1- composition of the family can be determined. As indicated 
earlier, this school of thought has fallen into the serious error of 
confusing the right of this immediate * sub-lineage to benefit from such 
property with the right of the whole lineage to succeed to the property.
It cannot be over emphasised, the desirability of dichotomising between 
the right of individual memebrs of the family to benefit from property 
held by it and the right of the family to administer, manage and control 
such property generally. This distinction is imperative as it is the 
major source of confusion in the exegesis of the legal composition of 
the family.
As Allott's imperical research has led him to believe, an analysis
of traditional property systems such as those of the Akan, ought to be
based on this fundamental dichotomy between benefit and control.
Significantly, he writes:
"At the level of BENEFIT persons -are entitled by the law to profit 
from economic resources; this claim to benefit includes rights of 
use, to the fruits, and of abuse. Powers of control constitutes 
a higher-order system, which specifies how claims to benefit may 
be exercised. Control is the grammar of the property system, a 
set of meta-norms erected over exploitative norms connoted by benefit.
It is the failure to recognise the kind of distinction of which the 
learned author is concerned that has led to the bizzare conclusions reached 
by the courts and some legal writers on the legal concept of the family.
The fact that members of the family nearest in proximity to a person 
dying intestate have the right to benefit from the self acquired property 
of such deceased member does not necessarily constitute such beneficiaries 
into a family in the legal acceptation of that word. They remain members 
of the maximal lineage of which they are a mere segment and beneficiaries 
of such property. Their right of benefit does not per se, divest the
See A. N. Allott, "Language and Property: a Universal Vocabulary for 
the Analysis and Description of Proprietary Relationships", /19707 
African Language Studies, 12 at p. 16. -
1010 Ibid., at p. 16.
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family as a whole of its rights to succeed to the property with its superior
powers of control and administration.
The supervisory role of the family, represented by its management 
committee may be necessary to determine how rights or claims
to benefit may be exercised equitably so as to preserve what is a group 
property in which the family has a reversionary right.
Before further comments on the effect of these decisions establish­
ing the immediate family view of the legal concept of the family, it 
will be worthwhile to delve into the opposite view which maintains that 
the whole lineage is that which constitute^the legal person in Akan i n s t i ­
tutions of tenure and not a segment of it.
v. The Wider Family
Neither the courts nor some text writers are clear in their minds 
whether the wider family is a legal entity in itself, independent of 
the so called immediate family or whether the latter is part of it.
What can be deduced from the decisions however appears to be that there 
is only one type of family known to the Akan law, although there may 
be variations in one community and smother with regard to internal arrange­
ments as to how rights may be enjoyed.
Upon this basis the family is regarded as a lineage segmented into 
a number of branches or houses. The process of segmentation continues
with population increases until one comes to the immediate matrilineal 
sub-lineage of a person. This last segment normally consists of a person's 
mother, brothers and sisters and the issue of such sisters which as will 
be recalled Sarbah refers to as "real" and "proper" successors, the group 
which the exponents of the immediate family view regards as a family 
in itself.
One difficulty of regarding the family as a lineage consisting
of several segments -each of which trace descent from a common ancestress
is that, it is not too clear how far back one ought to trace descent
in the pedigree in order to discover the corporate juristic entity.
*
It is.in fact, this difficulty which the immediate family school of thought 
has exploited to place such explicit limitation on the ambit of the family.
It would appear however, that the lineage can be traced to the oldest 
living descendant of the lienage in the female line and her living brothers 
and sisters and the issue of such sisters. There is no doubt that members
1011
See A. N. Allott, "Family Property in West Africa: its Juristic
Basis, Control and Enjoyment" in Family Law in Asia and Africa,
London, 1968, p. 130; ed. J. N. D. Anderson.
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of the lineages themselves are clear in their minds as to which lineage 
they belong.
This wider family view of the family was established in the West
1012
African Court of Appeal case of Amarfio v Ayorkor. .
In this case, the plaintiff was the head of the wider family of 
the deceased. He sued a member of the immediate family who was treating 
the property in question as his exclusive property. In the West African 
Court of Appeal, Mr. Akuffo Addo, learned Counsel for the Appellant 
sought to establish that the larger family had no interest in the property 
until the immediate family of Ayiku was exhausted and therefore the 
plaintiff had no right to interfere with the management of the property 
or to maintain the action.
In answer to the first leg of his argument, the presiding Judge Coussey
J. A. observed that the first inquiry must be to what family did Ayiku
belong during his life time.
"Upon Ayiku's death", said the learned Judge, "his self-acquired
property fell to his family united by the tie of blood traceable, as
the evidence shows through the female descendants of Adaku Mensah, the
maternal grand mother of Koshie." 1013
The rational for this conclusion would appear to be what the learned
judge observed to be saying, that no woman stands alone, for behind her
stands a united family bound by the tie of blood. This is perhaps, a
metaphorical way of saying that the ambit of the family is not so narrow
as the appellant sought to establish. The important point about this
decision though is that, it has established the view that in determining
the ambit of the family, descent ought to be traced from the maternal
grandmother of a person. This would include "Ordinary" successors such
as uncles, aunts and the issue of such aunts.
There is also some dicta in the case suggesting that the immediate
family is excluded fcs>m administrative controls over property held by
the lineage. For, the learned judge observed thus:
In my view, therefore, the plaintiff was the one and only head-: 
entitled to manage and control the property self-acquired by Ayiku, 
but which upon his death had become family property and the action^Q^ 
was properly brought by him to ward off the defendants claims."
1012 (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 554.
1013 . .
Ibid., at p. 556, my emphasis.
1014 . .
Ibid., my emphasis.
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It is regretable, however, that the court did not give any indication
as to the nature and the extent of the immediate family’s interest in
the property. It is submitted that the right of the immediate family
members is the immediate beneficial enjoyment of the property with some
inferior rights of control. That of the group as a whole is the right
of management and control as the court rightly pointed out.
Six years after this decision, Ollenu J., as he then was, had an
opportunity to review the cases and define the legal concept of the family
in Kwakye v Tuba (Dauda Tuba - applicant). in the present case,
the immediate family head sued as a successor to establish title and
right of possession to some property. The head of the wider family applied
to join as co-plaintiff on the grounds that he was the head of the wider
family of which the present successor from the sub-lineage was a. branch
and that as between the two of them, it was he the head of the major
segment who was entitled to litigate over the property.
Ollenu J., as he then was, dismissing the application of the wider
family head said:
” . . .  Upon the death of a person intestate, although his self- 
acquired property becomes the property of the whole of his family, 
the immediate and the extended together, the right to immediate 
enjoyment of the beneficial interest in it, and to the control 
of it, rests in the immediate or branch family and the person appointed
successor^to the deceased is, ifn law the head of the immediate or branch 
family. lorB
It may be understandable that the immediate beneficial enjoyment 
of the property resides in the persons nearest in relationship to the 
deceased which is the immediate family. However, it is anything but 
clear what the learned judge implies by the proposition that control 
of the property rests in the immediate family. If as the learned judge 
rightly says, the property devolves on the immediate and the extended 
family together, does control here imply or carry with it plenary disposi­
tive rights which will have the effect of extinguishing the reversionary 
rights of the lineage for example?
It is submitted that it is extremely doubtful if this is the logical 
import of the term ’’control” in this context. For, if this be the case, 
there would seem to be no tangible reason for asserting that the property
1015 /1961/ 2 G.L.R. 535.
1016 _, . , ___
Ibid., at p. 538. My emphasis.
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devolves on both!.the wider and the immediate family together. For if 
the latter has the legal capacity to destroy the reversionary interest 
of the whole group then it will be superfluous even to suggest that the 
wider family has any interest in the property at all.
As will be recalled, the case of Amarfio v Ayorkor left open the 
question as to whether the two typffi of families constitute two legal 
entities with the one independent of the other. It also failed to indicate 
the rights of the immediate family members. The learned Judge in the 
present case, Kawkye v Tuba, was Council for the successful litigant 
in Amarfio v Ayorkor and one would have thought that he would take this 
opportunity to clarify the issue, but he made no reference to that case. 
Instead, he made other observations in the present case which does very 
little to assist us in the resolution of these issues.
For instance, he ruled that prior to the appointment of a successor, 
the right to litigate and preserve and take charge of the property remained 
with the head of the "next wider family". Similarly when a successor 
of the immediate family mismanaged such family property, "the head of 
the wider family with the concurrence of the principal memebrs of the
family - the trunk and the branch as well - can set in to preserve the
. ,, 1017
property."
The question is, from where does the 'trunk' family derive its authority 
to intervene in those circumstances indicated by the learned Judge?
Though he does not express it, it is submitted that such powers are derivable 
from the reversionary rights and the overall controlling powers of the 
head of the "trunk" family, the lineage head. These are powers, the 
exercise of which lends support to the view that in Akan property systems, 
there is only one type of family though there may be variations in internal 
arrangements concerning the enjoyment of rights and priorities in that 
regard.
The phrase employed by the judges to denote the beneficial rights 
of the so-called immediate family is significant. The phrase, "immediate 
enjoyment" by the immediate family imports the present and future enjoyment 
of rights. Inherent in the choice of phrase is the recognition of the 
right in the present beneficiaries to enjoy the property, while it also 
concedes the right of the next segment nearest to the present beneficiaries 
to enjoy such property in the future should the latter be extinct, though
Ibid., at p. 538. He likens the lineage to the trunk of a tree 
with the various segments as the branches attaching to the trunk.
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the power of control may still remain in the whole group.
That this is a r e a s o n a b l e  conclusion to be drawn from the decision 
in Kwakye v Tuba is underlined by the observations made by the learned 
Judge on the decisions of Adumua-Bossman. In the present case he approved 
of In re Eburahim, Ansah v Ankrah to the extent that it accorded to the 
immediate family^ the right to benefit from the property and that the 
head of this group was the proper person to deal 1018with such property.
He would, however, disagree with that aspect of the case which established 
that the property vests in the immediate family alone to the exclusion 
of the wider family. Here again, the use of the phrase "the right to 
deal" with the property is ambiguous and does not clarify the extent 
of that dealing with the property, yet again as we have argued, taking 
the case as a whole, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from 
it is that it establishes, like Amarfio v Ayorkor, the view that the 
right to benefit at the first instance is in the immediate family while 
the right of control remains with the maximal lineage; that there is 
therefore not two separate families, on the one hand, the wider, and 
on the other, the immediate. They are two segments of one and the same 
thing.
These views are confirmed by the learned judge in his review of
the cases in his book. The author rejecting the immediate family
view of the legal composition of the family in his review of the cases
on the subject, is of the opinion that Adumua-Bossman J .'s decisions
establishing this view were made per incuriam. His contention is that
the latter Judge's attention was not drawn to the West African Court
of Appeal decisions of Ghamson and others v Wobill and Krah v Danquah
1021
and others (Consolidated) and Amarfio v Ayorkor during the course
of his judgement. As the two cases were in direct conflict with Arthur
v Ayensu, In re Eburahim; Ansah v Ankrah, Daatsin v Amissah and Ennin
v Prah which estasblished the immediate family as a legal personality
of the customary law, they must be regarded as having been given per 
incuriam.
1018
My emphasis. It is unfortunate that the learned judge does not 
make it clear the extent and nature of such dealings with the property, 
It leaves unexplained the nature of the rights of the beneficiaries 
vis-a-vis the family.
1019
The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana, London, 1963,
109-126.
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(1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 181.
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To buttress his argument, he points out that the last case noted
above, Ennin v Prah, was appealed against to the Supreme Court where
the decision of the High Court Judge was reversed by consent judgment.
On the basis of these arguments, Ellennu concludes:
" . . .  the only binding judicial pronouncements on the subject 
as to the family which succeeds and which is entitled to manage 
and control self-acquired property of which a person, male or female 
dies possessed,, are Ghamson v Wobill and Krah v Danquah (Consolidated), 
Amarfio v Ayorkor and the judgment in the Supreme Court in Krabah 
v Krakue" . 1022
He concludes that it is the principles in the above cases which
1023
he summarised in his decision in Kwakye v Tuba and others.
With regard to the first part of his argument, Woodman has convinc­
ingly refuted it on the grounds that the West African Court of Appeal 
decision of Ghamson v Wobill which the author regards as binding on the
High Court, was not concerned with the. problem of the delimitation of
1024
the ambit of the family. The issue on which the appeal was fought
was that of choice of law. The question was whether Efutu customary 
law in Winneba according to which children inherit their fathers was 
applicable or the Fanti customary law which excludes the children was 
that which should apply.
The West African Court of Appeal in deciding the issue was of the
view that it was the personal law, Fanti customary law, and not Efutu
law, the lex situs which should apply. It was upon these grounds that 
the West African Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the lower court.
As Woodman has demonstrably shown therefore, the case of Ghamson v Wobill 
cannot be a direct authority on the point and may not be regarded as 
being in conflict with the cases according legal personality to the immediate 
family.
As to the second part of the argument to the effect that the Supreme 
Court reversed the decision of thge High Court in Ennin v Prah, Woodman 
again rightly points out that the compromise which the parties reached 
was that which the court accepted and that the court did not decide the 
issues raised by the case. Certainly, it will be illogical to say
that sin agreement reached by the parties concerned and accepted by the 
court is necessarily the decision of the court. As Woodman point out, 
it may well be that the parties reached this compromise in order to avoid 
1022
Nj_ A._011ennu, p. 121. The last case referred to, Krabah v Krakue 
/1063/ 2. G.L.R. 122, is one of the cases establishing the wider family 
view.
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Ibid., at p. 10. See also A.P.K. Kludze, Ewe Law of Property, London,
1973, p. 272.
costly litigation and in order to maintain cordial relations between the
various segments of the family.
Upon the basis of these arguments, the case of Ennin v Prah cannot
be said to be a decision of the Supreme Court and which reversed the
decision of the lower court. Thus the only case which would appear to
be in direct conflict with the cases, the effect of which is to attribute
legal personality to the so-called immediate family is Amarfio v Ayorkor,
which we have argued is not very clear on the respective rights of the
wider and the immediate families.
However, there was an outright rejection of the immediate family
1020
concept by the Supreme Court in Pobee v Arhin, where Blay J.S.C.,
made the following significant observations:
"It seems to me that ;this so-called doctrine of the immediate family, 
as enunciated in the case of Arthur v Ayensu and in the Divisional 
Court judgment of Isaac Ennin v Kwaku Prah which evidently influenced 
the appellants to institute these proceedings, if allowed to be 
extended unchecked, the whole of our family system would be in jeopardy. 
It would mean that as in this case, where it is admitted that the 
stool and all that is attached to it, were acquired by Awortwi and 
more so Arhin I, by whose name the stool is known, only Arhin's 
brothers and sisters and their descendants (the immediate family) 
could succeed to the stool and the properties attached to it, to 
the exclusion of the descendants of Arhin's or Awortwi's maternal 
cousins of the same grandmother, otherwise known as Ena Mba. (The 
wider family). That clearly is not the customary law as I have 
always understood it." 1027
Perhaps the courts themselves arebecanipgweary of the multiplicity
of litigation which the previous decisions have encouraged. Ollennu who
was a member of the panel of judges who presided over the present case
was therefore forced to change his views which he had earlier expressed
in Kwakye v Tuba that it was the immediate family which succeded to the
rights of control and benefit, although the wider family could intervene
to preserve the property on occasions where it was being mismanaged.
He thus quotes with approval Blay J.S.C.'s observations quoted above
and emphasises the fact that: "it is the entire family, and not a branch
1028
of it - not the immediate family which succeeds."
Happily, the courts and some commentators are beginning to realise 
the distinction between the right of the entire family to succeed and 
the right of certain individual members to benefit immediately from the
/1964/ 1 G.L.R. 40 at p. 44. It is clear from this warning the unhappi 
ness of the courts about the encouragement which the court decision has 
given to members of the immediate sub-lineage to assert absolute rights 
over property from which they are presently benefitting.
N. A. Ollenjjiu, op.cit., p. 123
1026
1027
1028
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property thus succeeded to. The recognition of the inherent problems of . 
carving out multiple families out of lineages which may result in the 
disintegration of the family system must also be noted. Not only the 
courts, but certain students of the law are also becoming concerned about 
this trend.
Allott for example, commenting on the attribution of legal personality
to the so called immediate family regards the decision by Adumua-Bossman
1029
in In re Eburahim as a re-interpretation of the Akan law. He rejects
the learned judge's proposition that the self-acquired property of a
person dying intestate becomes the property of his immediate family only
i.e. his minimal.'- matrilineage and not of the whole family lineage and
that it is the principal memebrs of the immediate family alone that are
competent to appoint the successor to the exclusion of the wider family.
It is his opinion, based on empirical research that the preferential
claim to benefit from the self-acquired property of the deceased rests
in his immediate sublineage, but he points out that this claim to benefit
depends on the superior title of the lineage as a whole.
He makes it clear that the family has not merely the reversion to
the property but a right to control its alienation. To deny the title
of the family and to equate successor and head of family will contradict
all the previous authorities in Akan family law and make nonsense of
1031
the texts which have previously expounded it.
Against these views recognising the inherent defects and the undesirable
consequences of the attribution of legal personality to the immediate
family, is that school of thought which maintains that the delimitation
of the ambit of the family to the immediate family is a good policy to
adopt, arguing that it is consistent with modern economic trends.
The principal exponent of this view is Bentsi-Enchill who regards
1032
the trend as progressive. In his erudite discussion of the uncertainties
concerning the ambit of the term, "family", he argues that so far as 
it can be gathered from the table of descent given by Sarbah, the succeed­
ing family consists of the uterine brothers and sisters of a deceased 
intestate and the issue of such sisters and the children of their daughters
1029
1030
1031
1032
A. N. Allott, "Family Property in West Africa: its Juristic Basis, 
Control and Enjoyment", in Family Law in Asia and Africa, London, 
1968, p. 132, ed., J. N. A. Anderson.
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and so on until there are no more descendants of the deceased's mother
tracing descent exclusively through females. Bentsi-Enchill regards
the possibility of not finding any such descendants, in which case one
1033
has to fall back on the mother of the deceased remote.
He submits that title to and beneficial enjoyment of the deceased's
property rests in the uterine collaterals of the deceased and descendants
through females of the deceased's mother. To support the appropriateness
of this inference from Sarbah's treatment of the subject, he draws attention
to the fact that Sarbah stresses that the "real" successor of the deceased
is his mother and refers to the deceased's sisters as the "natural and
proper guardians" of the deceased's property during the minority of
the persons eligible for choice as successors, not the mother's sisters,
1034
although the deceased's mother is herself a member of a wider family.
This view, he submits, has received explicit enunciation in judgments
by Adumua-Bossman J. The author in his review of the cases approves
without qualification the latter judge's decisions expounding the legal
concept of the immediate family. He writes:
"On this view, the title and the right to possession and enjoyment 
devolve on the "immediate family" exclusively, and this immediate 
family has an unfettered right of disposal thereof. The wider family 
has only a s'pes successionis." 10^5
By these propositions, the learned author agrees with the view which 
regards the immediate family as a family,in itself with legal capacity 
to enjoy and control property in absolute terms carrying with it the 
right to dispose of such property without reference to anyone.
In his opinion, this view can be supported on cogent grounds of 
administrative convenience of allowing a person or his immediate next- 
of-kin enjoy the fruits of his enterprise. It is also consistent with 
the need to achieve certainty with regard to membership of a land holding 
group. The explicit limitation of the term, "family" to the group defined 
in the cases narrows the area of search for determining membership, lessens 
the number of persons whose consent may be necessary for valid alienation 
of property and at the same time commands rational support that a man 
must enjoy the fruits of his enterprise and failing to make a will, on 
his death his immediate next-of-kin.
1033 T. ..
Ibid., p. 135.
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He argues that these views are in harmony with the observable fact
of progressive individualisation, and opens the way for according greater
weight to the interest of children as against that of remoter matrilineal 
1037
relations. He reviews the cases which hold that the property devolves
on the whole family and submits that there is very little to commend 
that view. "We conclude then that the better view is the first one 
which holds that upon the death intestate of a person, both the legal 
title to and the beneficial enjoyment of his property devolves upon his 
immediate family", he writes.
The author's arguments have been outlined in some detail because 
we regard them as provoking commentary on the socio-economic underpinings 
of the law involving considerations of policy which ought to be taken 
into account in a perspicacious analysis of the issues raised by them.
Before delving into such policy matters it is pertinent at this stage 
to observe how in the search for the family as a legal entity, we have 
found ourselves discussing the right of succession to property. The 
reason as we have noted earlier, is the axiom that in Akan customary 
laws, when a person dies intestate, his property devolves on his family.
Thus in almost all the cases discussed, the preliminary inquiry has been 
the determination of the issue as to which family the person from whom 
the property is transmissible had belonged in his life time. The question 
of delimiting the ambit of the term, "family" for legal' purposes is 
thus frequently raised.
However, as has already been noted, one is likely, in the course 
of doing so, to blur the distinction between the right of the individual 
member or members of the family to benefit from property to which the 
whole family has succeeded in this way with that of the family as a corporate 
juristic entity, separate and independent of J.ts corporators to succeed 
to the legal title in that property. It cannot be over emphasised the 
need to draw this distinction which ought to be borne in mind continually 
in the expositicn of „ Akan customary law.
Unhappily, the school of thought which holds that the immediate 
family is a legal entity in itself has not infrequently fallen into this 
error in its analysis of the law of succession. We fear that Bentsi- 
Enchill has also fallen into this common error in equating the right
1038 ....Ibid, p. 141.
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to benefit with the right to succeed, both of which operate in different 
orders.. It must not be overlooked, the fact that in all the decided 
cases, including those advancing the immediate family view, the right 
of members of the next segment of the lineage nearest to the immediate 
sub-lineage to benefit in the event of the latter being extinct is always 
conceded.
y i . Considerations of Policy
The view which we seek to urge is that the decision as to the composi­
tion of the family for the purposes of enjoyment of rights in property 
and the legal competences concerning it ought not to be legal decisions 
devoid of the consideration of socio-economic, even political policy 
objectives.
For the disintegration of the family system and the individualisation 
of interests inherent in the immediate family doctrine is certainly an 
expression of a new economic and social development trends. The social 
and economic underpinnings of the doctrine is a movement away from the 
traditional communal, ethical and economic value systems concerning property 
rights which lay emphasis on social cohesion and strengthening of family 
bonds. A system through which skills are funnelled through cooperative 
effort in the exploitation of resources and their equitable distribution 
with its incidental social security for its members.
The question which falls to be examined is whether it will be a 
good policy to promote and encourage the movement towards disintegration 
and individualisation. The decision as to which policy to adopt depends 
inescapably on our socio-economic policy objectives. The courts are 
supposed to be declaring and applying the laws. But if the law is to 
be regarded as a purposive ordering of human affairs, then the applicable 
laws must be -'.reflective of social and economic facts which are more 
often than not inexhaustive in the laid down rules. This would suggest 
that the courts and jurists must necessarily bend the law to suit every 
kind of change without regard to the desirability for such change.
But society functions. Legal rules and social norms prescribe how 
it ought to function. Judges and lawyers have formative influence on 
the law. Economic policy objectives formulated, translated and crystallised 
into legal rules by lawyers and judges can determine how society ought” 
to function. Didactive judicial and juristic opinions can thus have 
a useful role to play in shaping socio-economic policy and the social 
ordering of society.
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To say, as does Bentsi-Enchill, that the attribution of legal persona­
lity to the immediate family is consistent with modern trends of individuali­
sation without relating this to the effect which this process can possibly 
have on resource exploitation within the family systems in the rural community 
where over 70% of the working population is engaged in land development 
overlooks the functional role of the institution within the traditional 
system. One would agree with the learned author that a man must be. 
free to enjoy the fruits of his enterprise and if he is unable to make 
any directions concerning it before his death, it must be enjoyed by 
his immediate next-of-kin, but it is unnecessary to constitute such.. 
groups into families in order to achieve this result.
Indeed, such a proposition is not a novel one. The land tenure 
systems of the various communities throughout Ghana recognise individual 
effort in the creation of wealth as being exclusive property of such 
creators. The right of immediate family members to benefit from it after 
the creators' death has never been denied in law or in fact. Obviously 
the considerations which weighed with the learned author to propose the 
attribution of legal personality to the immediate family have to do with 
certain attitudes to property rights which are developing among the urban 
elite, the merchant class and some educated elements in the cities.
The usual manner of creating individual property in the traditional 
family system is through group effort. Members of the immediate sub-lineage 
including wives and children normally assist in land development which 
noramlly creates such wealth. It is for this reason that in early times, 
the wealth of a man was determined by the number of wives and children 
he could maintain, since their number- determined the size of his labour 
force. Even today, in the rural communities where the majority of the 
population is engaged in land exploitation, this pattern of development 
is still an essential feature.
Sadly, in the Matrilineal family, the wife and children of a man 
are not recognised as being a member of the husband's family for purposes 
of inheriting property. Hence, where the man fails to make a will before 
his death, his matrilineal relatives often seize his property and may 
leave the children and the widow destitute even though they might have 
contributed substantially in the creation of the property.
Today, the urban elite, and the merchant class do not necessarily 
acquire property through land exploitation or by joint efforts through 
,the family system* They live outside the rural community where their 
matrilineal relatives reside and are therefore not in close contact with 
them. Living together with their wives and children, the ties that bind
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husband, wife and children become stronger while those of the man and 
his matrilineal relatives become weaker and weaker.
Apart from these factors, the urban community has over the years 
imbibed and accepted western ideas of the family as consisting of a man, 
his wife and children. These factors have combined with economic pressures 
to create a situation giving rise to a process of individualisation, 
particularly in the urban and city areas, a process regarded by Bentsi- 
Enchill as progressive.
However, with due deference to the author, these are social and 
economic problems which cannot be solved merely by constituting the immediate 
family into a person of the law, thus detaching it from the lineage of 
which it is a part. Bentsi-Enchill is of the view that this would accord 
greater weight to the rights of children to succeed; but to accord greater 
weight to their rights is not to create such rights and the attribution 
of legal personality to the immediate family does not solve the problems 
concerning widows and children.
It must be borne in mind that we are not making a law for the urban 
community alone. It will be unrealistic to suggest that these social 
and economic pressures are not affecting the rural community as well.
But the production of resources continues to occur within the family 
system through co-operative efforts. In a system where the tools of 
production remain the crude and inefficient old friends, the hoe and 
the cutlas, joint efforts will remain one of the best means of lam* ___ 
exploitation.
It will therefore not be a good policy to adopt by encouraging the 
process of individualisation through policies which will have the effect 
of breaking up the family system without regard to its social and economic 
consequences on the rural community which produces the bulk of the country's 
wealth. The fact that such policies will be accepted by the urban minority 
does not necessarily mean that it will be healthy for the rural community 
or the country as a whole.
One of the cogent grounds upon which Bentsi-Enchill advocates the
convenience and certainty with regard to the number of persons whose 
consent might be necessary for valid alienation of property held by the 
group. True, it is, that the explicit limitation of the term "family", 
to this group can reduce the number of persons with legal capacity to 
deal with the property to the barest minimum. The learned author's concern 
is obviously certainty of title which can be achieved in this way. Yet
personality to the immediate family is administrative
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as we have seen in this work, the creation of multiple families out of 
lineages by attribution of legal personality to the immediate family 
has had the opposite effect indicated by the volume of litigation ' incidental
thereto. It is this phenomenon which has so alarmed the courts of the
development in Pobee v Arhin.
We conclude with the following respectful submissions that:
i. the- school of thought which contends that the immediate family 
is a legal person in Akan customary laws bases its arguments 
on mistaken premises by confusing the rights of the immediate 
next-of-kin of a deceased person to benefit from property left
by him,with the right of the whole family, as a corporate juristic
entity, separate and independent of its constituents to 
succeed to such property;
ii. the right of the family to control property entails the vesting
of the legal title in it with a power to control how the rights
to benefit from such property ought to be exercised so as to 
protect not only the spes successionis of other members but 
the reversionary rights of the family;
iii. the constitution of the immediate family into a legal entity
will not necessarily solve the problems of intestate succession 
in Akan family law in so far as the rights of widows and chil­
dren are concerned;
iv. it is a reductio ad absurdum to suggest that because Sarbah refers 
to members of the immediate family as real and proper successors 
he necessarily implies that the group is a family with legal 
personality in itself;
v. the attribution of legal, personality to the immediate family
is not a necessary condition for its members to benefit from
property left by a deceased member;
vi. the exponents of the immediate family view have not seriously
considered the social and economic implications of the creation 
of multiple families out of lineages;
vii. for these reason, the better view is that there is only one
type of family in Akan family law consisting of lineages segmented 
into branches though there may be variations in places with 
regard to internal arrangements about how rights may be enjoyed.
